Abstract
‘Sea lines of communication’ (SLOC) describes the primary maritime routes between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval operations. In peace, they serve as commercial trade routes but in times of war, these routes turn into strategic pathways that become increasingly vital to a nation’s internal peace, security and economic growth. It thus becomes a strategic imperative for all nations to secure efficient and uninterrupted SLOCs to expand trade and global commerce as more and more people connect to the international supply chain aided by technology. And as the world gets more and more connected through technology, India and Taiwan, with their shared values democracy and human rights and to this effect: freedom of navigation, are emerging as natural allies and partners in furthering the well-being of their people. Sea Lines of Communication that have traditionally been the lifeline of a country’s economy and security are becoming increasingly important and in the present paper we discuss how, in a fragile world with an ever evolving geopolitical dynamics, strategic partnerships are vital. Emphasis has been laid on the sea route through South China Sea as it is of paramount geopolitical importance to the stability of these maritime lines of communication. Further, efforts in this direction, specifically by Government of India through its Act East Policy and by Taiwanese Government through its New Southbound Policy have been lauded as key preliminary steps to cement a long-lasting relationship with these nations.
Introduction
The importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the South and Southeast Asian region flows from the nature and the complexity of the geographical environment as well as their effects in the regional countries and major powers. In its distribution of water and land, the region has one of the most perplexed structures on earth. Topographical features such as shallow continental shelves, deep-sea basins, troughs, trenches, continental slopes and volcanic and coral islands are found in the region. There are numerous large and small islands, which divide the waters into different seas connected with many channels, passages and straits. Furthermore, the increasing significance of the maritime issues - natural resources, marine environment, accidents at sea, search and rescue issues, and the propensity of illegal activities, and disputes that occur at sea, render the issue of management of the SLOCs, a substantial concern for the policies of the regional states as well as those of the major powers.
Indian Ocean SLOCs are geopolitically among the most strategically significant in the world. According to the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, more than 80% of global oil trade occurs via choke points present in the Indian Ocean. Of those around 40% traffic runs through the Hormuz Strait, 35% through the Malacca Strait and around 8% via Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait. Historically, during colonial period, the British, Portuguese and French controlled majority of trade in the Indian Ocean. Today, no one nation controls the ocean. Post-World War II, Indian Ocean got divided into Africa, Middle East and South African sub regions and after cold war US emerged as a prominent player and to establish control over it divided the Indian Ocean into East and West Oceans. The Western part was jointly supervised in conjunction with France and its French speaking alliances while the Eastern part was managed with India. Towards the beginning of 21st century US influence gradually weaned off as it diverted its geopolitical efforts to Afghanistan and the Middle East. While it jointly managed the sea affairs with India, France and UK to a lesser extent, issues of piracy around Gulf of Aden by the Somali pirates and other security entanglements diverted most of the attention and efforts to the western regions of the ocean. This gave leeway to China which gradually over the past few decades started asserting more and more dominance over the Ocean affairs.
SLOCs in the South China Sea:
Sea lane through South China Sea has been of great historic importance for India (e.g. Chola and Srivijaya maritime empires flourishing between 7th and 13th Century AD) and passage had been unimpeded over centuries. India has historical rights established by practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment. India uses its waters for trade worth $200 billion every year. Nearly 55% of India’s trade with the Indo-Pacific region passes through the South China Sea [1]. These international sea lanes through Southeast Asia are important to the economic and political well-being of billions of people throughout the world. As the interdependence of nations continuous to grow, the issue of concrete co-operation and communication for the management and safeguarding of these passages has become indispensable in the political agenda of different states and institutions. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that roughly 80 percent of global trade by volume and 70 percent by value is transported by sea. Of that volume, 60 percent of maritime trade passes through Asia, with the South China Sea carrying an estimated one-third of global shipping. Its waters are particularly critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which rely on the Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean.
As a vital artery of trade for many of the world’s largest economies, the South China Sea has garnered significant attention. The high concentration of commercial goods flowing through the relatively narrow Strait of Malacca has raised concerns about its vulnerability as a strategic chokepoint. Nearly 40% of China’s total trade transited through South China Sea.
