The Russian ties with the region goes to centuries back from its quest for warm water, access to Mediterranean Sea and protection fellow orthodox Christians in Ottoman empire. Contemporary Russia wants its presence in this crucial strategic region as a power. Russia is in the process of rebuilding its relationships in the region which been scaled back during the 1980s and 1990s. Russia shares the interests and stakes with the oil and Gas rich Gulf states and thus seeks collaboration and cooperation in the global energy market. The Russian entry in the Syrian conflict in 2015 has changed the course of the conflict as well as Old Russian relations in the region and forging of new relations like with that of Israel and has attained significant stature in the geopolitics and security of the region. [1]
The contemporary trend of shared fear of US retreat from the region in the Arab Gulf nations and how far China is willing to security partner in the region has spurred the geopolitical content and value of Russia. Growing influence of Russia in the Syrian conflict, oil politics (OPEC Plus), and Iran which has enormous bearing for the geopolitics and security of the region.
The Joint Naval Exercises by China, Iran and Russia started in 2019, and has been continued in January 2022. “Improving bilateral relations between Tehran and Moscow will enhance security for the region and the international arena,” said Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian President. This is a clear representation of changing geopolitical landscape in the region where Russia is reclaiming its role in the region with the cooperation of West-sanctioned Iran and China. [2] The visit of the Iranian President to Moscow in January 2022 and talk of strengthening of relations by the two anti-US nation was a manifestation of the growing Russian influence in the region. Agreement of Strategic ties for 20 years is direct dent on the geopolitical influence of the US and its vision of US security order in the region. [3]
The 33rd OPEC and Non-OPEC Ministerial meeting on 5th October 2022 declared downward adjustment of overall production by 2mb/d from the August 2022 required production levels, starting from November 2022. [4] The US reaction was sharp in a statement that “The President is disappointed by the shortsighted decision by OPEC+ to cut production quotas while the global economy is dealing with the continued negative impact of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.” The decision was viewed in the United State as influenced by Russia and unexpected defiance by its strategic alliance in the region mainly Saudi Arabia. [5]
The Ukraine conflict has brought about profound changes in the strategic vision towards the West Asian region with significant geopolitical implications. The Arab nations response has been intermediate position manifest with their stands on the UN Resolution on Ukraine conflict. Irrespective of voting condemning Russia or abstaining, unlike the Europeans have not imposed sanction, nor followed it and maintained the level of economic and trade engagement without attracting sanction violations and related consequences. Given the talk of US retreat from the region and Russian historical roots of engagement, the Russian influence at political level is on the rise. But given its present hostile relations with the West, the military technical cooperation would see downturn as witnessed in the case of Turkish deal for S-400 and Egyptian deal for Su-25 aircraft. [6]
The Russian focus has, however, been deepening towards the region as the region assumes enhanced strategic geopolitical significance. This finds echo in the clear expressions of the Rusian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov when said that “There is neither a point nor desire to maintain the previous presence Western States” due to the Russophobic policy of the West. [7] He further added that the center of gravity of Russian relations will shift to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America on equal and mutually beneficial terms. The continuous visits of these regions by the Minister makes it apparent that West Asia is the core of the shift and re-alignment. The motto of the visits is to ensure that concrete position of the states of the region for cooperation amid the Western pressure. [8] The dense visit of Sergei Lavrov in the region manifests its increasing foreign policy priority in the region. He participated in the 5th GCC-Russia Joint Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue where the issue of regional security found the central focus and the Russian Minister got the assurances from the GCC states that they would not join the sanction regime against Russia. [9]
In midst of the crisis, the Russian President visited Tehran to attend the meeting of the ‘Asthana Peace Process’ on Syria and met his Iranian and Turkish counterpart as well as the Iranian Supreme Leader. The visit on the heels visit of the US President’s visit in the region has surely more to do with the evolving geopolitical environment than merely to the Syrian crisis. It represents a deepening Iran-Russia ties to frustrate the US predominant US geopolitical leadership in the region and beyond. Such proximity is bound to have geopolitical impact as Israel in particular and Arab World in general take their streps to adjust in the changing geopolitical syndrome depending on the evolving patterns. [10] The Russian Security Council Secretary, Nikolay Patroschev visited Tehran and met his Iranian counterpart, Ali Shamkhani for updrading the economic cooperation