As India aspires to become a Great Power it will expand its influence in the Central Asia to which it has historical relations 1

Central Asia happens to be cradle of civilization is at the crossroads which connects important land routes in Eurasia forming an indefensible cog in the wheel of the geopolitics of the wider region including in the world politics having impact in the international system

India has always been an important player in Central Asia from historic times and vice versa subcontinent polity has been affected by happenings from the region.

India’s relations with Central Asia are being nurtured on its own and so the external players in region’s politics which will have effect on how New Delhi maneuvers itself in the complex Great Game.

India’s strategic approach to Central Asia

New Delhi’s strategic interest in Central Asia is interesting as despite its immediate focus on the strategic outreach in the Indo-Pacific to buttress its capacity as a Maritime Great Power, it’s true that India seeks to expand its strategic outreach in the Central Asian region as a part of its extending Look West or Look North policy

Though India has got dilemma over its capacity to balance its continental and maritime outreach, it’s true that in an effort to nullify China’s presence in Central and to act as a counterweight to Pakistan, New Delhi will reach out more in Central Asia in years to come

India is definitely slow in understanding the strategic importance of Central Asia as it’s more focused on expanding its diplomatic and military efforts on its “Act East Policy” and it understood that it will start “Looking West also”, especially with more focus on Central Asia. It’s done through the Connect Central Asia Project.

Earlier, New Delhi began to work its own strategic priority especially in the 1990’s that a forward presence in Central Asia.

presence in Central Asia. Further, India’s only military base outside its territory is in Central Asia’s Tajikistan named Ayni which if properly defined is in Russia’s own backyard. India is Russia’s all-weather friend and vice-versa

On the other hand, Air Force base has to be operational then it will also have the logistics for sharing intelligence with say Russia and may be even Iran all that can be first achieved if Tajikistan gives a nod there is a very little chance for India to project its ambitions in Central Asia.

Apart from Tajikistan, India is also expanding its reach with other countries in the Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan is the nerve center of Central Asia. Cultural contacts between India and Uzbekistan are deep and they cannot be wished away. Oil-rich Kazakhstan deserves India’s immediate attention

Further, Turkmenistan is relevant for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI ) Pipeline, pipeline, if at all it works out. Kyrgyzstan has huge hydropower potential and, like Mongolia, it is a democracy. India enjoys historical affinity with Tajikistan. The country is strategically critical for India in the context of the Af-Pak region

For India to evolve an enduring Central Asia policy, it hopes to foster a regional economic integration approach, but the main problem is that it lacks direct geographic connection to the region

Compounding the problems is New Delhi’s pursuit during the last two decades of the flawed policy of gaining access to Central Asia through the Persian Gulf. This folly in thinking persists even now

Routing through Iran and Afghanistan or via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) are important pursuits, but even the best pursued connectivity and pipelines projects like the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and TAPI have not seen the light of day

On the other hand, India and Central Asian Republics (CARs) - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - share deep civilization ties. However, the importance of Central Asia for India is not merely cultural and historical

Being at the center of the vast Eurasian landmass, one can always refer to Mackinder’s ‘Heartland Theory’ that dwelt upon the Geopolitical importance of the Eurasian heartland, bounded by Volga in the west and Yangtze River in the east, and the Himalayas in the south and the Arctic Ocean in the north.

Central Asia serves as a land bridge between Asia and Europe and is very rich in natural resources. It is, thus, geopolitically axial and economically offers a whole range of opportunities. However, due to lack of direct geographical connectivity, India along with other partner countries in the region is working on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), among other options

India and the Central Asian Republics (CAR) also share common concerns on the issue of rising threat from terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. The re-emergence of threat from the Taliban-Haqqani network in Afghanistan and growing religious radicalization and sectarian violence within Pakistan, has raised serious questions about the stability of the region as a whole. India thus plans to further strengthen its cooperation with the CARs, especially on the counter-terrorism issue, within the framework of India’s newly coined “Connect Central Asia” policy.

At a more specific level, the five CARs are important to India due to some of the following factors: Tajikistan’s importance for India lies in its geo-strategic location. While it shares borders with China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it is also located in proximity to the Pakistan- occupied Kashmir.

