On 22 May, Indian Health Minister Harsh Vardhan assumed the chair position of the World Health Organisation‘s (WHO) Executive Body for the next three years. Earlier, in the run- up to the 73rd World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO ̳s governing body, Indian statecraft faced three distinct but interconnected conundrums – Taiwan‘s observer status at WHA, an independent investigation into the source of COVID-19 outbreak, and WHO reforms. The three conundrums will incessantly test Indian statecraft and challenge New Delhi‘s multilateral leadership aspirations during India‘s WHO leadership term over the next three years.
Against this backdrop, any policy decision by India in its leadership position at the WHO will hold diplomatic and geopolitical implications. Meanwhile, Indian geopolitical analysis hit the twilight of realism and idealism. Yet, neither of them offers diplomatic dexterity to traverse the geopolitical uncertainty in a COVID-19 world. Only pragmatism reinforces New Delhi‘s prospects to maximise Indian interests and minimise the global disorder. As a result, New Delhi will need to practise balanced statecraft and maintain strategic autonomy at the WHO through a three-layered approach over the next three years.
Critical Circumspection on Taiwan’s Membership
For disavowing the ―One-China‖ policy, Beijing opposed President Tsai Ing-wen-led Taiwan‘s proposal for WHA observer status, which it managed to secure under Kuomintang Leader Ma Ying-jeouas ―Chinese Taipei‖for eight consecutive years between 2009-16. In March, as the US-China relations were at a nadir, President Trump approved the TAIPEI legislation to shore up Taiwan‘s international posture and promote its participation in international organisations as either a member or an observer. In addition, the US‘ diplomatic heft gained support for Taiwan‘s bid from the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Taipei‘s fourteen diplomatic allies and two QUAD members – Japan and Australia. Taiwan‘s WHO observer status is thus now more an international political and diplomatic issue than a global health security concern. Taiwan‘s WHO observer status is thus now more an international political and diplomatic issue than a global health security concern. Despite the US-led coalition‘s support, India neither issued public statements nor implied any support for Taiwan‘s WHA membership bid. India‘s position on Taiwan offers three explanations.
First, New Delhi‘s critical circumspection signals an intent of diplomatic complaisance with ―One-China‖ policy and China’s core interests, in consonance with India-China consensus. The bilateral consensus aims to strengthen India-China relations by respecting each other‘s sensitivities, particularly those of territory and sovereignty.
Second, India‘s long-term interests to maintain peace and tranquillity along the 3,488-km long border with China – the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Although ―temporary and short duration faceoffs‖ are usually recorded along the LAC due to ―differing perceptions‖ of the border and claim lines, the 73-day ―Doklam stand-off‖ at India-Bhutan-China tri-junction in 2017 manifested Beijing‘s game of military brinkmanship. Ahead of the WHA, localised scuffles renewed border conflict on 5 May. Although the tensions escalated as the WHA was nearing, India‘s new leadership role in WHO is unlikely the sole factor behind Beijing‘s bellicose military approach. Yet, any plausible attempt by New Delhi to promote Taiwan‘s membership bid might have antagonised Beijing, leading to shrinking of conducive diplomatic channels, which were successful in diffusing the Doklam stand-off and laid the ground for the Wuhan informal summit.
Third, to maintain stable supply chains, especially of critical sectors such as pharma and the medical industry. While India has achieved self-sufficiency in producing masks and personal protection equipment (PPE), the country continues to import an estimated 70 percent of its active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) from China. To understand the nature of risk associated with APIs, early supply chain disruptions in February due to lockdown in China made ICRA to downgrade its outlook on the Indian pharma industry from ̳stable‘ to ̳negative‘.
Although the risk of a comprehensive ban on API exports remains low, Beijing is capable of deliberately imposing export barriers on critical APIs, which is more likely if India supports Taiwan. Further, any supply chain disruptions at the time of COVID-19 will have catastrophic consequences and New Delhi cannot afford to divert its focus and energies.
Taiwan‘s observer status will re-occupy geopolitical center-stage ahead of the WHA in 2021 and following two years. Pragmatism offers flexibility to reassess the statecraft in accordance with any changes in the above-mentioned three factors in the coming months and years. However, considering changes are unlikely to happen in the next three years, New Delhi is expected to refrain from supporting Taiwan during its WHO leadership position.
Conscious Cooperation for COVID Investigation
Australia-led diplomatic campaign gained the support of 122-member nations, including India, to seek an ―impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation‖ into the origins of the coronavirus and WHO‘s response. While holding the demands over Taiwan‘s membership at bay, New Delhi joining forces with Canberra over the investigation into COVID-19 source is well- coordinated conscious cooperation against Beijing‘s recriminations and geo-economic coercions. Despite strengthening and institutionalising Indo-US cooperation through Indo-Pacific Core Group consultations during COVID-19 outbreak, India rebuffed US’ tougher language against China and the WHO. It reiterates New Delhi‘s strategic autonomy, which should clear China‘s suspicions over India‘s support for the investigation. India aims to strengthen WHO capabilities to bolster preparedness and prevent future pandemics by identifying the origins of the outbreak and the nature of spread.
Besides, India need not prove its resolve to stand against China just to appease the like- minded Indo-Pacific partners, including the US. New Delhi holds an exceptional record of challenging Beijing when its core interests are threatened. India is the first in the Indo-Pacific to oppose President Xi Jinping‘s flagship Belt and Road Initiative over sovereignty concerns. New Delhi also rejected the Beijing-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement. In both instances, the Indo-Pacific partners engaged with Beijing despite India‘s concerns.
Collective leadership for WHO reforms
India registered its regional leadership by initiating the SAARC virtual summit and projected global leadership as well by emphasising the need for a G-20 virtual summit to coordinate anti-COVID efforts. While diplomatic space for moderation has been shrinking, India has a greater responsibility to establish a conducive climate at WHO to build a global effort against the pandemic. Containing COVID-19 increases prospects to stabilise the global supply chains and rekindle the global economy. Such an attempt is reflected in Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s renewed engagement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit and highlighting ―a new template of globalisation based on fairness, equality, and humanity‖.
In its chair position, India shall prioritise WHO reforms proposed by Modi to contain future pandemics. Besides, the WHO may also require reforms, such as improving coordination between headquarters and ―uniquely independent‖ regional offices, and exercising legal authority by framing new regulations concerning global health. In addition to the composition of non- permanent members representing different regions, India should consider restructuring WHO’s Executive Body with most populous members and large economies as permanent members. Such renewed composition empowers the body to continuously monitor the WHO reforms and share critical information in real-time.
The collective leadership of like-minded Indo-Pacific partners and NAM – a group of 120-member states spread across Asia, Africa and Latin America – complements Indian efforts to pursue aforementioned WHO reforms. The collective leadership also promotes a multipolar world order and deter an evolving China-centric regional order, especially when President Trump terminated the US‘ relationship with WHO.
The above-mention three-pronged approach is expected to help India establish conscious cooperation at the WHO to balance the US-China rivalry that possibly occupies the centre stage in all the future multilateral forums, including the WHA. Amid the G-2 rivalry, Indian leadership may identify a responsive space for cooperation that promotes global solidarity and resilience. New Delhi recognises cooperation with both the US and China as essential to reviving the global supply chains and international economy. India thus holds an opportunity at WHO to deliver responsible leadership in safeguarding lives and livelihoods for a shared future, further promoting New Delhi‘s leadership in post-COVID world order.
