Abstract
Since 1995, there has been substantial efforts to enhance India-Taiwan relations in a multidimensional manner. However, the relations between the two states have been subject to considerations that pertain to China that is a mutual neighbor to both India and Taiwan. Furthermore, Chinese actions in Hong Kong and Doklam have led both New Delhi and Taipei to rethink or reconceptualize their relations with China and with each other. Meanwhile, India retains a key position in Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and Taiwan’s geopolitical location including nearby sea lines of communication (SLOCs) provide an important avenue of collaboration with India in maritime security. The research has attempted to understand the historical context of the geopolitical importance of the India-Taiwan relations with a special focus on SLOCs; to assess the contemporary significance of India-Taiwan relations and the SLOC; and the future implications of closer India-Taiwan on SLOCs in the region.
Introduction
Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy implemented in 2016 has resulted in closer relations with India. Furthermore, the cementation of the Indo-Pacific in the policy alignment of both New Delhi and Taipei has ensured the pursuit of an invigorated expedition for ever greater collaboration. The COVID-19 pandemic and Taiwan’s prowess in the semi-conductor sector along with its access to regional sea lines of communication (SLOCs) continue to highlight the reasons for India’s pursuit of closer ties with Taiwan.
Taiwan’s Southbound Policy (NSP) has motivated Taipei to move beyond cross-Strait ties, a move that has been further encouraged by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under Tsai Ing-wen that has repudiated the 1992 consensus thereby incurring a reiteration of its promise by China that have included recurrent intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the inclusion of regional SLOCs into China’s enlarging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), acquiring ‘scramjet’-based hypersonic anti-ship cruise missiles along with directed-energy weapons. Other capabilities include submarine quieting and undersea warfare abilities that are to bolster China’s ‘undersea great wall’ that is slated to hamper the freedom of navigation for vessels (Davis, 2017). Furthermore, SLOCs have become essential in order to control and manage “narcotics trade, smuggling, refugee flows, and disputes” as well as other activities such as disaster response, relief and preparedness along with facilitation of “naval deployment in the different regional or sub-regional seas” (Laimou-Maniati). History has seen tensions particularly in 1958 and 1994 between Taiwan and China take place in the Taiwan Strait and the contemporary geopolitical alignments appear to have yet again produced conditions that are likely to stand witness and to contribute to a maritime confrontation or “subtle geopolitical contestations in the region” (Singh, 2013).
The research has attempted to understand the historical context the geopolitical importance of the India-Taiwan relations with a special focus on SLOCs; to assess the contemporary significance of India-Taiwan relations and regional SLOCs; and the future implications of closer India-Taiwan on SLOCs in the region.
Historical context the geopolitical importance of the India-Taiwan relations with a special focus on SLOCs
Scholars have traced the roots of contemporary India-Taiwan relations to the 1920s that saw the Leadership of the Indian National Congress (INC) conferring with the leader of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek. India and Taiwan both participated in League against Imperialism in Brussels in 1927 and relations were further solidified with Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to meet Chiang Kai-shek in 1939 (Hashmi, 2020). Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek visited India in 1942 as well and met with Mahatma Gandhi. There was common ground to be found as Chiang Kai-shek was at the time concerned with Japanese imperialism just as India was preoccupied with countering British colonialism. Chiang Kai-shek, additionally, advocated to the British to be more sympathetic to Indian demands and to allow “real political authority” to the Indian people at a time when the second World War was still underway (Chen-Tsai, 1987).
However, there were divergences as well. Scholars have particularly highlighted the “Tibet and the McMahon Line” as such. There was intense interaction from 1947-1949 about various issue that encompassed the border concerns. The civil war in China ultimately paved the way and New Delhi established diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as India had to content with the “the political reality of having a Communist China at its border” (Karackattu, 2019). This development coupled with other factors such as One China Policy (Pant, 2021) contributed to New Delhi’s past inability to dephypananete its Taipei relations from its relations with Beijing. India’s proximity with the Soviet Union at the time when Taiwan was aligned with the US further aggravated relations. After the Sino-Indian War in 1962, there was an improvement in relations in India-Taiwan relations as New Delhi reassessed its alignments in the international order.
Subsequently, the end of the Cold War and the pursuit of the Look East Policy by India saw more opportunities materialize to enhancer grater engagement between India and Taiwan including the establishment of the India-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Forum (Nagda, 2020).