and mutual security strategy in the region and the world. [11] The signing of the $40 billion Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the Russian Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has enabled them to implement their long-desired plan to become the decisive core of the global cartel of Gas Suppliers. With this Russia will have the opportunity to explore other countries in the region to work the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in the pattern of OPEC. Russia, Iran and Qatar together account for 60 percent of the Gas reserve. [12] As a result, they would play the leading coordinator role with the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in global gas production and pricing as well as strategic use of their resources for global power and influence. This is manifest with the strategic goals of the GECF that strives for promoting of fair value of natural gas and international positioning of the group as a global platform for energy dialogue to sovereign rights of the member countries on their natural gas resources. [13]
The Saudi-Russian relation has also undergone significant transformation particularly after the visit of king Salman to Moscow in 2017. The visit was described as historic which contains paramount economic interests of both the countries and personal political ambition of the young Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman. The prince views Russia as an important factor in economic cooperation in consonance with the ‘Vision-2030’ of the kingdom. [14]
As part of Africa trip, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov visited Cairo and met with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry and discussed about multiple cooperation. Meeting with the Arab League Secretary General, Ahmed Aboul Gheit and address to the permanent representatives of the pan-Arab organization was also part of the schedule. Thus apparent, Russian diplomatic push in the region is sure to add geopolitical changes in the region. [15] Mr Lavrov made also visited UAE and shared views and position on key issue of the region- Yemen, Libya,Syria and Arab-Israel issue and called for an their inclusive discussion and resolution . Sheikh Abdullah underscored the importance of the Comrehensive Strategic Partnership of the two countries for regional cooperation and security. [16]
Israel also has a profound geo-strategic interest with Russia in the region mainly in the Syria sector in its strategy against Iran. Syria remains a geopolitical return of Russia in 2015 with its military presence and with complete strategic embrace with the Syrian regime and its naval base in Tartus and Latakia and air base, Khmeimim operated by Russia. [17]
The Russian diplomacy and engagement in the region amid the Ukraine crisis have become dense and will have bearing on the geopolitical landscape as the region is having its own intra-regional competitions and issues which is bound to to be affected by the assertive entry of the outside powers. Iran-US hostility over Nuclear Deal and Sanctions has profound implications for the geopolitical landscape in the region as Saudi Arabia and Israel as regional opposition of Iran. Iran is already in the anti-US, anti-Israel and anti-Arab orbit of security. Given the growing closeness of China and Russia with Iran in the recent sanctioned years.
The most notable point about growing Russian influence is part of the broad global pattern of increasing multipolar world and in line with the economic aspirations and security imperatives of the countries in the region. There is growing sense political autonomy and maturity in the states of the region to diversify their economy and sources of security. The influence share in this strategic region of West Asia has always been a yardstick of geopolitical influence of powers at the global stage. The Russian expansion in the region along with China and India is part of the global syndrome. The responses of the states in the region, the GCC states like Saudi Arabia and UAE even Israel and their strategic reluctance to toe the US line and support the West’s position in the Ukraine conflict are manifestation of unprecedented strategic weakness of the US.
This is also a marked sign political maturity of these states of the region to take the stand based on their own national interest, economic imperatives and strategic vision despite the fact of their dependence on the US security structure in the region. In longer term the Russian expansion of influence is strategically formidable as all the regional powers and major states have their interests intertwined with that of Russians. Iran and Russia has the shared burden of Western sanctions and economic exigencies to cooperate and collaborate at all levels. Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar share profound strategic geo-economic interests as major stakeholders in oil and gas production and global energy market stability as members OPEC-plus. The intra-Arab normalization trends along with the Saudi-Iran normalisation with economic visions and technological pursuits are favourable patterns for Russian interests and expansion in the region. A cursory view of Israel- Syrian Sector, Intra-Arab normalisation, Saudi (GCC)-Iran normalisation and Economic Vision in the region- Countries needs technology and production sharing and Palestine situation makes it apparent that all runs counter to the contemporary US strategy and Policy. This is what makes Russia a formidable factor in the geopolitical alignment in the region in emerging multipolar World Order.
