Abstract
The growing Asian giant China has long been in contestation with border conflict with its Asian neighbours. India feared Chinese ambitions are not contended to its rise and counter-hegemony to U.S world order but the security dynamics of the south-Asian countries which India considers to be ‘sacrosanct’ for its geo-political needs. Bhutan shares 470-kilometre-long border with China and according to some reports over 25 per cent remained in dispute for decades. Recently, China has brought a new land dispute regarding the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary (Tashigang district) lying in the eastern sector of the India-Bhutan border. The region of Tawang and Tashigang has much potential to explore if the connectivity of the road is opened. The road will enable India to deploy troops faster to respond to any military moves by China, not only across Tawang but also towards the eastern region of Bhutan and it can also play an important role in Arunachal Pradesh’s economy.
Keywords: Tashigang, Shangri-la, Lumla, Yeti
Introduction
India has multiple opportunities for its economic potentiality, yet the government of India has implicitly put some of the projects under the freezing zone there is an economic, social and political hurdle for such projects but one can bring certain justice to the region by developing and realising the economic prosperity that resides. One such project which can transform the region into a prosperous and economic viable is the Tawang- Bhutan road via Lumla. The Tashigang in Bhutan and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh are two regions which have multiple areas to explore in terms of trade, transport, tourism, and social and cultural aspects. The two regions also share cultural and matrimonial relations, which in a way create an inter-subjective understanding among both tribes residing along the border. Furthermore, these regions have much geo-political importance regarding security.
Bhutan and India share zeitgeist relations after the independence and their relations have been tested through time. India and Bhutan are traditionally close allies as both countries to share a special relationship based on culture and mutual interest. Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose Bhutan as his first foreign destination, placing regional cooperation before global cooperation.[1] The geospatial areas of Bhutan adjoining Indian states of Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh as well as its proximity to Nepal and China have increased Thimpu’s strategic importance vis-a-vis India’s security calculus on the Himalayan front. India’s security is linked with it neighbouring countries as it shares borders with other Asian neighbour.
India and Bhutan signed a friendship treaty on August 8, 1949, with regards to the non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The treaty also established free trade and extradition protocol. Prime Minister Nehru in the Indian parliament in November 1959 said that any aggression against Bhutan will be considered aggression against India. For Bhutan India was a reliable ally to count on but the Sino-India war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 cut a deep impression on the Bhutanese people regarding India’s ability to protect Bhutan. Bhutan in the past had claimed its independent stance at the non-alignment movement summit conference in Havana and Bhutan voted along with China and some southeast countries rather than with India on the issue of allowing Cambodia’s Khmer rouge to be seated at the conference. [2] There can be scrutiny regarding India’s interest in Bhutan but one cannot ignore India’s effort in the Bhutan modernization programme. Project Dantak is one of the programmes initiated by GOI (Government of India) under Dantak over 1800 km of roads through very difficult mountainous terrain in Bhutan were constructed. The project also constructed all the major highways such as the east-west highways (548 km), Thimpu-Phuentsholing highway (181 km), helipads and Bhutan broadcasting station etc. India re-negotiated the 1949 Indo-Bhutan friendship treaty in 2007 bringing some new fresh amendments. [3] The new treaty replaced the provision of requiring India’s guidance over Bhutan’s foreign policy and not requiring India’s permission for acquiring arms.
Chinese claims and Bhutan’s response
The growing Asian giant China has long been in contestation with border conflict with its Asian neighbour. India feared Chinese ambitions are not contended to its rise and counter-hegemony to U.S world order but the security dynamics of the south-Asian neighbour which India consider to be ‘sacrosanct’ for its geo-political needs. The current territorial dispute between Bhutan and China is not just a boundary disagreement but it is the result of an all-out Chinese plan to control Asia through vassal states under the Chinese dream as well as the belt and road initiative started in May 2017 by the president Xi-Jinping.[4] Bhutan’s position in international relations is portrayed as a peaceful and rich cultural heritage nation; its adoption of GNP (gross nation happiness) has earned Bhutan recognition as a unique nation around the world. The Chinese incursion and claim on Bhutan territory have insight fear among the territorial sovereignty of Bhutan, therefore, Bhutan sees India as a reliable ally and trustworthy partner against Chinese hegemony in Asia.