Key Straits in South China Sea:
Despite the end of the cold war, the strategic importance of many international straits in the region for global powers continues to be regarded as vital, because of the link they provide between naval deployments in the different regional or sub-regional seas. Before identifying and analyzing the main areas of problems around the SLOCs and the security co-operation in Southeast Asia, the SLOCs of the region need to be defined and explained. The first sea lane of communication is the Strait of Malacca, which is the main passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It is 600 miles long and 300 miles wide on its western side. Heading east, it narrows considerably into the Phillip channel and the strait of Singapore. It is relatively shallow, with some points just 72 feet deep. The length of the Singapore Strait, which connects Malacca with the South China Sea, is 75 miles, with an overall width of less than 12 miles. The second SLOC is the wider and deeper Lombok. It is less congested than the Strait of Malacca and quite often is used as an alternative passage. It is sometimes used for the largest tankers transiting between the Persian Gulf and Japan, and it is considered the safest route. The third SLOC is the 50-mile-long Strait of Sunda, another alternative to Malacca. Because the currents are strong and the depth of water is limited, deep draft ships do not use the strait. In the north, it is particularly shallow and dangerous, and therefore it is not heavily used. The largest SLOC is the South China Sea. It stretches 1,800 nautical miles from Sumatra to Taiwan and is home to four principal island groups and three major zones of petroleum exploration. It also provides the Sea-lanes connecting northeast Asia with Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Regional and greater powers, in terms of regional maritime security stability and seaborne trade, consider the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to be the most important. The strategic concept by which this two-way international trade developed was based on peace and stability and predicated upon the freedom of navigation, principles enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC).
Disrupting South China Sea Trade
While there are several major transit routes or sea lines of communication (SLOC) that offer entry into the South China Sea – the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait among them – the Strait of Malacca is by far the most widely used. It is the shortest and therefore most economical passageway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. There are a variety of scenarios that could disrupt shipping traffic and endanger commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Malacca. A short-term peacetime disruption would force vessels to either wait until access is reestablished or consider using an alternate route, while a long-term disruption could have far-reaching consequences for the trillions of dollars of goods that transit the South China Sea each year.
When considering a short-term peacetime Strait of Malacca closure, the added costs of rerouting can be estimated by calculating average daily voyage costs of various vessels. Assuming that tankers and bulk carriers exceeding 100,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT) detour through the deep-water Lombok Strait and that all other smaller transiting ships use the more proximate but shallower Sunda Strait, a week-long closure of the Strait of Malacca would result in an estimated $64.5 million in additional shipping costs. [2] While an additional $64.5 million in shipping costs is significant, this would represent just 0.08 to 0.10 percent of the average weekly value of trade value that passes through the South China Sea. Over the course of a year, the costs of a week-long closure would drop to just 0.0015 to 0.0019 percent of annual trade passing through the waterway. In the case of multiple SLOC closures, rerouting all shipping for one week through the Lombok Strait would cost approximately $119 million. A worst-case planning scenario entails all three straits (as well as other possible Southeast Asian SLOCs) being unavailable for commercial traffic, forcing vessels to sail around the southern coast of Australia before pushing north into the Philippine Sea. This would be analogous to traders rerouting around Africa when the Suez Canal was closed from 1967 to 1974 and would carry a considerable monthly cost of $2.8 billion [2].
Global Economy Projection: India and China Ascend
The PWC global growth projections for 2050 for 32 of the largest economies in the world, accounting for around 85% of world GDP predicts that China will account for 20% of the world economy, with India at 15% and the US at 12%. That’s a big change from 2016, when the US was beating both China and India by a big margin. Emerging markets (E7) could grow around twice as fast as advanced economies (G7) on average [3]. To fuel this, it is estimated that the current consumption of primary energy from 13.5 million tons today will increase to 20 million tons by 2050. According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, world primary energy consumption reached 13,511 million tons of oil equivalents in 2017 growing at an average annual rate of 1.5%from 2007 to 2017[4]. The transportation of minerals including oil and coal requires vital security and stability of SLOCs specifically through the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea.
Geopolitics in South China Sea and its implications to the SLOCs
South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean and is surrounded by littoral states of China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines and Taiwan. Strait of Malacca connects it with the Indian Ocean and Taiwan Strait connects it to East China Sea. Economies of Southeast Asian countries heavily depend on ports and free movement of goods and services through trade lanes in South China Sea. An estimated $ 3.4 trillion in goods pass through the sea annually, accounting for 30% of world’s shipping including 14% of all US trade, 40% of China’s and 86% of Vietnam’s.
In an increasingly energy hungry world, South China Sea harbors reserves of oil, natural gas, sea products and other minerals. Between 10-30 billion barrels of estimated oil reserves, 190-900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are likely located in its contested waters [5] The Sea is also among the most heavily fished waters in the world accounting for an estimated 12% of global fish catch (2015).
