Kashmir Imbroglio Conflict Resolution through Strategic Interactions
“All models are wrong, some are useful!
The paper is based on some of the useful models, not formula based models, but agent based models. This consists of,
1. Premises
2. Explains type of conflict
3. Role of external factors
4. Strategic interaction for conflict resolution
I. Premises
1. The first premise is, the current conflict is, inorganic and not organic in the sense that, this is not home grown, but role of, external factor cannot be over emphasized. Cross border influence of the neighboring country, which considers terrorism as the instrument of state policy has inorganically caused this state of conflict
c) The author uses’ Threshold Model of collective behavior1 ’ It explains the support internally.
If the threshold of taking to weapons is
As in case A, despite lower threshold. One would not take to weapons if the support for the first instigation does not come from outside.
a) Similarly as per “ standing aviation model2 - S = Q + E > T Where Q = Quantum of Instigation, E = External Factor or error - Threshold is lower, people stand. - Standing ovation is possible if more than X % of people stand. Here, despite minimum instigation or disgruntlement, if external factor is high, people would cause agitation and standing aviation model would be applicable. Thus, Peer effect + Signal would come in effect.
b) It has been well documented that, the brutality of LeT and JeM can clearly be identified to be different from brutality of JKLF and Hijbul mujahidin.
2. Second premise being, this external provocation has led to intergroup conflict. Here the author uses, segregation Model3 . This states that, people who stay together, think alike, speak alike, and behave alike. This can happen due to
a) Peer effect, ie due to peer group effect, they adapt themselves to the group thinking
b) Sorting effect, i.e if they are different from the group surrounding them, they leave the cell, and go to the cell where there is a group thinking alike. The following table shows, there has been a lot of sorting effect, due to Exudus tip (People Leaving) and not Genesis tip (People entering) and in the last 20 yrs., the segregation index based on ethnicity has change from approximately 68% to 98%.
Genesis Tip or Exudus Tip Demography
Last 20 yrs. segregation index (approx.) 68% 98%
3. This has both Rational and Emotional contents.
In this kind of Game theoretic model, the agitation has already started. The Indian govt. has a choice of threatening to strong arm the Agitation or not and in first case, the agitators can withdraw or defy. In the pay off the first number is of India , and the second is of the Agitators. Obviously rather than going to 2 pay off, India would want to threaten and rather than setting for -8 pay off, the agitators would like to withdraw, hence, the Sabgame equilibrium is, India threatens and Agitators with draw. But then, why would the agitators start the game in the first place?
(b) Consider the role of an external force, its whose consideration, the pay offs are different. In whose calculation, the payoff of losing face, honor not disturbing peace of India is much worse than withdrawing, in which case they would not withdraw and defy. This typically seems to thee game of the rogue neighing state or non-state actors.
3. (A) Strategic interaction can change pay offs: Consider the following interactions: In the above example. At a value of P = 0.27, the above game can be converted to bottom game by external factors but India can also revenue it, using other factors like diplomacy, public diplomacy etc., and minimize such effects.
(B) One can also consider negotiation as an important tool. Hence the auto uses sequential coordination game- Battle of sexes,
It a man on dating wants to go to football and the lady wants to go to opera, the pay offs are as per (a). The solution could be, in the first week they go to opera and serbsequest week they go to football watch. But, when we include factors like suspicion, blind dates they pay off are like. (b) and there is not sub game equilibrium.
(c) using Neutrosophic Game, (Fuzzy Dynamic Fuzzy bargaining Game)4 as the situation is extremely dynamic also does not lead to any result, as bringing U.N (Human rights) in on Kashmir issue, Uri Attack, constant cross boarder terrorism and ceasefire violations has vanished semantic negotiation space hence, Pakistan strategy vectors : - Internationalize Kashmir problem - Bring India an negotiating table India strategy Vectors - Stop cross borders terrorism - No negotiation except Pak occupied Kashmir - Declare Pak a rogue state
II. Type of conflict:
Yet another aspect of the conflict in Kashmir in, typically an In-group out-group conflict. Hence, a) Hostility in the intergroup interaction results in the fraction of parochial members of at least are group is sufficiently large.
b) The possibility of conflict increases with the difference between the parochial altruists between the groups- This causes phase tradition
c) During peacetime the payoff of Tolerant non altruists in more, whereas during war time parochial altruists is more leading to fitness
d) This agent based model doesn’t necessarily speak of ethnicity only
III. Role of External factor
Apart from Ingroup outgroup conflict, the cause of conflict among nations has been well explained by Charles Doran’s Power cycle theory, where a revisionist power challengers a status quo power at the inflection point.
