Abstract
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was started on November 09, 2023, at the G20 Summit in New Delhi. India’s participation in this initiative shows its commitment to multilateralism. The IMEC provides India with an alternative route to Europe through the Middle East, bypassing Pakistan, Iran, and the Suez Canal. The IMEC relies on the geopolitics of connectivity, a recent trend in international politics, which is necessary to comprehend. The concept of geopolitics of connectivity is explored in this paper, examining its relevance to IMEC and the potential prospects for IMEC.
Keywords: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Geopolitics, Connectivity, G20, India, China.
Introduction
India’s role in the recently concluded G20 Summit in New Delhi established it as a major global player and reiterated its role as the leading advocate for the global South. The summit highlighted India’s strong and proactive commitment to multilateralism, particularly during a time when power rivalries and regional conflicts pose a threat to the idea of multilateralism and globalisation. During the Summit, on November 09, 2023, the leaders of the US, EU, India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Germany, and France came together under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative (Losos and Fetter, 2020) and entered into an MOU for the establishment of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) (PIB, 2023a). The IMEC announcement was a tangible outcome of the summit, demonstrating India’s commitment to multilateralism.
The IMEC Surprise
The IMEC announcement, surprised many because it hadn’t been discussed much in the public domain before the summit compared to issues like the Ukraine conflict, rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, etc. The focus at the summit was primarily on whether the African Union would be included in the G20 and the feasibility of a joint declaration. Another element of surprise about IMEC was that it saw a diverse mix of nations, including India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, the US, the EU, Italy, France, and Germany each with their distinct foreign policy priorities and ambitions that sometimes converge on select regional and global issues but often clash on many others. The bilateral relations between these nations have been generally friendly and strong. However, as a subgroup of the G20, they have not yet expressed any common goal or vision. Yet, these nations joined hands for IMEC. The corridor’s questionable practicality and economic feasibility compared to initiatives like China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Trans-Asian Railway surprised many observers.
This paper analyses the geopolitical rationale behind the IMEC and briefly outlines the potential geopolitical concerns for participating nations. The paper’s main focus is on the geopolitical aspects, rather than examining the economic feasibility of transportation of goods via the IMEC vis a vis existing route.
India’s Foreign Policy: From Non-Alignment to Multilateralism
Since independence, India’s foreign policy has consistently adapted and evolved. The initial years of the Nehruvian paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s transitioned into the non-aligned movement, steering India away from Cold War politics yet anchored it in a firm friendship with the erstwhile USSR. This phase was followed by an increased emphasis on regional and sub-regional multilateralism, particularly through the SAARC. India altered its foreign policy in response to the economic crisis of the 1990s. India focused on the economic aspects of foreign policy and therefore strengthened ties with Southeast Asian nations, leading to the ‘Look East’ and later ‘Act East’ policy.
With the end of Cold War and the Soviet Union falling apart, Indian foreign policymakers opted to engage with the sole superpower, the US. The India-US relationship, which began in the 90s, deepened strategically with the signing of the civil nuclear deal in 2005. These transitions weren’t sudden ruptures, but rather a gradual reorientation driven by economic and geopolitical factors. Continuity has been present in certain areas. Relations with Pakistan and China have consistently been focal points in India’s foreign policy. Relations with neighbouring countries are a major concern for India, it is evident in its “Neighbourhood First” policy. Foreign policy broadened its scope and ambit in tandem with India’s growing economic leverage and political importance in the world order. The Act East policy has now expanded to include the Asia Pacific, and India’s present foreign policy is distinctly marked by its focus on the Asia-Pacific region and increasing emphasis on multilateralism. The key factors shaping foreign policy today include a firm democratic government, a quest for development, and a thriving economy. In the past two decades, India has joined several new multilateral groupings. Important groupings include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), G20, Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), etc. Each of these groups has a different aim and focus. For example, QUAD and SCO are security-related groups, while the G20 and BRICS have a broader focus on development and cooperation. IMEC’s latest initiative is a clear display of India’s firm commitment to multilateralism.
Geopolitics of Connectivity
The IMEC’s announcement aligns with a current global trend of leveraging transport and logistics arrangements for strategic purposes. The role of roads and railways as instruments of state power to consolidate political power and facilitate resource distribution is widely recognised. In recent decades, various actors in the international system have developed and put into action vast transport and logistics networks to facilitate the movement of people, goods, services, capital, ideas, and knowledge with strategic aims. The existence of mega ports, mega ships, and global transportation networks demonstrates the influence of transport connectivity in international politics.
Several significant initiatives to enhance connectivity have been announced in the last two decades. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, is the most ambitious plan to connect China with Europe and Africa through a labyrinth of rail, road, and power/ energy projects (Tsuji, 2023). In 2016, Japan proposed a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative (Watanabe, 2019). The EU announced a strategy for linking Europe and Asia in 2018 (European Union, 2018). Under the Act East policy, India is actively working on initiatives such as the Trilateral Highway between India-Myanmar-Thailand and the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Corridor project (Sajjanhar, 2016).