In addition to its strategic location, Tajikistan is rich in hydroelectric power and has the largest natural water resources in the region. Tajikistan also has rich mineral deposits. India and Tajikistan cooperate over a wide spectrum of issues - political, economic, health, human resource development, defence, counter-terrorism, science and technology, culture and tourism. Tajik military cadets and young officers have also been attending military training institutions in India.

Kazakhstan’s importance for India needs to be viewed in the context of developments in and around Central Asia, India’s growing energy needs, Kazakhstan’s increasing role in the region and its immense hydrocarbon reserves. The two countries cooperate in various sectors like hydrocarbon, civil nuclear energy, space, information technology and cybersecurity, pharmaceuticals, health care, agriculture, and cultural exchange programmes.

The importance of Turkmenistan for India lies in its enormous gas reserves, transit potential and geo-strategic location. India’s rising energy demand and the fact that it imports 70 percent of its oil requirements, which is likely to go up to 90 per cent by 2025, has made Turkmenistan an attractive destination for India and in this context the TAPI gas pipeline is of great significance. Turkmenistan can also serve as a gateway to Central Asia through Iran. From India’s point of view, the North–South Corridor would not only help India in reaching out to Central Asia but also enable it to transport goods at a cheaper cost to the European markets.

One of the carrots that are offered to India is the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which is being used by the US to transport supplies and weapons to its forces in Afghanistanby steering clear of Pakistan. The initial plan of the NDS will connect the Zaranj-Delaram road and Afghanistan garland highway connecting it to Iran Chahbahar port.

If Iran gives nod to that, then India will also be on board on this project along with Moscow. Maybe however, this also ought to include Washington’s nod as it’s trying convert the existing logistics route to Afghanistan as a New Silk route.

It’s here that India’s diplomatic maneuvering is required as if it can use it’s good influence on both Russia, Iran and the United States, it can increase its profile in Central Asia at least diplomatically through trade welcomed by Moscow, Tehran and Washington as all the three countries will benefit from that. Second, it will also urge Moscow to support India’s full membership into Shanghai Cooperation Organization and exclude Pakistan’s one despite prodding from Beijing for Islamabad’s inclusion.

India’s engagement with Shanghai Cooperation Organization and it’s relevant strategic connotation

India’s outreach to Central Asia will be anchored further through the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation as the group has become more relevant for Russia and China as their relations with the West have deteriorated.4

Experts say the group’s potential can’t be underplayed, despite the existence of more prominent regional and multi-national institutions such as forums like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the G20 and G7

The SCO groups around 40% of the world’s population and more than 20% of global GDP. Add Iran’s, and it will control around 20% of the world’s oil reserves. Iran’s inclusion as a full member will boost the SCO’s energy portfolio but it will spark anger in Western capitals. As the SCO is increasingly pitted against Western-led forums, it may get harder for India to strike a diplomatic balance between its different global partners

China, Russia and four Central Asian countries formed the SCO in 2001 as a countermeasure to limit the influence of the West in the region. India and Pakistan joined in 2017

SCO group has become more relevant for Russia and China as their relations with the West have deteriorated. Experts say the group's potential can't be underplayed, despite the existence of more prominent regional and multi-national institutions such as forums like the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the G20 and G7

The SCO groups around 40% of the world's population and more than 20% of global GDP. Add Iran's, and it will control around 20% of the world's oil reserves

How Delhi manages its diplomacy - and its differences with Russia, China and Pakistan in particular - will have an impact on future of the SCO

Iran’s inclusion as a full member of the SCO will strengthen the organization’s energy portfolio but is likely to provoke anger in Western capitals. As the SCO becomes more aligned against Western￾led forums, India may find it increasingly challenging to strike a diplomatic balance between its various global partners

How New Delhi manages its diplomacy—particularly its relations with Russia, China, and Pakistan—will influence the future trajectory of the SCO.

To begin with, Russia, India’s longstanding ally, seems supportive of India’s ambition to link South and Central Asia through Iran, bypassing Pakistan. India will also work with Iran to complete this project, which will foster closer economic ties between Central Asia, Moscow, and New Delhi.