The treaty of 1890 settled the border between British India and imperial China but redrew the boundary between Tibet and Bhutan. Bhutan shares 470-kilometer-long border with China and according to some reports over 25 per cent remained in dispute for decades. China has proposed Bhutan cede 269 square kilometers area in west of Bhutan including Darmana, Shakhatoe and Sinchuling for which it had offered a swap deal to give 495square kilometer area of Pasamlung and Jakarlung in northern Bhutan. [5] The talks between the two sides began in 1984 and from the seventh round in 1990 China pushed a “package proposal”, during the 10th and 11throunds of talk there was intensive diplomacy from both India and China. Bhutan backed off from the Chinese proposal in November 1996, many believed that India played a crucial role to convince Bhutan.
To Bhutan,Doklam seems to be just a tri-junction, but to India and China, it has strategic importance. It is an area spread over less than 100sq km comprising a plateau and a valley at the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the Chumbi valley of Tibet; Bhutan’s ha valley and Sikkim. Chinese possession over Doklam serves two important significant purposes first, it will help enlarge the narrow and strategic Chumbi valley and second possession of Doklam would give it a military advantage over India. [6] The security concern for India is to protect the chicken neck corridor, which connects the northeast region of India; the Chinese presence near Doklam can impinge on the territorial sovereignty of India.
Recently, China has brought a new land dispute regarding the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary (Tashigang district) lying in the eastern sector of the India-Bhutan border. China has refused any grant being sanctioned by the global environment facility (GEF) to this sanctuary. Since Sakteng is very close to the Tawang district of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, therefore any Chinese claim over Sakteng is linked to its claim over Tawang and the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, which it considers as south –Tibet.[7] The Chinese claim over Sakteng is believed to counter India’s plan over constructing a road from Guwahati to Tawang via the Tashigang district.
Tawang- Bhutan road connectivity
The region of Tawang and Tashigang has much potential to explore if the connectivity of the road is opened. The road that proposes to connect Tashigang in Bhutan falls under the Lumla division of Tawang. The Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in the Tashigang district is believed to be the home of mythical creatures called ‘yeti’ or ‘Migoi’ in Bhutanese. The area is also home to Brokpas- a semi-nomadic population which migrated from Tibet in the 14th century. [8]
The chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh Pema Khandu emphasized the need for connecting Bhutan by the road from Tawang, which he claimed would boost the tourism sectors of both Bhutan and India benefiting Arunachal Pradesh.[9] The pristine and rich culture of Bhutan and Tawang attract tourists from outside countries, Tourists around the world visit these two places for vacations, pilgrims and scholarly work if these two regions get connected it will be feasible for the mobility of the people. The road from Tawang to Bhutan will provide the shortest connectivity to Guwahati via the Darrang land custom station in Assam Nalbari district. [10]
The opening of the Tawang-Tashigang road is crucial for both the region, as the Tawang region is located on difficult terrains, people find it difficult to reach there, especially in the rainy season and winter. The roads are covered with landslides and snow, constructing an alternate road from Tashigang will help the people to move without hindrance. The distance from Tawang to Guwahati via Tashigang is only 395 km compared to the normal existing route, which is about 550km and thus a distance of 155km will be reduced. The construction of road from Lumla up to the border point at Waraongde of Bhutan has already been completed and is motorable; remaining area from Waraongde to Kheney in Bhutan of about 12km is yet to be constructed. If that 12km is linked then beyond it, there is an all-weather road existing connecting all parts of Bhutan.
There can be two major impediments for India and Bhutan to carry on this project, firstly the Chinese frustration, the connection of this region will surely change or irritate the behaviour of China towards its neighbour, it will more furiously and assertively put its claim on Sakteng wildlife sanctuary and Tawang region. Secondly, Bhutan maybe avoids construction in this region due to the pristine and fragile ecology of the Himalayan Shangri-La and the unique culture of its pastoral community from external influence.
Opening regions and opportunities
The road connectivity between Bhutan and Tawang will bring multiple opportunities to the people residing on both sides of the territory. The road will bring economic opportunities to the people and create jobs as stated by the people of the Lumla division. The supply of horticulture products from Tawang to Bhutan will help to grow the agro-industry of Arunachal Pradesh similarly Bhutan can do the same. The region of Lumla and Bongleng cultivate potato, beans, chilly and soybean which can be a sell to the Bhutan similarly Bhutan can also sell their agro-product.