However, there still appears to be significant limitations in the relationship due to considerations pertaining to Beijing along with the absence of formal diplomatic ties. Although India had emerged as a member of grassroots Milk Tea Alliance, highlighting perceptions that persist in Taiwan and regional countries (Banka, 2020). India has spoken in favor of Taiwan in regard to the Itu Aba (Taiping Island) in the Spratly group of islands in the South China Sea as well contributing to the shaping of the emerging perception (Saxena, 2022).
Contemporaneously, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) member states that include India focused on the Taiwan Strait (After G-7, Quad includes Taiwan Strait in talks, 2021). It has been said that the Taiwan straddles the “crucial geographical location at the convergence of sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific water”. However, India for its part in the past has been stated to be an “onlooker” during the Taiwan Straits crises. Taiwan Strait separates Taiwan from China’s Fukien province. China has previously also jeopardized Bashi Channel between Taiwan and Philippines as well as Miyako Straits between Taiwan and Okinawa (Easton, 2017) and tried “submarine blockade, besides plans for overall invasion, amphibious landings, saturation strikes” (Kondapalli, 2020). Other strategic Islands, SLOCs and chokepoints that are vulnerable to such actions include Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu Islands along with the South China Sea, Lombok the Malacca Sea and the Strait of Malacca as Beijing increases its focus on its Eastern Theater Command. Additionally, relations between China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation have been strained. The major SLOC remains the South China Sea that has the potential to emerge as the epicenter for bases that can in turn provide for command over the SLOCs that exist the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
The Contemporary Significance of India-Taiwan Relations and Regional SLOCs
A SLOC is defined as a path or a route that is traveled by a naval vassal for transit. SLOCs differ in span dependent on the “geography in terms of landmass, choke points, reefs, foul ground and location of ports and harbors”. SLOC have chokepoints that are “narrow channels along widely used global sea routes” (Kan, 2016). New Delhi and Taipei understand acutely the importance of SLOCs with India lying between SLOCs, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca and Taiwan in relations to Taiwan Strait that have the potential to emerge as a “flashpoint” due to it being encompassing a chokepoint (Sakhuja, 2001).
Experts have posited that cross-strait tensions have witnessed an increase in escalation particularly since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. Correspondingly, “China has been participating in increasingly aggressive actions, including by flying fighter jets near the island” (Maizland, 2021) and over the Taiwan Strait SLOC. SLOCS have become essential for energy and maritime security especially as the conceptual underpinning of the Indo-Pacific construct that aims to develop a novel ‘strategic system’ (Liu, 2016). Furthermore, experts have propounded that from a defence viewpoint, maritime SLOCs are instruments of power that possess immense importance to India-Taiwan relations as they can be used to stalk or inhibit passage to and from Taiwan.
There are other susceptibilities that makes Taiwan Straits vulnerable such as “different interpretation over the freedom of the seas principle; islands’ sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritime jurisdictional claims; the emerging naval build-up; and non-traditional threats such as pollution, piracy, drug-trafficking” (Guoxing, 2000).
Furthermore, scholars postulate that joint patrol and joint development zone could lessen the threat arising from intersecting nautical claims as well as sovereignty concerns. However, political considerations that currently exist between China and Taiwan make this an unlikely prospect in the near term. Additionally, China faced with the Malacca Dilemma and cognizant of its reliance on hydrocarbon export from ports as well as its reliance on Taiwanese ports such as ports of Kaohsiung and Taipei for its Silk Road initiative. These developments have led to Beijing considering the Taiwan Strait to be a priority and deliberates any kind of interactions with intrusion from other extra-regional powers stating that “stop all forms of official exchanges and military interactions with Taiwan and handle the Taiwan-related issues with caution” (Pickrell, 2018).
Strategic analysts have also stated that the Port of Taichung on the Taiwan Straits could be the “most probable location for a major PLA landing attempt” along with their Defence consisting of “concentrated ground forces in well-prepared, covered defense works, which could include underground bunkers and tunnel systems” (Axe, 2021). China is also on the lookout for port ownership and the country has the potential to construct dual-purpose ports.
