Currently, the government of Taliban in Afghanistan is coherent to a high degree of governance over the lives of most of the Afghans living under their rule. Well defined committees govern the sectors of finance, education, health, taxation, law and order, justice and enforcement of religious edicts, with clear chain of command from the leadership in Kabul down to the villages.

When international governments and aid agencies attempt to provide life-line goods and services, the Taliban coopts and controls them. Even prior to taking official power in Afghanistan, the Taliban exerted influence in almost every area of governance; from monitoring health care delivery, to regulating the education system, utilities, communications and imposing their own taxes. The reach of the Taliban governance system that operated in parallel to the Western Nations backed proxy Government of Afghanistan (before its fall) demonstrated that the Taliban did not have to formally occupy a territory to influence what happened within it. For the Taliban, governance preceded the actual capture of territory. Their influence on everyday life extended far beyond areas that they had control over. Today, the Taliban is the official government of Afghanistan, and sets the rules that govern 85% of that country, a reality with which very few countries are willing to engage with.

Origins of modern Taliban:

Creation of the modern Taliban can be traced to the early years of the Afghan-Soviet Union [USSR] war. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a communist party which ruled the country at that time. The Soviet invasion was resisted by the Afghan mujahidin, who were anti–communist and committed to strict Islamic beliefs. The mujahidin fought the Soviet Union’s forces for most of the 1980s with the generous help from the United States of America which supplied them with money and weapons. In 1989, the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving a country that was fragmented across tribal and ethnic divides. Different tribal leaders and war-lords began fighting among themselves for control over the nation. In 1994, the Taliban militia emerged victorious.

‘Taliban’ is the plural of the Pashto word “talib”, a student of Islam; literally, ‘one who seeks knowledge’. These students of Islam have been present across the Afghanistan society since the earliest days of Islam through the network of madrasas, the Islamic religious schools. The disruptive nature of the Taliban is not new. A British intelligence report of 1901 described them as the ‘talib-ul-ilm’, the ‘men who contemplate religion as a profession’. The report goes on to state that, ‘their number far exceeds those required to fill up vacancies in village mullahships and other ecclesiastic appointments. They are at the bottom of all the mischief in the country, the instigators and often the perpetrators of the bulk of the crime. They use their religious status to live free on the people, who are too superstitious to turn them out, even when they destroy the peace of the family circle.’

While sponsoring the mujahidin in their fight against the Soviet invaders, the USA, with the help of Saudi Arabia, and with Pakistan as the coordinator; formally declared the Afghan–Soviet Union war, as a jihad against the godless communists; which led to thousands of madrasa students joining the fight against the USSR. By the late 1980s, most such students assimilated into fighting units and were defined in general as the Taliban. They were easily distinguished by their turbans, in emulation of the headgear worn by descending angels who, according to the Quran, came to Prophet Muhammad’s rescue during one of his battles.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country descended into chaos, with the disparate ethnic and religious leaders, who had comprised the mujahidin, brutally fighting for power. In 1994, thousands of civilians were killed during the fight for the control of the capital city of Kabul. The utter chaos led to a failing economy and a power vacuum due to the lack of a central government. It was during these chaotic times, during the latter part of 1994, leaders of the Taliban fighting units gathered at the White Mosque in Sangsar (25 kms outside Kandahar), to unite as a single entity that became known as the ‘Taliban Movement’. The movement nominated and accepted Mullah Mohammed Omar as the leader (Emir) of Taliban and the transformation of Afghan political landscape was initiated.

From obscurity as a minor commander of the mujahidin to the undisputed leadership of the extremist Taliban movement, the rise of Mullah Omar was meteoric. His largely unrecognized Islamic Emirate controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until the invasion by the U.S. and its allies in late 2001; after which Omar was not seen in public. An Islamic fanatic and a recluse who hardly met any outsiders and had little knowledge of the world outside his Emirate was infamously known as the man who gave asylum to Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda. The planning and instructions for the 11 September 2001 attack on USA by the al-Qaeda, was supposedly from this safe haven of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The retaliation by USA through massive bombings, reinforced by its troops and Afghanistan’s own Northern Alliance fighting alongside US troops, led to the collapse of the Taliban regime in November 2001. Omar and his senior aides fled to Quetta in Pakistan, where the Pakistan army’s Inter-Services Intelligence wing (the ISI) gave them sanctuary and helped them to rebuild the Taliban. In 2006, when 3,000 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops entered the Helmand province, they encountered a massive, Pakistan backed insurgency. Their ensuing battles with waves of Taliban fighters were vicious beyond expectations.

