Introduction - India and Extended Neighbourhood

Neighbours are not only those with whom one shares geographical boundaries but also those with whom hearts meet, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on India’s 74th Independence Day, asserting that India has deepened its relations with all countries in extended neighbourhood. Modi said India's ties with West Asian and ASEAN countries have grown manifold in key sectors. "India is constantly trying to deepen its age-old cultural, social and economic ties with its neighbouring countries. South Asia is home to one-fourth of the world population and we can create infinite possibilities of development and prosperity of such a large number of people through cooperation," Modi said in his address to the nation from the Red Fort on India's 74th Independence Day. Asserting that all leaders of the region have big responsibility for development and prosperity of their people, the prime minister said more peace and harmony there will be in the region better it will be for humanity". “Today, neighbours are not only those with whom we share geographical boundaries but also those with whom our hearts meet... In recent times, India has strengthened its relations with all countries in the extended neighbourhood," Modi said. Rapid progress has been made in India's political, economic and human relations with West Asian countries and trust with them has also grown, he said. "With these countries, our economic relations, especially in the energy sector, are very important. A large number of our brothers and sisters are working in these countries. The way these countries helped Indians in the times of coronavirus and honoured the Indian government's requests, India is thankful to them," he added.

India’s multifaceted relations with West Asia:

The term ‘civilisational link’ is perhaps most sacred expression in Indian foreign policy lexicon invoked very often to describe India’s relationship with individual as well as collective nations of West Asia. India’s relationship with Arab – Islamic world is rooted in history and has been enriched over centuries by an intense and prolonged phase of exchange of ideas and people across both sides. The old cultural link assigns a unique status to Indian relationship with West Asia (Siddiqui, 2022). This closeness and proximity in cultural and civilizational terms between two regions are well reflected at present when one witnesses the level of trade between the two and presence of large number of Indians working in different countries of West Asia. India through its cultural and geo-strategic prism locates the Arab world in three parts, namely, Gulf, Maghreb and West Asia (Abyhankar, 2013).

The cultural connection between India and West Asia points towards some of the stark similarities between them because no other civilisation in Asian continent have had as long and sustained historical engagement with West Asia region as that of India and that emphasises significance of present-day connection of their mutual relations which make their historic meeting unique and extraordinary. Over the centuries, customs, goods, languages and people have crisscrossed the continent largely as result of conquest and commerce (Siddiqui, 2022):

Socio-economic Relations: India’s connection with West Asia goes back to ancient times. These ties between the two cultural zones consolidated constantly with fast-spreading cultural, economic and social interactions between the two civilisations. The cultural criss-cross between India and West Asia is quite manifest in many perspectives that one can see here how the Islamic world has been enriched as a result of these interplays. West Asians translated numerous Indian works spread over a diversity of subjects and went on to work out original creations based on treatises they translated. The fields of Indian knowledge they studied included books on ethics, logic, politics, veterinary art, philosophy and science of war.

Customs and traditions: Many social rituals of both civilisations manifest common features as regards social intercourse like common assembly for considerations on social and political issues, marriage proceedings, usage of household utensils, birth and death ceremonies and rituals towards dead ancestors.

Religion: Many religious rituals including religious symbols of both civilisations reflect commonalities between them. The Aryan deity ‘agni’ occupies second important position among Vedic dev-mandal (a group of gods), and that also figures prominently in Zoroastrianism as revealed in Zend-Avesta. The Boguz qui inscriptions from this region have close similarities with Indian Vedic deities viz. Varuna, Indra, Mitra, and Nasatya.

Architecture: One of most well-known features between two cultures lies in common architectural designs of both civilisations manifested in making of domes, decorations on house walls, roof arches and doors. They manifest themselves till today in different ways as regards similar architecture and sculptures.

Medicines and Science & Technology: Arab sources dating back to tenth and thirteenth centuries reveal about several Indian works on medicines and therapeutics that were transliterated into Arabic at direction of Caliph-Harun-al-Rashid, ruler of Baghdad from AD 286 to AD 809. Indian scholars were also invited in these translation works. Sushruta Samhita was translated into Arabic by Indian scholar – Mankh. In realm of Astronomy, two famous works viz. Brahama-Sphuta-Siddhant known to Arab world as Sindluin and Khandakhadyak (known as Arkand) were brought to Baghdad from Sindh with help of Indian Scholars. They were transliterated into Arabic by Alfarari. The Arabs acknowledged their debts to India by calling mathematics ‘Hindisa” (about India). India imbibed a prominent exchange from West Asian cultures which has become an inextricable element of Indian cultural ethos (Siddiqui, 2022).

