Introduction
It has been known in many quarters that China has been a major source of concern for India’s national security architecture since the 1962 war. However, the author is of the opinion that the threat to India came from China much before 1962 pushing the year to 1949 when China came into being as a full-fledged Communist country. There are no signs of these concerns abating in the near future. China not only poses a danger to India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but is also determined to obstruct India’s rise as a major power.
The attitude od China towards India has to be seen in the perspective of the so-called “Chinese Dream”, which is the core reason for China behaving in the highly irresponsible manner in the domain of international relations with other countries especially with India. It is true. China not only poses a threat to India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but is also determined to obstruct India’s rise as a major power. According to this lofty “Chinese Dream”, by the year 2049 China would be replacing the USA as the sole superpower of the world, thereby retrieving the ancient glory of China’s Middle Kingdom concept. The year 2049 was selected as the watershed period intentionally by the top most authorities of China to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the Chinese revolution. The former USA Ambassador to India Mr. Robert Blackwill has emphasized this aspect of Chinese mindset in his book entitled War by Other Means where he mentioned China as carrying out geopolitical combat through geo-economic means, often to undermine American power and influence without giving an iota of doubt to others about Chinese grand military ambition of annexing the entire world. China is doing it brilliantly camouflaging them in the cleverly crafted slogan of peaceful rise of China to the world. China thinks that in the fulfillment of this dream other than USA, India is the only Asian country which can hamper China from realizing such a dream. That’s why China is not allowing India to rise by the employment of various strategies by fair or foul means.
Chinese Attitude Towards Resolution of Border Disputes
The first border talks after the 1962 India-China war took place in December 1981. Seven more rounds of talks were held between 1981 and 1987. After 1988, the talks resumed under the newly-formed Joint Working Group (JWG) mechanism under which 15 rounds took pace between 1998 and 2003. In 2003, the talks rebooted to the Special Representative (SR) mechanism. Until 2012, there had been 15 rounds of SR talks. It was also in November 2012 that Xi Jinping took over as President, there were five rounds of meetings at the SR level with the last one taking place in December 2017, making it a total of 20 rounds of SR talks since 2003. In fact, the special representatives talk on the boundary question, or SR-level dialogue mechanism between India and China, is an important channel of communication and should continue in order to mitigate border standoffs and other issues. The 22nd edition, which was the last round of SR-level talks to take place, happened in New Delhi last December 2019 between National Security Advisor Mr.Ajit Doval and Mr.Wang Yi, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, both of whom are designated SRs for India and China, respectively.
India and China agreed on 23 October 2013 that in any face-off on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) they should not use force or threaten to use force against each other and prevent exchange of fire or an armed conflict. This was among a set of confidence building measures contained in the Border Defence co-operation Agreement (BDCA) signed by both sides during former PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to China. The BDCA envisages a graded mechanism, starting with meetings between border personnel, periodic meetings between officers of the regional military headquarters, higher level meetings between the two ministries of defence, working mechanism for consultation and co-ordination on India-China Border Affairs and the Indi-China Annual Defence Dialogue. Crucially, Indi and China have also agreed that if the two sides come face to face in areas where they have differing perceptions of the LAC, “both sides shall exercise maximum self-restraint, refrain from any provocative actions, not use force or threaten to use force against the other side, treat each other with courtesy and prevent exchange of armed conflict”.
The border question has been complicated by the difference in the claims about the length and ambit of the border. According to the official records of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), India shares 3,488 Km of borders with China that runs along the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. As the borders are not fully demarcated and the process of clarifying and confirming the LAC is in progress. China does not acknowledge the borders of Arunachala Pradesh as well as Ladakh as sovereign Indian claims. Beijing claims the entire Arunachala Pradesh as its territory and the entire Kashmir state as territory disputed between India and Pakistan.
Recent Incidents of Border Trespassing by China
Border incursions and trespassing have been a routine affair by China laying fictious claims on disputed territories. Earlier in 2013, a contingent of around 50 men of the China’s People Liberation Army reached Burthe in the Dault Beg Oldi (DBO) sector of Ladakh on 15 April 2013. 10 Km into the Indian territory and erected a tented post there, setting the stage for a face-off with the Indian troops. Later on, Indian Government admitted te intrusion and the stand-off lasted over three weeks.