South China Sea, being one of the busiest waterways in the world connecting large markets of East and Southeast Asia with Eurasia and Africa warrants a free and secure sea line of communication, which is important not only to the region’s but also to global economic stability. However, due to above mentioned resourcefulness of the region and its strategic geolocation whereby controlling and restricting the heavy maritime traffic by the choke points of Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok in the south and Taiwan in the north, make this sea line extremely geopolitically significant.
Littoral Claimant States to the South China Sea
Six governments directly claim islands in South China Sea. These group of islands, rocks, reef some often barely above sea level, are essential in bolstering legal territorial claims of the countries since, in theory, holding them is essential for expansion of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).The EEZs can extend 200 nautical miles around the countries coastal baselines and proved exclusive access to the resources and to build military assets increasing the nation’s ability to actually enforce the territorial claims and restrict access to the waters should the need arise in situations like war. Vietnam claims significant portion of the sea arguing many reefs and islands (e.g. Paracel Island) were used by their fishermen for centuries and were also formally incorporated into Vietnam during the French colonial period. Malaysia’s claim to the sea is based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the continental shelf principal wherein another 350 nautical miles of extended EEZ is added taking into account the shallow submerged part of the island. Malaysia further claims that the Spratly islands were part of the Japanese empire until 1945 which then renounced its claims and allowed Malaysia to annex some of them. Brunei’s claim to Spratlys is similar.
China claims vast majority of South China Sea including islands of Paracel, Spratly, Pratas, Macclesfield Bank and Scraborogh Shoal for itself, in accordance with a vaguely defined demarcation line called the nine-dash line. It argues that much of Southeast Asia was part of China’s dominion under its historic dynasties dating as far back as the Hans of second century AD. Soon after the lines were drafted in 1947 by the then republic of China based on historical documents, China would be plunged into a disastrous war with Japan while fighting a civil war at the same time. This led to victory of communist forces and the newly formed People’s Republic of China adopted the same nine dash line theory. The nationalist forces lost and retreated to Taiwan which brought with it the same territorial claim to the South China Sea. On 1st January 2013, China issued a new map, which for the first time marked in detail more than 130 islands, reefs, shoals that Beijing claims within the U-shaped lines. Recently Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia have approached UN expressing the illegality of Chinese nine dash line claims. Philippines challenged China’s maritime boundaries in an arbitration tribunal constituted under UNCLOS which it won in 2016 but the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was disregarded by China and Taiwan.
While claiming islands as one’s own territory is one thing, actually controlling them is another. As an example, various small constituent islands comprising the Spratlys have different countries controlling them. However, China has started occupying more and more islands and since 2013, also started creating artificial islands capable of sustaining large military bases and even deep-water ports. In Spratly, China has 7 outposts and has built airfields at Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross, along with potential missile, radar and helicopter infrastructure at several smaller formations all amounting to over 3200 acres of new land. In Paracels, China has 20 outposts and has established a significant military installation at Woody Island with radar and helicopter facilities at several other areas. It also controls Scarborough Shoal which it seized in 2012, via constant coast guard presence. Skirmishes in overlapping claimed waters have become more frequent in recent years. In one instance, a Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by Philippines coast guard in 2013 [6]. China’s bigger vessels and coast guards often harass, intercept, attack or chase away Vietnamese fishermen near Xisha / Hoang Sa waters of Paracel Islands – roughly 150 nautical miles from both Vietnamese coast and Chinese island of Hainan. In the first half of 2020, Chinese naval forces have rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, buzzed a Philippines naval vessel and harassed a Malaysian oil drilling operation all within their respective EEZs [7]. Indonesia has also repeatedly come into conflict with China around its Natuna Islands. In another instance in July 2019, a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson claimed China was conducting “provocative activities” near several oil blocks, including where India’s ONGC was involved in oil and gas production [8]
However, at the same time, ASEAN overtook EU to become China’s largest trade partner in first quarter of 2020 and China is the third largest investor ($150 billion) in ASEAN. The member countries need China especially in a post-COVID world where they are struggling to revive their economies. US -China rivalry is presenting ASEAN a binary choice. This further highlights the need for India’s involvement in establishing long lasting trade relations with the ASEAN nations in the South China Sea.
