Russia was shaken by a deadly terror attack in the evening of 22 March 2024. During a rock concert in Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, four gunmen stormed and opened fire, leaving 144 dead and many more wounded. Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) claimed the responsibility for this attack through a statement on its Amaq news agency on Telegram. The timing of this attack was crucial, as it came within four days of Putin’s re-election as Russia’s president for the fifth term.
Russian territory had not seen attack on this scale in nearly two decades since a school seizure in Beslan in 2004 that led to around 300 fatalities. However, the country continued to be one of the targets for Islamist terror groups. In 2015, a Russia-bound flight crashed in Egypt leaving all 224 passengers dead. The Sinai branch of ISIS had then claimed to have planted an explosive device on the plane (Starr & Shoichet, 2015). Another terrorist attack took place in St. Petersburg metro in 2017. In 2022, a suicide bomber targeted the Russian embassy in Kabul, when 2 staff members and four locals died. ISIS has claimed responsibility for all these recent terror attacks against Russia or Russians. They have targeted their propaganda against Putin for alleged oppression of Muslims in Russia and for his support to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad (Saarinen, 2024). However, there are multiple layers to this long-drawn confrontation.
The Tajikistan Angle
Immediately after the attack, Russian security agencies caught the four terrorists and put them to the trial before the Russian court of law. Out of four, three pleaded guilty for carrying out the massacre. The police have also arrested a dozen more suspects in this case. It has emerged that all the four gunmen and most of the other detainees hail from Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s security service, working closely with the Russian team, has also detained nine people on the Tajik territory for suspected contact with the perpetrators of the Moscow attack.
This has brought the small, landlocked, mountainous, Central Asian country into the discussion. As a matter of fact, this attack was not the first one in the list of terror activities perpetrated by persons belonging to Tajik nationality. In recent years, there has been an observed increase in terrorist activities involving individuals from Tajikistan. President Rahmon of Tajikistan in a recent interview claimed that as many as 24 Tajiks have committed or planned terrorist attacks in 10 countries in last 3 years (Fergana Agency, March 2024). At the onset of 2024, two Tajik suicide bombers carried out an attack on an Iranian cemetery resulting in nearly 100 fatalities (Webber, 2024). Tajik nationals have also been implicated in terrorist incidents in Afghanistan, with unsuccessful attempts recorded in Germany and Turkey (Umarov, 2024).
Ethnic-Tajiks formed a significant chunk in the list of foreign fighters to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, estimates going as high as 2,000. Instances of Tajik security personnel aligning with ISIS have emerged, exemplified by GulmurodKhalimov, a former head of the Tajik special force who joined the ISIS military ranks in 2015 (Sarkorova, 2015). Khalimov's unique background, which includes military training received in both the United States and Russia, underscores the complex nature of these security challenges. Most of the Tajik fighters were either killed or detained by various countries; however, many of them have also returned home.
The increasing frequency of attacks by Tajik fighters highlights the proliferation of ISIS-K within Central Asia. Over the years, ISIS through its Khorasan branch has exploited the vulnerabilities of central Asian countries for radicalization and recruitment.
Tajikistan emerged as an independent country in December 1991, as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, it is the poorest country in the post-Soviet space. It is landlocked with 93 percent of its territory covered by high mountains. Immediately after independence, the country plunged into the Civil War (1992-1997), between the ruling regime on one hand and Communists and Islamists on the other. This conflict had enduring impacts leaving the nation's economy, infrastructure, and societal fabric severely ravaged. As part of the ceasefire agreement (1997), Islamist factions were granted a share of political power. However, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, which had held representation in the Tajik parliament for long, was banned in 2015. President Rahmon has maintained an authoritarian grip on the country for the past three decades.
Economic hardships and rampant unemployment have compelled Tajik youth to seek livelihood opportunities abroad, exacerbating the nation's reliance on remittances. According to World Bank data, personal remittances constituted approximately 50.9% of Tajikistan's national Gross Domestic Production (GDP) in 2022 (World Bank, 2022). This heavy reliance on remittances hints towards the precarious economic situation facing Tajikistan, with a significant portion of its economy dependent on funds sent by migrant workers. The economic challenges, coupled with lack of political freedom and limited opportunities for socio-economic advancement, create fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups like ISIS-K.
