Introduction:
If one looks at the emerging relations between India and some of the West Asian countries, their engagements are no longer restricted to the traditional oil-energy related cooperation or remittance-related financial activities, but are gradually entering the military-security domain as well. This is discernible since the last few years, particularly after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government headed by Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014 and started exhibiting personal interest in warming up to the leaders in the said region. The growing importance given by both sides towards strengthening military-security cooperation is timely due to the evolving geopolitical dynamics and security challenges in the respective regions (South Asia and Gulf in this context).
Commonly shared threats perceptions from non-state actors, including Al Qaeda, remnants of outfits like Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its tentacles in South Asia, phenomenon of violent extremism and radicalisation, cross-border terrorism, terror financing, money laundering, etc., are some attributing factors for bringing closer the capitals of the West Asian nations and India in recent period. Simultaneously, forging robust defence cooperation has also become an important objective of India’s current foreign policy. The aggressive nature of a few countries, moreover, has increased threat perceptions for their neighbours. This is applicable in India’s case where Pakistan, situated immediately on its western frontier, has been using terrorism as state policy for several years.i The latest being the February 2019 Pulwama attack that resulted in the death of 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. Likewise, China’s military assertiveness in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), especially by deploying ships and submarines,ii and its expansionist activities along the eastern and north-eastern border has not been viewed by India’s security establishments on a good note. With these developments, India has been stepping up its military-security cooperation with some of its international partners and arms trade are important characteristics of such defence ties.
Besides boosting its politico-economic ties, the rising salience of defence cooperation is evidenced by the nature of agreements or Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) that have been signed by India with its West Asian partners, recently. This is construable as a paradigm shift in their ties which, for a prolonged period, have been dominated by oil and energy trade while security ties remained lacklustre. Notwithstanding the upward trajectory in the Indo-Israeli military-security cooperation, similar engagements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, are equally on the rise.
This article highlights some of the major developments that are taking place in India’s military-security cooperation with the mentioned countries, mainly during the last six years. It also discusses the different patterns of the existing cooperation, including arms trade (which is one of the dominant features of Indo-Israeli defence ties discussed below), co-production programmes, bilateral military exercises, counter-terrorism/radicalisation cooperation and maritime cooperation and security dialogues.
India-Israel Defence Cooperation: An Ever-growing Phenomenon
Expectedly, the coming to power of BJP in May 2014 has led to a tremendous strengthening of relations with Israel. From this year, the camaraderie between the two countries is visible in numerous fields, including agriculture, water, science and technology, education, healthcare, trade and commerce, and, most importantly, defence and security. Undoubtedly, cooperation in the military-security sphere forms the backbone of the growing strategic partnership. Modi’s visit to Israel in July 2017 (the first one by an Indian PM)iii is what truly sparked the development of strong political ties, and both the countries used this rare occasion to raise the status of bilateral relations to that of a “strategic partnership.”iv What had led to further expansion of the overall ties was the reciprocal visit of the Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu to India in January of 2018. For these countries that had kept their defence dealings shrouded in secrecy for a prolonged period, the mentioned visits reflected the importance accorded by both sides to promoting bilateral ties, with defence cooperation one of the mainstays.
Military-security cooperation comprising of arms trade as well as technology transfer and licensed production emerged as an important dimension of the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship. Importantly, from 2014 onwards, Israel’s share in India's defence market began to increase significantly. For instance, during the period 2015-2019, India’s arms imports from Israel increased by 175 percent, making the latter New Delhi’s second largest supplier of major arms.vAn interest to carry forward this cooperation was underscored during Modi’s visit, when both the leaders “agreed that future developments in this sphere should focus on joint development of defence products, including transfer of technology from Israel, with a special emphasis on the Made in India initiative.”vi, The intensification of defence cooperation is signified by existing collaboration programs, involving Israeli technology in the field of missiles, air defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and more.
India and Israel have carefully nurtured their military-security cooperation, in which New Delhi’s arms purchase from the latter was a striking feature. During the initial days, most of India’s purchases were confined to surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering equipment, including maritime patrol vessels and Phalcon airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), but with the progression of the ties, the latter has also become an important supplier of light arms and ammunitions. Currently, some of the sophisticated Israeli-made weapons systems, namely Tavor assault rifles and Galil sniper rifles, are being used by Indian security forces. India also has availed Israel’s proficiency in upgrading Soviet-origin weapons systems, which constituted a sizeable portion of its defence stockpile. In the recent past, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signed contracts with the Indian Air Force (IAF) for upgrading the avionics on Russian-made MiG-21 aircraft. Continuing with such cooperation, both countries, since mid-2014, have clinched various defence deals to best cater to the rising Indian security challenges on all the major fronts – land, air and maritime.
