Abstract
According to Karin Kneissel, the former Foreign Minister of Austria; ‘European countries are growing ever weaker on the international stage and their places are being taken by Asian countries’. Further, she states that “European leaders, through ignorance and arrogance, are neglecting the existing geopolitical realities and basic principles of diplomacy and this has created a dangerous situation”.
Pakistan factor has played a significant role in India-US relations during the Cold War period. Subsequently, in the post-Cold War era Pakistan began getting de-hyphenated from the India-US relations. Both these democracies strengthened their partnership in the 21st century based on common political, strategic, and economic interest. The article concludes that currently the Pakistan factor though has faded away in India-US relations but has not completely disappeared.
Keywords: India-US Relations, Pakistan, Cold War, Post-Cold War, China.
Introduction
Since its independence, India has witnessed major transitions in the global order. Broadly, India’s foreign policy and particularly its bilateral relations with big powers have shaped within this framework of the changing global context. The article begins by examining how India-US relations were hyphenated with Pakistan during the Cold War. It further analyses the change that eventually came in the post-Cold War world order wherein Pakistan started getting de-hyphenated from India-US relations. At the cusp of the new millennium, India-US relations took an enormous leap and started looking at the bilateral relations beyond the lens of Pakistan. The article concludes that the significance of the Pakistan factor in India-US relations is currently on the decline but yet has not completely vanished.
Cold War Years- India-US Relations and the Pakistan Factor
August 1947 was a turning point in the history of the Indian subcontinent. The British colonial rule came to an end and two new nations, India and Pakistan, were born. India emerged as the largest democratic nation, while Pakistan was created as a Muslim state. This was also the period of the end of the Second World War, followed by the rise of the United States of America as a superpower. From the struggle against Britishers to faith in democratic principles, the commonalities between India and the US were numerous. It was expected to be natural for these two countries to strike a friendly chord. But this friendship never came to fruition due to multiple factors. The first important reason that severely exacerbated India-US relations was the preoccupation of the US, as the leader of the Western countries, to contain the Soviet expansionism that led to the Cold War and the accompanying policies toward the South Asian region (Gould & Ganguly, 1993). Secondly, India’s preoccupation with the policy of nonalignment and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru recognized as a leading voice of third-world nonaligned nations who rejected the premises of the Cold War of either joining the American-led Capitalist or the Soviet-led Communist bloc. The US was perturbed and viewed India with suspicion in the decade of 1950s. The US perceived a series of India’s actions as pro-communist, such as formally recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and later advocating a permanent seat for Communist China in the United Nations Security Council; India’s initial stance during the Korean War was of showing reluctance to send combat troops to join the UN forces in Korea. The US found these Indian policies as stumbling blocks in its Cold War calculations. The US was quick to realise the importance of the geostrategic location of Pakistan for establishing airbases and intelligence gathering facilities for countering or balancing the Soviet influence in South Asia (Palit, 2001). Moreover, Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf made it useful as a shield for protecting the Middle East oil fields in the eventuality of hostilities in Asia (Palit, 2001).
At this backdrop the US decided to make India pay the price for its policy of neutralism in international affairs and its closeness with the communist world by incorporating Pakistan into the alliance systems of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955(Gould &Ganguly, 1993). Here onwards Pakistan factor played an important role for both India and US in their mutual interaction.
With the strategic alliance, Pakistan officially became a trusted ally of the US, but much before the US had demonstrated its pro-Pakistan stand on the issue of Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Pakistan from the mid-1950s began receiving the US economic and military aid (1951-60 received $1723.8 million aid) (Kumar and Verma, 2021) mainly to contain the Soviet expansionism in the region. India perceived this as an enormous threat to its national security and interest.
A brief stint of positive vibes developed between the two estranged democracies during the 1962 India-China war. Bruce Riedel in his book JFK'S Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War give a detailed account of the US President J.F. Kennedy’s resolute support to India, including an airlift of supplies to the Indian Army and firm warnings to Pakistan to stay out of the conflict (Riedel, 2015). Pakistan saw an opportunity to develop friendly relations with India’s arch-rival China in the aftermath of the 1962 India-China war. Despite Congressional pressures, President Kennedy took special interest and a realistic approach to give development aid to India by overlooking India’s non-aligned policy and its tilt towards the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the closeness that mushroomed between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru to fight against communist China soon came to an end with the assassination of President Kennedy. Lyndon Johnson, who then entered the oval office, failed to continue the goodwill that was developed during the times of Kennedy and Nehru. Since Lyndon Johnson did not extend any military cooperation, India then turned to the Soviet Union for military aid.