The opening of roads will also help in the booming tourism industry on both sides, as people come from both regions for religious and holiday purposes. The people from both sides cross the border for religious purposes, the people of Tawang who attend Gombu kora Mela in Tashigang obtained passes issued from the district commissioner’s office in Tawang and then got stamped by the Lumla circle officer in Dudunghar, they walked through the mountains for about two hours through Bhutanese village like Kheney before reaching Zangfu, from there they board a public bus to attend mela. [11] Similarly, Bhutanese people walk through the mountains and cross the Indian border to visit the Tawang monastery.
People living on either side of the border are very similar in terms of lifestyle, food habits, language, and religious beliefs. The pedestrian route between the countries is centuries old. People from both Tawang and Tashigang regions can also have quick access to the medical center in Guwahati, a person sick in Tawang and has to reach Guwahati will take much time but the time can be lessened if the road is opened. The normal route crossing through the Sela pass has a high-altitude zone and in winter it is covered with snow which makes vehicle’s movement unpredictable and risky.
From security perception this road can also play ace for both India and Bhutan, the road will enable India to deploy troops faster to respond to any military moves by China, not only across Tawang, but also towards the eastern region of Bhutan.
Conclusion
The northeast region has certainly far much potential due to its adjacent neighbouring nations. The rapid rise of China has posed threat to Arunachal Pradesh’s territorial sovereignty and its appetite for territory is insurmountable. Bhutan as a landlocked nation and with its limited want had experienced Chinese expansion; it has certainly jeopardized Bhutan’s security concerns and its territorial sovereignty. India with its aid and development project convinced Bhutan to look after her as a big brother but sure Bhutan has also diverse interests. T.N Kaul in his book ‘Diplomacy in Peace and War’ has beautifully analysed the Indo-Bhutan relations within the border context of India’s policy towards its small neighbour. Kaul sternly argues that India should not act as big brother of small countries because these small countries are sensitive, even touchy on small things, proud and easily hurt therefore we must respect their sensibilities, honour their national aspirations and win their trust and confidence. [12] The road connectivity between Tashigang and Tawang should be parsimonious for both sides of the region rather than benefitting only the people of India as there are reports that Bhutanese were discontent about the projects which were funded by India serve only India’s interest. Any such policy where both nation confluences in an act of cooperation for better projects has to benefit the people of both regions.
Endnotes
[1] Yadav, Sangeeta; Kumar, Bhusan. PM Modi’s visit strengthens India’s neighbourhood first policy, keeps Himalayan kingdom away from Chinese embrace. RakshaAnirveda 2019. https://raksha-anirveda.com/pm-modi-bhutan-visit-strengthens-indias-neighbourhood-first-policy-keeps-himalayan-kingdom-away-from-chinese-embrace/
[2] Trivedi, Ramesh. India’s relations with her neighbours. Publication Isha books (2008). ISBN: 9788182054387. Delhi
[3] Kumar, Anand. China’s coercive diplomacy targets Bhutan. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/chinas-coercive-diplomacy-targets-bhutan-33023
[4] Beena, Mohammed. The Doklam stalemate. Published Kapursurya foundation (2019).
[5] Bisht, Medha. Sino-Bhutan boundary negotiations: complexities of the ‘package deal’. IDSA. 2019.
[6] Joshi, Manoj. The China-Bhutan border deal should worry India. Orf. 2021. http://www.orfonline.org/research/the-china-bhutan-border-deal-should-worry-india/
[7] Naha, Alik. The Himalayan discord: Bhutan’s in India’s strategic calculus. 2022. https://www.reserachgate.net/publication/360679288
[8] Chaudhury, Dipanjan. India proposed to build road in Bhutan’s ‘yeti territory’ which China claimed recently. 2020. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-proposes-to-build-road-via-bhutans-wildlife-park/articlesshow/76950740.cms
[9]Lepcha, Irani. 2019. Road connecting Tawang with Bhutan to boast tourism: Arunachal CM. east mojo
[10] Tribune news service. Tawang to Guwahati via Bhutan mulls Arunachal. 2016. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/tawang-to-guwahati-via-bhutan-mulls-arunachal-230729
[11] Pisharoty, Sangeeta. Exploring the diplomatic wrangle that is the Tashigang-Lumla motorway. 2017. https:/thewire.in/diplomacy/Bhutan-India-Arunachal-road
[12] Jayapalan.N. India and her neighbour. Publication Atlantic publisher 2000. New Delhi. ISBN: 8171569129