As India and Taiwan enhance their economic partnership, these concerns are likely to come at the forefront of the relations particularly as convergences are to be seen between the two countries in sectors such as technology, manufacturing and tourism. Moreover, Taipei is currently deeply aware that any kind of conflict in the regional SLOCs especially the Taiwan Strait would lead to “less contact and communication, a lack of cooperation, and a narrower range of signaling options available for Taiwan and mainland China” (Karackattu, 2019).
Furthermore, SLOCs have become essential for the collection of data and information along with providing navies of various counties with opportunities to enhance interoperability, attain fundamental knowledge of the operational environment as well as an essential exposure to create scenarios for future conflict. This becomes increasingly important as there is an intelligence gap between China and India-Taiwan. It has also been said that as China boosts its economic clout, its diaspora ties are increased and its natural resource thirst is far from being quenched, Beijing could list the protection of SLOCs as a core interest that could have considerable impact on India and Taiwan relations. Notably, SLOCs become “strategic pathways” during a conflict (Sakhuja, 2001). India has already increased its engagement in the South China Sea to that end (Indian Navy task force to deploy in South China Sea, Western Pacific, 2021). Consequently, an agreement has been signed between India’s National Maritime Foundation and Taiwan Asia Exchange Foundation in regard to the Indo-Pacific and its future potential in region where multiple SLOCs flourish (Chaudhury, 2020).
The future implications of India-Taiwan relations on SLOCs in the region
Analysts have emphasized the potential of trilateral relations with US, India and Taiwan that are likely to reduce the risk of retaliation from China (Timothy S. Rich, 2020) as reports indicate that China is on the path to execute “sufficient capabilities to execute an air and naval blockade of Taiwan”. This fact has compelled Taipei to cement relations with neutral powers that include India at a time when New Delhi is focusing on initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and Indian Ocean Rim Association that can offer convergences for cooperation with Taiwan particularly certain initiatives encompass SLOC security. For extra-regional powers, Taiwan retains enormous potential as it has been referred to as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ of East Asia. However, it remains hemmed in by Beijing’s “salami-slicing, hybrid warfare, limited war, and tolerance warfare” (Basu, 2020) to halt Taiwan Strait emergence as a chokepoint (China’s Maritime Choke Points, 2016) that can be countered by “asymmetrical systems and strategies” to hinder China’s power to control the Taiwan Strait (Pawiński, 2014).
India and Taiwan can also prioritize institutionalization of ties to achieve operational coordination (Patil, 2016). As multipolarity comes to the fore, India can also work with other powers such as Japan and South Korea to enhance multilateral relations for the achievement of develop “mechanisms for collective action to support sea-lane security” (Rielage, 2015) as demonstrated by the multilateral work on INSPIREsat-1 satellite (Ghosh, 2022). Exchange of technological know-how will further assist in the respective countries’ navy’s “efficiency and fighting power augmentation” Furthermore, clear-cut understanding of threat perception in regard to the SLOCs will also enhance effectively of the aforementioned measures (Qiyu, 2015).
Potential for cooperation South China Sea, a SLOC, for scientific exploration has been highlighted as well. Additionally, Taiwan and India could also work on standard setting apropos of SLOC defence and security measures (Xiaoxuan, 2015). New Delhi further continues to retain the prospect of “aligning India’s Taiwan policy with that of other Quad countries should not be seen as a move to counter China” as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy (Hashmi, 2021). that can include “integration on operation, training and exercises”, amplifying mutual maritime domain awareness, blue/ ocean economy initiatives coupled with coordinated problem solving in relation to SLOCs security (Rusland, 2021).
Experts have time and time again elucidated the need for “concrete co-operation and communication for the management and safeguarding” of SLOCs including against non-traditional threats. (Laimou-Maniati) Other measures include the establishment of confidence building measures, focus on “humanitarian assistance, search and rescue (SAR), avoidance of incident at sea (INCSEA) agreements, anti-piracy cooperation, cooperative maritime surveillance, and mine-countermeasures”. (Guoxing, 2000) Notably, India has emphasized the need for a “code of conduct” (Saxena, 2022) in the region that can see a convergence with Taiwan as both New Delhi and Taipei work on aspirational affinities. Concomitantly, Taiwan’s absence in multilateral naval organisations presents challenges for India in its engagement that require the minilaterals approach (Tan, 2021).