On the Kashmir, issue a war broke out in 1965 between India and Pakistan. The war once again made India’s relations with the US sour as the Pakistanis used the American supplied weapons in the Battle of Rann of Kutch. The US neutral approach towards the war and further its action to treat both the South Asian neighbours equally while imposing an arms embargo create danger in India along with a wave of anti-Americanism. The US tilt towards its ally was evident when, in 1970, a one-time exception was made for Pakistan by approving a package of ‘300 armoured personnel carriers and aircraft worth $50 million’ (Kux, 2008).
The 1971 India-Pakistan war sustained severe distrust in India about the US and deteriorated their relations as the Washington openly displayed its solidarity with Islamabad and accused New Delhi of aggression and suspended economic assistance. More disturbing for India was President Nixon’s action of sending an American aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) into the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 and pushing India and the US on the brink of a confrontation. The US and China had been Pakistan’s prime supporters during the war, which raised fears among Indians that the three countries were forming a strategic entente that would threaten India (Gould & Ganguly, 1993). The Superpower and the South Asian politics had become complicated and entangled. The snowball effect was the signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty in 1971.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 once again brought South Asian politics at loggerheads. On the basis of intelligence reports indicating that Pakistan is acquiring the ability to make nuclear weapons, the Carter Administration took the decision to cut off economic and military assistance to Pakistan in April 1979 (Burt, 1979). By 1980, the US realised the importance of Pakistan as a frontline state in dealing with the Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, thus restarted military and economic aid. The US offered Pakistan $400 million in economic and military assistance over the next two years (Oberdorfer, 1980). The US and Pakistan signed a six year agreement in 1981 under which a $3.2 billion military and economic aid package was offered to Pakistan (Gwertzman, 1981). Furthermore, a separate deal was worked out to speed the delivery of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan (Gwertzman, 1981). India viewed these developments as a direct threat to its territory (as F-16 would cover up to 60% of India) and generally disturbing the prevailing regional power balance leading to a serious set-back to India-US relations. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, reiterating the longstanding Indian argument against US military aid to Pakistan, complained that “we have faced this tilt against India for many years” (New York Times, 1981). The Indian decision to buy the Mirage-2000 was an answer to the US agreement to supply to India’s adversary Pakistan with F-16 tactical aircraft (Singh, 1984).
Pakistan put up its case for military assistance as it viewed security threat from India’s military build-up and close ties with the Soviet Union. The impression created was that the US-Pakistani ties were intended to defend the latter against a pro-Soviet India. The South Asian expert Selig Harrison wrote in New York Times in 1981, “What makes the present crisis far more ominous than any past periods of tension in India-United States relations is that the Administration has fundamentally altered the rationale for military assistance to Pakistan. Administration officials do not seek to justify arms aid solely or even primarily in terms of the threat posed by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They frankly acknowledge that Pakistan wants help mainly to build up its military posture vis-à-vis India, and they have pointedly refused to give public or private assurances to New Delhi that Washington would not permit American weaponry to be used in an Indian-Pakistani conflict (Harrison, 1981).
From mid-1985, the development of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities became a source of tension between India-US relations. It was a great cause of security concern for India, within no time India re-evaluated its nuclear policy and declared the building of the Dhruva the largest nuclear research reactor. This was a strong warning for Pakistan that India intends to maintain regional superiority in the arms race. The nuclear competition between the two South Asian neighbours became fierce at this point in time. During Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s three-day visit to the US in December 1987, he put it succinctly to the US administration as to how close Pakistan was to building nuclear weapons (Bhure, 1997). India had been consistently cautioning Washington of Islamabad’s clandestine nuclear programme and alleged that aid cut by the US would act as a big deterrent. However, the Reagan administration refused to accept India’s longstanding argument despite of the US Congress also building pressure to stop aid to Pakistan. In December 1987 Washington decided to continue with the US economic and military assistance of $480 million to Pakistan despite evidence that Pakistan tried to smuggle nuclear-weapons material out of the United States an act that normally would trigger an automatic cut-off of aid (Wines, 1988). Reagan’s decision of aid was criticised by Congressmen saying that it’s a severe blow to the US policy of nuclear proliferation (Wines, 1988). The Reagan administration reasoned out that a ban on US aid “would be counterproductive for the strategic interests of the United States, destabilizing for South Asia” and unlikely to stop Pakistan from building bombs, in any case (Wines, 1988).