One of the first breakthroughs for the newly elected Indian government in terms of its arms imports from Israel was the announcement in September 2014 regarding the procurement of IAI-manufactured Barak-1 anti-missile defence (AMD). The decision was timely, noting the depleted defensive capabilities of the Indian warships. The following years had witnessed key developments as both the countries made progress in their co-production programmes of this defence item. An evidence being the successful test-firing (in December 2015) of the Barak- 8 Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM), jointly developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), IAI and the Indian Navy (IN), aboard an IN’s Kolkata class destroyer. A mention could also be made of a contract worth $630 million signed between India’s Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) IAI in May 2017 to jointly develop four LRSAM for the IN.vii Further, it was March of that year, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) cleared the purchase of additional two Israeli-made AWACs at an estimated cost of $1.1 billion (an item which the US vetoed Israel from selling to China during late 1990s).viii India’s move to purchase such technology could not have come at a better timing, considering the rising airborne threats, which has also increased an urgent need for more ‘eyes in the sky.’ In November in the same year, for the first time, an Indian Air Force (IAF) delegation operated with Israeli Air Force in a multilateral exercise setting, called as Blue Flag (along with Germany and France).
Utility of Israeli-origin defence items was already witnessed during the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. Israel’s quick response to India's request for military assistance during this conflict increased its credibility as a reliable arms supplier and helped in bolstering the relationship.ix In a similar manner, following the Balakot airstrikes in February 2019, the IAF mulled over arming its fleet of Sukhoi Su-30MKI multirole fighters with the Rafael-manufactured I-Derby ER (extended range) beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM), after the service phases out its aging Russian-made Vympel R-77 (AA-12 'Adder') AAMs by 2021-22.x Furthermore, after using Rafael-developed SPICE (Smart, Precise, Impact, Cost Effective) 2000 bombs in the Balakot airstrikes against terrorist training camps, the IAF signed another deal with Rafael to procure a batch of these items, with delivery slated for September 2019. The Indian Army (IA) also reportedly approved an “emergency purchase” of 240 Rafael-made Spike medium-range (MR) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and 12 launchers for immediate operational requirements.xi In the wake of the border tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern Ladakh region in early 2020, India is considering acquisition of more Israeli defence items, including Negev light machine gun manufactured by Israel Weapons Industries (IWI).xii This clearly demonstrates how some of Israel’s defence products have caught the attention of the Indian armed forces because of their laudable performance in times of crisis.
Israeli-made high-altitude and medium-altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become sought after items in India, for help in protecting borders and sensitive sites. In mid-2018, India reportedly approved the purchase of IAI-developed 10 Heron TP drones at a cost of $400 million. Other such items in use include Searcher and Heron medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs for surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes. Inclusion of these advanced technologies in India’s stockpile would prove to be of immense utility in the event of another similar cross-border strike by the IAF in the future.
Co-production programmes have demonstrated the maturation of Indo-Israeli defence cooperation, which, for now, is lacking with other West Asian countries. Significant efforts could be seen in the UAV sector, with, in February 2020, IAI signing a MoU with Indian firms – Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Dynamatic Technologies Limited (DTL) – to manufacture advanced UAVs in India and to market the products abroad. xiii , A similar initiative was agreed between India’s Adani Defence and Aerospace and Israel's Elbit Systems (in 2018) to launch Adani Elbit Unmanned Aerial Vehicles complex at Hyderabad in Telangana (in India). This joint collaboration is the first private UAV manufacturing facility in India and the first one outside Israel to manufacture Hermes 900 MALE UAV. There is a similar collaboration in the small arms category as India’s Punj Lloyd Raksha Systems and IWI agreed (in May 2017) to establish a manufacturing plant in Madhya Pradesh (in India) to produce advanced weapons, such as X95 assault rifle, Galil sniper, Tavor assault rifle, Negev light machine gun, and the Ace assault rifle.xiv These are some of the popular Israeli arms systems which would be useful for India’s law enforcement agencies.