More often than not, it is the stronger state, which has the possibility of winning has the incentive of waging war against the weaker state. Then why would a weaker state cause even an asymmetric war against stronger state? The author here, addresses this phenomenon as context as cause which is neither sufficient nor necessary condition under which weak state wages war against strong state, but makes certain outcomes more or less likely in combination with other factors using
1. Power Transition Theory, “This is a war initiated by state, that feels more dissatisfied regardless of whether one in defender or challenger. Here, a weaker power would be more dissatisfied with status quo if it is in loss frame.
2. Windows of opportunity Theory. Policy makers decide to choose wars where the conditions are suitable for them, and such conditions world drastically worsen as time lapses. Thus Even a weak state would wage war that is anxious about future. This would be preventive or preemptive war
3. Diversionary Theory : This is external use of force for internal political purpose or internal compulsions.
4. Rational Choice Theories : Limited goals for military action in asymmetric conflict like better negotiation advantage
To analyses those, the author uses cognitive model, as combination of Game theory and prospect theory combining perceptions of rich and frame effect
The analysis suggests that
1. While strong states have preference order of prisoners Dilemma, weak states have preference order of chicken Game.
2. If credibility of Punishment is increased, strong state can push weak state thus preventing defection
3. Decision makers of rogue state in loss frame seek risky choiceGain frame choose safe choice. Hence strong state should make defection costly.
4. For weak state, - In chicken game co-operation is safe choice, defection is risky choice. - In prisoners Dilemma, co-operation in risk choice and defection is safe choice Sang Hun park has given enough imperical evidence to demonstrate this phenomenon U.S. Army War college clearly differentiates between ‘deterrence’ and ‘coercion’ and emphasizes on capability, credibility and effective imposition of unacceptable costs. Centre for strategic and international studies in such situations recommends deconstructing the network into component parts and deter them independently
This brings us to a conclusion that, strategically dealing with a weak rogue state requires proactive, credible use of strong incentives and disincentives, so as to make cost of defection high, thus converting the Chicken game into prisoner’s Dilemma game. Thus ensuring that the weak rogues state does not gamble and take undue risks threatening the strong state
Weak State’s choice in an asymmetric conflict
Strong states Preference Order : DC > CC > DD > CD (Prisoners Dilemma)
Weak States preference Order : DC > DD2 > CC > CD >DD1 (Chickens Game)
IV. Strategic interaction for conflict resolution:
(a) Short term :Externally
1) Increase cost of misadventure to an unacceptable level
2) Credibility of action to be high
3) Increase threat perception, while engaging civilian us in interactions and isolate rogue state internationally
Internally 1) Identity nodes and reduce clustering coefficient (Graph theory)
2) Appreciate difference in motivation b) Long Term : 1) Hard line on agitators cross border terrorism
2) Affecting demography with peer effect, Genesis effect
3) Bring only Pak occupied Kashmir an negotiating table
4) Develop sta ge – 3 Capacity
Limitation : This study does not include factors like U.S, China and Others
Reference :
1. Granovetter, mark, Threshold model of collective behavior, Americal journal of Psychology, (1978)
2. Miller, J.H and Page S.E Standing ovation odel. Complecity (2005)
3. Schielling, Thomes, Segregation model (1971)
4. Choi, jung Kyoo, Bowles, Samnual, the coevolutions of parochial aAlthuism and war, www. Sciencemag.org (2007)
5. Pracmanik, surapati, Roy, Tapankumar, Nutrosoph ic Game, Netrosophic Sets and System (2013)
6. Parnk, Sang Hynn, Cognitive theory of war (2004