In a nutshell, India objected to and continuously resented the US biased policy towards Pakistan while overlooking India’s security concerns. India perceived that the US economic and military aid to Pakistan was not used to contain the Soviet Union but was manoeuvred against India. As an effect, Pakistan turned out to be a major irritant throughout the Cold war period, trapping the two democracies into a hyper game of perception, misperception and deception (Meteskiet al., 2010) hence distancing them from each other.
Post-Cold War-A mix of old and new trends in India-US bilateral Relations
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989/1990 ended the Cold war and led to the emergence of new world order. For India, it lost its friend and long-time strategic partner and now would have to deal with the US as the only superpower. Understanding these changed global realities, India shifted from its foreign policy of non-alignment and underwent major economic reforms. The new global context, the altered discourse of India’s foreign policy, and disappearance of the Soviet factor, which from the US perspective was a hampering factor in the India-US relation created hope for redesigning a transformed bilateral relations between India and the US. At this point, the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan meant that for the US, Pakistan’s geostrategic importance in the Afghan conflict was on the decline. US had overlooked for a long-time Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities due to the ongoing Afghan crisis, but the nuclear issue was now upfront. The US suspended under Pressler amendment economic and military aid to Pakistan in October 1990, this was seen as a tilt towards India (Shakoor, 1992).
In the changing global climate in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, India adopted a realist approach as it was keenly looking forward to the foreign direct investment from the US Multinational National Corporation’s and military technology while the US was still giving mixed indications. The US was attracted towards the huge potential market of India for its business interest. It further recognized India’s strategic importance as an equilibrium in Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China. Whereas on the issues such as human rights, the historic enmity with Pakistan over Kashmir, and, above all, nuclear non-proliferation (signing NPT and CTBT), the US made no distinction between India and Pakistan (Frankel, 1996).
Another action muddled India about US intents, the passage through Congress in November 1995of the Brown Amendment that overturned the earlier Pressler amendment allowed the US to supply Pakistan with military equipment worth $658 million and included maritime reconnaissance aircraft and missiles (Tomar, 2002).The Brown amendment had the support of President Clinton, who was persuaded to help an old ally on the grounds of “fairness” as Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto made a case that her country had already paid for the military equipment but, as the U.S. Congress suddenly applied the Pressler amendment; because of prepayment, it should provide the equipment (Frankel, 1996). Pakistan had lost its ‘frontline status’ after Soviet’s had withdrawn from Afghanistan, but by mid-1990s to deal with the challenge of pan-Islamic fundamentalism US in its national security interest revived this status of Pakistan. The fallout of this was that India firstly was compelled to believe that the US would continue the old framework of the cold war period while establishing a relationship with its long-time ally or carry forward with the policy of equating India and Pakistan; secondly, India feared an arms race in South Asia; thirdly, it also paved the way to harden India’s stand on nuclear issue.
India’s deep discomfort with the discriminatory nuclear regime established with NPT and in the review Conference of 1995 its extension, deadline to sign CTBT approaching closer and increasing security threat from the nexuses of two nuclear capable adversaries Pakistan-China nexus triggered India to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 within a week Pakistan followed the suit and conducted nuclear explosions. The US reaction was sharp and imposed economic sanctions under the Glenn amendment (The Glenn Amendment, passed in 1977, required the United States to invoke economic sanctions on any country that detonated a nuclear device) against India and Pakistan. The US builds pressure on India and Pakistan to maintain strategic restrain. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was deputed to initiate a strategic dialogue with India and Pakistan. From 1998 to 2000, the longest ever dialogue between India and US happened between the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh. They met fourteen times in this period, wherein India showed its concern towards the US non-proliferation agenda and the US, for the first-time, acknowledged India’s security concerns in the region. The ground-breaking extensive engagement between Talbott-Singh resulted in improving the India-US relationship. Eventually, the sanctions regime against India and Pakistan had been softened by the Clinton administration to persuade them to avoid a nuclear arms race in the region.
