Introduction
It took two great wars to enable the United States (US) to cast away its self-declared isolation (Norwich University 2017; Boyle 1972) and embrace politicking on a global level, ushering in a competitive joust for space in a highly contested world. Events such as the sinking of the Lusitania was the immediate provocation (Trommler 2009) for the US entering the First Great War. In a similarly eerie fashion, the attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor thrusted the Roosevelt administration into joining the Allied powers in the Second Great War (Vidyalankar 1980). As we delve further, successive American administration were compelled to participate in important global events if not by choice then due to compulsion. Be it the Korean and the Vietnam War, countless military interventions in Latin America and Africa or even its experiments in the Middle East (Park 1983), the decisions makers in Washington after tasting a shot of power were reluctant to allow other regional powers, be it the European Union (EU) or any other to take charge of affairs. Colloquial monikers which attributed the US to the Global Policeman did not go down in vain (Fordham 2008).
However, as the age old dictum goes, with great powers comes greater responsibilities, somewhere down the line Washington did renege on its capacities. It should have realised during the Vietnam War and, its inability to keep Latin America close to its core (thus allowing the unscrupulous PRC to fill in the vacuum) (Fitzgibbon 1960), the Second Gulf War and failing to check the PRC (Herring 1991). What however is more astounding is its inability to monitor Pakistan which embezzled funds from the US and hoodwinked a global superpower. A great power’s misplaced priorities ensured the sacrifice of its larger goals and its decline (Riedel 2008). Pakistan which has been rightly called as the epicentre of terrorism not only managed to hoodwink the US for so long, but also ensured a complete show of reversal in Afghanistan with the return of the dreaded Taliban, all the while when other states such as India and even the American intelligence raised serious doubts on the authenticity of Pakistan’s intentions (Kleinberg 2012). At this juncture, the US has not only managed to destabilise the Middle East and Afghanistan it also needs to counter the PRC on a stronger footing, however its varying foreign policy goals and ambitions that lack a clinical execution often puts its ‘allies’ in jeopardy (Gates 1987; Thrall 2018). To offer a brief example, vis-à-vis the PRC, Taiwan often finds itself in a difficult spot especially in the aftermath of the Wuhan virus pandemic that originated in the PRC. Will the American establishment defend its ally from a possible Chinese invasion? How would the US cajole India to join a global alliance against the PRC especially in the aftermath of its fiasco in Afghanistan and even more when it just won’t ditch Pakistan?
A smashed American Dream
Former President George W. Bush’s “you’re either with us or against us” quote rattled Islamabad in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks which were the first attacks on mainland US after some fishy Japanese experiments during the Second Great War (Dunn 2005). The sheer devastation and morbidity of the attack convinced the US to go hard on terror, to zero in on the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for sheltering it and to ‘convince’ the Pakistani establishment (then under the rule of Pervez Musharraf) to aid the American Global War on terror (Wirsing 2003). Twenty years ago, sympathy for the United States ran high and so did the global conviction that terror must be pounded. The rattled Pakistani establishment after rounds of discussions realised that it was yet another opportunity to obtain some precious funds and also keep India off the hook (Mastanduno 2005). The US eager to prove its worth and to maintain the image of a global superpower did not even for once view Pakistan critically, for it required access to a landlocked Afghanistan like it did during the Soviet invasion of the same. The Pakistanis realised that their strategic position gave the US no choice but to depend on them which added to their advantage, and thus all the statements regarding Pakistan’s direct involvement in terrorism were washed away for some temporary logistical aid for which the Americans were generous towards Islamabad (Leffler 2004; Buzan 2006).
During the war in Afghanistan that saw the ousting of the Taliban and the utter decimation of the Al-Qaeda the Americans perceived Pakistan to be a strong strategic ally albeit with some discomfort (Cole 2009). A rising India and its proximity with the US also meant that Washington could not ignore the Indian claims for long. Besides Pakistan’s weak democratic values, a thorough authoritarian way of ruling and its rising proximity to the PRC also made the US question its own moves (Soherwordi 2010). This sheer utter dependency on Pakistan despite multiple examples of its role in terrorism in the entire region was a wakeup call for Washington (Rashid 1999; Cole 2009) which it simply brushed aside. Its utter preoccupation with the Middle East and Afghanistan not only shattered these regions but also the American dream of global domination.
