Abstract
The global landscape of nuclear weapons proliferation has been a topic of significant concern and debate for decades. As nations pursue their strategic interests and strive to assert their positions on the world stage, the acquisition and expansion of nuclear capabilities continue to shape international relations and security dynamics. In recent years, the nuclear activities of China have drawn increased attention, warranting a comprehensive analysis of its motivations, implications, and the resulting international concerns. This research paper provides an overview of China's stance on nuclear non-proliferation efforts, its participation in international organizations, and its export control regulations. Despite China's claims of active involvement in non-proliferation initiatives, evidence suggests its involvement in nuclear proliferation scandals, such as providing Pakistan with nuclear bomb designs. China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, including the supply of nuclear reactors, raises concerns about its commitment to non-proliferation. Similarly, China's nuclear technology sales to Iran and North Korea have further complicated the proliferation landscape. This paper emphasizes the need for China's active cooperation in enforcing international resolutions and preventing cross-border trade and transactions that could facilitate nuclear proliferation. It also highlights India's concerns regarding China's nuclear posture, particularly its deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. Overall, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of nuclear proliferation issues related to China and emphasizes the importance of international cooperation to address these challenges effectively.
KEY WORDS: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, International Atomic Energy, Nuclear-Weapon, National Security, Arms Control
Introduction
China's rise as a global power and its evolving security environment have prompted questions regarding its nuclear ambitions. Understanding the motivations behind China's nuclear proliferation becomes imperative to assess its impact on regional stability and international non-proliferation efforts. This research will delve into China's historical development of nuclear capabilities, its official nuclear doctrine, and its strategic calculus in the context of deterrence and national security.
Objectives
1) To provide an overview of China's stance on nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
2) To examine China's participation in international organizations related to nuclear non-proliferation, such as the IAEA and NPT.
3) To analyze China's export control regulations and their effectiveness in preventing nuclear proliferation.
4) To explore evidence of China's involvement in nuclear proliferation scandals, such as providing Pakistan with nuclear bomb designs.
5) To assess the implications of China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea on regional and global non-proliferation efforts.
6) To emphasize the importance of China's active cooperation in enforcing international resolutions and preventing cross-border trade and transactions that could facilitate nuclear proliferation.
7) To highlight India's concerns regarding China's nuclear posture, particularly its deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean.
8) To contribute to a deeper understanding of the motivations, implications, and international concerns surrounding China's nuclear proliferation.
Moreover, the implications of China's nuclear proliferation extend beyond regional dynamics. The potential effects on arms control, non-proliferation regimes, and the broader international security architecture necessitate a comprehensive examination. This paper will analyze the implications of China's nuclear activities on regional non-proliferation efforts, its impact on the existing global nuclear balance, and the concerns it raises among major powers and the international community. By addressing these crucial aspects, this research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the motivations, implications, and international concerns surrounding China's nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or non-state actors, poses one of the greatest threats to international security today. Iran – P5+1, what amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network all underscore the far-form-remote possibility that a terrorist group or so-called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass destruction or materials for dirty bombs.
PRC (People’s Republic of China) has always stated that (1)
1. China has actively participated in the international efforts of nuclear non- proliferation. China is a member of IAEA, NPT and Zangger committee.
2. China has established a rather comprehensive system of export control covering nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other fields. General practices such as end- use and end – user guarantee system, licensing system, control list and “Catch – all” principle have been incorporated into China’s export controls in nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other fields.
3. The Chinese government has promulgated the regulations on export controls of missile and missile related items and technologies and the export control list. The regulations and list in light of China’s actual conditioned the prevailing.
4. International practice is basically identical to the annex to MTRC in terms of scope and relative parameters.
5. China promulgated the regulations on the export controls of dual – use biological and related equipment and technologies and export control list.
6. As a state party of NPT China hopes that the members will respect the South – North joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and 1994 agreed framework.
President Hu Jintao at the UNSC stated “We are happy(2), that China has continued to state that it views non-proliferation not as an end in itself that rather as a means to the ultimate objective of complete disarmament and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.(3) Despite this China was involved in nuclear proliferation scandals throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s with respect to its sale of ring magnet to Pakistan in 1995. China provided Pakistan with a nuclear bomb design (used in China’s October 1996 nuclear test). These designs were later passed on to Libya by the A.Q. Khan network was discovered by the IAEA inspectors(4) in 2004 after President Qadhafi renounce its nuclear weapons programme and allowed inspectors to examine related facilities. The plans contend portions of Chinese text with explicit instructions for the manufacture of an implosion device.