Conclusion
SLOCs retain significant strategic significance in India-Taiwan relations as both countries depend on trade, commerce and security on the aforementioned SLOCs that have the potential to stir global maritime volatility. Furthermore, the Taiwan Strait are also subject to China’s hybrid warfare tactics and grey zone warfare strategies that continue to complicate the cementing of India and Taiwan relations. Strategic analysts continue to highlight the “permanent tension and outright hostility” in the current cross straits relations between China and Taiwan. Any change in the status quo including the “securitization of cross-strait ties” could have enormous impact on India and Taiwan relations vis-à-vis the Taiwan Strait, SLOC. Additionally, SLOCs have been essential for the collection of critical strategic information that present to offer an indelible impact on the strategy of nations and policy consideration (Kostadinov, 2014).
These concerns become increasingly pertinent as New Delhi and Taipei attempt to enhance ties. (Laimou-Maniati) Furthermore, any kind of disrupting in relation to SLOC security could have wide ranging “economic and geopolitical” consequences for India-Taiwan relations as well as for China and Taiwan who remain excessively depended on imports and therefore on safe transit through various regional SLOCs (Rodrigue, 2004).
Notably, maritime security and energy security retain great potential for collaboration with prospects such as establishment (Liu, 2016) a regional SLOC cooperative organization providing cause for encouragement. To that end, India can incorporate Taiwan in its ventures such as its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) Partnership.
References:
After G-7, Quad includes Taiwan Strait in talks. (2021, August 14). Retrieved from TribuneIndia: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/after-g-7-quad-includes-taiwan-strait-in-talks-297204
Axe, D. (2021, July 23). Target: Taichung. This Port In Taiwan Could Be China’s Main Target. Retrieved from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/07/23/target-taichung-this-one-port-in-taiwan-could-be-chinas-main-target/?sh=20b5cd0a1e32
Banka, N. (2020, April 21). Explained: Why ‘Milk Tea Alliance’ of Southeast Asian social media warriors has the Chinese fuming. Retrieved from The Economist: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-thailand-taiwan-coronavirus-nnevvy-bright-6370850/
Basu, P. (2020, December 1). The Eastern Corridor and the Law of the Sea: Ensuring Sea-Lane Security. Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation: https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-eastern-corridor-and-the-law-of-the-sea-ensuring-sea-lane-security/
Chaudhury, D. R. (2020, October 12). Indian, Taiwanese think tanks join hands to foster cooperation in Indo-Pacific region. Retrieved from The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-taiwanese-think-tanks-join-hands-to-foster-cooperation-in-indo-pacific-region/articleshow/78617364.cms?from=mdr
Chen-Tsai, W. (1987). Chiang Kai-Shek's Visit to India and the Indian Independence. Chinese Studies in History, 3-38.
China’s Maritime Choke Points. (2016, April 26). Retrieved from Geopolitical Futures: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-maritime-choke-points/
Davis, M. (2017, November 17). Towards China’s A2AD 2.0. Retrieved from The Strategist: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/towards-chinas-a2ad-2-0/
Easton, I. (2017). The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia . CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Ghosh, R. (2022, February 18). US Strategy On Indo-Pacific: It opens the door for greater India-Taiwan cooperation. Retrieved from The Times of India: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/us-strategy-on-indo-pacific-it-opens-the-door-for-greater-india-taiwan-cooperation/
Guoxing, J. (2000, February). SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific. Retrieved from Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies : https://apcss.org/college/publications/occasional-paper-series-reports/sloc-security-in-the-asia-pacific/
Hashmi, S. (2020). India-Taiwan Relations: Time is Ripe to Bolster Ties. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal.
Hashmi, S. (2021, July 16). A Missing Link in the Quad: India’s Support for Taiwan. Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/a-missing-link-in-the-quad-indias-support-for-taiwan/
Hashmi, S. (2021, November ). India-Taiwan Ties: A Case for Stronger Partnership. Retrieved from Institut français des relations internationales: https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/india-taiwan-ties-case-stronger-partnership
Indian Navy task force to deploy in South China Sea, Western Pacific. (2021, August 3). Retrieved from Tribune India: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/indian-navy-task-force-to-deploy-in-south-china-sea-western-pacific-291860
Kan, F. Y.-h. (2016). The Ma-Xi Summit and Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: Implications for Taiwan-India Cooperation. In J. P. Panda, India-Taiwan Relations in Asia and Beyond: The Future (p. 10). New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Karackattu, J. T. (2019, April 22). The Case for a Pragmatic India-Taiwan Partnership. Retrieved from Carnegie India: https://carnegieindia.org/2019/04/22/case-for-pragmatic-india-taiwan-partnership-pub-78855
Karackattu, J. T. (2019, April 1). The Case for a Pragmatic India-Taiwan Partnership. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20962.3?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Kondapalli, S. (2020, October 6). China-Taiwan ties are in dire straits after Beijing's repeated air intrusions but India's studied silence is surprising. Retrieved from First Post: https://www.firstpost.com/india/china-taiwan-ties-are-in-dire-straits-after-beijings-repeated-air-intrusions-but-indias-studied-silence-is-surprising-10029721.html
Kostadinov, Y. (2014, October). Flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific. Retrieved from Strategic Vision.