The actions of a few SCO member states have forced India to reconsider its broader economic and strategic priorities, primarily because these states have worked against New Delhi’s core concerns in the region. The deep-seated contradictions among member states on regional security and terrorism, combined with growing Chinese influence, have compelled New Delhi to perform a strategic balancing act. India is cementing its bilateral ties with regional key economies without downgrading its engagement with the SCO. Barring China and Pakistan, all SCO member countries, especially CARs, have sought greater cooperation on connectivity projects through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Chabahar trilateral grouping between Uzbekistan, India and Iran, seeks to link the eastern route of INSTC with Chabahar to enhance Eurasian connectivity. The Eastern Route, also known as the 928-km Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) line, runs east of the Caspian Sea

Once connected to Chabahar via the 628-km Chabahar-Zahedan railway line, it will boost India- Eurasia trade. During the inaugural India-Central Asia summit in 2022, the CARs endorsed and proposed the inclusion of the Chabahar port in the INSTC to facilitate increased trade

Due to the fragile global political environment and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, China has tried to assert dominance over the SCO. It aims to transform the grouping into a China-led multilateral forum for regional geo-economics and strategic interests, particularly to help BRI gain regional prominence.

On the other hand, Belt Road Initiative is Beijing’s strategic tool to offer large funds for mega infrastructure and connectivity projects, only to gain greater control of the assets in the recipient countries if they default on loan repayment. Beijing has used the project to pursue its hegemonic interests rather than providing any gains to the CARs. However, despite China’s inroads, CARs remain one of the world’s least connected economies, giving India a chance to strengthen its presence.

Historically, China has sought to leverage the SCO to strengthen its bilateral relationships, particularly economically, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway, the SCO Bank, and the SCO international road transportation agreement.

This effort was limited by Russia’s traditionally cautious stance on such overtures. But notably the Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen a waning of Russian influence in Central Asia, and a tacit Russian acquiescence to more robust exchanges between China and the Central Asian states.

Over a period of time, the SCO has matured as an international organization and expanded its influence. Now the international community is showing greater interest in the SCO. It seems that within the organization there is an eagerness to expand the membership, which is increasingly seen as a counterbalance to western influence in this strategically located region. However, in today’s world of integrated security, no region can develop without taking into consideration the role of strategically placed countries of that region. This factor has become a driving force behind all regional organizations today.

The SCO cannot be an exception to this rule. By accepting India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia as observers in 2005, the SCO expanded the scope of its activities, and this process has to be taken to its logical end. Its current approach is to transform the region into an energy and economic powerhouse and reconfigure strategic alliances, which would be able to eradicate the unilateral approach of the post-cold war era.

India historically has a close relationship with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) countries which is based on mutual trust and goodwill, the main pillars of India’s multi-dimensional foreign policy. India’s strong and vibrant modern-day engagement with the SCO countries facilitated India’s smooth entry into the organisation. India was granted Observer Status in SCO in 2005 which was later elevated to full membership in 2017. The more than a decade-long association with SCO underscores India’s willingness to play a proactive role in the organisation.

India has been actively participating in SCO and has been providing substantial support to various mechanisms in the forum. After its accession, India is focusing on initiating proposals for the mutual benefit of SCO Member States, Observers and Dialogue Partners. India’s extensive engagement in SCO has contributed to further enhancing the role and authority of SCO in international arena.

India has ensured that various meetings and events of SCO are represented at appropriate level. While the SCO Council of Heads of State (CHS) meetings are attended by Prime Minister, the SCO Council of Heads of Government (CHG) meetings are usually represented by External Affairs Minister (EAM). India has also participated in Ministerial meetings and other dialogue formats and has contributed positively in advancing SCO’s agenda. To augment India’s contribution to the day-to- day activities of SCO, India has deputed two officers each to the SCO Secretariat (Beijing) and SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (Tashkent).

To buttress it’s commitment to SCO, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the SCO Summits in 2018 (Qingdao), 2019 (Bishkek), 2020 (Moscow, virtual format), 2021 (Dushanbe, virtual format) and 2022 (Tashkent). During the Summit Meetings, PM Modi had put forward a number of important proposals aimed at further deepening cooperation in ensuring regional security, strengthening economic ties and promoting cultural and humanitarian cooperation.

China’s strategic expansion in Central Asia and India’s strategic stake

As New Delhi wishes to expand its strategic expansion in Central Asia, Beijing also wants to expand its strategic horizon as a part of its Eurasian strategy. It has intensified its outreach in recent times.