While since the 1980's Pakistan has always maintained that all its nuclear programme is entirely India specific, it’s a matter of concern for us that China signed the nuclear agreement with Pakistan and committed to provide two nuclear reactors to Pakistan at Chasma(5). China justified the agreement by noting a “Grandfather” provision; in 2004
When China joined the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) no such commitment was reported(6). While China’s continuing support of Pakistan is partly motivated to contain India, Pakistan tribal areas provide training and monetary support to Xinjiang extremists(7). People's Republic of China itself has noted that explosives used in separatist activities in Xinjiang in 1997 were manufactured in China but originally “exported to Pakistan and then re-exported to Afghanistan.
Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean through the deployment of a Chinese nuclear submarine – presumably a Type 093 Shang- class as part of the anti-piracy patrol of two ships and supply vessels operating off the Gulf of Aden has set alarm bells ringing loudly amongst the Indian analysts(8). The implications of such a strategically significant move are simply enormous. On this background the researcher wishes to state the following
1. Nuclear technology sales to Pakistan
As reported by Pakistani and PRC news sources in1992 China began to build a nuclear power plant at Chasma and was suspected in 1994 of helping Pakistan to build an unsafe guarded plutonium producing reactor at Khushab(9). Operational since 1991 Chasma reactor has IAEA safe guard but not full scope safeguards. The US arms control and disarmament annual report 1998, stated that there continued to be some contacts between Chinese entities and Pakistan’s unsafe guarded and nuclear weapon programme. US Defense (Intelligent) Intelligence Agency in February 24, 2004 stated that PRC entities remained involved with nuclear and missile programmes in Pakistan and Iran.
On May 5, 2004 China signed a contract to build a second nuclear power reactor (Chasma2) in Pakistan. This contract raised questions because of continuing PRC nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and its signing right before a decision by NSG on China’s membership, as a result of which Chasma 2 remains outside the full scope of safeguards, not just IAEA safeguards on reactors(10). On September 21, 2010 PRC foreign ministry claimed that the 3rd and 4th nuclear reactors were based on PRC – Pakistan agreement of 2003.
Later in December 21, 2010, PPG paints trading company in Shanghai pled guilty in the US court to illegally exporting high performance coating from the United States through the PRC to the Chasma 2 reactor in Pakistan from June 2006 to March 2007(11).
On December 3, 2010 the China nuclear industry Huaxing Construction Company of Lananjing pled guilty in the US for illegal exports of high performance epoxy coating to Chasma 2 reactor. Section 722 report that the PRC entities were associated with Pakistan nuclear programme.
China’s ties to A. Q. Khan nuclear network is a matter of concern because China was early recipient of Uranium enrichment technology using centrifuges that Khan has acquired in Europe in return in 1982 China gave Pakistan 15 tons of Uranium Hexafluoride gas for production of bomb grade uranium, 50 kilograms of weapons grade enriched uranium enough for two bombs and a blueprint for a nuclear weapon that China has already tested according to Khan.
A senior Pakistani diplomat was quoted as saying while in Beijing in 2002 PRC officials said they knew A. Q. Khan was in China and bribing people and they wanted him out. Particularly troubling was the reported intelligence finding in 2004 that Khan sold Libya a nuclear bomb design that he received from China in early 1980’s (in return for giving China his centrifuge technology), a design that China had already tested in 1966 and had developed as a compact nuclear bomb for delivery on missile. According to two former US nuclear bomb designers the PRC proliferated nuclear bomb technology to Pakistan including a test conducted in 1990 for Pakistan for its first nuclear bomb(12).
Despite PRC’s November 2000 missile non-proliferation pledge on September 1, 2001 the US state department imposed sanctions on China metallurgical equipment corporation of missile technology (category 2 items of the MTCR) to Pakistan(13).
2. Nuclear technology sales to Iran
In light of the Iran – P5+1 deal on July 14, 2015 while we appreciate the support and positive contribution of China in its non-proliferation efforts it would be appropriate to recall that in the 1997 US PRC summit China pledged to end nuclear cooperation with Iran.