Again in 2015, both were locked in a face-off over the issue of the erection of a surveillance structure by China. The two forces were locked on eyeball to eyeball confrontation. But Chinese denied a face-off saying that Beijing ws committed to maintaining peace and tranquillity along the frontiers. However, the Chinese government blamed India’s actions for the crisis and the crisis was deescalated once both withdrew their forces to their original position.Indian and Chinese border security forces were involved in a face-off again in 2014 at Chumar sector of eastern Ladakh, an area that saw a big increase in Chinese activities in 2014. This happened when the Chinese President was visiting India. This violation by China was resolved when they were pushed back by Indian troops.
Again in 2014, they vandalized Indian tents and erected new tents at Demchok, Ladakh. Following the protests and issues raised at a Border Personnel Meeting between the two armies, they removed their tents. Actually speaking, China launched a two pronged incursions into Indian waters as well as Indian territory trough the land route in the same area on 22 October 2014.
Again in 2015, both were locked in a face-off over the issue of the erection of a surveillance structure by China. The two forces were locked on eyeball to eyeball confrontation. But Chinese denied a face-off saying that Beijing ws committed to maintaining peace and tranquillity along the frontiers. However, the Chinese government blamed India’s actions for the crisis and the crisis was deescalated once both withdrew their forces to their original position.
In a fresh transgression in the Ladakh sector, PLA troops entered 6 Km deep inside Indian territory near Pangong Lake leading to a stand-off between the security personnel of both sides.
Again, China posed a direct security threat to India when we spotted the presence of senior PLA officials in the PoK. Again, as usual China denied such presence saying it had not heard about the presence of its troops in PoK. Actually, there were about 15,000 Chinese troops undertaking strategic infrastructure projects as technicians, engineers PLA troops as part of the $46 billion CPEC.
India-China relations witnesses its most precarious moments during the 73-day long Doklam stand-off which started on June 16 2017. Chinese soldiers entered the tri-junction border area of Doklam claimed by China, India and Bhutan where Chinese were involved in building a road construction. Road construction would have brought the Chinese military close to the Indian border in West Bengal whereby the Siliguri Corridor must be opened to serious security vulnerability. Because of Indian initiatives in initiating diplomatic communications with the Chinese side to seek a solution. As a result, the tense situation was resolved following the thirteen rounds of negotiations which resulted in the disengagements of border personnel on 28 August 2017.
In an yet another daring incident of this year’s Chinese violation, even as the pandemic of COVID-19 has been at its peak, the Ladakh stand-off shot very much higher political tensions between the two Asian superpowers. The tension escalated as both the nation’s army began violent stand-off including armed scuffles and close-quarter un-armed combat. Both the nation engaged in clash-off on June 15, 2020 which is regarded as one of the highest military confrontations over the past few decades.
During the time of escalation, nearly twenty soldiers, including a commanding officer were martyred from the Indian army while causalities on the Chinese side remain unknown. What makes this Galwan Valley located in the eastern part of the Ladakh region so special, which in turn has made two nations fight for this piece of ‘No-man’s Land’ for decades. The key answer to this question lies in the distant past of the year 1962, when the first Sino-Indian war broke out.
CPEC & India’s Security
Brushing aside Indian concerns, the Chinese concluded the $46 billion 3,000 km long China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with Pakistan on 20th April 2015, as part of 51 deals signed with Pakistan. This CPEC would link China’s underdeveloped far-western region Xingang to Pakistan’s Gwadar deep-sea port on the Arabian Sea via the Pakistan – Occupied Territory (PoK) through a complex network of roads, railways, business zones, energy schemes and pipeline. This corridor is expected to give China a direct access to the Indian Ocean and beyond and is expected to be ready in three years. The deals included infrastructure projects, energy generation, agriculture, education, telecommunication and research. It was reported that a defence agreement worth $4-5 billion for providing eight Chinese submarines to Pakistan had been reached. This is what I call as “weaponization of India’s neighbours”. China’s repeated exhortation to India to join this CPEC project were turned down by India on the ground that it violated India’s sovereignty as it runs through PoK which is legally belongs to India.