The turning point in the bilateral relations came in the summer of 1999 when the Pakistani military infiltrated the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. The US effectively played the role of a crisis manager in averting the chances of nuclear war over the issue of Kashmir. All US assistance to Pakistan was suspended. For the first time, the US viewed India-Pakistan relations independently and objectively and slammed Pakistan for putting the two South Asian arch-rivals at the risk of a nuclear war (Sharma, 2020). Talbott-Singh diplomacy and US intervention in the Kargil conflict created a deep sense of trust in bilateral ties, setting the tone for India-US relations towards de-hyphenation from Pakistan.
The New Millennium
US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 turned out to be historic as it ended the five-decade old estrangement between the two democracies and set the new path for engagement. President Clinton in his address to the joint session of the Indian Parliament on March 22, 2000, stated “As Prime Minister Vajpayee has said, India and America are natural allies, two nations conceived in liberty, each finding strength in its diversity, each seeing in the other a reflection of its aspiration for a more humane and just world” (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2000). President Clinton’s speech marks a positive attitudinal change of American administration towards India. In contrast, the American administration’s friction with Pakistan was increasing on three major issues-political instability or restoration of democracy, non-proliferation, and terrorism. As a result, the US was almost deserting its Cold war ally.
The solid base laid for enhanced bilateral ties at the end of the second term of the Clinton administration was strengthened under the George W. Bush administration in 2001. Interestingly, the growing influential and vocal Indian diaspora played a catalyst role in improving the overall ties. The US realized India’s strategic importance to maintain stability in Asia largely against its strategic competitor, China. Soon American and Indian leaders were building a new partnership based on a shared commitment to freedom, prosperity, and security (People, Progress, Partnership: The transformation of US and India Relations, 2003). The first signs were encouraging, as the US government promised to lift sanctions on India without reference to CTBT except for an underlying assurance of tighter export controls (People, Progress, Partnership: The transformation of US and India Relations, 2003). During this period, we see a shift wherein ‘China factor’ was replacing the ‘Pakistan factor’ in India-US relations. The US-Pak equations had certainly changed and India was no longer viewed at par with Pakistan rather, it was seen and compared with China.
9/11 and reordering of US policy in South Asia
9/11 terror attack on the US followed by President George W. Bush declaring “war on terrorism” the tangible effect was reordering of US relations with Pakistan and India. The United States moved from a strategy of containing Pakistan to one of re-engagement by making it a “frontline state” in the war on Al Qaida and the Taliban (Nayak, 2005). Due to these developments, the US lifted its sanctions, and it opened the gates for US military sales to Pakistan. Simultaneously, Pakistan also experienced flak from the US, it pressurised President Musharraf to crack down on Islamist militant groups active on Pakistan land. Some of these groups were active in Kashmir and were used by Pakistan as a tool to put pressure on India to settle the long-pending Kashmir issue. Moreover, the US State Department added organizations such as LeT to the list of global terrorist organisations. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, India offered immediate diplomatic support and cooperation to the US. For India 9/11 attack gave a chance to bring the US and world community’s attention to its two-decade-long sufferance and struggle against the Pakistan- supported separatist activities in Kashmir. India thought that it can now garner the US and international communities’ support in countering terrorism. The terror attacks also posed some challenges to India as Pakistan was now going back to its old cold war period role of a close US ally. Thus, it became crucial for Indian policymakers to see how the US would strike a delicate balance between New Delhi and Islamabad. The US pragmatically tried to balance its interest-while there were loans to Islamabad to rescue it from the economic failure and sanctions were lifted, the Bush administration also assured Indian leaders that the US forces based in the region and military and economic assistance provided to Pakistan were designed to assist the war on terrorism and not directed towards New Delhi (Sahasrabuddhe, 2016). The balancing strategy of the US in the region was largely to assure India’s utmost importance in the Asia-Pacific region and as a partner in the 21st century. Washington indicated that it sees India and Pakistan in a different light and thus is determined to implement the policy of de-hyphenation in South Asia. India-US relations reached new heights under the Bush administration as it viewed both the South Asian neighbours on their merit.
