The security and strategic architecture of any country is always expected to be dynamic, flexible and least static. This is all the more important in a region whose balance of power is forever in a state of flux. Any dithering on periodic re-calibrating national defence strategy will seriously affect our national security preparedness perhaps in due course if not immediately. Reviewing strategies and policies in routine or without need assessment may be counterproductive but policy paralysis and doctrinal stagnation are even more perilous. It is in this background that the BJP in its manifesto had stated that it will ‘study in detail India’s Nuclear Doctrine and revise and update it to make it relevant to challenges of current times. Needless to say, any review and revision will have to be preceded by extensive debate wider consultations, which in a way, has already begun. India’s Nuclear Doctrine itself mandates that it “shall be revisited every five years and specifies the areas that need review. We are expected to continue research on developing both delivery systems and warheads in the light of global technological advancements. In the light of international nuclear regimes, the nuclear document says we shall cooperate with other nations in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and work towards democratising their structures. We are also committed to maintaining strict controls on the export of nuclear and missile-related equipment, materials and technologies, and these lists shall be revised from time to time.
The rapidly changing regional security environment extends many lessons for our own security architecture. The Indo-US nuclear deal and the change in the outlook of many NSG members have opened up several opportunities as well as challenges for our nuclear, defence and security parameters.
Military and strategic experts will agree that there is always a need to constantly assess the prevailing security environment and re-examine our doctrines in the context of the existing nuclear doctrine. India’s nuclear doctrine itself warrants us to be prepared to meet new challenges in ballistic missile defence, chemical, biological and radiological weapons that may have a bearing on its nuclear doctrine. Again, India’s nuclear doctrine clearly lays down the need to examine the fundamental assumptions underlying the country’s position on nuclear deterrence at any given time. This is also necessary to explore relevant doctrinal ideas to safeguard Indian interests in a changing security environment.
A large section of the strategic community is in concurrence with the BJP’s view of a need to revisit India’s nuclear doctrine as they feel that the circumstances that prevailed in 1999-2003 have changed. Soon after the Pokhran-II tests, India announced a suo-motto no first use policy. We also declared a self-imposed moratorium on any further tests. But politico-social changes, technological and military improvements and shifts in power equations have introduced new aspects in the security and political environment within and outside over the last decade.
The radicalization of the army and the increasing and unrestrained role of non-state actors in our neighbourhood adds urgency to the task of strengthening our security preparedness and response mechanism. In addition, political instability under a fragile and sham democratic system, ironically supervised by the army and its terror fosters in our neighbourhood is only abating our need to increase all-around preparedness.
The increasing belligerence on the part of Islamabad’s ruling establishment, ISI controlled radicalized sections of the army and the non-state actors should be a cause of ample concern to our security establishment. Though China is dumping olive branches on the door of the new political set up in India, New Delhi will be well advised to study the fall-out of Sino-US relations, Beijing’s fulminations against India’s legitimate economic engagements in South East Asia, the Indo-Pacific region and the South China Sea area and the growing China-Pakistan nexus in the PoK and other clandestine nuclear collusions.
India and China have put in place a strong conflict resolution mechanism to deal with issues at the border and other matters of serious disagreement. Long after 1962, both the countries have behaved responsibly, even cooperated on several international issues like climate change. This has allowed both the Asian giants to sit back and relax on nuclear standoff worries and attend to more urgent matters such as health care and standard of living.
But the relation with Pakistan is on an entirely different keel. Pakistan’s existential dilemma continues to plague its national discourse making it essential to treat India as a permanent enemy. Forces swooping down on Islamabad would never want a normalized India Pakistan relationship. Before and after every attempt at peace, trade, commerce and industry talks, there will necessarily be terror strikes followed by vehement denials by the political establishment and the civil society. What are the options available to India in the event of another major terrorist strike, however much we may not want it? The cliched argument that both are nuclear powers has no meaning as long as our nuclear capability has no deterrence teeth. Has not New Delhi experienced this predicament during the attack on the Indian Parliament and Mumbai attack?
The priority for the government is to strengthen our national security establishment, regain the strategic space lost in the past decade and reinforce a credible response mechanism through radical systemic changes against any misadventure by anyone wanting to endanger our national security and integrity.