In modern times, India’s connection with West Asia acquired a new geo-strategic dimension to this civilizational link. Besides historical linkages and economic interactions, in past two decades, West Asia has occupied an important place in India’s relations, figuring prominently not only in India’s economic growth but also in its great power aspirations (Siddiqui, 2022). Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been signalling greater importance of West Asia for India. Without any declaratory statement, Modi has delineated the parameters and components of the relations, through intense political engagements to transform the transactional nature of the bilateral ties and add economic and strategic substance (Kumarswamy, 2018).

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries

In wake of ravages of Second World War, regional groupings were established in various parts of the world including Middle East, where seven former Arab possessions of Ottoman empire came together to form the Arab League in 1945. Today the organisation has twenty-two states and territories as members. Despite its growth and impressive achievements in some areas, the Arab League had poor track record in promoting cooperation at regional level. Due to lack of cohesion, persistent rivalries among members, and influence of external powers on inter-Arab politics, Arab unity has been an elusive goal for the Arab League (Miller, 2016). In 1981, Arab Gulf States, all members of the Arab League came together at sub-regional level to form Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Gulf Cooperation Council is a consortium of following six oil-exporting countries:

1. The Kingdom of Bahrain – Its 1.2 million people enjoy GDP per capita of $50,700.

2. Kuwait – Its 2.8 million residents enjoy 11th highest standard of living in the world ($71,900 per person). The country holds 6 per cent of world’s oil reserves.

3. The Sultanate of Oman – It has 3.4 million residents and its GDP per capita is $46,100.

4. Qatar – The second richest country in the world, with GDP per capita of $125,100 for each of its 2.3 million residents. It has 25 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 13% of world’s natural gas reserves.

5. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – The largest of GCC countries (28.5 million people) has 16 per cent of world’s proven oil reserves. Its GDP per capita is $55,300.

6. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Its 6 million people enjoy per capita GDP of $68,100 (Amadeo, 2017).

GCC was established in 1981 as a response to Iranian Revolution and outbreak of Iran– Iraq War in 1980 (Goldman & Rapp-Hooper, 2013). The initial hope for formation of GCC was that this would provide security in wake of revolution in Iran. One thing that has bound GCC together is shared belief among Gulf states that they are vulnerable to external actors who view them as rich and militarily weak states. This has engendered a deeply held belief among Gulf rulers that safety of their kingdoms is more likely to be achieved by working together than by acting apart. When their sovereignty has been threatened, GCC states have put their grievances on hold and have given out united response in political, economic and military realms. Despite sharing same security challenges, Arab Gulf States do not share same national interests. They have engaged in stand-offs over oil, borders, Iran, Israel etc. Though there have been intra-Gulf disputes over territorial rights, hampering development of bonds needed for GCC member states to trust each other fully with their own strategic security, they have never militarised their differences with each other beyond localised clashes. The belief in benefits of collective security is very strong in GCC (Miller, 2016). The quest for regional security in midst of political upheavals prompted these countries to consider different options for security cooperation. The fall of Arab regional system, wider instabilities in Afghanistan compounded threat perceptions. Similar political systems, shared values and common bonds between Gulf nations have contributed to emergence of GCC (Ramazani, 1988).

Though the policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are not coordinated centrally by the Council’s secretariat and no treaty binds the external conduct of its member-states, the GCC has been recognised as a regional bloc and empowered to act on behalf of its members in a number of arenas, including negotiating economic agreements with other states and regional blocs and forming common diplomatic platforms over a range of regional security matters. The GCC has emerged as West Asia’s most important regional organisation and the role it and some of its six members now play in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has credited the parties as a whole with new status in the region and internationally. Due to their considerable wealth and purchasing power, several GCC states – Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have gained international footprint. The GCC as a bloc is a financial force to be reckoned with (Ehteshami. 2015).

