Over the last two years, as US–backed security forces of Iraq on one hand, and Syrian forces loyal to their President Bashar Al-Assad with the support of Russian military, have been squeezing the territory of the Islamic State (aka Daesh) in the Arabic peninsula comprising the erstwhile territories of Iraq and Syria.
But Daesh is not the only Islamic terrorist organization that has to be fought and defeated. The other older partners in the business of Islamic terrorist activities are Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and while Al-Qaeda is out of the lime-light after the death of its founder Osama Bin Laden, it is now slowing resurging in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is thinking in long term strategy and building alliances. It‟s keeping its activities under-the-radar and its intensions secret, making it difficult to track down its operatives and assess the threat that it poses. Al- Qaeda may have decided in this present time to focus on regional issues inside Afghanistan and help the Taliban on the ground; but that does not mean that they can be discounted as a threat for any future attacks they might be plotting abroad; especially against the United States.
Afghan officials say Al Qaeda activity in the area has also decreased after years of drone strikes. That matches with a 2017 military analysis that described an exodus of “key Al Qaeda personnel” from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Middle East. While the group would probably remain active in Afghanistan, the report predicted, “the future strategic direction of core Al Qaeda will likely align more closely with dynamics in the Levant,” a reference to a stronghold Al Qaeda has carved out amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. But Al-Qaeda will never disappear from Afghanistan and will keep reappearing in different forms. That, say some experts who study Al Qaeda; is exactly what the group is doing in Afghanistan, switching its focus from a small group of foreign operatives secretly planning global attacks to a larger, newer regional subgroup, called Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Founded in 2014, the Indian Subcontinent subgroup has sometimes been dismissed as “not real Al Qaeda,” in part because it is composed mostly of locals, not the Arabs who fill many of Al Qaeda‟s top positions. While most senior Al Qaeda personnel are trying to hide from the US surveillance, the subgroup members are “more active” but are focused on training Taliban members who are fighting the Afghan government. Divining the true intentions and capabilities of a particular branch of a covert group like Al Qaeda has always been difficult and “subjective” and always will be, until the day they execute an attack in the West.
In contrast to the laid-back approach of these Jihadi organizations; the Taliban has seized several districts in Afghanistan in recent years and have carried out frequent and deadly attacks that target the Afghan forces. Recently (21 Aug 2018) the Taliban had accepted an invitation for peace talks scheduled in September, in Moscow, in a high-profile embrace of public diplomacy that will be a landmark for the group and their Russian hosts after 17 years of war. The talks in Moscow would have marked the Taliban‟s first public participation in a regional forum since they were ousted from power in Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on America. A ceasefire in June, during the Eid holiday at the end of the month of Ramadan, showed huge public appetite for ending decades of war. It also showed the Taliban had command and control over thousands of militants scattered across the country. The Taliban, however have refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, which they denounce as a puppet, and insist they will only attempt to broker peace directly with Washington. The meeting in Moscow could have offered a rare public platform for the Afghan government and senior Taliban leaders to interact directly; but these peace talks had to be postponed by Russia after the Afghanistan Government refused to participate. The United States of America also declined to attend.
Today, the Taliban govern the lives of tens of millions of Afghans living under their rule. Taliban governance is more coherent than ever before; where high-level commissions govern sectors such as finance, health, education, justice and taxation, with clear chains of command and policies from the leadership based in Pakistan down to villages in Afghanistan.
Its rival, Daesh has established a local affiliate, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, which has challenged the Afghan government and NATO forces, as well as its rival militant group, the Taliban, for territory and influence. In Pakistan, the group has showcased its presence and influence by conducting deadly attacks on soft targets.
How is Daesh surviving after the loss of its territory in Iraq / Syria?
1. By converting its physical caliphate to virtual one, with the message to followers – “stay in your society and we will help you / instruct you to create havoc in your own localities”, which is the first challenge of the future. It must be remembered that the “original message” to followers was that the caliphate is a perfect place to live with the laws being clear and indisputable, since they were framed by Prophet Mohammed on the instructions of Allah.