External National Interests in the region
External actors are also involved in the region owing to the importance of this sea line of communication. Japan’s economy heavily depends on access to South China Sea. It imports 70% of its oil through this sea route. Japanese energy firms are also involved in the region with Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. Japan and China’s rivalry (e.g. over Senkaku Island and dispute over status of Taiwan) also warrants its presence in the area. Singapore also doesn’t have a claim in South China Sea islands but is one of the most important economic and financial hubs of Southeast Asia and the world and relies heavily on free access to South China Sea. ASEAN, a formidable economic block with a combined GDP of 3 trillion dollars, comparable to that of India or the UK, has successfully brought China to the table but internal conflicts (Laos and Myanmar taking a more pro-China stance versus Vietnam and Malaysia) have limited its success.
Historically US had played a major role in securing the South China Sea waters promoting freedom of navigation and its presence afforded ASEAN countries the opportunity to pursue economic prosperity without substantial increase in their defense expenditures. The Indo-Pacific has prospered under American hegemony for over four decades. In fact, US invested around $ 328.5 billion in ASEAN region in 2020. However as Chinese influence in the SLOCs through South China Sea increased considerably, US has reasserted its presence forming quasi anti-China alliances to contain Chinese ambitions and performing regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) during which American and allied navy ships will traverse parts of South China sea which China claims its territorial waters while US claims as international waters.
Role of India and its Allies
Over the last decades China’s conduct in the South China Sea has become much more assertive. It relocated significant part of its navy including its submarines to large naval base on Hainan island to be closer to the disputed area and has continuously built up military assets on many islands and reefs to increase its overall naval presence giving it the ability to police much of these waters as demonstrated by its regular interference with foreign fishermen (Vietnam, April 2020 Reuters) and oil and gas exploration in disputed waters (Vietnam July 2017, BBC and Malaysia May 2020, Reuters).
A Necklace of Diamonds to the String of Pearls
The critical sea lines of communication that connect China to Middle Eastern oil-producing states traverse the South China Sea, making it a key strategic region, and potential trouble spot, for the Chinese government. Chinese naval vessels heavily patrol South China Sea waters, and conflicting territorial claims in the region have periodically erupted in naval confrontations. Furthermore, under China’s so called “String of Pearls” strategy a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships run along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan (Gwadar Port), Sri Lanka (Hambantoa Port), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Kyaukpyu), Maldives (Marao Atol), and Somalia. China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) along with its inland initiatives like the Belt and Road and China-Pakistan-Energy Corridor (CPEC) has strengthened its diplomatic and hegemonic ambitions in the regions encircling India.
To counter Chinese growing influence and its contentious territorial, diplomatic or commercial issues in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and with ASEAN nations. India has enacted several strategic measures. One of such strategy especially to counter China’s String of Pearls and New Silk route is the so called 'Necklace of Diamonds' strategy under which India has strengthened ties with Vietnam, Oman, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, Singapore, Mauritius, Seychelles and all five Central Asian Republics to conduct joint army, air force and naval exercises. Necklace of Diamonds Strategy includes boasting cooperation with partners building coast guards, air corridors and naval bases (for instance in Mauritius and Seychelles) [9]. One such instance was signing access agreement with other regional powers such as the French who are now allowing reciprocal access for Indian naval ships to French bases like one on Reunion Island in Mauritius. Another plank of India’s strategy is investment in commercial ports to head off Chinese control of those facilities and to allow future Indian naval access. India has made investments in Chabahar Port in Iran, Sabang port in Indonesia among others.
Act East Policy (AEP) and QUAD
The ‘Look East’ Policy developed under Prime Minister Narsimha Rao and its successor ‘Act East’ Policy furthered by PM Narendra Modi has been instrumental in establishing extensive diplomatic, economic and security cooperation with Southeast Asian nations and has bolstered India’s standing as a regional power and a counter to ever increasing Chinese expansionism and influence in the region.