Scholars in international politics refer to this trend as the geopolitics of connectivity (Godehardt and Postel-Vinay, 2020). It suggests that nations, either on their own or in collaboration with other like-minded nations, are leveraging their geographical position and economic power to direct and control the flow of resources -physical, financial, and digital-that serve their interest the most. These initiatives are primarily focused on creating physical infrastructure, like roads, rails, ports, pipelines, warehouses, and more. However, these initiatives come with a soft infrastructure of economic dependence, debt finance, and political control. In this scenario, the selection of a connectivity initiative is not solely based on economic factors. A country’s political allegiance and strategic orientation can be determined by the dominant economic and political forces supporting an initiative.
What is IMEC?
IMEC is a part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which was announced at the G7 summit in 2022. The PGII’s goal is to raise $ 600 Billion for sustainable and high-quality infrastructure development in emerging economies (European Commission, n.d.). It is a new version of President Biden’s Build Back Better World initiative. The G7 countries have agreed to provide infrastructure finance to projects meeting standards of transparency, accountability, sustainability, and community development under the PGII. All the signatories to IMEC are members of the PGII. The IMEC consists of two main components, viz the Eastern Corridor, linking India to the Arabian Peninsula, and the Northern Corridor, connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Israel and Greece. The corridor will include a network of shipping lanes, ports, railway lines, energy and fuel lines, and data transmission cables. This will enable the movement of goods, people, energy, data, and ideas among member states.
According to the MOU signed at the G20 summit, “The IMEC is expected to stimulate economic development through enhanced connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe…. This corridor will secure regional supply chains, increase trade accessibility, improve trade facilitation, and support an increased emphasis on environmental social, and government impacts” (PIB, 2023b). The stated aim of the corridor is to achieve comprehensive connectivity, encourage sustainable logistics, and foster economic growth. Undoubtedly, the underlying objective is to propose an alternative to the Chinese BRI that does not involve the detrimental effects of debt traps associated with BRI.
Rationale of IMEC
Currently, there are multiple missing links in this proposed corridor. Upgrading and creating new rail and road networks will be necessary in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Installing power, gas, and data cabling will pose significant challenges in various political jurisdictions. India’s access to the Arabian Peninsula and Europe will improve as a major beneficiary of the IMEC, benefiting its ports on the west coast like Jawaharlal Nehru Port Authority (JNPA), Mundra, and Kandla. The corridor’s broad architecture outlined in the MOU suggests that IMEC will promote trade between North-South and South-South (Monroe, 2023). The IMEC’s economic rationale relies on India becoming a leading trading partner with the EU and the Middle East. When considering the geopolitics of connectivity, the IMEC exemplifies how the strategic and political orientation of member states influences infrastructure finance. Shifting from the typical Western approach, of FTAs, and SEZs for improving trade the focus is now on infrastructure finance in the intended countries. It will be easy to assess the project details thoroughly as they further unfold in both corridors.
Geopolitics of IMEC
It is important to examine the geopolitics behind IMEC. The shipping links between the west coast of India and the Arabian Peninsula via the UAE already exist, making the eastern corridor straightforward. Major ports in India, such as JNPA, Mundra, Kandla, and Pipavav, and Jebel Ali, Fujairah in the UAE are already operational and thriving. Enhanced infrastructure in these ports will enable increased trade capacities. Presently, Indian cargo faces economic obstacles when trying to reach Europe by overland route due to the geographical position of Pakistan which is a strategic adversary, and Iran’s tense relations with the West. The northern corridor provides India with an alternative route to Europe, bypassing Pakistan and Iran by using overland road or rail routes on the Arabian Peninsula. Jitendra Singh, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, hinted at this aspect when he mentioned that the “Bharat-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” redeems post-Partition India’s quest for restoring an extended and deeper connectivity in the region” (PIB, 2023c).
IMEC is considering a northern corridor route that would bypass a major choke point in global shipping by running north of the Suez Canal. A major portion of The Red Sea littoral, including the Bab-El-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden, has long been unstable, putting trade via the Suez Canal at risk. The IMEC corridor will become a safer and more reliable option for member states due to the civil war in Yemen, conflicts in Eritrea, Chinese presence in Djibouti, conflict in Sudan, and recurring attacks by Somalia-based pirates on shipping. Multiple incidents of Houthi rebels targeting commercial shipping between Israeli ports and Yemen have been reported recently (Singh, 2023). Another attack by pirates based in Somalia has taken place (UK MTO, 2023) The combined threat of Houthis and pirates is endangering energy and cargo in the Red Sea. This underlines the necessity of having an alternative passage like the IMEC.