It should be noted that the GCC was forged in raging fires of Iran–Iraq War and it is conflict which shaped the conditions for emergence of this first sub-regional organisation in MENA regional system. The GCC is above all a security organisation, bringing like-minded states under single protective umbrella (Al – Hamad, 2002). In spite of its loosely framed common security structure, over time the GCC’s external security blanket has been extended to provide cover for internal security of its ruling elites as well. Thus, while its Peninsula Shield Force may still be more of a shell than a defensive blanket, its existence enables the GCC states to act in defence of each other and, if need be, against external threats. Despite its many structural weaknesses, then – small native populations, presence of large expatriate communities, weak security and military structures, varied size of its member-states, geographical domination of one over other five parties, and collective exposure to hydrocarbons price fluctuations, – the GCC has survived and prospered. Its survival and development are arguably due to the inherent strengths of its member-states and their intuitive responses to regional and sub-regional crises. Their similar regime types, the assuredness of their ruling families, the durability of their ‘ruling bargain’, and the elites’ abilities to globalise without social dislocation have all helped the GCC to develop into an influential regional bloc since its birth in 1981. Also, the GCC states’ ability to negotiate close and durable security partnerships with the West, has acted as a backstop for them, thus enabling them to take foreign policy initiatives more comfortably when pressed (Ehteshami. 2015). To understand the GCC states’ foreign policy conduct, we need to understand not only the nature of decision-making in these states but also the conditions under which decisions are being crafted -The drivers of foreign policy; and secondly, the context for foreign policy, the arena in which foreign policy takes effect (Wright, 2011).

The GCC states’ globalisation, resulting from their hydrocarbons wealth has been further fuelled by these countries’ strong financial muscle and augmented by their extraordinary information and communications technology (ICT) penetration. The KOF Index of Globalization ranks four of the GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE) in the top 50 most globalised countries in the world, and in terms of social globalisation the UAE and Kuwait lead the region. The GCC’s complex globalisation has set the Council members apart from the rest of the region, has encouraged deeper cross-border relations, and has given these societies and their elites the ability to seize opportunities presented outside of the region (Ehteshami. 2013).

There are number of contextual forces which should be considered as factors shaping the GCC states’ foreign policies. The first is manifold pressures on Arab region arising from dynamic changes following Iranian revolution in 1979 and resultant war (1980–8), leading to a fragmenting Arab order in 1980s, which in 1990s resulted in polarisation and ultimate implosion of Arab order (Noble, 2008). Added to these structural tensions are demise of Iraq as a regional actor, new regional power dynamics arising from collapse of Ba’ath regime in Iraq, and subsequent rise of Iran (Kostiner, 2011).

The complex geopolitical conditions arising from Arab Awakening have brought their own tensions since 2011, causing rifts in GCC bloc as the Arab region has further fractured. Despite their many similarities, the GCC states are not alike; their different leaderships, social bases and geography have dictated their own conditions on these countries’ foreign policies, and therefore, on many occasions, have pushed them in different directions. It could thus be argued that despite its organisational paraphernalia the GCC has never been a unified bloc representative of all its members, and despite its members having held surprisingly close positions on wide range of issues since its birth – threat of Iran, place of Iraq in Arab order, Shi’a rising, stability of Yemen, Arab–Israeli conflict, threat of al-Qaeda – their interests have also diverged quite spectacularly on numerous occasions (Ehteshami. 2015).

The GCC’s multipolarity has been tested by the Arab revolts and the role that the Islamist forces have come to play in these uprisings. For some GCC states the rise of the Ikhwan is a direct threat and one bolstered by one of their own, leading them to take public action against Qatar (Policy Analysis Unit, 2014). Regional dynamism has entrenched change as a permanent structure in which the GCC now plays a leading if not the leading part (Korany, 2010).