China’s Obstruction of India’s Membership and UN actions on Pakistani Terrorists
China, since 2016, blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), invoking the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), stating that China along with other member countries want to have a discussion on whether or not non-NPT countries can join the NSG. China blocked UN action against Pakistan for having released the Mumbai attacks masterminded timid terrorist Zakir ur-Rehman Lakhvi on 23 June 2015. China justified her stand saying that India has not provided sufficient information. Ironically, China said that it is opposed to all forms of terrorism.
Again in April 2016, China blocked India’s another bid to ban the spineless terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar, the mastermind of the Pathankot terror attack, in the UN on technical ground saying that the decision taken was based on facts and relevant rules of procedure in an objective and just manner.
Doklam Crisis and its Long-Term Impact
Worried about the effect of the Doklam conflict on commercial relations with India, China softened its tone on 24 August stating that it did not want the current crisis to hurt the trade ties between the two countries and promised to send a delegation to India by December 2017 to tackle imbalances. On 28 August 2017, the Doklam stand-off was called off as both New Delhi and Beijing mutually agreed to withdraw troops from the area, bringing a two-month old military stand-off to an end. The decision was made just before the BRICS Summit in Xiamen from 3 to 5 September 2017. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping were scheduled to have a bilateral meeting on the side-lines of the BRICS summit. The calling off of the armies from Doklam created a positive atmosphere for the summit and bilateral meetings. China also agreed to remove the bulldozers and stop road construction. In the following days, the Indian media came up with possible reasons as to why China ended the Doklam crisis. The foremost could possibly be that China wanted to avoid military conflict whose consequences were unpredictable; secondly the BRICS summit at Xiamen was approaching and China wanted a smooth conduct of this conference because India could have decided not to attend the summit if the stand-off continued; and thirdly the need to have a crisis-free period until the 19th Party Congress due later in October 2017. One year after the end of the stand-off, with Beijing and Delhi agreeing to return to their original positions, new developments have already taken place as China is quietly seen to be building infrastructure and deploying troops in the area, gaining advantage in the contested region. Neither India nor Bhutan seemed willing enough to step in and block these activities. According to an assessment report by Stratfor, India is observed to be reinforcing its air power close to the Doklam Plateau with the Indian Air Force greatly increasing the deployment of Su-30 MKI war planes at the Siliguri Bagdogra air base and the Hasimara Air Force Station after the Doklam 2017 incident. Earlier, Siliguri Bagdogra normally hosted a transport helicopter unit while Hasimara was the base for MiG-27ML ground attack aircraft until they were retired at the end of 2017. On the Chinese side as well, satellite imagery of the Chinese air bases in Lhasa and Shigatse show a greater level of activity. Since there is a lack of air bases near the LAC, China is forced to concentrate its air power more on these two air bases. Imagery of the two air bases shows a significant presence of fighter aircraft (which peaked in October) and a notable increase in helicopters as well as deployments of KJ-500 airborne early warning and command aircraft, components of the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system and Soar Dragon unmanned aerial vehicles at Shigatse Peace Airport. The Chinese made a number of major airfield upgrades at Shigatse immediately after the end of the crisis. A new runway was constructed by mid-December, nine aircraft aprons measuring 41 by 70 metres each were built along the main taxiway and eight helipads were set up in the northeast corner of the airfield. This construction, along with the deployment of new equipment in greater numbers, highlights how China has undertaken a serious effort to improve its capabilities close to the LAC.