Israel is internationally acclaimed for developing some of the most-advanced missile and anti-missile systems, and this was reflected in 2019 when rockets and air defence systems constituted 15 per cent of its total arms exports (with a value amounting to $7.2 billion), with India as one of its top clients.xv Following an Indian test-firing in May 2017 of Rafael-made Python and Derby (Spyder) missiles, India’s Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems (KRAS) bagged a contract (July 2019) worth $100 million from this Israeli firm to supply the IAF and the IA with approximately 1,000 missile kits for Barak-8 missiles. Subsequently, under an IA and DRDO agreement of July 2018, the latter will jointly develop with IAI Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM), at an estimated cost of $2.5 billion, involving a substantial indigenous component. As recent as February 2020, IAI and BEL have entered into a MoU for collaboration on establishing a new centre for providing product lifecycle support, including repair and maintenance services for the air defence systems in India. The need for the aforementioned items of all the three services – army, air force and navy – has increased in recent times due to the aggravation of threats on India’s territorial sovereignty.
Tellingly, more co-production ventures are likely as a new India-Israel sub-working group (SWG) on defence industrial cooperation has been created (September 2020), to promote transfer of technology, co-development and co-production, technology security, Artificial Intelligence, innovation and joint-export to third countries.xvi This also bodes well to India’s increasing endeavours, under the current government, to transform itself from the status of weapons importing nation to that of an exporter. It is, however, very likely that India will use longstanding defence cooperation with Israel to modernise its armed forces, to face emerging security challenges. By exporting state-of-the-art defence items as well as incorporating Israeli technology in some of the joint-collaborative programs, Israel and India have created a synergy not only between the governments but also between defence firms, and the enhanced arms trade is manifest.
Growing Partnerships: India and the GCC Countries
Until recently, over emphasis on the oil trade and commercial relations between India and the GCC countries is precisely because the latter is India’s largest trading partner, alone accounting for about 34 per cent of India’s total oil imports,xvii and Indian expats sending home remittances approximately $49 billion annually.xviii In the current scenario, however, governments on both sides are recognising the importance of scaling up military-security cooperation not only due to the complex traditional and non-traditional security threats they are facing from non-state actors but also to establish thriving defence industrial cooperation for mutual economic and technological gains.
As aptly opined by scholars like P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Modi's visits to the Gulf countries and engagement with their leaders have provided a critical but long-absent political content to the bilateral relations. The current Indian buzz in the Gulf is mostly the result of these political contacts since 2014.”xix He further added that Modi’s efforts is to “transform the transactional nature of the bilateral ties and add economic and strategic substance.”xx This fillip the Indian leader has given significantly contributed to the augmentation of military-security ties, and are predominantly focusing on “counter-terrorism, money laundering, cyber security, organised crime, human trafficking and anti-piracy.”xxi
Since the 2000s, the Indo-Gulf military-security cooperation has been mainly confined to joint military exercises, naval ship visits and training of military personnel. That said, there are existing formal mechanisms, such as Delhi Declaration and Riyadh Declaration, signed in 2006 and 2010 respectively, between India and Saudi Arabia, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium-IONS-(established in 2008 in which all the Gulf countries are also members), and several bilateral institutional agreements, which could add vigour to defence and military-security cooperation. The succeeding section highlights briefly some key developments between India and GCC countries, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar between 2014 and 2020 in the military-security domain.
Saudi Arabia:
For the first time, a MoU on Indo-Saudi defence cooperation was signed during the visit of the then Crown Prince (CP) and Defence Minister (current king), Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, to India in February 2014, and emphasised on expertise, training and defence industry cooperation.xxiiThese issues were discussed during Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2016 and October 2019, and CP Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) visit to India in February 2019. The presence of India-Saudi Arabia Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation (JCDC) enables both sides to conduct regular meetings (4th round held in January 2019 in Riyadh) and identify areas of mutual interest and cooperation.