India’s tightrope walk
India, unfortunately has been at the receiving end of Pakistan and Chinese sponsored terrorism, despite which it has indeed done a commendable job of countering it (Bajpai, 2003; Stern 2000). India’s brush with Pakistan sponsored terrorism came in the wake of the early 1990s after the genocide (Narain 2016) against the Kashmiri Pandits. Pakistan quickly realised that it would never be able to defeat its stronger neighbour in a conventional war and therefore resorted to cross border terrorism, additionally it continued its tirade against India on various international platforms with the help of the PRC which offered it a strategic counter-weight. Thus India was boxed in the neighbourhood fighting a defensive non-conventional war. The western powers were not too keen to listen to New Delhi and especially the US did not offer much aid apart from periodically chiding Pakistan. The 9/11 attacks led many to believe that the US would actually go hard on terror only see it once again hobnobbing with Pakistan(Sharma 2012). Pakistan’s misadventures against India is not just limited to cross border terrorism but also cooperation with the PRC to check India while also engaging in a vicious propaganda warfare. Pakistan’s India-centric foreign policy approaches has left it quite vulnerable economically and diplomatically (Calabrese 2015). India’s countermeasures which range from appropriate defensive responses to terror, to cross border strikes and neutralising Pakistani propaganda have borne fruits, however the approach of the US towards the India-Pakistan angle is still disheartening.
In contrast to a couple of decades earlier when the American foreign policy was more in line with Islamabad’s desires, a rising PRC especially in the aftermath of the Wuhan virus pandemic has again put the United States in fix. While it needs India to counter the PRC which is clearly challenging the American hegemony and also threatening its allies in East and Southeast Asia, it cannot renege on Pakistan despite ample evidences of its double-play (New American Foundation 2011; Narayanan 2010). Such a dubious foreign policy objective and approach is not only delusional but creates trust deficit with the US. Although much has changed since the end of the Cold War, American support for Pakistan despite the obvious is in fact the biggest bone of contention. The U.S. must now realise its clear policy failure in Afghanistan due to Pakistan’s covert support to the resurgent Taliban (Miller 2021) and set out its objective in a clear fashion if it is willing to engage in a constructive partnership with India.
America’s changing enemies
Being a dominant superpower the onus is on the US to maintain its strategic reliability for which it has periodically taken on various ‘foes’. The American media has been quick to raise tempers back in the states and its veritable war machine has often proven to be more than a match against its foes (Sides & Gross 2013). One may also notice that during the period of the Cold War, communism and communist states were the bête noire of Washington, which in the post-Cold War Islamic terrorism became the rallying point in defining undesirable elements. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and also a possible military showdown in the Southeast Asian region exhibits how the ‘foes’ of the United States have periodically changed (Begleiter 2002) with only one element being constant, its utter dependency on a beleaguered and financially inefficient Pakistan. It is indeed hard to explain such a paradox.
Any hegemonic power has to take into consideration a few factors, primarily it must consider the changing international scenario with rise of new powers, fading away of older ones, newer conflicts and issues. Secondly, it must also realise that relationships may alter over a period of time and hence it must be open to all sorts of possibilities. Finally, it must deal with errant states and non-state actors with an iron hand if all diplomatic means fail (Walker 1996; Hayes 1988); Wilkinson 1999). If we are to observe these factors then the US should have realised that much has changed since the end of the Second Great War and more so after the end of the Cold War. Regarding changing nature of relationships it should understand that certain ‘allies’ such as Pakistan have gone rogue and should be dealt with, while the US should be more amicable with responsible powers (Ganguly 2004). The rise of the PRC which is on a path of confrontation with the US does not bode well for the latter (Chai 2002). Finally, the US must deal with Pakistan in a stronger way without buying its bargain of a strategic depth.
On analysing these three precedents of a hegemonic power, the misery lies in the fact that the US ignored all these vital arguments, instead going in for unnecessary wars, invading states which ultimately led to an asymmetric guerrilla warfare which the US could not deal with. Memories of the Vietnam War are still fresh in the minds of many American GIs (Shy 1971) and adding the events of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars exhibits how a stronger military could not keep up with insurgents despite tremendous power. For a change, the U.S. must desisting from pushing away its allies and draw up a common plan of action and pay attention to the genuine grievances of states like India, Taiwan and Japan to say the least before thrusting its opinions on them.