The bulk of remittances flowing into Tajikistan originate from labour migrants employed in Russia. According to estimates by the Russian Interior Ministry, approximately 3 million Tajiks were engaged in various forms of labour in Russia during the period of 2021-2022 (Asia Plus, 2022), which represents more than a quarter of Tajikistan's entire population. This figure encompasses individuals seeking temporary employment opportunities as well as those aiming for permanent settlement in Russia. Notably, in 2022 alone, around 103,000 Tajik nationals were granted Russian citizenship (Ibid.), highlighting the significant demographic impact of Tajik migration to Russia. Tajikistan stands out as one of the only two post-Soviet countries permitting dual citizenship with Russia.
Amidst Russia's aging population, Tajik migrant workers have emerged as a vital component of the Russian economy. However, their integration into Russian society is marred by a plethora of challenges. These include residing in marginalized and ghettoized neighborhoods, receiving meagre wages, undertaking menial jobs, facing discrimination, and experiencing marginalization. Such circumstances render them susceptible to Islamist radicalization. Their vulnerability is exacerbated by the widespread availability of propaganda materials in the Russian as well as Tajik language, which further amplifies the risk of radicalization among Tajik migrant communities residing in Russia.
The ISIS-K Threat
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) is one of the most pressing transnational security threats, after the defeat of the Caliphate in Syria. The name Khorasan applies to an ancient region spread in modern day Iran, Afghanistan, parts of Central Asia and Pakistan. The ISIS-K was formed in 2014 by a collective of defectors from groups like al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and some former Taliban fighters. It has been operating primarily from Afghanistan and Pakistan with estimated 4000-6000 members (Eggink, 2024).
ISIS-K’s expansionist agenda and transnational ideology present significant security challenges for both Russia and Central Asia. Its geographical proximity to these regions raises concerns regarding the potential for spillover effects, including cross-border terrorism and the recruitment of local sympathizers (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The group's propaganda campaigns are particularly targeted at marginalized populations in Central Asia, exploiting grievances related to socioeconomic disparities, lack of political freedom, and ethnic tensions (Ozawa, 2024). Consequently, this has facilitated the recruitment of individuals from these regions, thereby increasing the risk of domestic terrorism and insurgency.
ISIS-K’s expansionist agenda and transnational ideology present significant security challenges for both Russia and Central Asia. Its geographical proximity to these regions raises concerns regarding the potential for spillover effects, including cross-border terrorism and the recruitment of local sympathizers (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The group's propaganda campaigns are particularly targeted at marginalized populations in Central Asia, exploiting grievances related to socioeconomic disparities, lack of political freedom, and ethnic tensions (Ozawa, 2024). Consequently, this has facilitated the recruitment of individuals from these regions, thereby increasing the risk of domestic terrorism and insurgency.
The group’s territorial aspirations in Afghanistan and Pakistan intersect with the strategic interests of both Russia and the Central Asian states. The instability and conflict fuelled by ISIS-K's activities undermine the international efforts aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan and countering the Taliban regime. Russia perceives the Central Asian region as a buffer against Islamist extremism and drug trafficking, making ISIS-K's activities a direct threat to its security interests. Similarly, Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are apprehensive about ISIS-K's potential to exploit ethnic and religious fault lines to incite violence and destabilize the region (Asia Plus, 2022).
ISIS-K's operational capabilities and tactics further aggravate the threat for Russia and Central Asia. The group has demonstrated in recent years the ability to execute sophisticated attacks, including suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, and other forms of violence. Its adeptness at recruiting and mobilizing fighters from diverse backgrounds, including local militants, foreign jihadists, and disillusioned youth, enhances its operational capacity and resilience. Moreover, ISIS-K's adept utilization of social media platforms and encrypted messaging services enables it to disseminate propaganda, radicalize individuals, and coordinate attacks with relative impunity.