In order to seek stability in relations after the Doklam incident, an “Informal Summit” was organised at Wuhan in April, 2018. The informal talks were not clearly defined in its purpose and objectives but it was understood that bilateral issues along with overlapping regional and global interests were stressed during the meeting. After the Doklam standoff, the Indian government’s policy reflected an attempt to have a turnaround in ties, even going the extra mile in many cases such as asking Indian government officials to not attend the Dalai Lama event which was shifted from Delhi to Dharamshala on 31 March – 1 April 2018. The government of India also directed its national carrier “Air India” to switch the name “Chinese Taipei” from Taiwan on its website as demanded by China. After Modi and Xi met again on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit held during 9-10 June 2018 in the coastal city of Qingdao, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale announced that the two countries would undertake a capacity-building project in war-torn Afghanistan – their first third-country joint project. This Afghanistan project was considered as one of the steps to revive stalled dialogue mechanisms.
According to the panel report submitted on 10 August 2018 by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, it took 13 rounds of diplomatic discussions over six weeks to defuse the military stand-off at Doklam. On 22 February 2018, as part of his evidence for the parliament committee, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale stated that the Chinese troop build-up in the area, though in a territory disputed between Bhutan and China, was taking place across a large part of the India – China boundary, and on both sides. On 26 July 2019, Alice G. Wells, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, told US lawmakers during a Congressional hearing while responding to a question on China’s increased road building activities along the Indian border that China had quietly resumed its activities in the Doklam area and neither Bhutan nor India had sought to dissuade it. Senior officers, on conditions of anonymity, said China’s movement was part of winter stocking exercise. The Chinese PLA has around 700 troopers in the Doklam area with a back-up of heavy vehicles and large prefabricated barracks.
According to The Times of India report of 13 August 2018, China continues to needle India at different stretches along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC), with People’s Liberation Army troops intruding around 300-400 metres inside the Demchok sector of eastern Ladakh and pitching five tents there in the latest such incident in July 2018. Security establishment sources on 13 August 2018 said the PLA subsequently removed three of their tents in the Cherdong-Nerlong Nallan area after brigadier-level talks between the two armies, but the remaining two tents with “some Chinese troops in civvies” were still present in the area. The Army, on being contacted, refused to say anything about the incident. Sources said the PLA soldiers, in the garb of nomads with cattle in tow, had intruded into Indian territory in the first week of July and did not retreat despite Indian troops repeatedly conducting “banner drills” (showing flags to ask them to go back to their own territory) in accordance with the laid down protocol to defuse face-offs along the LAC. The number of transgressions, which is a military euphemism for incursions, by Chinese troops along the LAC has crossed 170 this year. Around 273 transgressions were recorded in 2016; the number touched 426 in 2017 in the wake of the 73-day troop face-off at Doklam tri-junction. The fallout has been that the PLA has constructed military infrastructure and helipads as well as permanently stationed around 600-700 troops in north Doklam.
India’s Potential Leverages over China
Tibet
Tibet’s annexation into mainland China after 1949 has always been a bone of reserved contention for India. Giving refuse to the Dalai Lama in 1959 was one of the rare acts of defying the growing clout of China in Tibet that India undertook. India-China relations deteriorated and in 1962 China invaded the area then known as NEFA. India-China relations remain uneasy and Beijing continues to fume at the Dalai Lama’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. Nonetheless, the Indian government used to assuage China that the events were non-political in nature. In an unusual departure from its stand on the Tibetans-in-exile, the Government of India had sent out a note asking “senior leaders” and “government functionaries” of the Centre and states to stay away from events planned for March-end and early April 2018 by the “Tibetan leadership in India” to mark the start of 60 years in exile of the Dalai Lama. In fact, the Tibetan government-in-exile had to cancel its two main events in Delhi – an inter-fath prayer at Gandhi Samadhi in Rajghat on 31 March, along with the “Thank you India” function scheduled to be held in New Delhi on 1 April 2018 which was shifted to Dharamshala. The government underlined that due to the sensitive nature of India – China relations post Doklam, it was important to adopt a cautious approach towards Beijing. However, strategic experts have always felt that the Tibet issue should be used by India in order to quell China from dictating terms. However, post-Doklam developments seem to have led the government to be reluctant to play the Tibet cad. Whether that can be done in future in an option worth considering.