Driven by the fact that more than 50% of India's trade passes through the Malacca Strait, the Indian navy has established a Far Eastern Naval Command off Port Blair on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It has developed Car Nicobar Airforce base with a 9000ft long runway. In July 2012, India established deep-water maritime facilities in Campbell Bay (INS Baaz), the most southerly point of the Andaman Islands, potentially enabling Indian surveillance operations in the South China Sea [10].The Indian Navy also held exercises in the Andamans and has deployed MiG-29K fighters in the islands [11] and in May 2019 the Indian Navy conducted joint sailing in the SCS with the navies of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan, as a demonstration of their presence amidst suggestions by the Philippines Defence Minister, Delfin Lorenzana that “India has expressed its intent to carry out navigation activities in the South China Sea [12].India has also been conducting joint naval exercises with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993, with Vietnam in 2000 and has engaged in joint patrols with Indonesia in the Andaman Sea since 2002. In recent years India has provided oil exploration and drilling assistance through its state firm run ONGC Videsh Limited to Vietnam. Philippines and Vietnam among others have also procured or expressed interest to procure BRAHMOS missile to strengthen their security of the region. Ensuring unimpeded free trade with ASEAN, Japan, Korea and Taiwan is important as China is well ahead in the waters. The ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) of 2009 has boosted bilateral trade. India’s merchandise exports to ASEAN increased from US$23 billion in 2010 to US$36 billion in 2018 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of five percent, while its merchandise imports from the bloc increased from US$30 billion in 2010 to US$57 billion in 2018, at a CAGR of eight percent. India’s exports to ASEAN in 2019-20 were worth US$31.49 billion, while its imports from the bloc reached US$55.37 billion. [13]
India is looking to work more closely with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific and is entering into issue-based multilateral partnerships like Japan-Australia-India, India-Australia-France, more recently with the UK and Taiwan. In November 2017, India, the US, Australia and Japan gave shape to the long-pending Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad" Coalition to develop a new strategy to keep the critical sea routes in the Indo-Pacific free of any influence. In a joint statement in March 2021, "The Spirit of the Quad," the Quad members described "a shared vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," and a "rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas," which the Quad member states are needed to counter Chinese maritime claims [14]. Of the four partner countries, only India has not directly spoken about the South China Sea disputes. However, following the Galwan Valley clash of June 2020, a change in India’s attitude towards China started becoming more noticeable, even in relation to the SCS disputes. On 13 July 2020, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo released a statement that reflected the hardening of US policy in a “vital, contentious part of the Indo-Pacific region which is the South China Sea.” [15]
Indo-Taiwanese Collaborations
Taiwan lives under the constant threat of invasion by China, which sees the self-ruled democratic island as part of its territory to be brought into its fold, by force if necessary. With the Sino- Taiwanese tensions being the highest they have been in recent years; China is capable of blockading Taiwan's major ports and airports to cut off key transport links warned the island’s defense ministry [16]. Under this light, India’s increasing engagement with Taiwan has strengthened its ties over common emphasis on democracy, human rights and strategic interests. Thousands of Indian citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan and security and safety of Indian diaspora and their investment in South China sea region is a key responsibility of Indian state.
The concept of the ‘Taiwan miracle’ is not a new one. Today, Taiwan plays a critical role in the global technology supply chain, is an important market for global trade – and is a location that is increasingly ripe for foreign investment. Through rapid industrialization and growth over the last few decades, the island state has transformed itself into a hi-tech powerhouse and successfully positioned itself as a key shipping and logistics hub for the Asia-Pacific region. This success is no more evident than in Taiwan’s recent ranking in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 2017-2018, where the nation holds 15th position. A business-friendly regulatory regime, coupled with both a capacity and a willingness to innovate, are supplemented by world-class infrastructure that makes trade an attractive prospect for shipping and logistics companies with high-tech ports located in An-Ping, Hualien, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Mailiao, Ma-Kung, Su-Ao, Taichung, Taipei, Taoyuan to name a few.
India’s Act East policy meets Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy
Taiwan’s constrained international space and China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea region is a ground reality. With President Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign policy of deepening “relationship with friendly democracies” in the region envisaged by the New Southbound Policy (NSP), Indo-Taiwanese cooperation has reached new heights. Taiwan’s distinction as an island in Indo Pacific is unique. Being positioned at the confluence of South China Sea and East Asia, Taiwan makes an important maritime island across international shipping lanes. Thus, it would be beneficial for it to actualize this geographic advantage with greater cooperation with likeminded countries such as Japan and India.
Major Indian exports to Taiwan include waste oil, naphtha, cereals, cotton, organic chemicals, copper, aluminum and food residues. In 2019, India - Taiwan trade volume was US$7 billion, growing at a rate of 20% YoY. Taiwan is eyeing a 20% y-o-y growth in trade with India in the backdrop of the New Southbound Policy (NSP) institutionalized in 2016, which sharply focused on Taiwan’s engagement with 18 South and Southeast Asian countries. Besides this, the ensuing China-US trade war and escalating costs in China have made the Indian economy more lucrative to Taiwan as the world’s fastest growing emerging economy [17]. The current trade volume between India and Taiwan is to the tune of $7 billion. There is a lot of market to scale up further. Taiwan’s trade with China alone is $160 billion. A spate of Taiwanese investments came by in India in 2018, with investment figures spiraling to $360 million by Taiwanese companies. Notable among these have been Taiwanese contract manufacturer companies such as Wistron and Foxconn which planned to invest Rs 7,500 crore in India over a five-year period. More than 80% of the chips come from Taiwan. Currently, some of the top Indian exports to Taiwan comprise mineral fuels, oil seeds, maize, iron and steel and organic chemicals, while imports from Taiwan are electrical machinery and equipment, plastics, machine tools and organic chemicals.
