Latin America witnessed frequent struggle for influence between the former Soviet Union, and the US. The latter always maintained an upper hand. The former Soviet Union exercised considerable influence over Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. With Cuba, the former Soviet Union offered massive aid and even installed missiles to defend itself against the US leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Relations with Nicaragua improved after 1979. In 1979 the Somozas ceded power to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua which led to greater Soviet-Nicaragua friendship, thus becoming a major irritant for the US. With Venezuela the US enjoyed satisfactory relations but with the onset of Chavez’s assumption of presidency in 1999, the US lost its influence gradually. Venezuela on facing harsh sanctions from the US turned towards Russia.
Russia’s initial approach to Latin America-
Post-Soviet disorder crept within the newly formed Russian Federation. It would have to face insurmountable challenges especially as the US emerged as an undisputed leader (Edelman 1988). It looked inwards and countries in Latin America had to depend on the US. Issues that plagued Latin America were high inflation, poverty, corruption and lack of basic amenities. The US quickly showered benefits to all those states which aligned with it, while keeping out those who were not in conformity with its foreign policy (Leonard 1999). Notably Cuba, Nicaragua and later on Venezuela found itself at odds with Washington.
Post-Soviet Russia had a number of objectives on its hands when it came to dealing with Latin America. Like the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) it realized its limitations when dealing with a region that was geographically far away. It also realized that the US would disallow any major foreign power to play a key role in its special sphere of influence. The only way that Russia could ever make some gains in the region would be to strengthen its relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela and make inroads into other countries (Mijares 2014). One peculiar feature of Latin America which Russia considerably exploited was that a change in regime could spell a change in its foreign policy. This peculiar feature harbouring the region offered the former Soviet Union to make inroads into Cuba after the fall of the Batista government and also into Venezuela when Hugo Chavez assumed power.
Russia realized that it does not have the means to pursue a Soviet style strategy in Latin America, and while the US has advantages the rise of other nations such as the PRC, South Korea, Japan and India also offer challenges. In an increasingly globalised world it would gradually become difficult for the US to maintain an eternal hegemony over Latin America and therefore Russia could find some space to exert its influence.
Russia’s strategy is deviant from its Soviet predecessor. More than ideological underpinnings, stress is laid on cooperation on various issues and implying various models. These are not just necessarily to counter the US position, but to enable strategic depth (Levaggi & Albertoni 2022). Whereas during the Cold War, strategic depth implied essential hard power; Russia’s stance has changed gradually towards the use of both hard as well as soft power. Taking advantage of the American complacency in the region, Russia steadily begun to court the Latin American states. In the 1990s, Moscow realized that its relationship with Latin America under the aegis of the former USSR was based on economic aid and with strong ideological leaning; hence it could not pursue the same. It was only in the early 2000s when Russia pursued a deviant strategy (Barman 2022).
Russia’s diplomatic outreach to Latin America-
In the early 2000s, Russia made gradual outreach towards Latin America; former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was instrumental in making several visits to the region. Trade increased especially with states such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Peru. However, the trade was mostly driven by its requirement of energy and raw materials while the Latin American states imported finished Russian goods (Barman 2022). Agriculture and intermediate products also played a key role in the trade relations. Latin America’s turn towards the Left gave some space to Russia to manoeuvre and establish strong partnerships in the region. More than ideology, mutually agreeable terms played a key role in fomenting relationships. For instance, increased American interference in the region gave rise to opposition and Russia managed to capture the space. Countries such as Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua understood that Moscow would not question its internal policies as long as it maintained cordial relationship (Ellis & Berg 2022). Such leeway allowed the development of greater relationships. Leaders such as Raul Castro, Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega realized that Russia could be an effective counter-balance to the US (Malamud et. al. 2022).
These states welcomed Russia’s limited military cooperation, writing off debts and investments. In turn they allowed the Russians to conduct joint military exercises in the region much to the chagrin of the Americans and a political space to counter the US.
Resurgent Russia and Latin America under Putin
Russia’s interests were mainly confined to its neighbourhood in the initial years and it was only after 2000 that it tried to look beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Notably, after 2012 with the re-election of President Putin, interest in Latin American increased manifold (Berg 2022).
For Moscow, Latin America is primarily important due to its geographical location. Proximity to the United States makes it lucrative and it was in this background that Russia’s relationship with these three Latin American states were termed as strategically important. Even in early 1997, the then Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Boris Nemtsov stated that Russia’s strong relationship with Latin America would compel the US to rethink its policies in the immediate vicinity of Moscow (Brancoli 2022; Berg 2022). Russia has always alleged that the US policies in the former Soviet states ignore Moscow’s concerns.
The real test occurred in 2008 and in 2014 when Russia created autonomous territories after a brief engagement with Georgian forces in 2008 (Ramani 2021). Four years later in 2014, Russia had another tussle with Ukraine leading to the annexation of Crimea and in both these occasions, while many Latin American states voiced concerns over Russia’s approaches, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela remained steadfast in their support for Moscow (Claudia 2022; Arturo 2022). In other states too, depending on the political orientation of the regime, relations with Russia are determined either in a positive or in a lukewarm way. For instance, Argentina under the presidency of Cristina Kirchner was very receptive to Russia and in fact under current President Alberto Fernandez the reception has become even greater. Lula’s presidency in Brazil also witnessed a sudden improvement of ties with Moscow. Ecuador under Rafael Correa, Bolivia under Evo Morales became closer to Moscow owing to the ideological tensions with Washington (Claudia 2022; Dempsey 2022).