Taiwan
New Delhi has always found it difficult to maintain its bilateral relationship with Taiwan as it officially gave recognition to the “One-China” policy (OCP) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950. The gesture put India-Taiwan relations into a deep freeze for the duration of the Cold War, with Delhi prohibiting senior officials from engaging their counterparts in Taipei. However, bilateral relations improved in the 1990s when India began to open up its economy and introduced the Look East Policy in 1991. The importance of cultivating a more robust relationship with Taiwan undertook a much sharper focus once Beijing collaborated on the CPEC project with Pakistan. This project has been opposed by New Delhi as it passes through territory claimed by India and affects India’s sovereignty. Recent India-Taiwan economic relation have particularly thrived. According to trade analysts. Taiwanese investment in India from 2002-2014 amounted to a total of just $66 million but Taiwanese FDI in India surged exponentially in 2015 with a $5 billion investments from Taiwan’s Foxconn. Bilateral trade had reached %6 billion in 2016, with as many as 90 Taiwanese firms stated to be working and investing in India. There were a series of modest diplomatic achievements since 1995 when both sides established unofficial relations and formed representative offices in each other’s country. Despite Chinese protests, India and Taiwan relations have been on the upswing. Taiwan also adopted the New Southbound policy in 2017 to pro-actively engaged with ASEAN and South Asian countries. India was especially considered as the most important country for this new policy. The sense that prevails in India is that Taiwan should be extending an outstretched hand to India due to New Delhi and Taipei sharing a range of mutual interests from managing the rise of China to economic, and institutional collaboration. However, it seems New Delhi is unlikely to do anything to inflame Beijing’s insecurities over Taiwan. Perhaps robust engagement with Taiwan could provide India with some leverage over China.
Maritime
India’s stand on the security competition it faces from China in the maritime sphere was articulated in some form during the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on 1 June 2018. Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored the importance of a rules-based regional order that values sovereignty, international law and freedom of navigation. The speech also indicated veiled criticism of China when Prime Minister Modi emphasized on empowering nations and not placing them under impossible debt burden. Despite being vocal on the goals of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, India remains hesitant when it comes to participating in joint freedom of navigation patrols with the US Navy in the South China Sea. India states that it does not participate in joint patrols but only joint exercises. Indian naval spokespersons have also underscored that India only takes part in joint patrolling under the United Nation’s flag. Even the Malabar naval exercise has been burdened with the decision whether to allow Australia to participate. This decision is considered to be based on an outdated analysis of Australia being an unreliable partner when it had abruptly withdrawn from the proposed Quadrilateral Security Initiatives in 2007. However, the decision of not including Australia it also perhaps an attempt to accommodate China’s concerns. But while India still-deliberates on whether to conduct joint patrols or exercises and whom to allow as a participant in its Malabar exercise, China has already borne the fruits of an aggressive campaign of coercion in its near seas. With the Belt and Road initiative, Beijing has even formed new structural realities. India needs to be more decisive and less inhibited in undertaking maritime activities which would thwart China’s aggressiveness.
Trade
India-China bilateral trade remained unaffected by the Doklam crisis as it reached a high of $84.4 billion in 2017. As per the data of the Chinese General Administration of Customs there as a 40 per cent increase of Indian exports to China in 2017 totalling $16.34 billion. However, the trade deficit also reached a high of $51.75 billion as it grew at a rate of 8.55 per cent in 2017. India had been pressing China to open its IT and pharmaceutical sectors to Indian firms to reduce the massive trade deficit. India stood as the seventh largest export destination for Chinese products and the 24th largest exporter to China. It was diamonds with copper, iron ore, organic chemicals and cotton yarn which contributed to the increase in Indian exports to China. India was the second largest exporter of diamonds to China with a market share of 33.06 per cent. India was also the second largest exporter of cotton to China with 15.04 per cent market share in 2017. The value of cotton yarn and woven fabric exports had reached $1.30 billion; it was jump of 1.86 per cent. China’s export was mostly dominated by electrical machinery and equipment registering an increase of 28.23 per cent to $21.77 billion.