2. The next challenge is: how does one prevent someone from being radicalized online and more importantly, how do you find out who is being radicalized online
3. Causes of any extremism:
a. Fear of being persecuted or wronged
b. loss of identity
c. economic hardship
d. sympathy with causes
e. set of perceived grievances
The Origins of Al-Qaeda and Daesh
The origins of Al-Qaeda are a result of „Operation Cyclone‟; a program carried out by the American clandestine agency, the CIA; that armed and funded the „Mujahidin‟ in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The origins of Daesh, and more importantly its growth; are the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of the Saddam regime. Originally founded by Abu Musab al- Zarqawi as the Group for Monotheism and Jihad, Daesh became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and later the Islamic State, after the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Daesh was disowned by al- Qaeda in April 2013 for excess brutality toward civilians and the murder of al Qaeda representatives and commanders. The group continues to hold its designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States Department of State. Its current leader Caliph al – Baghdadi had broken out of Abu Ghraib prison in July 2013, along with several hundred other experienced jihadists. On June 30, 2014 they declared themselves a „Sunni caliphate‟ with al-Bagdadi as the “Commander of the Faithful,” a term essentially declaring him leader of all Muslims.
To understand the origins, impact and the future of Daesh, the focus of research and analysis should be on multiple levels. The beginning should be with the Ideology of Daesh and its intellectual origins, and connections to al- Qaeda, Salafis, and Salafi Jihadi groups. The complexity of Daesh needs to be understood through the factors that created it; its dependency on the religious texts through which it projects its unique identity, its barbaric and ruthless approach to jihad, and its rigid and seemingly unwavering ideological interpretations of Sharia; its psychological approach of sectarian dominance, and its extreme brutality towards all those it considers as its rivals or the infidels and apostates.
The Role of Pakistan as a Terrorist Sponsor
The United States and allies have long been frustrated with Pakistan‟s persistent acquiescence to safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and its vicious Haqqani branch in Pakistan (both of which benefit more from mis-governance in Afghanistan, but Pakistan‟s aid helps a lot). Worse yet, Pakistan has provided direct military and intelligence aid to both groups, resulting in the deaths of U.S. soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, plus significant destabilization of Afghanistan. Pakistan has long been a difficult and disruptive neighbor to Afghanistan, hoping to limit India‟s influence there, and cultivating radical groups within
Afghanistan as proxies. The main reason being; that Pakistan is dependent on the theory that the Taliban will maintain significant power in Afghanistan, and perhaps even obtain formal political power; and does not want to alienate it. After all, the Taliban is Pakistan‟s only ally among Afghanistan‟s political actors, however reluctant and unhappy the relationship maybe.
Pakistan further fears that its long refusal to fully sever support for these groups will high- light its lack of full control over the militant groups it has sponsored, even though it will never admit it. Such a disclosure of weakness would be costly: reducing the omnipotent image of Pakistan‟s military-intelligence apparatus with respect to varied domestic audiences, including opposition politicians, and further encouraging misbehavior of militant groups. And while such a disclosure may somewhat reduce international pressure on Pakistan, it would also weaken Pakistan‟s hand in international bargaining. Pakistan is also afraid of a strong Afghan government aligned with India, potentially helping to encircle Pakistan. The paranoia cannot end unless the military-intelligence apparatus loses its predominant power in the Pakistani government and becomes subordinated to an enlightened, capable, and accountable civilian leadership.