Earlier, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the leaders of Central Asia — Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, Turkmen President Serdar Berdymuhamedov, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev —gathered for the first time in person (although it is the third China-Central Asia summit since the format was kicked off in 2020) in Xi’an, a city in Shaanxi Province known historically as Chang’an in May 2023.

Further, in 2022, when Xi and the Central Asian presidents marked 30 years of relations they announced the building of a “China-Central Asian community with a shared future,” regional twist on the Chinese diplomatic catchphrase of creating a “community with shared future for mankind.” Xi outlined four core principles in that effort during his keynote speech at the summit

There is much more to unpack from the China-Central Asia Summit, especially stemming from the various bilateral visits that occurred on the sidelines.

The Pamir Mountain base also operational for the past two years, will also be upgraded to a permanent facility.

The Pamir base is situated near the Wakhjir Pass and connects through to China’sTaxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang. The immediate region is only accessible to military personnel. An access road has been built for use by border guards, leading on the Chinese side to the Karakoram Highway 80 kilometers to the east

The daily flagged the expert opinion that “a new ‘5+2’ axis is being formed (Central Asia plus China and Russia)”. Evidently, although Putin was not present at the event in Xi’an, Russia’s interests have been taken into account.

To be sure, China’s decision in the context of the Ukraine crisis to assume a leadership role in Central Asia as provider of security is a paradigm shift that profoundly undercuts the very essence of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy to isolate and contain China. Look at the map to comprehend why the West’s talk of encirclement of Russia and China will remain a pipedream so long as Inner Asia remains out of bounds.

In such a volatile setting aimed at surrounding China with a ring of unstable states, Central Asia assumes critical importance for both Russian and Chinese strategies as a region that is beyond the reach of US influence.

On the other hand, Central Asia is considered China’s western periphery, and Beijing has strategically developed oil and gas pipelines connecting to the region, including routes to Kazakhstan and the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline.7 Moscow is aware of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian republics, particularly through the SCO and bilateral agreements in the energy sector.

Furthermore, Afghanistan and Pakistan, both neighboring China and maintaining strong political ties with Beijing, are increasingly attuned to China’s role in mediating conflicts, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as in the Ukraine crisis. Both nations have heightened expectations of China, and the trilateral meeting in Islamabad signaled their growing confidence in China’s diplomatic role.

Russia, Central Asian states, and China share a common perception of existential threats posed by terrorism and religious extremism, a longstanding concern of the US. This shared threat has fostered cooperation to prevent the US from establishing basing facilities in the region or allowing the Afghan Resistance (Panjshir) to use Central Asia as a sanctuary for further conflict.

These ancient routes, which connected the East and West, facilitated the exchange of people, goods, and ideas between Europe and the Far East, profoundly shaping the region’s cultural, economic, and political landscape, even when it was part of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—five Central Asian countries that have made significant strides in political transformation, modernization, and economic growth.

Central Asia has become increasingly significant in global geopolitics, especially due to the escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict. This conflict has attracted the attention of regional and global powers, all seeking to expand their influence in the region, thereby impacting Central Asia’s economic, political, and security dynamics

The Russia-Ukraine crisis, which began in 2022, has had a profound effect on the economic and political landscape of Central Asian countries. For example, the energy sector has faced significant supply chain disruptions. Additionally, the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries have had a ripple effect, adversely impacting the economies of Central Asian nations that are heavily dependent on Russia.

Conversely, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has reignited Western interest in the region. A key moment was the summit in September 2023, where all five Central Asian heads of state met with US President Biden for the first time. This was the first summit-level meeting between the US and Central Asia, symbolizing a renewed engagement.

Regarding India, the past decade has seen significant developments in its relationship with Central Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to all five Central Asian countries in 2015 marked a milestone, reinforcing India’s commitment to the Global South

India’s strategic stake in the project in Chabhar project and it’s geopolitical significance

As India wishes to expand it’s influence in Central Asia it will look to expand it’s influence from the Iran’s Chabhar port from where it can benefit it’s trade relations in Central asian countries.