India and Saudi Arabia have begun to explore the possibilities of initiating joint-production programmes into their defence partnerships. Progress are likely with the signing of the MoU between Saudi General Authority of Military Industries (GAMI) and India’s Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defense, concerning collaboration in military acquisition, industries, research, development and technology during Modi’s October-2019 Riyadh visit.xxiii Such an initiative has arrived at this juncture when co-development and transfer of technology are high priorities on foreign policy agenda of the Modi-led government. The incoming February-2019 visit of MbS further opened more opportunities to boost cooperation in the naval domain as both sides agreed to hold the inaugural joint naval exercises (slated for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic) and to “collaborate in joint defence production of spare parts for Naval and Land systems as well as supply chain development, in line with ‘Make in India’ and [Saudi’s]‘Vision 2030’.”xxiv This is an important step from the prism of maritime security cooperation as well as to safeguard international trade via sea routes.
Taking the ties to newer heights, India and Saudi Arabia agreed (in February 2019) to constitute a Comprehensive Security Dialogue at the national security adviser (NSA) level and set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism.xxv Presently, these two countries face multidimensional security threats, not only on land, air, and sea, but also in cyberspace. Conduct of regular NSA-level security dialogues could enable both sides to explore new areas of cooperation in the security realm. Saudi Arabia, despite being one of the military powers in its region and spending billions of dollars annually on arms purchases, appears to have limited experience in countering threats from groups like Yemen-based Houthi militias, who have mastered guerrilla warfare tactics for several years. This is an area where India’s expertise in fighting such threats could be imparted to the Saudi side, by enhancing joint military training programs and exercises.xxvi While India continues to face cross-border terrorism (including seaborne threats), Saudi Arabia equally remains vulnerable to frequent missile and drone attacks on its civilian dwellings as well as on its major oil fields.
Suffice to mention that shared security concerns are promoting the Indo-Saudi cooperation on security issues. Since many years, the kingdom has come forward while deporting terrorists (of Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba) to India. It is within the framework of counter-terrorism cooperation that they are giving heightened priorities towards preventing flow of funds to terror groups and boosting information and intelligence sharing. From these security-oriented developments, it is visible that relations are moving beyond traditional oil-energy quid pro quos.
The UAE:
By upgrading the status of the bilateral ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during Modi’s visit to the Emirates in February 2015, military-security dimension of India-UAE cooperation is gaining momentum.xxvii The existing personal bonhomie between Modi and Abu Dhabi’s CP Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has also been instrumental in establishing robust strategic partnerships. Cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism/radicalisation/extremism, maritime security, intelligence sharing, military exercises, manufacture of defence items, Strategic Security Dialogues, capacity building, cyber security, anti-money laundering, drug trafficking, trans-national crimes, extradition arrangements as well as police training have become some of the patterns of the evolving security cooperation. It could, however, be noted that a renewal of an agreement on defence cooperation in 2014 provided a general framework for strengthening ties in these specific areas.xxviii
The visit of Abu Dhabi CP to New Delhi in January 2017, which had resulted in the signing of a MoU on defence, has given a major thrust to India-UAE cooperation.xxix With their similar quests for technological advancements, these two countries have agreed to enter into research & development domain (involving both public and private institutions), and the Indian government invited investments from the UAE in the defence sector.xxx Defence industrial cooperation and transfer of technology will likely form a pivotal component of their engagements in the near future.
Lately, regular conducts of joint military exercises have become a trend. In May 2016, both the air forces conducted Desert Eagle II bilateral air combat exercise at Al Dhafra airbase at Abu Dhabi.xxxi Similarly, maritime security has become an important area of cooperation involving the two navies. In February 2020, Indian and UAE maritime agencies carried out joint exercises as part of a goodwill visit of Indian Coast Guard Ship ICGS Samudra Paheredar (specialised in marine pollution control), and the exercise included “Marine Pollution Response, Maritime Search and Rescue and Maritime Law enforcement.”xxxii Prior to this, in March 2018, two Indian Navy ships –INS Gomati and INS Kolkata – held the first bilateral exercise codenamed ‘Gulf Star 1’, off the coast of Abu Dhabi.xxxiii These activities are crucial from the standpoint of advancing the shared maritime security objectives of both the countries in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region.