In June 6, 2002 US assistant secretary of state John Wolf stated concerns about possible PRC – Iranian interactions despite China’s 1997 pledge to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran. The PRC voted for UNSC resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) 1803 (2008) 1929 (2010) to impose sanctions on Iran. But PRC also invested in and traded with Iran’s oil and gas energy sector. India has always cherish close alliance with Iran, we are perplexed to note that in 2002 Iranian opposition group revealed that Iranian front companies procured materials from China for secrete nuclear weapons facilities, and experts from China worked at uranium mine at Saghand and centrifuge facility (for uranium enrichment) near Isfahan(14). It is reported that Iran, since 2002, was building a secret uranium enrichment plant at Natanz with technology for gas centrifuge enrichment from Pakistan (Khan Research Laboratories) a country that has received nuclear cooperation for PRC. Also IAEA found out in 2003 that in 1991 PRC supplied Iran with 1.8 metric tons of natural uranium. US – Defense Intelligence Agency director Lowell Gacoby testified in February 2004 that PRC entities remained involved with nuclear and missile programme in Pakistan and Iran while, ‘In some cases, the entities were involved without PRC governments’ knowledge, In May 2006 diplomatic sources reveal that Iran had used uranium hexafluoride gas from China to accelerate Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. Chinese companies have reportedly helped Iran to procure nuclear related hardware like in 2010 under IAEA investigation, China’s Zhegiang Ouhai Trade Corporation, a subsidiary of Jinzhou group supplied to Iran sensitive valves and vacuum gauges useful for uranium enrichment.
On the diplomatic front, in November 2004 the PRC foreign minister argued that the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme should remain under the IAEA handling and on the next day opposed referral of Iran’s case to UNSC. But China abstained when the IAEA passed a resolution on September 24, 2005 declaring that Iran was not complying with the NPT and the PRC envoy in Vienna continued to call for dealing with Iran at IAEA.
3. Nuclear technology sales to North Korea
PRC has always been North Korea’s patron from one “Dear Leader” to the next. In February 2015, Chinese officials reported that Pyongyan has many more nuclear warheads than previously believed – up to 20 already, perhaps 40 by next year. North Korea tested their first bomb in 2006 and was later discovered to be building a secret building facility in the Syrian Desert which was destroyed by Israeli war planes in 2007(15). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi opined, North Korea doesn’t even have the kind of control over its neighbors that Tehran enjoys in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Pyongyan had been supplying Iranians with ballistic missile technology and hosting Iranian scientists at its nuclear tests. The role of the PRC is extremely crucial in de-escalating the nuclear threat in that region.
On this background it would be worth noting that US NSA report dated March 8, 1998 suggested that China sold specialty steel for use in North Korea’s missile programme. In June 1999 US intelligence reportedly found that PRC entities transferred accelerometers, gyroscopes, precision grinding machinery to North Korea(16). On October 20, 1999 it is reported that China’s Changda Corporation sought to buy Russian gyroscopes that were more or less the same that China supplied to the North Korean missile program.
After North Korea’s failed launch of a Taepo dong – 2 missiles on April 13, 2012, a military parade two days later in Pyongyang showed KN -08-ICBM on a 16-wheel transporter, erector launcher that reportedly originated from PRC.
Pakistan provided equipment, including gas centrifuges to the DPRK uranium enrichment programme in return for North Korea’s supply of Nodong MRBM to Pakistan in 1998(17). PRC’ all weather friends continued to provide nuclear technology to North Korea even in 2002. Particularly troubling was a reported intelligence finding in early 2004 that Khan sold Libya a nuclear bomb design that he received from the PRC in early 1980’s.
We expect the PRC to enforce UNSC resolutions on DPRK activities in allowing cross border trade and transactions to and from North Korea as well as Pakistani and North Korean ships and planes to use PRC ports and air space. This is particularly in light of the report in July 2002; Pakistan flew a C-130 transport aircraft to pick up missile parts in North Korea. In December 2002 the Spanish and US navies’ interdicted a North Korean (so san) with scud missile bound for Yemen and the Spanish defense minister reported that the ships last port of call was in China. In November 2007, an Iranian plane flew via Beijing airport to Iran with a shipment of a missile jet for Iran’s missile programme, whereas in August 2008 India denied use of its air space for a North Korean plane that stopped at Myanmar that was scheduled to fly to Iran with suspected cargo related to weapon proliferation. In November 2009 South Africa seized DPRK weapon cargo bound for Congo in violation of UNSC resolution 1874(18). The shipment was first loaded in Dalian. China’s port of Dalian, close to North Korea’s port of Nampo has been one of the critical trans- shipment points.