The Trump administration’s decision to modify or rescind India’s sanctions waiver for the port project represents a strategic move to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran. This development raises concerns regarding India’s investment in the port, the future of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and broader geo-economic and geopolitical stability in the regionIndia has invested approximately $24 million in equipment and infrastructure at the port, signaling a long-term commitment to enhancing connectivity with Central Asia and Europe. The revocation of the waiver could not only jeopardize this investment but also disrupt India’s broader geostrategic plans, particularly the INSTC, which aims to facilitate trade between India, Iran, Russia, and Europe via an alternative to traditional maritime routes

India has invested approximately $24 million in equipment and infrastructure at the port, signaling a long-term commitment to enhancing connectivity with Central Asia and Europe. The revocation of the waiver could not only jeopardize this investment but also disrupt India’s broader geostrategic plans, particularly the INSTC, which aims to facilitate trade between India, Iran, Russia, and Europe via an alternative to traditional maritime routes

The decision to re impose or intensify sanctions on Iran aligns with the Trump administration’s broader policy of exerting “maximum pressure” on Tehran. This strategy, aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence, has significant consequences for global geopolitics. Notably, the move strengthens U.S.-Israel relations, as Israel perceives Iran as its principal adversary in the Middle East. Trump’s overtly pro-Israel stance, including statements supporting Israeli sovereignty over contested territories, further reinforces this geopolitical alignment

For India, this development creates a diplomatic dilemma. On the one hand, India seeks to maintain strong strategic and economic ties with the United States. Meanwhile, India has historically maintained cooperative relations with Iran, particularly concerning energy security and regional connectivity. The increasing U.S. pressure on Iran complicates India’s ability to navigate these competing interests without jeopardizing critical aspects of its foreign policy.

If the Trump administration’s decision leads to renewed sanctions on Chabahar Port, India’s broader trade and connectivity ambitions will face considerable setbacks. The INSTC, envisioned as a critical trade corridor linking South Asia with Eurasia, hinges significantly on Chabahar’s operational viability. If a trade route gets blocked, India would have to search for other opportunities that would involve using Israel and the UAE as transit hubs for Europe. These alternatives might not provide the same level of strategic value as the path through Iran, especially when it comes to expenses and weight in the region

Furthermore, Russia and China are likely to continue their economic engagements with Iran in spite of U.S. sanctions. Russia has shown interest in strengthening its economic and security ties with Tehran.

Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided Iran with alternative economic partnerships, thereby mitigating some of the intended effects of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign. This further underscores the limitations of unilateral sanctions and the growing multi polarity in global economic relations.

The Indian government is currently assessing the long-term implications of these policy changes and exploring potential diplomatic engagements to secure its interests. One possible response could involve greater engagement with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to emphasize the legality and legitimacy of India’s infrastructure investments in Iran. Additionally, India may seek to negotiate bilateral arrangements with the European Union (EU) and other strategic partners to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions.

The broader question is whether India will continue to adhere to unilateral U.S. sanctions or challenge their legitimacy in favor of its sovereign economic and strategic interests. New Delhi has maintained a tight relationship with the United States in part by abiding Washington’s sanctions but has also shown signs of independent foreign policy action regarding energy security and regional inter-connectivity.

In a nutshell, the Trump administration’s decision to revoke India’s sanctions waiver for Chabahar Port represents a significant geopolitical challenge. This move disrupts India’s investment in Iran, threatens the viability of the INSTC, and forces New Delhi to reconsider its trade and connectivity strategies.

The port witnessed an increase of 43% in vessel traffic and a 34% rise in container traffic in 2023-2024. It is envisaged that there will be substantial increase in maritime trade and commercial earnings once the port becomes fully functional.

Indian Minister of Ports Shipping and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal and Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Mehrdad Bazrpash, signed a 10-year agreement for the operation of Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman in southeastern Iran. Under the agreement, India is to invest $120 million in the development of infrastructure in the Shahid Beheshti terminal at the port and extend a $250 million credit line to Iran.

ndia made the agreement with the aim of boosting trade with landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. By equipping and leasing Chabahar port, India could meet several other goals, including bypassing China, competing with Pakistan’s nearby Gwadar port and influencing Afghanistan. However, challenges remain including U.S. economic sanctions and potential tensions with China and Pakistan despite their otherwise good relations with Tehran

A major impediment is U.S.-backed sanctions against Iran, including Iran’s blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global watchdog against money laundering and terrorism financing, and Iran’s lack of access to the SWIFT system of electronic international payments. Iran is also barred from conducting transactions in dollars. Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, campaigned in part on these issues but his ability to resolve them remains in doubt.