Within the framework of Make in India initiative,xxxiv there could be Indo-Emirati joint-production of defence platforms in India. Prospects appear to be promising with the launch of the UAE-based EDGE, a company which is set to reposition the country as a “notable global player in advanced technology.”xxxvIn all likelihood, Indian defence firms will forge a partnership with EDGE, exploring opportunities in the development of advanced defence products, which would be beneficial to both countries.xxxvi Indicating an initial progress in potential Indo-Emirati arms trade, India’s Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) signed a deal worth $45.75 million with the UAE (in August 2019) to supply around 50,000 artillery shells used with the Bofors guns.xxxvii
Counter-terrorism, information and intelligence sharing are becoming trademarks of India-UAE security cooperation. Indicating a robust engagement in this field, the UAE has been deporting to India not only terrorists but also sympathisers of outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)xxxviii and ISIS in recent years.xxxix Related to such cooperation is the strong interest expressed by both the governments to disrupt “the use of web and social media for promotion of extremist and violent ideologies; preventing the use of religious centres to radicalize youth and recruit terrorist cadres.”xl In view of this, regular exchange of ideas, studies, training curriculum and good practices between the UAE-based Sawab and Hedayah centers and concerned Indian establishments to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) are believed to be in progress. Radicalisation of impressionable youths is a common phenomenon, if unchecked, could adversely impact the national security of both the countries. With an increasing use of cyber medium to propagate violent extremist ideology, and also with Al Qaeda and ISIS becoming more of transnational terrorist franchises, close coordination on tackling these real-time security threats should bind India and its West Asian partners, let alone the UAE, firmly.
Oman:
Oman is the first geo-strategically located GCC country with which India has signed a MoU on defence cooperation in 2005. Presently, both countries have established robust defence cooperation not only in the maritime domain but also in the training of several Omani cadets and military officials in Indian military institutions. The frequency of the defence ministerial and high-level military official visits of both sides has also indicated the effectiveness of the cooperation. While the visit of the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to Oman in May 2016 laid the foundation for deepening of defence ties (under the BJP-led government), the Indian prime minister’s visit to Muscat in February 2018, however, has revitalised the overall bilateral relationship.
Taking due cognisance of the importance of Oman, the Indian government continues to expand its overall bilateral engagements. The strategic partnership is underscored by the fact that Oman provides Operational Turnaround (OTR) of IN ships for anti-piracy patrols as well as technical support for landing and overflight of IAF planes.xli These two countries have been cooperating in combating piracy in the Indian Ocean. Particularly, Oman’s location at the mouth of the “Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea makes it evitable for guarding the SLOCs [sea lines of communication]” in the mentioned ocean.xlii It is telling that, by signing (in February 2018) an annexure to the MoU on military cooperation, India has been granted an access to Oman’s Port of Duqm for military use and logistical support.xliii Various relevant services of this port and dry dock will be available for maintenance of Indian military vessels. Moreover, situated on the south-eastern seaboard of Oman, which overlooks the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and also because of its close proximity to the Shahid Beheshti port at Chabahar in Iran, having such an access to the port will prove to be an asset for the IN. In all, considering India’s maritime strategy to counter the rising Chinese navy’s surreptitious activities in the IOR, this is a major breakthrough for India as well as for the Indo-Omani strategic cooperation.
Indian and Omani armed forces also conduct regular interoperability exercises. In October 2019, IAF and the Royal Air Force of Oman conducted a 10-day joint air combat exercise – Eastern Bridge V – at Masirah air force base in Oman, and its earlier edition was held in Jamnagar (India) in January 2017. Likewise, in March 2019, the IA and the Royal Army of Oman (RAO) Joint Exercise Al Nagah III in Oman, with a focus on counter-terrorism.xlivThe latest edition of the joint naval drill, Naseem-Al-Bahr (Sea Breeze), focusing on maritime security and anti-piracy, was conducted off the Goa coast in January 2020.xlvAlongside this, requirement to expand their counter-terrorism / extremism / radicalisation cooperation have figured prominently in almost all the bilateral discussions. This is precisely one of the reasons why both sides called for enhancing cyber security cooperation. Oman is known for having the best cyber security preparedness in the Arab world.xlvi
Bahrain and Qatar:
While India’s military-security relations with Bahrain and Qatar are as not as robust as compared to the above-discussed GCC countries, there are continuous efforts from all the three governments to strengthen cooperation in this sphere. Steps to enhance cooperation in counter-terrorism, exchange of intelligence and information, maritime security, safety of sea lanes, cyber security and defence were adequately flagged during Modi’s visit to Qatar and Bahrain in 2016 and 2019, respectively.