Aware of problems of relying on finite resources such as oil, GCC countries embarked on massive diversification programmes to reduce their dependence on those resources for income (Sultan, 2012). During the last decade, GCC countries embarked on massive infrastructural programmes aimed at diversifying their economies and creating job opportunities for their citizens, spending hundreds of billions of petrodollars on building new cities; accumulating massive financial reserves known as Sovereign Wealth Funds and using them to invest internationally through buying commercial outlets and shareholdings in major foreign businesses (Sultan, 2012). UAE wants to become world’s new tourist attraction. Qatar hopes to become destination for world events and conferences. Saudi Arabia is trying to become region’s economic powerhouse. They have invested heavily in urban spaces to turn them into attractive destinations for the more refined traveler. This ‘instant urbanisation’ (Abu-Lughod, 1983) has taken place alongside with an aggressive campaign to attract major sporting and cultural events to their new cities. Qatar’s success in being awarded world’s most popular sporting event, the FIFA Football World Cup is an example of this (Miller, 2016). Some GCC countries like UAE have invested in renewable and potential future energy fuels such as solar and nuclear (Sultan, 2012). Kawach (2009) believes that GCC countries could spend about $ 200 billion on such projects in next two decades. In Dubai non-oil sector in mid 1990s were already contributing 82 % of the emirates GDP and in 2006, the figure may have been 95 % (Davidson, 2008). Projects in infrastructure and utilities are carefully selected and implemented according to predetermined framework and linked to macro indicators (Saif, 2009). The massive infusion of oil wealth and ambitious attempts to rapidly modernise societies with only small pools of citizen labour explain huge rise in number of foreign workers entering the Gulf from Arab and Non-Arab worlds. They provided cheap labour needed to build and staff airports, hotels, hospitals, schools, universities, communication networks (Sayigh, 1978). Major constraint on GCC countries is limited supply of local skilled manpower resulting in reliance on huge expatriate labour force (Ramady, 2012).

The 36th annual GCC summit took place in Riyadh on 9th December 2015 which saw broad consensus on political, social and economic issues such as combating extremism, security cooperation, economic integration, support for political solution to crises in Yemen and Syria, and firm support for Palestinian cause (Gulf News, 2015). The 37th annual GCC summit was held in Manama, Bahrain on 7th December 2016 (Arab News, 2016). The promotion of GCC unity and economic integration among GCC member states was important point of discussion (Khatana, 2018). GCC states control 29% of world’s crude oil reserves, highlighting relative global importance of Gulf petroleum sector. GCC states also held 22.3% of world’s natural gas reserves. Fueled by massive oil revenues, value of GCC real GDP was $ 1,479.3 billion in 2017 enjoying one of world’s highest GDP per capita.

State Revenues are largely driven by exports of hydrocarbons that stood at $ 345 billion in 2018 (U-Capital, 2018). GCC states’ financial surpluses and sovereign wealth funds are among highest in the world. Total GCC funds are close to $ 2.9 trillion in total assets, which is 40% of global sovereign wealth funds (Rachman, 2017).

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and India

India adopted Look West policy in 2005 for deepening engagement with West Asian countries who have been considered as ‘extended’ neighbours. India’s former Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, attending 9th ministerial meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2015, pushing for GCC – India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) said that Gulf was “extended part of India’s neighbourhood” (Taneja, 2020). As Sushma Swaraj explained in August 2016, “In our diplomatic engagements in the last two years, you will therefore find that major focus now is using international partnerships to advance domestic flagship programmes.” This tight meshing of domestic and diplomatic goals is one of the hallmarks of Modi Doctrine” (MEA, 2016). The then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar laid out India’s foreign policy agenda in a speech in March 2015 (MEA, 2015). He noted that India’s West Asia policy in past had been “an evolutionary happening that was relatively autonomous of strategic calculations.”

Reorientation of India – GCC region Foreign Policy

A reorientation of Indian foreign policy in Gulf region is seen since Mr. Narendra Modi became Prime Minister, as the region has been receiving considerable political, diplomatic, strategic, economic attention and new focus towards the Gulf region was brought about by Mr. Modi’s active role and engagement with overseas Indian community in the Gulf (Kumarswamy, 2018). Prime Minister Modi galvanized it by creating an exceptional personalised style at highest level of leadership, with results in form of investment commitments, extradition of wanted criminals, counter terrorism cooperation, security cooperation, energy security, diaspora welfare and business expansion having multiplier effect on bilateral relationship (Trigunayat, 2020).