There have been incidents in the past and even sanctions have been imposed on PRC “entities” (not the PRC government) for transfers related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and cruise missiles to Pakistan and Iran. About half the PRC entities “serial Proliferators'' have faced repeated sanctions raising questions about effectiveness.
India has specific other concerns about China’s nuclear posture especially deployment of nuclear submarines with the PLA (N) Flotilla – 18th convoy from its South sea fleet in India’s strategic backyard. China has reaffirmed its prowess in creating high tech platforms along with its ability to project power and demonstrate “Blue water” capability in distant oceans. We wish to request the US renew the nuclear cooperation agreement with China that if the reactor cooler technology could be adapted to make its submarine quieter and harder to detect it could be a concern for the international community. The PRC has successfully reverse engineered very complex imported technology in the aerospace and nuclear fields. It would also matter if China does not refrain from sailing missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, a payload of 499 kg, as far as 305km(19).
China is believed to have maintained a very low alert level for its nuclear weapons during peacetime. But if China adopts Launch – on – warning, it may keep its war head mated with missiles and keep the weapons at a much higher alert level. This could increase the risk of accidental or unauthorized launches.
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)(20)
It was predicted in the 2022 released annual U.S. Department of Defense report on China's military posture that China's nuclear force will grow substantially in coming years, reaching 1,000 nuclear warheads in 2030, roughly a fifth of the size of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal.
In August 2022 it was estimated that China had 350 nuclear weapons. Over the past few months, satellite images of hundreds of new missile silos near Yumen, Hami and Ordos in China have come forth, which are suspected to house missiles armed with numerous warheads. Also, further construction has been undertaken at the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)’s training site close to Jilantai revealing a clear connection of these silo fields to PLARF’s missile program. While the Chinese government has not declared a public acknowledgement of this military buildup, the sites which began being built from 2020, appear to be at several differing levels of completion. Using analysis of recent satellite imagery, two non-governmental organisations have declared each to have roughly the following amounts: Yumen (~120 silos), Hami (~110 silos) and Ordos (~40 silos and growing) bearing different types of short, long, rectangular and solid shelter shapes and patterns. Scientists suggest the following that, China is building these silos for several reasons: diminishing the vulnerability of China’s ICBMs to a first strike, reducing probable effects of missile defenses, changing from liquid to solid fuel missiles, doubling down on readiness as well as the balance of the ICBM force, adding to China’s nuclear first strike ability and options to strike. United States defense have claimed that China would double its nuclear warhead stockpile in the next decade, without any substantiation, these images do confirm these claims.
Therefore, the researcher emphases on:
1. The Government must focus on not only on clandestine and illegal development but also transfer of missile and nuclear technology.
2. It's important to acknowledge that India's indigenous program serves as a vital minimum credible deterrent for regional security and that India has played no part in nuclear proliferation.
3. India should acknowledge the environmental significance to civil nuclear program and engage in cooperation with safeguards to guarantee that all traded materials are dedicated to peaceful purposes. Additionally, the country should have stance on the NPT and CTBT.
4. Indian government should consistently uphold a peaceful stance and extend a warm welcome to the concept of a "peaceful rise" within our neighbouring regions.
Literature Review
1) Based on the article “China’s Nuclear Buildup Violates the NPT” by Thomas D. of the National Interest; found that The Japanese prime minister and Secretary of State Blinken expressed concern about China's secretive nuclear weapons buildup. China's refusal to engage in good-faith talks with other NPT members, as required by Article VI, has gone largely unnoticed. The upcoming NPT Review Conference in August presents an opportunity to pressure China to fulfill its obligations and promote effective nuclear arms control. China's nuclear buildup poses a significant challenge to strategic stability, and it calls for reasoned arguments grounded in international legal obligations. China's approach violates Article VI by seeking to change the negotiating environment and disregarding the duty to seek negotiated solutions. Its buildup undermines the outcome of potential negotiations and exacerbates strategic challenges that negotiations aim to address, ignoring the constraints set by the NPT's commitment to negotiations.