Additionally, ISIS-K's strategic alliances and external support networks pose significant challenges for counterterrorism efforts in Russia and Central Asia. The genesis of ISIS-K origins as the Tehreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan and subsequent transformation into the Khorasan Wilayat can be traced back to dissatisfied Pashtun leaders who parted ways from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda (AQ), and the Afghan Taliban (Doxsee, 2021). These alliances facilitate the flow of resources, including finances, weapons, and foreign fighters, thereby complicating efforts to disrupt ISIS-K's activities and dismantle its infrastructure. Furthermore, external factors, such as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and rogue elements within Russia's security apparatus, may exploit ISIS-K for their own geopolitical interests, exacerbating regional tensions and conflicts (Ahuja, 2021).
ISIS-K and the Tajiks
The ISIS-K and its supporters have orchestrated a concerted propaganda campaign specifically targeting Tajik-speaking communities. Central to this effort is the portrayal of the Taliban as primarily Pashtun-centric, emphasizing its perceived hostility towards other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, including Tajiks (Caravanserai, 2022). Tajiks are the second-largest ethnic-group in Afghanistan. Interestingly, number of Tajiks residing in Afghanistan is higher than their population in Tajikistan. By framing the Taliban as predominantly Pashtun, ISIS aims to position itself as a unifying force capable of transcending ethnic divides and challenging established governance structures.
A key tactic employed by ISIS-K involves strategically highlighting Tajik individuals who have either sacrificed themselves or demonstrated unwavering commitment to the ISIS cause (Umarov, 2024). These individuals are showcased as exemplars of dedication and self-sacrifice, serving to foster empathy and recruitment opportunities within Tajik communities. By presenting relatable jihadist role models, ISIS-K seeks to cultivate a sense of solidarity and belonging among Tajiks, thereby enhancing its appeal and influence within the region.
ISIS-K frequently discloses the kunyas, or honorific aliases, of its militants, thereby signalling at their diverse ethnic, linguistic, and national backgrounds (Webber, 2022). These kunyas serve as identifiers denoting affiliations with specific ethnic groups such as Tajik, Baloch, Uzbek, Uighur, and others. By highlighting the varied ethnic compositions of its members, ISIS-K underscores its purported inclusivity and multinational character. This practice of revealing kunyas not only emphasizes the diversity within the ranks of ISIS-K but also serves as a strategic tool for the group to project an image of broad-based support and representation across different ethnic and linguistic communities (Wahlang, 2023). Furthermore, by publicly disclosing the ethnic backgrounds of its militants, ISIS-K seeks to attract individuals from diverse backgrounds who may feel marginalized or disenfranchised within their own societies, thereby exploiting socio-political grievances to bolster its recruitment efforts. This tactic underscores the complex interplay between identity politics, recruitment strategies, and the propagation of extremist ideologies in modern asymmetric conflicts.
The importance of comprehending and addressing the socio-cultural dynamics manipulated by terrorist organizations in their recruitment and dissemination of extremist ideologies cannot be overstated. This intricate interplay between socio-cultural factors and terrorist propaganda presents formidable challenges for counterterrorism efforts, necessitating nuanced strategies that simultaneously target both the ideological allure and the socio-political grievances exploited by extremist groups. It is imperative for effective counterterrorism measures to adopt a holistic approach that extends beyond conventional military and security tactics to encompass socio-economic development, community engagement, and initiatives aimed at enhancing ideological resilience.
Security in Tajikistan
Apart from historical and economic factors, Tajikistan is challenged in terms of security. It shares a long border and entho-cultural spillovers with Afghanistan, where Tajik population outnumbers Tajiks in Tajikistan. The spectre of Islamic fundamentalism emanating across the border, drug and international criminal networks, and porous borders has made the situation even worse. Nevertheless, these challenges have multiplied since the emergence of the ISIS-K. President Rahmon has tried to tackle these security challenges with an iron hand and international partnerships.
Russia continues to be an important security partner of Tajikistan. The security relationship between the two countries is characterized by a multifaceted collaboration aimed at addressing common security challenges and preserving stability in the Central Asian region. Historically, Russia has played a significant role in Tajikistan's security landscape, particularly in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was the main mediator in signing the ceasefire agreement after the Civil War. Tajikistan, in turn, has welcomed Russian support in various security domains, owing to its geopolitical vulnerability and internal security concerns.