Obama Administration and Continuation of De-hyphenation Policy
President Barack Obama entered the oval office in 2009 with his campaign agenda to end the war in Afghanistan. For this purpose, the Obama administration appointed Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy to take a fresh, integrated approach to the security challenges in South Asia. Many Indians were quick to sense the potentially dangerous shift in U.S. policy toward New Delhi and the unacceptable linkage between Pakistan’s dispute with India on Jammu and Kashmir and the situation in Afghanistan (Mohan, 2009). India did aggressive lobbying. The External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee registered strong disapproval of President Obama’s plan to appoint a special envoy for the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan region (The Hindu, 2016). New Delhi always perceived Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and would not accept the Kashmir issue to be included in Holbrooke’s agenda. Finally, understanding India’s strategic value in Asia, especially to balance China, the US administration had no option but to restrict Holbrooke only to the “Af-Pak” region. Though ultimately President Obama had to delink India and Pakistan undeniably, his approach to South Asia indicates a significant departure from the Bush administration’s successful policy of de-hyphenation of India-Pakistan geopolitically. Keeping India out of Holbrooke’s agenda was seen as a diplomatic victory by New Delhi an official in the ministry on the basis of anonymity told Time that India is “feeling vindicated because finally, the U.S. has given us the respect we deserve we objected to being lumped into a category with two of the world’s most dangerous countries” (Ghosh, 2009). Thus, there would be no “re-hyphenation” tying India back to Pakistan in the U.S. framework for the region (Kirk, 2010).
In the later part of Obama’s tenure, the approach towards India was more pragmatic. Obama viewed India as a pan -Asian power (Kirk, 2010) and acknowledged its strategic importance against rising China. Besides, from the 1990s, India has remained an attractive destination for US investments and the Obama administration was cognizant of the contribution of the Indian diaspora in determining India-US economic ties. In 2014, Narendra Modi was elected as India’s Prime Minister, after which President Obama had called to congratulate him. Modi’s past troubled relationship with the US did not create a hurdle to the evolving India-US relationship. Both the leaders accommodated and developed a personal equation. PM Modi invited President Barack Obama as the Chief Guest to Republic Day in New Delhi on January 26, 2015. This was a symbolic statement by PM Modi that his government believes in continuing and further deepening India-US relations. The striking shift from the American side was that President Obama shifted the State of the Union Address to visit India. Obama was the first American President to attend the Republic Day parade wherein in his speech he said, “India and the United States are not just natural partners… can be India’s best partner” (Remarks by President Obama, 2015). The Indian government showed maturity and took a realistic approach by accepting the fact that Americans were reluctant to confront Pakistan due to their continued reliance on it to prosecute the war against the Taliban and the remnants of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Ganguly, 2001).
Trump Balancing ties with India and Pakistan
Since Donald Trump took over the Presidency, he developed a personal rapport with India’s PM Modi so much so that during the mega programme of Indian Americans ‘Howdy Modi’ in Houston by stating ‘Abki Baar, Trump Sarkar’ PM Modi gave an endorsement to Trump’s candidature for the Presidential elections 2020.
Yet despite the two leaders’ warm relationship, India experienced many times President Trump’s vagaries and his flip-flop policies. Keeping with this style during his meeting in Washington with Pakistan President Imran Khan in July 2019 Trump said that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had asked him to play the role of a mediator on Kashmir, and “if I can help, I would love to be the mediator” between India and Pakistan (The Indian Express, 2019). New Delhi refuted Trump’s remarks, as India has always maintained that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Trump again tried to provoke India when during his meeting with President Imran Khan on the side-lines of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2020 he reiterated that Washington is watching closely the developments between India and Pakistan specifically in the context of Kashmir and is ready to play the role of mediator. Within a couple of days, President Donald Trump visited India in February 2020 while addressing the gathering at the Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad reiterated that ‘India has become an economic giant a natural friendship has built between the two nations, the US wants an expanding partnership with India, strengthen the defence cooperation by providing India with best military equipment’s ... the US is going to sign $3 billion deal to sell military helicopter and other equipment to Indian Armed forces.…US and India will protect the free Indo-Pacific region.’ (Indian Express online, 2020). In the same speech, President Trump said that ‘the US has good relations with Pakistan and they work together to crack on terrorist organisations that operate on the Pakistan border.’ (Indian Express online, 2020). President Trumps’ speech distinctly compartmentalised India and Pakistan. The Joe Biden Administration currently continues this approach.