Broad parameters of India’s West Asia policy were largely in place when Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India in 2014. The new government followed same course, intensifying what was known as “Look West” policy, by focusing on three main axes: Arab Gulf countries, Israel and Iran (Burton, 2019). During this tenure, he visited UAE twice, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Jordan and Palestine. These visits cemented a renewed and revitalized outreach for India towards West Asia. The joint statement concluded during these visits had recognized India as ‘strategic partner’ of these competing countries. History is littered with strong ties between India and West Asia, capitalised efficiently and effectively, by Narendra Modi. Modi’s visits to Gulf countries can be seen as an effort to consolidate economic ties. The interest has been reciprocal as Saudi Arabia, UAE and other GCC countries increasingly see India as an important emerging market for their energy exports, foreign investments and joint venture opportunities. Upon his victory, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Modi over a telephone call. UAE conferred Modi with their state’s highest state honour, the Zayed Medal for bringing ties between two regions to an all-new level. In 2016, Saudis also conferred Modi with their highest civilian honour, the King Abdulaziz Sash during his visit to Riyadh. The answer to success lies more within interests of Gulf nations than Modi government’s outreach. These cash rich states looked towards Indian economy to secure their own future financial interests. As US becomes mostly self-sufficient on oil, Asian economies led by India and China, are expected to lead purchases of crude. This market capacity makes for ideal destination for Gulf’s rich wealth funds (Taneja, 2020).

When manifestation of Qatar crisis occurred in mid-2017, India was under pressure to take sides. Instead, it resisted and adopted neutrality as a way of maintaining economic relations with both sides (Al-Tamimi, 2017; Siyech, 2019). India’s present approach has been helped by wider structural context in which the region finds itself (Burton, 2019). The Middle East has become more multipolar, with power diffused among regional and extra-regional actors (Cavatorta, 2014; Kamrava, 2018). India’s approach balances different parties (Burton, 2019).

Challenging Gulf Scenario

The changing dynamics of domestic and regional politics in West Asia ensured continued turbulence during 2015 and 2016. GCC monarchies remained embroiled in firefighting issues, ranging from economic troubles due to lower oil prices, Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, ISIS threat, and growing Iranian regional influence (Khatana, 2018). The 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ had been fundamental change for many Arab countries, but with exception of Bahrain and Oman, GCC countries seem to have been an oasis of relative calm compared to rest of Middle East (Ramady, 2012). The Qatari support for Egyptian Islamists angered al-Saud and contributed to temporary breach of diplomatic relations in 2014 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and U.A.E. withdrew their Ambassadors from Qatar (Kirkpatrick, 2014). While Oman did not join hands with this Saudi-led move, Kuwait sought to mediate. Even though three ambassadors returned to Qatar in December 2014, tensions continued. Saudi-led military offensive against Yemen, Operation Decisive Storm (March–April 2014) and Operation Restoring Hope (April 2015– present) highlighted differences within GCC. Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for Yemeni crisis. Oman maintained its neutrality, partly due to its traditional policy of regional autonomy and partly due to closer ties with Iran. Other GCC countries joined Saudi-led military offensive. The Gulf monarchs settled for popular co-option through financial largesse to blunt demands for political reforms (Kumarswamy, 2018). The oil prices—which had reached $ 60 per barrel in December 2014—continued to fall and dropped to $ 50 per barrel in December 2016 due to slow growth of global economy and energy alternatives. Falling oil prices affected oil-rich Gulf Arab countries. GCC countries were forced to introduce small portion of taxes to meet budgetary deficits. Saudi Arabia imposed limits on overseas remittances by expatriate workers (Flanagan, 2011). Bahrain reduced subsidies on key issues such as water, electricity and fuel (Naar, 2016). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were forced to dip into sovereign wealth to bridge current account deficits (Townsend, 2016). According to Al-Rasheed (2017) economic prosperity, the backbone of Gulf political ambitions, is stumbling under pressure of drastic decline in oil prices. Many GCC countries already adopted economic and social visions for reform. Saudi Arabia was the last country to join visionary trail of economic transformation in April 2016 when it announced implementation of Vision 2030. The visions are bound to impact traditional domestic Gulf politics and ability of governments to continue to convince domestic and global audiences of merits of stability and security at expense of political dynamism. The visions are confined to moving state centric oil-based capitalist economies into open liberal finance, privatisation, diversification, without any visible political transformations (Al-Rasheed, 2017). The 2017–18 Qatar diplomatic crisis began when Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017 withdrawing ambassadors and imposing trade and travel bans. The crisis is escalation of Qatar-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict. The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism as main reason for their actions. Saudi Arabia and other countries criticised Qatar’s relation with Iran (Wikipedia, 2018). Regional tensions, sectarian divide, Arab-Persian rivalry, falling oil prices marked 2015 and 2016 (Kumarswamy, 2018).