There are also logistical obstacles, such as Iran’s delay in completing two railway lines – Chabahar-Zahedan and Rasht-Astara — which are necessary for moving cargo from the port and connecting to a planned International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Another question involves China. In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year, $400 billion partnership agreement. This fueled speculation that China would invest in Chabahar or in both Chabahar and Gwadar, which are only about 100 miles apart. There is room for Chinese involvement in Chabahar since India has only invested in the ShahidBeheshti wharf and Shahid Kalantari terminal there.

So far, however, Tehran has not received the support from Beijing it anticipated. China invested only $618 million in projects in Iran from 2018 to 2022, mainly in the construction sector. Meanwhile, China invested $22.5 billion in Saudi Arabia, $13 billion in Iraq, $4.6 billion in Kuwait, $1.8 billion in Qatar, $19.3 billion in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and $2.5 billion in Oman. Even China’s investment in tiny Bahrain was more than twice what it put into Iran.

Iran has also been irritated by Chinese diplomatic stances. In a recent meeting with Arab states, China signed off on a communique that disputed Iranian control of three small islands in the Persian Gulf that are also claimed by the UAE. Iran summoned the Chinese ambassador to Tehran to protest but China’s foreign ministry spokesman reaffirmed Beijing’s position that the UAE and Iran should resolve their differences through negotiations.1

Competition between Chabahar and Gwadar is also significant. China has committed to investing $62 billion in Gwadar port, while India will invest less than $500 million in Chabahar. In addition, the projected capacities of the two ports are significantly different. It is expected that by 2030, Gwadar will handle up to 400 million tons of cargo per year, much more than Chabahar’s projected capacity of 10 to 12 million tons

Conclusion

In conclusion, Central Asia has emerged as an important geopolitical player in the 21st with the West including the US vying for important goals with Russia and China already in the competition. India though joining the competition late has shown improved interest by forming strategic partnership with countries in Central Asia. It may increase further in the years to come which may materialize using it’s astute diplomacy

References:

1) As Central Asia looks for diverse partners, India should expedite engagement with the region ( First Post, June 2, 2023) https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/as-central-asia-looks-for-diverse- partners-india-should-expedite-engagement-with-the-region-12682392.html

2) BalajiChandramohan, “India relies on Ayni for its Central Asian presence,” Universal New Wires, December 13, 2012

3) BalajiChandramohan India’s Growing Strategic Reach in Central Asia and its Impact on the Wider Asian Geopolitics (Diplomatist, September 4, 2024)

4) SCO crucial for India to emerge as a third option in Central Asia (Moneycontrol, July 5, 2020) https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/politics/sco-is-crucial-for-india-to-emerge-as-a-third-option-in- central-asia-10907241.html

5) India’s SCO Presidency: Gateway to Closer Ties with Central Asia (PolicyPolicy Perspective Foundaiton) https://ppf.org.in/centre/centre-for-neighbourhood-studies-ppf-cns/indias-sco-presidency- gateway-to-closer-ties-with-central-asia

6) China-Central Asia summit: Pushing the region towards debt trap (Economic Times, May 23, 2023) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-central-asia- summit-pushing-the-region-towards-debt-trap/articleshow/100454439.cms?from=mdr

7) Neha Mishra China’s Overtures to Afghanistan: Prospective Rare-Earth Mining Centre for Airpower Studies CAPS InFocus: 20/2021 https://capsindia.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/11/CAPS_Infocus_NM_00-1.pdf

8) Deepak Kumar Key to Engaging China and Russia MP-IDSA Monograph Series No. 76 July 2022 https://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph/Monograph%2076%20for%20website.pdf

9) Kashif Hasan Khan Chabahar in the Crossfire: How Trump 2.0’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Squeezes India’s Strategic Ambitions ( Diplomat, February 8, 2025) https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/chabahar-in-the-crossfire-how-trump-2-0s-maximum-pressure- squeezes-indias-strategic-ambitions/ https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/what-to-make-of-russias-new- security-agreements/

10) Chabahar in the Crossfire: How Trump 2.0’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Squeezes India’s Strategic Ambitions (The Diplomat, February 7,2025) https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/chabahar-in-the- crossfire-how-trump-2-0s-maximum-pressure-squeezes-indias-strategic-ambitions/

About The Author

Balaji Chandramohan is a research scholar with University of Madras and he was previously a visiting fellow with future directions international, Perth Australia.'