The US-China trade war has provided an advantageous position to India. Analysts suggest that with the slowdown of machinery, vehicles and transport parts for export to the USA from China, India can gain a competitive advantage in the ensuing trade war. The report ‘New Export Opportunities for India in Trade with US and China by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), states that with the USA imposing additional duty of 25 per cent on imports worth $34 billion from China, certain Indian products may become more competitive. India needs to take advantage of these opportunities.
Manufacturing
Though India lags far behind China in several fields, China is getting wary of India’s gains in foreign direct investment (FDI), technology and manufacturing. India’s closer military ties with the USA is another major concern of China. China has realised that India holds great potential and if it is able to tap it effectively, it could emerge as a major threat to China. On 6 March 2017, President Xi Jinping vowed to open up China like never before. China faced dwindling foreign exchange reserves when India was aggressively pushing itself as a destination for foreign investment. In 2015, India was for the first time the leading country ($63 billion) in the world for FDI, overtaking China (%56.6 billion) and the USA ($59.6 billion). This had set alarm bells ringing in the Chinese establishment. China is also scared of India overtaking it in manufacturing in the long term as labour costs in China are rising. These developments can be appropriately utilised by India to counter China’s strategy of dominance.
Technology
The Chinese state media has agreed that India has better technological talent than China. Recently, Global Times wrote, “Over the past few years, China witnessed an unprecedented boom in tech jobs as the country became an attractive destination for foreign research and development centres. However, now some high-tech firms are turning their attention from China to India due to the latter’s relatively low labour costs. Attracting high-tech talent from India cold be one of China’s options for maintaining its innovation ability”. India, with a sufficient young talent pool, is becoming increasingly attractive, the Global Times said. When India launched 104 satellites, breaking the Russian record of 37 satellites being place in orbit at one go, the Chinese media made light of this achievement. But a few days later, it corrected its stand and said China could learn from India in space technology. What India is doing in the space sector can be the envy of China. This may help India in improving its image vis-a-vis China in the developing world.
Defence Partnerships
In 2016, India and the USA signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), a military pact that facilitates the provision of logistical support, supplies and services between the US and Indian militaries on a reimbursable basis and provides a framework to govern them. Though the Chinese media downplayed the deal, it has become a big bother for China. The deal means that the USA can now dominate not only the Indian Ocean but also have easy access to the South China Sea as US warships can dock and be repaired at Indian ports. This will dent China’s attempt to ring-fence India by dominating the Indian Ocean.
Conclusion
There is an overall sense of assessment that is prevailing as of now that China does not respect India and that it will seek to prevent India’s rise. As evidence, critics point not only to China’s relationship with Pakistan, which is seen as driven by a desire to keep India tied up in South Asia but also note China’s refusal to endorse India’s demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or its objections to India being given membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Every time there is a border incident it reinforces the narrative that has prevailed in many quarters in India since the 1962 China-India war: that China only understands strength; that while Beijing’s leaders say China and India “must shake hands”, they cannot be trusted – that one handheld out might just be a precursor to the other stabbing one in the back. The Wuhan informal summit which was expected to quell nerves between the two countries after the Doklam stand-off was more optics than substance as China has resumed its tactics of ‘salami-slicing’ in the disputed territories of the India-China border once again. Seychelles, cancelling the Assumption island agreement with India on 4 June 2018, has further led to a security setback for India which was attempting to regain lost ground in the IOR where China is spreading its influence. American President Trump’s incoherent approach to global security has further led to a situation of flux as India and its regional allies are becoming unsure of the US maintaining its role as a security guarantor. The US-China trade war and US imposition of heavy tariffs on countries it considers are having unfair business practices with US industries has ratcheted up global trade tensions. This trade war could also result in erosion of the recently expanding strategic partnership between India and the USA. The close alignment in military and counter-terrorism fields, the goal of stabilising the Indo-Pacific region and countering the rise of China awaits an uncertain future. Lastly, now it is time for India to teach a lesson for China.
References
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