Increasing bilateral trade with ASEAN countries (Taiwan: $104.8 billion, India: $78.3 billion, Japan: $ 218.9 billion, 2017) makes it extremely important to ensure safety and security of India Taiwan Sea Line of Communication through the South China Sea. Keeping this in mind, in order to actualize its Indo-Pacific engagement, Taiwan has several options. On India’s part developing new ports on its east and west coastlines under its multimillion-dollar Sagarmala Project is a step in this direction. One more medium to enhance cooperation is by factoring on how to cooperate with India-Japan envisioned Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and establish a soft strategic network more intently with Quad countries without annoying or confronting mainland China. Moreover, AAGC could help Taiwan have a more economy oriented engagement in the Indo Pacific. In the face of the current geopolitical scenario, Taiwan needs to establish a much more deliberate strategic convergence with other major countries, their initiatives and their institutional mechanisms in Indo Pacific. Given India’s central positioning in the Indian Ocean and its rising commercial ambitions in the South China Sea zone, India’s maritime planning must board Taiwan as a stronger maritime link[18]. This would help both countries address their shared challenge: enhance economic resilience by reducing dependence on China. To this end, India and Taiwan must continue to engage in and explore joint development of marine technology, joint strategy for safety and security of ports/harbors/shipping/regional marine sciences exchange programs along with the ongoing efforts of establishing high tech industries in India through bilateral investments.
Conclusion
The Joe Biden administration, during the fifth anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the SCS on 16 July, issued a statement: “Nowhere is the rules-based maritime order under greater threat than in the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to coerce and intimidate Southeast Asian coastal states, threatening freedom of navigation in this critical global throughway.” [19] As an upholder of free and democratic values itself, India is fully committed to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to ensuring a rules-based international order. To that extent, it is fully supportive of initiatives in this regard in the entire region. Close knit bilateral and multilateral relations with Taiwan and allies will boost the trade in this important sea line of communication and enhance the economic prosperity and security of India – Taiwan SLOC.
References
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[2] China Power Team. "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?" China Power. August 2, 2017. Updated January 25, 2021. Accessed March 5, 2022. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/
[3] https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/economy/the-world-in-2050.html
[4] http://peakoilbarrel.com/world-energy-2018-2050-world-energy-annual-report-part-1/
[5] "South China Sea – Analysis". U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 7 February 2013.
[6]. P. Chow (11 September 2014). The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations: Economic and Security Dynamics. Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 241–. ISBN 978-1-137-36077-9.
[7] Sunken boats. Stolen gear. Fishermen are prey as China conquers a strategic sea. SHASHANK BENGALI, VO KIEU BAO UYEN, NOV. 12, 2020 LA Times
[8] “Vietnam briefs India about Chinese action in South China Sea”
[9] "What is Necklace of Diamonds Strategy?". Jagranjosh.com. 21 July 2020. Retrieved 29 October 2020.
[10] “Indian Navy deploys warship in South China Sea after Galwan clash,” Deccan Chronicle, August 31, 2020
[11] Dipanjan Roy Choudhury, “India is interested in navigation in the South China Sea region: Philippines,” The Economic Times, July 7, 2020
[12] “India, U.S. begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region”, The Hindu, March 28, 2021
[13] Issaku Harada, “ASEAN becomes China’s top trade partner as supply chain evolves”, Nikkei Asia, July 15, 2020,
[14]"Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting". Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia. 6 October 2020.
[15] Washington, US State Department, U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (Washington: US State Department, 2020), https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
[16] Sources of Taiwanese defense ministry, Tuesday, November 9, 2021
[17] Dewan, Neha (20 May 2019). "Taiwan sets eyes on India amid China-US trade war". The Economic Times.
[18] “Taiwan in Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): Why and How?” Jagannath Panda, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, September 2018
[19] Washington, US State Department, Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the South China Sea, (Washington: US State Department, 2021), https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-china-sea/
The Views and opinions expressed in this above article are those of the author and are informed by his experience with sea domain.