The leader of this Pakistani rebuilt Taliban was Mullah Omar. Born into the Hotak tribe of Ghilzai Pashtuns, he was a village mullah who ran his own madrasa (Islamic religious school) and fought as a member of YunusKhalis’s Hisb-i-Islami mujahidin party; first against the Soviet invaders, and later against the pro-USSR Najibullah regime. Mullah Omar would most probably have returned to anonymity after the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992; had it not been for the total breakdown of law and order in his home province of Kandahar. When a local commander kidnapped and raped two teenage girls, Omar felt obliged to take action and created a force of 30 young religious students (the Talibs) and attacked the commander’s base, rescued the girls and hanged the commander as punishment. Whether this happened in reality or is just a folk tale is a matter of speculation. What is a matter of record is that Omar and his Talibs went on a rampage against the region’s warlords and took control of the Kandahar region? Their message was ruthlessly simple; surrender to us and accept our leadership or suffer the consequences. The Taliban imposed draconian rules and regulations which it claimed were sanctioned by the Koran. The Taliban banned television, music, dancing, and almost every other pastime, from kite-flying to cinema-going. Public executions, the stoning to death of women for adultery and the amputation of thieves’ hands became commonplace.

In 1995, the Taliban achieved its first big success outside the Pashtun area with the capture of Herat. When Omar turned his attention towards the capture of Kabul, it was clear that he had ambitions to rule the whole of Afghanistan. For a year his Taliban troops tried to capture Kabul, without any success. However, in the summer of 1996, in an attack planned and supported by the Pakistani Army and financed by Saudi Arabia, the Taliban captured Jalalabad and then the strategic cross-roads of Surobi, 60 kms East of Kabul. They entered and captured Kabul in September 1996 from Ahmed Shah Masud, the Tajik guerrilla commander and leader of the Northern Alliance.

Masud, who had captured Kabul in 1989 after the departure of the Soviet forces, withdrew to his base in the Panjsher valley, and over the next five years his Northern Alliance prevented the north-east territories of Afghanistan from falling into the hands of the Taliban. Omar’s forces conquered the rest of the north, massacring thousands of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. All pretense at restoring law and order and governing with popular consent had long been abandoned. Then, two days before 9/11 (2001), while still undefeated, Masud was assassinated by two Arab suicide bombers posing as television journalists, sent by Bin Laden.

In its prior history, two significant events took place in Afghanistan in 1996. One was the arrival of Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan, after his expulsion from Sudan. In return for the hospitality that he received from Mullah Omar, he helped finance the Taliban and encouraged their quest for creating a pure Islamic State. The second event was the rare public appearance of Mullah Omar in Kandahar, where he donned what was claimed to be the cloak of the Prophet Mohammed and was proclaimed ‘Amir-ul-Momin’, Commander of the Faithful, which basically was broadcast as the leader of all Muslims, worldwide. Both these events committed Afghanistan to becoming the home country for al-Qaeda and a haven for terrorists to be recruited and trained there.

The Taliban Leadership Structure

Any description of the Taliban leadership must begin with a set of caveats. Among the senior Taliban officials, there are subtle differences in how these individuals saw the movement being controlled and operated. The status of a reporting system (who reports to whom) and who influences which policy or decision, are all open to interpretation. With a functional government in power in Afghanistan, the movement has become more organized and coherent; but still has vast elements of flexibility to accommodate a variety of preferences and differences. Security and secrecy being prime motivators, the structures within the Taliban are fluid in practice. Some roles exist only in theory or are ad hoc in nature, though many roles are clearly defined as required for governance. Individual personality of key figures matters immensely but are dependent on the context of the situations in which they are involved.

The current Taliban leadership began to re-organize since 2002. By 2003, they had established governing commissions for military operations, political affairs, culture, and finance; all during their exile in Pakistan, and under the guidance and tutoring of Pakistani military’s ISI wing. Until 2006, these commissions existed only in name since the control of the organization in the initial stages was haphazard and order was established only over a period of time. As the military wing became cohesive, it helped to bring the civilian aspects of governance into workable structures. The first evidence of the Taliban shadow government inside Afghanistan was the presence of provincial military commanders and shadow provincial governors. Some early military positions transformed into hybrid military-civilian roles. Judges were the first functional service of the Taliban, being established around 2006. It is estimated that by 2010, there were approximately five hundred judges of the Taliban who were delivering justice in Afghanistan. Other officials who were charged with the responsibilities of finance, health, education, and media; emerged during this same period.