Russia on three counts has made an impact on Latin America. In terms of tourism, Russian tourists frequently visit the place as there are barely any visa restrictions. Russian arms and heavy equipment sales to the region also occupy and important position but the telecast of Russian news in Spanish by the Russia TV is one of the hallmarks of information sharing in the region (Global Voices 2022; Berg 2022). The state funded TV network is involved in highlighting Russia’s position on major events in the world and is widely watched in Latin America. Policy makers in Moscow understand that it would be difficult to compete with the US or other European rivals in Latin America. It is in this aspect that information sharing becomes a crucial part of Russia’s approach to Latin America.
Methods of Russian Approach to Latin America
President Putin’s approach to Latin America has been steady, and not as an outright challenge to the US. Moscow was attuned to the fact that domestic and neighbourhood issues should receive primary focus, despite which it was important to make an outreach to Latin America. Russia’s approach is mainly geopolitical in nature and also to obtain support and legitimacy for its actions in the international order. As a result of which it becomes highly imperative for Russia to consider Latin America seriously.
Russia’s first approach is to build alliances pan-Latin America, in which it has tried to solidify its relations with those states that seek an independent approach from the US. Apart from the three states it has made strong outreaches to countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Argentina and Peru (Claudia 2022). The result may not be phenomenal as the US is still the primary power in that region, nevertheless in 2014 Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela voted against a resolution that condemned Russia’s actions in Crimea (Barman 2022; Buenos Aires Times 2022). A difficulty that Russia faces is the change in regimes in Latin America which may lead to abrupt shifts in foreign policy orientation.
Trade and investment are another aspect for developing close relationships. Even though Russia cannot match the might of the US in terms of economic prowess, it has still over the past decades attempted to foster economic relations. Brazil and Mexico share around 50 percent of the total trade with Russia in Latin America while Russian investment in the region runs around 20 billion dollars. Russia has focused mostly on the oil and gas sector in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico (Gurganus 2018; Kim 2015; Mijares 2014). In terms of agriculture its focus is mostly on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
Perhaps Russia’s military power projection is remains the primary tool of influence in the region. Visibly taken aback by the NATO expansion and deployment in its immediate vicinity, Moscow understands that its troop and military deployment in Latin America will be a strong counter. (Lane 2022; Parkinson 2022). Notably, Russia’s military advancements have been again in the mentioned three states. Russia requires a military outlet in Latin America, which so far it has not been able to achieve. However, it has made some advancement in the recent past which is military exercises and export of arms.
Russia and Latin America today
Despite hiccups, the US has more leverage internationally; in contrast Russia has difficulty in finding support for its policies. Apart from the PRC no other major power has openly supported it. In Latin America, the condemnation regarding Russia’s actions on Ukraine was subtle in nature (Moncada 2022). While the US hoped for more support from Latin America, the region chose to remain non-aligned even refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow. However, none of the Latin American states voted in favour of Russia in the UNGA resolutions. Its allies, Cuba and Nicaragua abstained from voting while Venezuela owing to its status of suspension could not exercise its vote. Others such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina voted in favour of the resolution, thus condemning Russia’s advances towards Ukraine (Moncada 2022). In another vote which called for Russia’s suspension from the UN Human Rights Council, Russia witnessed some success. Countries such as Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua voted against the resolution. Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname abstained. This of course does not imply a sudden change in the foreign policy of Latin American states, but it would be hard to deny Russia’s influence in the region. Like its predecessor, Moscow looks for points of friction between Latin America and the US and seeks to capitalize on them (Muro 2022; Parkinson 2022). As Latin America seeks to carve out a niche for itself in a highly globalised world, it seeks to build relationships with various players. Russia understands this position and hence seeks to build on the gaps provided by the region and cement its position.
Latin America and Russia in the backdrop of the events in Ukraine
The events in Ukraine, no doubt divided the region once again as it has happened in the past. States such as Argentina, Colombia and Chile condemned the invasion strongly but declined from imposing sanctions. Later on Ivan Duque, the Colombian President affirmed that diplomatic ties with Russia may be severed due to the ongoing conflict. Some other states were more careful with their stance but appealed for peace (Muro 2022; Berg 2022). Despite the best wishes of the US, the Latin American states chose an independent path towards gauging the situation in Ukraine and its impact. The surprising factor was Chile, as President, Gabriel Boric turned out to be quite vocal against the actions of Russia. Others such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Peru adopted a measured stance, also reminding the world of their bilateral relations with Russia (Rodriguez 2022). States such as Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua solely blamed the US and the NATO for the crisis by provoking Russia (Ellis& Berg 2022). These three countries are closely tied to the Russian financial system and hence sanctions on Moscow will indirectly have an effect on them.
Although the responses from the Latin American states are varied to some extent, there are some important points to ponder. Primarily, Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua are the only three states that have taken an open position defending Russia. The larger states are more calculated in their response, underlining the strong bilateral relations with Russia and China (Tokatlian 2022). The US despite its best intentions has not been able to push out Russian influence from the region, even though it remains as the leading partner state of most Latin American nations. During the Cold War, various Latin American states were embroiled in conflicts over which they had very little choice. In the present context with a rising China and a resurgent Russia on one side and the US and its allies on the other, these states do not wish to become a part of a conflict over which they have no control. Currently the protracted conflict has casted Russia’s future in uncertainty and as a result of which it would require allies to mitigate the impact of the war (Wilkinson 2022; Frontier View 2022).
As the battle for influence continues in Latin America, Russia may still face an uphill task. The US on the other hand will be extra cautious to prevent states in the region from switching sides. Latin America’s strategic importance will increase in course of time; therefore it would be interesting to keep an eye on the developments.
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