Battleground Bangladesh
Bangladesh is prime breeding ground for Daesh. It has the fourth largest Muslim population that very poor and Daesh has shown a keen interest in securing a presence there, due to its potential pool of recruits in large numbers and a porous border with India. Interestingly, the first Bangladeshi Islamist militant factions emerged long ago in 1989, when a network of 30 different factions was established and expanded in the following years. The main goal of most Islamist groups in Bangladesh is to create a separate Islamic state, or to govern Bangladesh according to Sharia law. Bangladesh has experienced significant terrorism conducted by a number of radical local Islamist organizations. Islamic extremist militant organizations have risen to prominence through assassinations, hostage takings and bomb attacks. Both Daesh and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent have claimed to be active in the country, although the Bangladeshi government believes that they mainly operate through local affiliates. When compared to his peers in the terrorism community, Akayed Ullah was most certainly a loser. The amateur jihadist attempted to blow himself up at the New York City port authority bus terminal by strapping a pipe bomb to his body. But the bomb, made with firecracker powder and lit with a Christmas candle was so low intensity that, far from creating widespread terror, he didn‟t even end up killing himself. In the weeks that have followed since, the 27-year- old Bangladeshi migrant has received more ridicule than fear or praise. Ullah‟s attempt gained widespread media attention in the West because of its location: New York City. But a look at the trend of Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh will show that he isn‟t the only one who‟s tried the fedayeen format in recent times. He‟s in fact part of a growing tribe of martyrdom seekers that has been emerging since 2016.
Until 2016, all of the violence had been restricted to their home ground; nothing was attempted overseas. Even large Islamist terror groups of the previous decades, the Harkat-ul- Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh for example, had been homegrown outfits. They shared training links with Pakistan-based Kashmir-centric outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and they also received funding from overseas. But both their membership and their political goals remained focused on Bangladesh. But the reality changed in 2016.
For the new generation, the injustices of Iraq and the dream of building a Caliphate in Syria were what inflamed their passions. The Islamic State replaced al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) as the brand to which they now swore their loyalty. This organizational change coincided with an attitude shift toward fighting. Where Islamists of previous decades had been content with killing in the name of religion, the millennial militant wants to die for it. Unlike fanatics of past decades, the new attackers aren‟t schooled in madrasas imparting religious education. Instead, similar to iconic Islamic State militants like Muhammad Jassim Abdulkarim Olayan al-Dhafiri (aka Jihadi John) and or Siddhartha Dhar (aka Abu Rumaysah al-Britani), these young Bangladeshi men hail from well-to-do families and have had access to expensive English language higher education much of their lives.
Most have lived overseas for extended periods of time and have had direct exposure to Western culture and liberal values. Following his arrest, Ullah said he was inspired by the Islamic State and was seeking revenge for U.S. air raids on Mosul. From investigations thus far, it is clear that he did not hold any formal membership or post with the Iraqi-Syrian outfit. In fact, he doesn‟t even appear to have been in touch with Bangladeshi terror groups. The only known operative of the Islamic State in Bangladesh who actually traveled to Syria was the so-called emir of Bengal, Tamim Chowdhury. Due to their proximity to the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment, older South Asian jihadist outfits, mostly Kashmir-centric groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and Jaish-e Muhammad followed military-like command chains with handlers, trainers, and operatives.
The new cells of younger jihadis, however, are far more decentralized, non-hierarchical, and reliant on the internet. This decentralization makes the Islamic State in South Asia operationally much cheaper than traditional outfits and allows the flexibility to quickly adapt to changing pressures from government forces. The reliance on the internet and messaging apps makes tracing and tracking much more difficult. Providing propaganda, inspiration, and tutorials through shareable videos, audio sermons, e-magazines, and other digital content is the main trade of the Islamic State in South Asia. There is next to no coercion or monetary compensation. Individuals go from being the boy/girl next door to a terrorist almost entirely on their own effort. All the Islamic State does is provide a template to which vulnerable individuals mold themselves and content which inspires and educates. This has become a pattern of sorts in Bangladesh.
Two groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh and Ansarul Islam, dominate Bangladesh‟s jihadist landscape today, with a faction of the former appears to have consolidated links to the Islamic State (ISIS); while the latter is affiliated with al-Qaeda‟s South Asian branch. The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar‟s Rakhine state in August-December 2017 also raises security concerns for Bangladesh. Jihadist groups, including ISIS and Pakistani militants have referenced the Rohingya‟s plight in efforts to mobilize support. For now, though, little suggests that the refugees are particularly susceptible to jihadist recruitment.
Kashmir – The Next Battleground?