In the early stages there were set-backs for these roles to function as intended; due to US-led military operations and targeted assassinations of mid and high-level commanders. During 2012–16, most Taliban governors could not stay in their assigned provinces for fear of being killed and their governance was severely limited. However, by 2018, Taliban shadow governors had taken up residence in majority of the provinces. This led to a change in their governance posture as they gained more control over larger territories. The earlier attacks of the Taliban on aid–organization workers, schools, and medical clinics; had made the Taliban look disorganized and volatile, and led to negative global media coverage. In 2006, the Taliban published its 1st edition of the ‘Layha’, the Taliban code-of-conduct. It sought to deliver the impression that the Taliban could impose order on its troops. It defined a concise list of 30 rules, designed to instil discipline and a coherent policy of behaviour among its members. As the Taliban evolved into an armed political force with substantial influence across vast territories of the East and South, editions of layha in 2009 and 2010 detailed the governance structures in an elaborate manner, which included the roles of district and provincial governors and local committees. The motive of these details in Layha was to show that the Taliban would be accountable and that they could form a government that would be acceptable across social and international boundaries, based on this accountability. As such these editions of 2009 and 2010 were more than rulebooks. They were the tools to communicate the aspirations and values of the movement to local and international observers.

By 2011, the Taliban leadership had signed agreements with multiple aid organizations and established a clear central policy for negotiating with NGOs. However, the adherence to this policy by the local, on-ground Taliban was uneven and the cooperation with aid agencies was frequently disrupted over suspicions that aid agencies might be spying on the Taliban and also acting against them. There were other high-level incidents that added to their suspicions. One was the killing of Mullah Akthar Mohammed Mansur; who was the de-facto Emir from 2010 and then officially the Emir following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death from July 2015 till his death in May 2016. Mansur had been credited by various credible sources as having transformed the insurgency into a political movement, and into a ‘government in waiting’.

As international forces withdrew, the Taliban gained more territory and expanded their influence dramatically. With international forces leaving, the Taliban could reduce their war activities and focus on governance. They seemed to be more prepared than in the 1990s, being confident in their analysis that the western supported Afghan government would disappear and they would have to be ready with their own system of governance for an easy takeover. A British survey in January 2018 placed the Taliban as ‘openly active’ in 70% of the country’s districts; while estimates from the U.S. led Operation Resolute Support, stated that the Afghan government controlled just over 50% of the districts in Afghanistan in October 2017. Even this modest estimate was indicative of the Taliban influence, particularly due to the virtually non-existent government presence in the rural areas.

Taliban of the 21st century:

The Taliban’s agility and ability to adapt has been remarkable. Their gradual acceptance to the fact that unrestricted violence would hurt their quest for popular support, transformed into sophisticated policy planning and implementation of developmental activities. Step-by-step, they revived and re-started parts of their governance, and invented other systems through trial and error. Much of this process appears to be from the ground-up and influenced by popular demand and local experiences. Their leadership also proceeded to correct many of the flaws and shortcomings that undermined their rule in the 1990s. The ban on women and girls attending school has been removed, though most Taliban officials claim that no ban ever existed, and have publicly stated that women should have access to education. The ban on opium cultivation and its trade, which was a disaster during their earlier government times is clearly no longer in place, but the Taliban do not publicise this shift in policy and down-play the opium connection in public. Other subtle differences are their stated respect for other ethnic groups and their embrace of technology, limited as it may be.

Circumstances have radically changed for the Taliban since 2001, and their policies and goals have shifted accordingly. Far from being a revolutionary movement of the 1990s, they now consider themselves as a deposed government and the main armed opposition fighting the pro-Western government supported by foreign soldiers. The Taliban leadership itself has also been transformed. Circumstances have forced them to travel outside their villages and also outside the country at times, and they have learned from their travels. The simple fighters of yester-years are worldly trained politicians today, transforming themselves from being traditional conservatives into modern Islamists. They have also become better at managing external perceptions, having realized that educated people are an advantage and its helpful in manipulating the media. They have become sophisticated; with professional-standard glossy publications, a website in several languages, videos made of high-quality production and highly capable spokesmen that respond rapidly to questions and criticism across social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp; even though what is publicised on the social media is vastly different from the ground reality in Afghanistan. What exactly do the changes in Taliban policy means for Afghans and the future of Afghanistan will depend on the critical study and analysis of their on-ground actions.