America’s changing enemies
Pakistan’s relation with the US could either be seen as an act of compulsion or a choice, but it certainly never was a partnership. As an act of compulsion, post 9/11 the Pakistani administration had no choice but to heed the call to fight against terror which obviously meant only fighting those which hurt American interests (Khan 2010; Singh 2009), while the US looked the other way considering Pakistan’s dark reputation regarding cross border terrorism against India. As a matter of choice it is rather more historical as the Pakistanis warmed up to the US back in the heydays of the Cold War along with Turkey. This offered the Western powers led by the US a couple of Islamic nations that would give it a strategic advantage (Rafique 2011). Indeed, one must admit that the Pakistani administration has been quite cunning for all these years in its pursue of an India-centric foreign policy which however has only served them for a shorter period.
Till the end of the Cold War, Islamabad has always been quite successful in banter against India, gaining sympathy and support from many of the Western states including the US. Bolstered by this and also with foreign aid flowing into its coffers (Alavi 1998), the Pakistani military managed to gradually increase its hold over the civilian government. In fact Pakistan must be one of those few states that maintains a civilian government as a façade while the ISI and the military call the shots which often confuses democratically elected governments of other states (Nasr 2004; Indurthy 1991). The US is also to blame for this fiasco as it never questioned the motives of the Pakistani military, its role in cross border terrorism against India and never sought clarifications regarding numerous incidents of nurturing terrorism. In fact, Pakistan became perhaps the most important ‘strategic’ ally (Wagner 2010) of the US in Asia during the Soviet-Afghan war. This war showcased the strategic location of Pakistan, and further convinced Washington that Pakistan as an ally could be trusted, maintaining it would not incur a lot of expenses, leading to stability within the region. Little did the American policy makers realise that much of the foreign aid would end up in private coffers (Ali 2007; Hasan 1967; Cohen 2010) while the entire Western neighbour of India would be caught in a vortex of terrorism, financial insecurity and instability in the region.
It was only after 2012 with the liquidation of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan that Washington finally realised the duplicity of Pakistan (Bergen 2021), despite which the Americans were reluctant to downsize the relations between both the states and instead hoped that Islamabad would be sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism. Little did the American policy makers realise that, Pakistan in its quest for avenging the humiliation of 1971 and its sheer obsession with India would go to any extent to lend credence to their objective. Being a rentier state with a flawed democracy (Milam 2018), Pakistan at best could be described as a state which focuses on its strategic depth in order to eke out concessions which again feed its military at the cost of governance. Unfortunately, the U.S for years turned a blind eye to the obvious reality which led to the fiasco in Afghanistan.
Few words on the current situation
It would be of course wrong to completely write-off the US as a major global power although it must be admitted that the current scenario does not bode well for it. Experimental wars and inept policies have placed the US in a situation that no global power would wish to be in. As discussed earlier newer powers emerge over a period of time and the changing situations call for a change in policies (Biswas 2016). For instance, for years the PRC have made inroads in previously uncharted territories (Navarro 2016) while the US focussed on wars in the Middle East and in Afghanistan American funding of the biological experiments in the PRC has also come under public scrutiny of late which is connected to the deadly Wuhan virus pandemic (Chakrabarty 2021). Of late the American policy makers have been rather inept in dealing with threats from Beijing. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was not only hasty but done in a very callous manner which has offered free ammunition to Beijing to continue its tirade against the US, thus shifting the debates form its complicity in the Wuhan virus pandemic to the imbroglio in Afghanistan. With Pakistan now openly siding with the PRC and taunting the US, it is indeed time that Washington realises that it was funding an ‘ally’ which can be compared to Judas (Fair 2021). Furthermore, the US cannot keep shifting its focus from region to region. Even the allies of the US such as Japan, South Korea and Western Europe have their own aspersions regarding its policies (Sly 2021).
Having said that, the US cannot hope to cajole allies for its own security reasons and channelize them to join an American led alliance. The US must treat partners equally and should castigate Pakistan regarding which is neck deep in duplicity. Similarly, it must also understand that its adversaries may not be the same for other partner states. With limited options the US must now heed some sane words instead of going gung-ho in a chaotic world.
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