India is set to begin a formal roll-out of its long-awaited theaterisation plan to best utilise its military’s resources amidst expanding security threats, with the Air Defence Command and the Maritime Theatre Command set to be launched by May. An Integrated Logistic Command (ILC) is to follow. The nomenclature Integrated Logistic Command reflects the logistics predominant mindset of the Army; IAF and Navy would rather prefer an integrated maintenance command which focuses on platform readiness. While Airforce and Naval operations are platform-centric, the Army still banks on boots on the ground. The vast array of weapons and equipment of any military represent a combat capability and retaining these in a state of readiness is a formidable task. It is through a well-established maintenance and refit capability that battle endurance can be maximized i.e. enable a missile to complete its flight without a malfunction; a helicopter to complete a mission without breaking down; a tank to assault an enemy position without experiencing a mission abort failure.
Logistics is procurement and mass-based while engineering is centered around technology, reliability, and speed. With the conventional focus on supplies, clothing, housing, ILC may end up as an additional layer of control; Services already have adequate integration in areas like quartering, rations, stores, medicare, etc. Setting up of Integrated Logistics Command with an engineering orientation can assist theatre commands in retaining a long-term capability edge; keeping the armed forces future-ready. A cue can be taken from IAF’s Maintenance Command and US Army Material Command, both contribute to Strategic Readiness by leading sustainment efforts at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In the eighties there were some discussions on setting up an Army Material Command, however, with the focus shifting away from conventional operations to counterinsurgency, this initiative failed to take off.
Suddenly, the Chinese rekindled the threat of conventional war in HAA forcing the military to react and deploy additional forces to match force ratios. In the ongoing modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army, it is reported that the thrust for land forces has been on acquiring equipment comparable to other militaries. The substantial build-up of forces; visible systems like guns, light tanks, rocket systems, wheeled combat vehicles in the immediate vicinity of LAC as well as certain invisible capabilities spanning multiple domains such as time, mission, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum(EMS), NBC is reflective of this change. Electronic systems, precision weapons, and communication capabilities will change the employment of forces. Warfighting up North therefore may not be hand to hand, Galwan notwithstanding. The army thus has to shift focus to system readiness and disruptive technologies. How we employ and support new systems will have a great bearing on the readiness of the future military.
It is to be remembered that in any serious crisis, India will be on its own. There is, therefore, a need to think beyond the algorithm to sustain all-around operational capabilities that are distinctive in character, content, and capacity. Unified engineering support will revolutionize the impact of equipment capability on mission outcomes, as was achieved by Israel in 1973, where initial surprise and adversary’s quantitative advantages were offset by superior technical capability. The Integrated Logistics Command needs to be rechristened as Integrated Readiness and Engineering Command (IREC) to set its gunsights towards its True North i.e., sustaining readiness of weapons and platforms. A military force can plan missions only if it is aware of how far it can jump or how long it can run. From a military operational context; the creation of IREC is highly desirable. The Services often point to the inadequacy of funding for modernization. What is not conveyed is that due to budgetary squeeze, operational capability is gravitating towards hollowness; rebuild and upgrades are delayed, there are critical shortages of spare parts, minimum readiness levels are sustained through hanger queens and deviations. Technicians leaving a store with 4 out of 10 parts i.e. 40% fill rate is a common phenomenon. The Army is the most affected as its manpower costs take away a large chunk of the pie. IREC can become a center of excellence in systems engineering of weapons from cradle to grave, ushering the concept of Through Life Capability Readiness. TLCR is an approach to acquisition and in-service management of an acquired capability to ensure that it remains mission capable through life.
Close and Deep Support
Today, each service has its integral maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) infrastructure that comprise close support (CS) and deep support (DS) outfits. CS comprises Organisational (O) and Intermediate (I) whereas DS comprises Depot (D) level support. While CS is located close to weapons deployed, DS is spread throughout the country as base repair depots (BRD), army base workshops (ABW), and naval dockyards. These are specialist enterprises that carry base refit activities and are the last port of call. There is duplication of engineering infrastructure across three services and optimization is certainly called for e.g. ABW executing DS of armaments can effectively support naval guns and air force cannons. Missile repair centers of the Navy can provide all-around support. BRDs can service UAVs and aviation assets and similar integration can be extended to radars, communications, electro-optical systems, etc. As more indigenous systems are rolled out, integrated engineering support will be more economical and effective like medical support.
Iceberg Effect
Operation and support costs are fait accompli once an acquisition has been made. Post introduction the weapon has to be maintained as per OEM protocols to remain mission capable. Few years after procurement, the OEM generally notifies that the system will soon become obsolescent and buoys up prices of subsystems and spares. IREC could find an enduring solution to this problem. It is common knowledge that any main battle tank or fighter aircraft requires 3 to 5 times the acquisition cost to be sustained over the lifecycle. Called the Iceberg Effect (Fig 1), it is a response customized by OEMs to India’s poor acquisition management. It is time to graduate to value-centric procurement and system readiness.
IREC: Structure and Functions
The IREC needs to be organised to sustain integrated readiness, maximize system availability, manage obsolescence, improve the quality of indigenous manufactures, and handhold local industry on behalf of CDS. The Directorates of Quality Assurance and Standardization could be merged with IREC to make technical support all-encompassing. IREC could comprise four verticals viz; MRO, Indigenization, Sustainment Engineering and Testing & Quality Assurance. Prominent functions could be –
Provide technical advice to CDS on all phases of design, development, production, and deployment of new systems, capability shortfalls, and configuration management through spiral upgrades, as a part of continuous and composite capability development
Ensuring 24×7 capability edge by an agile MRO support to theatre commands hinged on TLCR to shore up operational availability.
Indigenization and standardization of spare parts plugging supply chain vulnerabilities. Provide a national capability for quality assurance, experimentation, testing, and evaluation to the industry thus facilitating maturing of prototypes.
Assist Acquisition Wing in making the shift to value-centric rapid acquisition and TLCR.
Maintain technological readiness of BRDs, ABWs, and Naval Dockyards through optimization, sharing of skills, modernization, and lean staffing.
IREC could scale up equipment readiness with availabilities above 90% as against 60-65%. TLCR will ensure that the military remains agile to respond to capability surprises. It could turbocharge MSMEs through the localization of spares and subsystems. Impressive cost savings could come through downsizing of the workforce, automation, leaner stocks, indigenization, and resource sharing. Highly skilled technicians could be gainfully utilized through lateral absorption in ordnance factories, DPSUs, etc. bringing the collectivist culture of teamwork and loyalty with a focus on system effectiveness & quality, in these outfits. IREC could provide theatre commands reliable weapons to develop composite responses to capability surprises, making formations deploy not with deficiencies but known capabilities. It could turbocharge Make in India through expansive localization and reliance on local innovation for upgrades. Logistics components could be put as addons once IREC has stabilized.