Joe Biden Reiterates Policy of De-hyphenation
Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 elections and the new administration showing interest in enduring a robust engagement with India signifies many facts. Firstly, the roller-coaster graph of India-US relations appears to have been largely stabilised now and the new reality is that the change in leadership in White House no more completely destabilises the bilateral ties. Secondly, the US de-hyphenated policy in South Asia is here to stay. Thirdly, hyphenating India and Pakistan is not in the interest of the US and India’s role as geo-strategic partner in Asia is foremost especially when the US-China relations are deteriorating.
While describing its relationship with the two South Asian neighbours the US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price made a distinction between the global dimension of its partnership with New Delhi and its shared regional interest with Islamabad (The Times of India, 2021). Today Pakistan has gone down on the priority list of Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda mainly with a shift in its strategic calculus after its withdrawal from Afghanistan and its changing policy on the war on terror.
The focus of Biden administration’s foreign policy has shifted from Afghanistan to Indo-Pacific region and from counterterrorism to climate change and the global pandemic. To meet the climate change goals of Paris agreement of 2015 PM Modi and President Biden launched the “India-US Climate and Clean Energy agenda 2030 Partnership” in 2021. Both New Delhi and Washington will through this partnership work in cooperation for climate action. At the backdrop of the global pandemic the extension of the Indo-US Vaccine Action programme till 2027 is an important development in the field of biomedical research. Similar to his predecessors Biden administration also acknowledges India as a crucial partner specifically to deal with the aggressive China in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the other side with the shrinking presence of US in the region and Pakistan’s dwindling economy it now expects that the Biden administration should emphasize on US-Pakistan economic relations by focusing on trade and investment. Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership have together been promoting a new focus on “geo-economics”- an approach that emphasizes regional trade and connectivity and recognizes that a geostrategic approach only goes so far, and if Pakistan is to rise on the world stage (as its neighbour India has done), that position will have to be predicated on economic growth (Afzal, 2021). Looking at the approach of Biden administration the chances that it would reset its relations as per Islamabad’s expectation is difficult. The US would continue a working relationship with Pakistan as its geostrategic significance, whether in the context of Afghanistan or broadly in Central Asia or South Asia still remains.
Conclusion
The Cold War witnessed in the South Asian politics a prismatic relationship between US -India, and Pakistan. With the end of the Cold War the US focus shifted from its long-time ally Pakistan to the emerging India. The game was changing, and so were its prime partners.
The transformation in India- US relations that started during President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Narsimha Rao’s tenure has indeed come a long way. In these years there were issues such as NPT, CTBT and others on which India and the US had divergent views, yet there was broader convergence on various strategic areas like the challenge of China, etc. For decades now, this relationship has received bipartisan support in Washington, leading to a broad or macro cooperative framework between the two countries. Many leaders of India and the US have called the two countries ‘natural partners’ having similar democratic values and geopolitical interests, yet it is very natural for them to have a difference on several issues. One such crucial factor in India-US relations has always been Pakistan. Throughout the Cold war period, Pakistan was one of the main factors that estranged these two democracies.
In the post-Cold War era, with the changing international context and the emergence of India as a fast-growing economy, perception of India and the US altered towards their bilateral ties. An enduring partnership was fostered between India and the US by the beginning of the 21stcentury. The US adopted the policy of de-hyphenation in South Asia and tried to maintain a balance with the two South Asian neighbours. They evolved their relationship with India and Pakistan based on their capacities. Having stated this it’s important to mention that in the last two decades de-hyphenation has also suffered a bit at certain junctures due to conflicting national interests. In recent years, India-US ties are not just viewed from the lens of Pakistan, but the China factor affects the relations equally. A balance of pragmatism is seen in New Delhi and Washington towards the India-Pakistan-US triangle. The bottom line is that Pakistan will remain a factor in India-US, relations but it won’t impact the overall constructive trajectory of the relationship.
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