The Taliban are led by the Emir ul-Mumenin (leader of the faithful), currently Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada. The scope and complexity of this position varies according to the person who occupies it, and the current Emir’s functions are more spiritual and political, than as an operational military commander. He is assisted by two deputies, as well as the leadership shura. At the provincial level there is a governor, appointed officially by the leadership shura. The Taliban now has a quasi–professional core of individuals who have served for several years across multiple provinces. These governors and local councils / commissions are not completely ‘civilian’, and the governors may serve in military capacity to varying degrees depending on the context and broader requirements of the office for local governance. Provincial ministers are appointed by the leadership of the relevant council, viz: education, health and finance; in consultation with the governor of the province. The system has grown more comprehensive over the years, with a dozen committees, some with multiple departments covering a multitude of issues. Significant autonomy is granted to province and district level officials within the overall framework of the policy. This flexibility is intentional, in order to accommodate different views and reducing dissent to as little as possible. It also helps to prevent the Taliban from splitting into different factions; since local politics and preferences based on history play a significant role in governance. Some areas might have a higher demand for health services than others, while others might want to give priority to education. The extent to which services have been available in the past also matters. Areas where customary structures of governance are influential and respected, are in a stronger position to bargain for amenities from the Taliban officials. Individual relationships also influence policies, although the Taliban does not generally welcome individual opinions, since such interactions could be perceived as corruption. In practice however, the Taliban rely on relationships in every aspect of their governance, due to a lack of trust in general and the widespread suspicion of their motives by the locals and the international interlocuters. Arrangements between the Taliban and civilians are based on a mutual yet unequal exchange, leading to an informal social contract that renders to the Taliban a legitimate authority, and strengthening its credibility as an acceptable form of government; even though it is not a government based on the choice and free will of the people of Afghanistan.

Governance by the good, the bad and the committed:

Distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban is one way in which civilians make sense of seemingly random differences in policy implementations, which are heavily influenced by personality of the people involved, the historical precedence and the common objectives that need to be attained. Those Talibs who have blood ties with the community, who keep people safe from the violence and crime, and do not interfere where Taliban values are unwanted are considered as ‘good’ Taliban. The ‘bad’ Taliban are those who are considered to be heavily influenced by the Pakistani Intelligence services or those whose origins are not from Afghanistan.

The implementation of policies across the Taliban governed lands are not uniform and are influenced by the degree of Taliban control over that area and local socio–political dynamics. While there is more coherence in Taliban activity than in the past, policies are still subject to modifications or outright rejections by local commanders. Given this fragmented sovereignty, wherein the Taliban exercises limited control, there are areas of violent competition from breakaway factions of the Taliban or the Islamic State affiliates and al-Qaeda factions. The local Taliban implement policies on-ground according to their own beliefs or self–interests. Most of the variations are from governors who enjoy a strong personal power base and are respected for their military exploits, while others may intentionally violate a Taliban directive to demonstrate their autonomy. Such dissent is actively discouraged by the leadership shura and any acceptance of internal differences is considered as disloyalty to the movement.

As in any government, ignorance of governance requirements and incompetence also affect outcomes. Officials are often appointed based on their loyalty and service in the Taliban movement, rather than expertise in any sector or sphere. During the 1990s Taliban government, the appointed officials had no technical qualifications and were regularly rotated, usually as they were beginning to understand their portfolios, to discourage corruption. The Taliban officials do not receive training on how to govern the society that they rule over. Unless ordered by their leadership to take specific action, they rely on their experience, counsel from their colleagues and own judgement, poor as it might be.

The Taliban leadership is realistic about its capabilities to implement policies in a uniform manner on the ground. Long-standing social order cannot be simply overcome by the presence of the Taliban, be it through coercion or dialogue. They accept that what might work in conservative, rural areas may not be accepted in more educated areas, or areas dominated by other local militia. Much of the Taliban policy is structured according to Islamic law, with an emphasis on total obedience to the Emir, and disagreements to the policy is considered un-Islamic.

Conclusion:

Currently, there are limited discussions within the international community, to determine a pragmatic response to the predicament of working with the Taliban to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan, and lack of clarity on how to negotiate and engage strategically with the Taliban government. They remain hesitant to engage, worried that any diplomatic or political outreach might legitimize the Taliban. Whether to engage is not the real dilemma. The Taliban is using humanitarian access for political and military ends and this has enabled it to decide the rules of engagements and parameters of negotiations, and the world powers are being forced to react to this reality. The challenge is how to engage with the Taliban in a politically acceptable and strategic manner.

References:

• Giustozzi, A. (2009) Koran, Kalashnikov, and laptop: the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, 2002–2007

• Gopal, A. and van Linschoten, S. (2017) Ideology in the Afghan Taliban.

• Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2006) ‘Jihadi Code of Conduct (Layha)’

• Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2009) ‘Code of Conduct for the Mujahedin (Layha)’

• Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2010) ‘Code of Conduct for the Mujahedin (Layha)’

• Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2017) ‘Percent of country under the control of Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate’,

• Ludhianvi, R. (2015) Obedience to the Amir: an early text on the Afghan Taliban movement.

• UNAMA Human Rights (2018& 2020) Afghanistan Annual Report: Protection of Civilians in armed conflict.