Bilateral institutional mechanisms, such as the Deputy National Security Advisors-level Security Dialogue with Bahrain provide both sides a platform to discuss different aspects of bilateral defence-security, regional and international issues. Over the period of time, these dialogues have played a pivotal role in boosting India’s military-security engagements with all these West Asian countries. Interestingly, Qatari side has expressed its interests to avail an opportunity under the Make in India initiative for joint production of defence equipment in India.xlvii Simultaneously, Qatari Emiri Naval Forces and IN conducted maritime exercises (November 2019) to further strengthen cooperation, particularly in the fight against terrorism, maritime piracy, surveillance and security.xlviiiGiven India’s experience of handling critical security operations, its security personnel will likely be a part of the security assistance programme for the forthcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup to be held in Qatar.xlixSuch an involvement could widen the scope for cooperation between the security units of both the countries.
Conclusion:
The growing defence and military-security partnerships have come about at this stage when India and the aforementioned West Asian countries are facing multidimensional security challenges. It is precisely because of this that the cooperation is expanded to almost all the fronts, as identified in the previous sections. What has further cemented the cooperation is the growing phenomenon of transnational terrorism in recent times. For New Delhi, combating such threats collectively has become an important objective of its West Asian foreign policy.
Considering India’s socio-economic and strategic interests in the wider West Asian region, it is imperative to intensify the existing military-security cooperation. More exchanges of high-level defence official visits, regular conduct of security dialogues, frequent military exercises of the three services, training programmes and conferences are advisable not only to enlarge the scope for cooperation but also to help each other better understand the rapidly changing security dynamics of the respective regions.
Unlike the case with Israel, arms trade between India and the GCC countries remain limited as they themselves rely on imports for most of their defence needs, and defence industrialisation programs are still in their nascent stages. That said, there are indications that future trade in such strategic commodities could flourish, given the unrelenting endeavours from the respective governments to augment cooperation in this domain.
The growing Indo-West Asian military-security cooperation coincides timely with New Delhi’s greater push for indigenisation in the defence sector, that is, to develop and produce defence items within the country, particularly under the Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (Self-Reliant India Mission). There is economic incentives of having a robust defence industry, since exports of domestically developed weapon systems will earn foreign currency and drastically cut import bills, which could then lead to the subsidisation of the country’s annual defence budget. In the light of this, investments from the affluent Gulf countries in the development and manufacturing of defence items in Indian defence industry should be welcomed. As it is, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which are currently modernizing their economies, consider India as a critical partner to conduct business with, including in technology and defence sectors.
Overall, the prevailing geopolitical climate is conducive for intensifying the military-security and defence cooperation between India and the mentioned West Asian countries. Realpolitik and the strategic interests of both sides have been instrumental in bringing the ties closer than ever before. The concerned governments have become cognizant of the fact that they have more to gain by solely focusing on their strategic and national interests, rather than letting their bilateral ties be dictated by a third party, say Pakistan, as it was the case until the recent period. The growing convergence of their interests, therefore, will contribute to the expansion of the military-security cooperation in the days to come.
Endnotes:
i “Inaugural Address by Shri Rajnath Singh, Hon’ble Raksha Mantri & President, IDSA on India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy: Regional Perceptions at 12th South Asia Conference, Manoj Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 28 January 2020, https://idsa.in/keyspeeches/address-by-rajnath-singh-280120 (Accessed 20 September 2020).
ii Zack Cooper, “Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean,”CSIS Briefs, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180627_Cooper_SecurityImplications.pdf?BC9DJQ8a4bZDRcAWY0u2qR5.7EwzZ9G (Accessed 20 September 2020.
iii P.R. Kumaraswamy, P.R.,“Reading Modi’s Visit to Israel,”India Quarterly, Vol.74, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1-16.
iv “India-Israel Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Israel (July 5, 2017),” Ministry of External Affairs, 5 July 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28593/IndiaIsrael_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Israel_July_5_2017 (Accessed 20 September 2020).
v“Trends in International Arms Transfer,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2020.
vi “India-Israel Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Israel (July 5, 2017).”
vii Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s BEL and Israel’s IAI ink $630M missile system deal,” Defense News, 22 May 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/05/22/india-s-bel-and-israel-s-iai-ink-630m-missile-system-deal/ (Accessed 20 September 2020).
viii For a detailed account, refer P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Israel-China Relations and the Phalcon Controversy”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005, pp. 93-103.
ix Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 93, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, January 2012.