2) From a paper titled “Great Powers and Nuclear Non-proliferation Norms: China in South Asia” by T.V. Paul of McGill University; China's involvement in South Asia has both contributed to and exacerbated nuclear proliferation. Additionally, China plays a significant role in mitigating the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. The Chinese policy towards South Asia is primarily driven by realpolitik considerations, as highlighted by Iain Johnston. He argues that Chinese foreign policy is influenced by hyper-sovereignty values and a strategic culture rooted in realpolitik. This worldview perceives military force as a potential tool for pursuing traditional power and maximizing national interests in a competitive and potentially dangerous global landscape. However, there remains uncertainty regarding whether Chinese decision-makers fully grasp the concept of the security dilemma. This dilemma arises when a defensive action by one actor is interpreted as a threat by another, prompting the second actor to take countermeasures, thus fueling a cycle of escalating arms races and security concerns.
Conclusion
China's nuclear proliferation activities reveal a complex and concerning picture. Despite China's claims of active participation in international non-proliferation efforts and its membership in organizations such as the IAEA and NPT, evidence suggests its involvement in nuclear proliferation scandals. China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, including the supply of nuclear technology and reactors, raises questions about its commitment to non-proliferation. Similarly, its nuclear technology sales to Iran and North Korea further complicate the global proliferation landscape.
The implications of China's nuclear proliferation extend beyond regional dynamics and pose challenges to arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The international community, particularly major powers, must address these concerns collectively. Active cooperation among nations, enforcement of international resolutions, and strict control over cross-border trade and transactions are crucial in preventing nuclear proliferation.
India, as a neighboring country, has legitimate concerns regarding China's nuclear posture, especially its deployment of nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. This highlights the need for open dialogue, transparency, and confidence-building measures between the two countries.
Ultimately, international cooperation is vital to effectively address the challenges posed by China's nuclear proliferation activities. Efforts must be made to encourage China's active participation in non-proliferation initiatives, strengthen export control regulations, and ensure strict adherence to international norms and obligations. By doing so, the global community can work towards the ultimate goal of complete disarmament and the destruction of nuclear weapons, ensuring a safer and more secure world for all.
End Notes:
1 Speech by Ambassador SHA Zukang at the Wilton Park conference
2 Statement by President Hu Jintao at the UNSC
3 Bill Gertz “China Nuclear Transfer Exposed : Hill Expected to urge sanction “ – The Washington Times, 5th February 1996
4 “Libyan arms designs traced back to China: The Washington Post , 15th February 2004
5 “Daniel Harnes” Prospects of nuclear deal with Israel dismissed” – Arms control today, September 2010
6 “ Who's fighting China war on terror” – The diplomat, November 26, 2003
7 “China, Pakistan & the Taliban syndrome” – Asian Survey, 2000
8 P.K. Ghosh, “Chinese nuclear subs in Indian Ocean” – The diplomat, 16/07/2015
9 Nucleonics Week, 1997-98
10 “Nucleonics Week” – IAEA Report, 2001
11 “China & Proliferation of WMD – Policy issues” – Congressional Research Service
12 “Unprecedented Peril Force through calls” – Washington Post, 2004
13 Washington Times 2001
14 Guardian, Wall Street Journal, 2010
15 “China’s Nuclear Warning” – Wall Street Journal, 23/04/2015
16 Washington Times, 1999
17 New York Times, Washington Post
18 Reuters, December 13, 2009
19 “US Nuclear deal with China” – The Guardian
20 ICAN Policy and Research
References:
1. India, China and Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), July 2014 world nuclear association
2. Zukang, SHA, 16/06/2015, “Reinforcing efforts to prevent nuclear non-proliferation- China’s perspective”
3. Kan, Shirley A, China and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles – Policy issues, January 5,2015
4. Mufson Steven, US nuclear deal with China raises proliferation concerns, The Guardian
5. Nuclear age peace foundation, 1998-2015
6. China’s nuclear warning, The Wall Street, 16/06/2015
7. Ghosh, P.K., Chinese nuclear subs in the Indian ocean, the diplomat, April 12, 2015
8. Zhao, Tong, Strategic warning and China’s nuclear posture, May 20, 2015
9. Santoro David Etc. Strengthening US-China non-Proliferation and nuclear security cooperation in Asia pacific, June 2014
10. Kulacki Gregory, The Chinese military updates, China’s nuclear strategy
11. ICAN China’s nuclear buildup violates international law, Nov 12, 2021