References
[1] Eugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss (2019) “A Brief Guide to Russia’s Return to the Middle East”, Carnegei Endowment For International Peace, 24th October, 2019 https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/24/brief-guide-to-russia-s-return-to-middle-east-pub-80134
[2] Leng Shumei (2022) “China, russia and Iran to hold joint Maritime Exercise: Report”, Global times, 19th January 2022 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246333.shtml
[3] TASS (2022) “Tehran Hands over to Moscow draft Agreement on Strategic Cooperation for 20 years-Raisi”, 19th January 2022 https://tass.com/world/1390491
[4] OPEC (2022) 33rd OPEC and Non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting, 5th October 2022 https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/7021.htm
[5] Statement from National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan and NEC Director Brian Deese, White House, 5th October 2022 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/05/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-and-nec-director-brian-deese/
[6] Ivan Bocharov (2022) “How Russia’s Policies in the Middle East and North Africa is Changing After February 24” Russian International Affairs Council, 19th July 2022 https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/middle-east-policy/how-russia-s-policy-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-is-changing-after-february-24/
[7] TASS (2022) “No point for Russia to maintain previous diplomatic presence in the West, Lavrov says”, TASS, 18th October 2022 https://tass.com/politics/1524431
[8] TASS (2022) “Lavrov’s Visit to Riyadh to enhance Gulf Monarchies balanced stance on Ukraine-Expert”, Tass, 31st May 2022 https://tass.com/world/1458589
[9] Mohammed Al-Sulami and Lama Al-Hamawi (2022) “Gulf United on Russia-Ukraine War, Says Saudi Minister, Arab News, 1st June 2022 https://www.arabnews.com/node/2094546/saudi-arabia
[10] Seth J. Frantzman (2022) “Russia’s ‘Geographic reorientation’: What does it mean for Israel, Middle East?, The Jerusalem Post, 19th October, 2022 https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-719991
[11] TASS (2022) “Russian Security Chief Arrives Tehran to discuss international issues and cooperation- Agency”, 9th November 2022 https://tass.com/politics/1533939
[12] Simon Watkins (2022) “Iran and Russia Move to Create A Global Natural Gas Cartel”, OILPRICE, 23rd August, 2022 https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Iran-And-Russia-Move-To-Create-A-Global-Natural-Gas-Cartel.html
[13] GECF Vision: Gas Exporting Countries Forum https://www.gecf.org/about/mission-objectives.aspx
[14] Leonid Issaev (2017) “Decoding King Salman’s Visit to Moscow”, AlJazeera, 4th October 2017 https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/10/4/decoding-king-salmans-visit-to-moscow
[15] The Economic Times (2022) “Russia FM Sergey Lavrov visits Egypt, Part of Africa Trip amid Ukraine War, 24th July 2022 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/russia-fm-sergey-lavrov-visits-egypt-part-of-africa-trip-amid-ukraine-war/articleshow/93091567.cms?from=mdr
[16] Ayush Narayanan (2022) “Russia’s FM Lavrov meets UAE’s Shaikh Abdullah on two days visit to Abu Dhabi, AlArabiyaNews, 4th November 2022 https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2022/11/04/Russia-s-FM-Lavrov-meet-UAE-s-Sheikh-Abdullah-on-two-day-visit-to-Abu-Dhabi
[17] Yuras Karmanau (2019) “Naval Base in Syria anchors Russia to Mediterranean” NavyTimes, 27th September 2019 https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/09/27/naval-base-in-syria-anchors-russia-to-mediterranean/