x Rahul Bedi, “IAF plans to arms its Su-30MKI with I-Derby ER BVRAAMs,” Janes, 22 May 2019.
xi Franz- Stefan Gady, “India’s Army Approves ‘Emergency Purchase’ of 240 Israeli Anti-Tank Guided Missiles,” The Diplomat, 17 April 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/indias-army-approves-emergency-purchase-of-240-israeli-anti-tank-guided-missiles/ (Accessed 20 September 2020).
xii Huma Siddiqui, “India to get state-of-the-art light machine guns from Israel,” Financial Express, 20 March 2020, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-to-get-state-of-the-art-light-machine-guns-from-israel/1904631/, (Accessed 20 September 2020).
xiii Greg Waldron, “IAI in MOU with Indian firms on local UAV production,” Flight Global, 5 February 2020, https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/iai-in-mou-with-indian-firms-on-local-uav-production/136542.article (Accessed 20 September 2020).
xiv Dinakar Peri, “Punj Lloyd, IWI of Israel make small arms in India,” The Hindu, 4 May 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/punj-lloyd-iwi-of-israel-make-small-arms-in-india/article18383248.ece, (Accessed 20 September 2020).
xv Alexander Fulbright, “Israeli arms sales drop to $7.2 billion in 2019, face potential virus squeeze,” The Times of Israel, 22 June 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-drop-to-7-2-billion-in-2019-face-potential-virus-squeeze/ (Accessed 20 September 2020).
xvi Rajat Pandit, “India & Israel to co-develop hi-tech weapons systems,” The Times of India, 26 September 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-israel-to-co-develop-hi-tech-weapon-systems/articleshow/78327521.cms (Accessed 1 October 2020).
xvii Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, https://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/Default.asp (Accessed 2 October 2020)
xviii Annapurna Mitra and Ria Kasliwal, “Twin crises in the Gulf: Implications for India,” Issue Briefs and Special Reports, Observer Research Foundation, 30 April 2020.
xix P.R Kumaraswamy, “Modi Turns West: India and the Persian Gulf,” ISAS Working Paper, No. 312, 23 November 2018, p.9.
xx Ibid., p.1.
xxi Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “India and the Gulf Region: building strategic partnerships,” IISS, 29 August 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/08/india-gulf-strategic-partnerships (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxii “Joint Statement on the occasion of the Official Visit of Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to India,” Ministry of External Affairs, 28 February 2014, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23014/Joint_Statement_on_the_occasion_of_the_Official_Visit_of_Crown_Prince_Deputy_Prime_Minister_and_Defence_Minister_of_the_Kingdom_of_Saudi_Arabia_to_Ind (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxiii “List of MOUs/Agreements signed during the visit of Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia,” Ministry of External Affairs, 29 October 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31981/List+of+MoUsAgreements+signed+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Saudi+Arabia+October+29+2019 (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxiv “India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement during the State Visit of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia to India,” Ministry of External Affairs, 20 February 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31072/IndiaSaudi_Arabia_Joint_Statement_during_the_State_Visit_of_His_Royal_Highness_the_Crown_Prince_of_Saudi_Arabia_to_India (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxv Ibid.
xxvi Alvite Ningthoujam, “India and Saudi Arabia: Scaling New Heights,” The Diplomat, 28 October 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/india-saudi-arabia-ties-scaling-new-heights/ (Accessed 2 October 2019).
xxvii “Joint Statement between the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of India,” Ministry of External Affairs, 17 August 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25733/Joint_Statement_between_the_United_Arab_Emirates_and_the_Republic_of_India (Accessed 2 October 2015).
xxviii Md. Muddassir Quamar, “India and the UAE: Progress towards Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” Issue Brief, Manoj Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 5 July 2018, https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-and-the-uae-progress-strategic-partnership-mmquamar-050718 (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxix “List of Agreements/MOUs exchanged during the State visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to India,” Ministry of External Affairs, 25 January 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27967/List+of+AgreementsMOUs+exchanged+during+the+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxx “External Affairs Minister and Foreign Minister of UAE Co-Chair 13th India-UAE JCM,” Ministry of External Affairs, 17 August 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32900/External+Affairs+Minister+and+Foreign+Minister+of+UAE+CoChair+13th+IndiaUAE+JCM, (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xxxi Rajat Pandit, “India hold air combat exercise with UAE,” The Times of India, 27 May 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-holds-air-combat-exercise-with-UAE/articleshow/52468271.cms (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxxii Sajila Saseendran, “India-UAE maritime agencies to have joint exercises,” Gulf News, 3 February 2020, https://gulfnews.com/uae/india-uae-maritime-agencies-to-have-joint-exercises-1.69462423 (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxxiii “Two Indian ships take part in UAE-India naval exercise,” Gulf News, 18 March 2018, https://gulfnews.com/uae/two-indian-ships-take-part-in-uae-india-naval-exercise-1.2190342 (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxxiv Make in India (2020), http://www.makeinindia.com/about (Accessed 3 October 2020).