Laimou-Maniati, I. (n.d.). The Management of the Sea Lanes of Communication in South East Asia and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Performance. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23243/Management%20of%20the%20Sea%20Lanes%20of%20Communication%20in%20SE%20Asia.pdf
Liu, F.-K. (2016). Maritime Security and the Indo-Pacific Security Link: The Strategic Reorientation of India and Taiwan. In J. P. Panda, India-Taiwan Relations in Asia and Beyond: The Future. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.
Liu, F.-K. (2016). Maritime Security and the Indo-Pacific Security Link:The Strategic Reorientation of India and Taiwan . In J. P. Panda, India-Taiwan Relations in Asia and Beyond: The Future. Pentagon Press and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Maizland, L. (2021, May 10). Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy
Nagda, A. (2020, March 13). What Role for Taiwan in Act East 2.0? Retrieved from Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5658
Pant, H. (2021, July 14 ). We had a One China policy for long. It’s time for a relook. Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation: https://www.orfonline.org/research/we-had-a-one-china-policy-for-long-its-time-for-a-relook/
Patil, C. (2016, November 17). Competing for Influence: China’s Strategic Constraints and Challenges in the Indian Ocean. Retrieved from Institute of Chinese Studies: https://icsin.org/blogs/2017/11/16/competing-for-influence-chinas-strategic-constraints-and-challenges-in-the-indian-ocean/#more-770
Pawiński, M. (2014). Drawing Lines Offshore Control and Taiwan’s Sea Lines of Communication.
Pickrell, R. (2018, Ocotober 18). A US Navy ship stopped at a port in Taiwan, and China is not happy. Retrieved from Business Insider: https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/a-us-navy-ship-stopped-at-a-port-in-taiwan-and-china-is-not-happy/articleshow/66267192.cms
Qiyu, X. (2015). Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security. In P. A. Martinson, Beyond the Wall:Chinese Far Seas Operations. China Maritime Studies Institute.
Rielage, D. C. (2015). Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security. In P. A. Martinson, Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Oper ar Seas Operation . China Maritime Studies Institute .
Rodrigue, J.-P. (2004). Straits, Passages and Chokepoints A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution. Cahiers de géographie de Québec.
Rusland, S. L. (2021). The Importance Of Naval Collaboration In The Post Covid-19 Pandemic. The Journal of Defence and Security.
Sakhuja, V. (2001, August ). Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication. Retrieved from Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_aug01sav01.html#:~:text=The%20SLOCs%20serve%20as%20umbilical,routes%20are%20considered%20strategic%20paths.
Saxena, A. (2022, March 4). Assessing Potential India-Taiwan Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific. Retrieved from Centre for Land Warfare Studies: https://www.claws.in/assessing-potential-india-taiwan-security-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific/
Singh, T. (2013, April 30 ). China: Contextualising the Anti-Access Area-Denial Strategy. Retrieved from Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=3902
Tan, N. V. (2021). India, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific: Economic–Security Strategic Partnership and Expected Utility Theory. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 98-126.
Timothy S. Rich, A. D. (2020, January 25). Taiwan’s Relations with India: Partisan Divides. Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/taiwans-relations-with-india-partisan-divides/
Venkateswaran, L. (2020, August 18). Vital sea lanes of communications as a core interest for China: Inferences for India’s national security. Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/vital-sea-lanes-of-communications-as-a-core-interest-for-china/
Xiaoxuan, W. (2015). SLOC Security and International Cooperation. In P. A. Martinson, Beyond the Wall:Chinese Far Seas Operations. China Maritime Studies Institute.