India and GCC Economic Engagement and Interdependence Relations

Importance of GCC for India lies in its energy security, volume of trade, and large presence of Indian expatriates. Due to lower oil prices and international slowdown, trade figures witnessed more than 30 per cent decline between 2013 and 2016 (Khatana, 2018). India’s trade deficit with GCC has fallen from $ 46 billion to $ 14 billion in last three years (The Hindu, 2016). The drop in oil prices impacted remittances from the region, leading to 2.2 per cent fall. In 2014–15, remittances to India from GCC amounted to $ 36.7 billion, and dropped to $ 35.9 billion in 2015–16 (The Hindu, 2016). According to World Bank, if oil prices stay low for prolonged period, or undergo unforeseen drops, remittances from GCC to India could fall further in future (Bundhun, 2016). GCC countries are biggest source, contributing 60 per cent of total remittances received by India in 2015–16 which contributed nearly 3.3 per cent to its GDP. Remittances help develop organic link between India and GCC countries (The World Bank, 2016). In 2015–16, India’s exports to GCC stood at $ 41.71 billion (Embassy of India Riyadh, 2016). India’s economic engagements with GCC countries during 2015 and 2016 were dominated by two challenges: continuing global economic slowdown and falling oil prices. While latter meant lesser hydrocarbon imports, former meant considerable drop in foreign trade. Since 2011–12, India’s total trade has been declining: from being close to $ 800 billion, it dropped to $ 758 billion in 2014–15 and reached $ 642 billion in 2015–16—that is, slightly more than in 2010–11 when its foreign trade stood at just over $ 620 billion. The fall in trade as well as in oil prices were reflected in India’s economic engagement with GCC countries. Indian export sector has gained 2.6 per cent in the Gulf region during FY 2017-18 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2018). Indian political and business leaders realised that countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar could supply more oil and gas, respectively (Siyech, 2017) and wealth accumulated made Gulf countries potential sources of foreign investment (Choudhury, 2017).

UAE, which for short period remained India’s largest trading partner, has been losing its position since 2012–13 and became third largest partner after China and US, followed closely by Saudi Arabia. Gap between India’s trade with UAE and China has been widening and, during 2015–16, it was more than $ 20 billion. With about US$ 49.7 billion in trade, UAE accounts for 7.5 per cent of India’s total foreign trade. Because of domination of energy trade, GCC countries continue to be among India’s leading trade partners and in 2015–16, three countries were among India’s top 25 trade partners; Saudi Arabia was in fourth slot; Qatar in 19th (Kumarswamy & Singh Roy, 2018). The Persian Gulf countries account for substantial portion of known oil and natural gas reserves in the world. Because of low cost of production and logistical considerations, the region will continue to be of vital importance to India. India’s growth story will remain intrinsically linked to Persian Gulf region (Kumarswamy & Singh Roy, 2018). GCC as a bloc is India’s largest trading partner. In period from March 2018 to April 2019, bilateral trade touched $ 121.25 billion. India’s imports from Gulf countries reached US 79.70 billion compared to $ 41.55 billion worth of exports from India to Gulf region. GCC countries account for 15 per cent of India’s total imports and 12 per cent of the country’s total exports in value terms. UAE accounted for major chunk of India’s exports and imports with $ 30.08 billion and $ 29.77 billion respectively for fiscal year 2019.