Xxxv “Mohamed bin Zayed inaugurates EDGE, an Advanced Technology Conglomerate, poised to transform Defence Industrial Capabilities,” Business Standard, 5 November 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/mohamed-bin-zayed-inaugurates-edge-an-advanced-technology-conglomerate-poised-to-transform-defence-industrial-capabilities-119110501421_1.html (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xxxvi Huma Siddiqui, UAE based EDGE to work together for building hi-tech defence products with Indian industry, Financial Express, 10 November 2019, https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/uae-based-edge-to-work-together-for-building-hi-tech-defence-products-with-indian-industry/1760159/ (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xxxvii Manu Pubby, “In its largest ever export order, OFB to supply 50,000 Bofors shells to UAE, “ The Economic Times, 3 August 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/in-its-largest-ever-export-order-ofb-to-supply-50000-bofors-shells-to-uae/articleshow/70501461.cms (3 October 2020).
xxxviii Anirban Bhaumik, “UAE deports JeM terrorist to India,” Deccan Herald, 3 April 2019, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/uae-deports-jem-terrorist-to-india-726678.html (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xxxix Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “UAE quietly deporting IS sympathisers of Indian origin,” The Economic Times, 6 December 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/uae-quietly-deporting-is-sympathisers-of-indian-origin/articleshow/66963305.cms (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xl “India-UAE Joint Statement during State Visit of the Prime Minister of India to UAE,” Ministry of External Affairs, 11 February 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29476/IndiaUAE+Joint+Statement+during+State+Visit+of+the+Prime+Minister+of+India+to+UAE+February+1011+2018 (Accessed 2 October 2020).
xli “Manohar Parrikar visit: India and Oman sign four key defence agreements,” Financial Express, 22 May 2016, https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/india-and-oman-sign-four-key-defence-agreements/262806/ (Accessed 4 October 2020).
xlii Muddassir Quamar, “Growing Indo-Gulf Defence Cooperation and Future Prospects,” Middle East Institute, New Delhi, 28 October 2018. http://www.mei.org.in/growing-indo-gulf-defence-cooperation-and-future-prospects (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xliii Subhajit Roy, “India gets access to strategic Oman port Duqm for military use, Chabahar-Gwadar in sight,” The Indian Express, 13 February 2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-gets-access-to-strategic-oman-port-for-military-use-chabahar-gwadar-in-sight-5061573/ (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xliv “INDO-OMAN Joint Ex Al Nagah 2019,” Press Information Bureau, 13 March 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1568781 (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xlv “Royal Navy of Oman Ships Arrive at Goa to Participate in Exercise Naseem-Al-Bahr”, Indian Navy, 6 January 2020, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/royal-navy-oman-ships-arrive-goa-participate-exercise-naseem-al-bahr (Accessed 3 October 2020).
xlvi “Oman on top in cyber security readiness in Arab world,” Gulf News, 25 November 2017, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/oman/oman-on-top-in-cyber-security-readiness-in-arab-world-1.2130299 (Accessed 4 October 2020).
xlvii “India-Qatar Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Qatar,” Ministry of External Affairs, 5 June 2016, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26870/IndiaQatar_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Qatar (Accessed 4 October 2020).
xlviii “Joint Exercise between the Qatari Emiri Navy and the Indian Navy Forces (the Roar of the Sea),” Press Information Bureau, 18 November 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1591973 (Accessed 4 October 2020).
xlix Rahul Tripathi, “Indian sleuths called up for cover at Qatar World Cup,” The Indian Express, 22 January 2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-sleuths-called-up-for-cover-at-qatar-world-cup-5034098/ (Accessed 4 October 2020).