One key aspect of Russia-Tajikistan security relations is military cooperation. The Russian military maintains a significant presence in Tajikistan through the strategic deployment of the 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, which is the largest Russian military presence in any foreign country. This installation constitutes a pivotal element of Russia's broader regional security framework, serving as a deterrent against external threats and actively contributing to the preservation of stability not only within Tajikistan but also across the wider Central Asian region. Joint military exercises and training initiatives conducted between Russian and Tajik forces further bolster interoperability and readiness levels, thus enhancing their collective capacity to effectively address prevailing security challenges.
Recent developments have seen approximately 1,500 troops from the expansive Russian military base in Tajikistan redeployed to Ukraine, marking a notable departure from their established operational focus within Central Asia (RFE/RL, 2022). Reports from a Tajik civilian employee associated with a warehouse affiliated with the Russian military base indicate a discernible decline in the volume of food supplies procured by Russian personnel in recent months. Notably, soldiers stationed at the base have purportedly been informed that their deployment to Ukraine is intended to be temporary in nature.
The temporary relocation of a substantial contingent of Russian troops from Tajikistan to Ukraine could potentially disrupt the operational capabilities of the 201st Military Base and diminish its effectiveness in serving as a stabilizing force in Tajikistan and the broader Central Asian region. Furthermore, the economic repercussions stemming from the decreased patronage of local businesses by Russian military personnel may exacerbate socio-economic strains within the surrounding communities. Such developments underscore the intricate interplay between geopolitical shifts, military deployments, and socio-economic dynamics of the region.
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts constitute a pivotal aspect of the security cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan, reflecting their shared commitment to addressing the menace posed by extremist groups operating in the region, notably ISIS-K and the Taliban. These groups represent significant security threats to both nations, with their activities spanning across borders and posing risks to regional stability. In this context, Russia plays a crucial role in supporting Tajikistan's efforts to enhance its counterterrorism capabilities. This support encompasses various dimensions, including the strengthening of border security measures to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and the smuggling of weapons and illicit goods. Additionally, Russia aids in intelligence sharing, facilitating the exchange of crucial information to identify and thwart terrorist plots effectively.
Beyond military and counterterrorism cooperation, Russia and Tajikistan also engage in diplomatic and political dialogue on regional security issues. They are members of various regional organizations, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), through which they coordinate efforts to address common security challenges and promote regional stability.
However, the security relationship between Russia and Tajikistan is not without its challenges. Tajikistan's growing economic dependence on Russia and concerns about maintaining sovereignty amidst Russian influence raise questions about the dynamics of their security partnership. Additionally, tensions may arise due to differences in strategic priorities and diverging interests in the region. Overall, the security relationship between Russia and Tajikistan is characterized by a blend of cooperation, mutual interests, and occasional challenges. Both countries recognize the importance of maintaining stability in Central Asia and are committed to working together to address shared security threats while navigating complexities inherent in their bilateral relationship.
Conclusion
The Moscow terrorist attack has proved that ISIS-K has emerged as one of the biggest security threats in the region and the world. Against the backdrop of Russia's involvement in the Ukraine war since February 2022, relations between Russia and the West are at their lowest point since the Cold War. This attack has sharpened these differences. On one hand, the US has claimed that they had warned the Russian establishments about the attack in the beginning of March. On the other hand, Russia has attributed blame to Ukraine and the West for their alleged role in the attack. Reports have also surfaced regarding the participation of Chechen and Central Asian ISIS terrorists in the Ukraine conflict from the Ukrainian side. Furthermore, the Russian investigative committee alleges financial connections between Ukrainian nationals and the perpetrators of the attack.
The threat of ISIS-K looms large over Russia and the larger Eurasian region. The ongoing conflicts in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Syria, and Afghanistan further complicate the situation. The implications of these developments extend beyond regional borders, posing threats to global peace and security. For India, the rise of ISIS-K and the destabilization of neighboring regions present significant security challenges. India faces the risk of spillover effects from regional conflicts, as well as the potential for increased terrorist activities targeting Indian interests both domestically and abroad. As such, India must remain vigilant and actively engage in diplomatic efforts to address the root causes of terrorism and promote stability in the region.
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