View from Türkiye
The IMEC excludes China and Russia, two major world powers. In the realm of present-day geopolitics, both these states find themselves in an adversarial relationship with the West. Due to the logic of geopolitics of connectivity, they have no role in the West’s initiative. Türkiye and Qatar, two influential regional powers, have also been left out of the IMEC. Both these states stand in stark opposition to Saudi Arabia and Israel, both of whom benefit from the IMEC. Türkiye has announced its initiative in collaboration with Iraq, called the “Iraq Development Road” to connect the Middle East to Europe via Qatar, Iraq, and Turkiye instead of via Saudi Arabia and Israel (Duman, 2023).
Geopolitical Rationale for Member States of IMEC
Every state in the IMEC has a compelling geopolitical rationale to participate. India and China are becoming long-term strategic adversaries. On the eastward side, India is actively implementing its Act East policy and expanding its focus beyond the Asia-Pacific region via the Quad arrangement. Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region face a threat from Chinese incursions in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, and Djibouti. IMEC could effectively counter growing Chinese influence in the IOR and BRI. The added advantage is that it bypasses Pakistan and a problematic state like Iran. Both UAE and Saudi Arabia are firmly aligned with the West and both are establishing ties with Israel amidst domestic and international pressure. IMEC presents a great chance to build bridges with Israel. Saudi Arabia, with Mohammad Bin Salman at the helm, is working towards reducing oil dependence and modernising infrastructure. IMEC provides a good opportunity to decrease the economy’s dependence on oil. The development of new rail links in the northern corridor will primarily occur in interior Saudi Arabia, potentially leading to further growth. Saudi Arabia benefits in the long run by preventing Iran, and Türkiye from gaining influence. From the EU perspective, a direct trade route to India and a secure energy route from the Middle East, bypassing all the trouble spots like war-torn Ukraine, a belligerent Russia, a global choke spot like the Suez Canal, and troubled waters of the Red Sea, strait of Bab-El-Mandeb is a welcome proposition. It will speed up the EU’s uncoupling from China. The EU highly values the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and ensures that any developmental finance is linked to the SDG. The IMEC could be an ideal opportunity for the EU to strengthen its commitment to SDGs and thereby exert influence over the member states. In this complex scenario, Israel could come out as a long-term winner. Israel stands to benefit in the long run from détente with the Arab World, a critical trade position between Asia and Europe, and financial support from the West.
Prospects for IMEC
The question is whether the IMEC will become a reality. Are the lofty ideals of transparency and accountability truly appealing to those who practise them the least? How can the challenges of systematisation and integrating such a vast network across different geographies and political jurisdictions be resolved? The onset of the Israel-Hamas conflict on October 07, 2023, immediately questioned the feasibility of IMEC. The Türkiye adverse reaction has emphasised the actual geopolitical conflict within these competing trade networks. It is too early to give precise responses to these uncertainties, but there are a few key points to ponder.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023, followed months of elaborate preparation and direct and indirect Iranian support. Although IMEC may have served as a trigger due to Israel’s participation, it was not the primary cause of the attack. The attack might have been triggered by the prospect of Saudi Arabia and the UAE establishing peace with Israel, with IMEC being an unintended casualty in the process. The Houthi rebels in South Yemen who are backed by Iran against the Saudis in the Yemeni civil war have started targeting Israeli shipping in the strait of Bab-El-Mandeb. This could be another manifestation of the long-standing enmity between Israel and Iran and another attempt to derail the Saudi-Israel peace process rather than target IMEC as such. As a result of recent attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea area, major shipping lines like MAERSK, Hapag Lloyd, etc. have announced that they will not ply services on the Red Sea route. Iran’s actions provide further justification for IMEC which will create a safer route for goods and energy from the Middle East to Europe bypassing the entire Iranian littoral.
Likewise, an adverse reaction from Türkiye is unlikely to have any long-term impact on the feasibility of IMEC. At best, it underscores an emerging Türkiye-Iraq-Qatar axis in counter to the Saudi-UAE axis in the Islamic world. Nevertheless, Saudi plans for modernisation and development are unlikely to be hindered in the long run.
From a geopolitical standpoint, it will be intriguing to witness whether the US and the EU leverage infrastructure finance to drive governance reforms in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even India. Presently, there are no such indications. Despite their lack of transparent and accountable governance, UAE and Saudi Arabia are close strategic allies of the US and the West. It is uncertain if both states will be asked to bring about more transparency and accountability in their systems. The previous discussion on the geopolitics of connectivity suggests that these countries will be subject to subtle pressure, particularly regarding their project procurement policies.
Conclusion
IMEC offers a strong alternative to China’s BRI, which has faced criticism for its “Debt trap diplomacy” and its negative consequences in countries like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Zambia. IMEC promotes economic growth, trade, and economic integration between India, the Middle East, and Europe while upholding SDGs. By utilising the Arabian Peninsula, IMEC foresees a direct link between India and Europe, bypassing Pakistan, Iran, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. The Israel-Hamas war and conflict in Yemen have raised doubts about IMEC’s feasibility in the short term, but they won’t change IMEC’s geopolitics in the long run. Hence, it has great long-term potential. India needs to grasp the geopolitics of connectivity that form the foundation of the IMEC to fully leverage its advantages.
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