In early February 2016, the Islamic State announced its intention to expand into Kashmir as part of its broader Khorasan branch. One of the causes of concern associated with the spread of the Islamic State affiliate in Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) is the existing instability within the region due to the presence of three prominent militant groups; the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) which historically have been linked to elements of the Pakistani state and largely favor Pakistan. Historically, such groups have tended to pursue either a separatist or a pro-Pakistan agenda, and it is only more recently that transnational terrorist outfits such as the Islamic State have attempted to infuse the Kashmiri jihad with pan-Islamist ideology.
The presence of Islamic State in J&K progressed gradually during 2017, starting with reports of Islamic State flags being waved during rallies and protests around the valley. While this claim is still pending official verification, Islamic State‟s Amaq news agency claimed responsibility for an attack in Srinagar on November 17, 2017, which killed an Indian policeman. The militant killed in the attack, Mugees Ahmed Mir, is suspected to have been inspired by the Islamic State‟s online propaganda and was found wearing an Islamic State T-shirt at the time of the attack. For the most part, though, signs of ISJK‟s existence have largely been observed in the online realm alone. Since late 2017, the pro-Islamic State J&K-focused media group Al-Qaraar has engaged in a social media campaign, directing messages tailored to inspire a Kashmiri audience. Although videos and pictures are a part of ISJK‟s online effort, more substantive materials have also been produced. The more detailed writings distributed by Al-Qaraar entitled “Realities of Jihad in Kashmir and Role of Pakistani Agencies” and “Apostasy of Syed Ali Shah Gheelani and others” provide deeper insights into the nature of the jihad that the Islamic State seeks to promote amongst Kashmiri followers.
The first article argues that the struggle in Kashmir has not been guided by Islam, but rather by Pakistan and its agents. In contrast to the first piece that focuses on the general insincerity of Pakistan, the other document names and shames specific leaders such as Sayeed Ali Shah Geelani of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). According to the Al-Qaraar article, Geelani is a kafir since he believes in democracy, seeks the judgment of the United Nations, a “false god,” and considers Shia community to be Muslims. Similarly, the document criticizes Yasin Malik, the chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
Given the present limitations on data regarding actual ISJK followers, evaluating ISJK‟s online propaganda against the current ground realities in J&K suggests that the group‟s goals are ambitious at the very least. Yet, it would be unwise to completely dismiss the threat associated with the potential popularity of ISJK‟s ideology. ISJK‟s social media campaign indicates that its goal is not to win the hearts and minds of Kashmir‟s hardened militants. Rather, its pan-Islamist message and extensive use of social media suggests that ISJK seeks to inspire the new generation of tech-savvy Kashmiris who may be dissatisfied with the status quo but have yet to engage in militancy. While existing J&K militant groups do recruit locally, they also include a large proportion of fighters from Pakistani provinces outside of Kashmir. For example, a study of 1,625 biographies of slain Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen [HM] militants found that 89 percent of LeT militants and 33 percent of HM militants were of Pakistani but non-Kashmiri origin. Thus, it would make sense for ISJK to aim to recruit the younger generation of Kashmiris to inspire a new movement that is more indigenous, more pan-Islamist, and less pro-Pakistan. Indeed, there may be opportunities for this; reports show that increasing numbers of young Kashmiri fighters are joining armed separatists, which may effectively change the overall ratio of local Kashmiri jihadis; to jihadis from outside of Kashmir. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, who was killed in July 2016, gained massive popularity through his extensive use of social media, which helped increase the group‟s numbers. His successor, Zakir Musa, however, left the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda‟s affiliate in J&K, making clear his intention to fight for Islam rather than for the independence of Kashmir or mergence with Pakistan. His message ran parallel to that of ISJK and unfortunately this suggests that there may be a fresh pool of recruits for ISJK to tap into to trigger a more indigenous movement, especially given the young demographic makeup of the Kashmir valley and high unemployment rates. It currently remains to be seen if the ISJK morphs into something larger than an idea or whether it simply remains an online propaganda channel. The real threat lies in ISJK effectively radicalizing Kashmiri youth via its social media campaign and coordinating activity through digital networks, which can give way to heightened terrorism, extreme tactics, and sectarian attacks.