India and GCC states have strong economic ties which increased to $ 84.96 billion in 2017-18, from $ 7.8 billion in 2003-04. The Gulf region accounts for 12.98 per cent of India’s total exports, while it has 13.76 per cent share of its total imports. Trade was mainly restricted to oil, spices and labour until 2000 (Pant, 1999). In past 20 years, its scope has expanded to fertilizers, petrochemicals, services, IT, gold and textiles. India and GCC states are signatories of Framework Agreement of Economic Cooperation (FAEC) which was signed in New Delhi on August 25, 2004. India-GCC industrial forum was established in February 2004, which enhanced trade and technology transfer activities (Pradhan, 2010). India granted Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to GCC states hoping to help secure a FTA (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2012). According to Dubai Chambers of Commerce (DCC), Indian companies are eager to invest in Dubai. In 2008, 12,359 Indian companies were registered with DCC. This figure tripled in a decade. Currently, 38,238 Indian companies are registered, while DCC has opened its international office in India to facilitate business community (Dubai Chamber of Commerce, 2018). More than 800 leading Indian companies have opened their businesses in Jebel Ali Free Zone and many Indian business houses have strong presence in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Hundreds of Indian companies actively are engaged in business activities in UAE Free Economic Zones. India is one of largest trading partners of UAE (Augustine, 2016). Further opportunities are opening up as UAE is looking to diversify its economy, strengthen its financial and service sectors and establish Emirates as global tourism and sports hub. UAE is creating a knowledge-based economy to adjust to changing market needs (Quamar, 2018). From 2001 to 2016, FDI from UAE to India increased manifolds. UAE invested more than $ 5 billion in India in 2017 which makes it third largest investment partner after China and US (John, 2018). MoU for investment in India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) was signed with Qatar Investment Authority in 2016 (Times of India, 2016). Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund held by Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), other State-owned entities and private investors in Qatar are attractive investment propositions for India’s growing market (Hussain & Ghosh, 2015). Qatar has several large-scale investments in India, including more than $ 1 billion stake in telecommunications company Bharti Airtel (BQ Magazine, 2015). India’s corporate sector has many operations in Qatar. These include Larsen &Toubro, Punj Lloyd, Shapoorji Pallonji, Voltas, TCS, Wipro, Mahindra Tech, HCL etc. SBI, ICICI and other Indian banks have limited operations under Qatar Financial Centre or private exchange houses (BQ Magazine, 2015). On 7th June 2016, Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SCDL) announced that Qatari company, Al Balagh Trading & Contracting and L&T had been appointed as main contractors to build 40,000 seat capacity Al Rayyan Stadium for football for World Cup matches 2022 (Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2016). In November 2015, Indian Engineering, Procurement and Construction companies secured contracts worth $ 5 billion for development projects in housing, hospitals, oil and gas, power transmissions in Kuwait (The Economic Times, 2015). On 26th January 2015, Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Ltd. signed $ 150 million contract with Kuwait University for construction, operation and maintenance of buildings of colleges in Sabah Al-Salem University City (The Times, 2015). Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation awarded contract worth $ 77 million to Larsen and Toubro in May 2015 to replace power substation at Al-Ahmadi refinery (DNA, 2015). The economic and commercial relations between India and Oman has been strengthened by presence of Indian private sector companies like Wipro, Larsen & Toubro, Shapoorji Pallonji, Jindal, Aditya Birla Group, Nagarjuna Construction Company, Simplex and KEC who are engaged in various projects in Oman. An Indian-Omani joint venture—Sebacic Oman will be constructing Sebacic Duqm Acid refinery which is worth $ 1,200 million. Oman is among top five sources of fertilizers for India accounting for 5.26 per cent of India’s fertilizer imports. India imports 8 Metric Tons (MT) of urea, 25 per cent of which is supplied by Oman India Fertilizer Company (OMIFCO) (Ahmed & Soni, 2017). According to Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA), there were 426 Indian companies registered for business in Saudi Arabia by 2017, compared to 190 in 2007, which shows 150 per cent growth (Embassy of India, Riyadh, 2018). During 2020-21, India’s exports to GCC were $ 28.06 billion. The bilateral two-way trade during the period was $ 87.36 billion, registering a decline of about 27% over the previous year.

India’s strong linkages with GCC are analysed by Kulkarni and Bandekar (2019). According to them, inter linkages of Indian Economy with trade blocs and financial markets has significantly increased. They explored economic tie-up with GCC considering today’s dynamic socio-political scenario. Such collaboration is significant as India is aiming at tag of $ 5 Trillion economy in forthcoming years. The important factors that give cutting edge to India’s relationship with GCC are Oil, Remittances and Indian Diaspora in GCC. It is most vital that India needs to nurture its tie-up with GCC in forthcoming years (Kulkarni & Bandekar, 2019). GCC investments in India, China and Africa are occurring on an unprecedented scale. These Investments are more comfortable due to diasporic links and cultural ties (Abdelal et.al, 2008).

India –GCC bilateral export is positively determined by size of economies, trade openness and diaspora and is negatively determined by distance between India-GCC and import tariffs (Alam & Ahmed, 2018). According to Kulkarni and Bandekar (2019) perennial deficit of current account is more to do with merchandise, in particular oil imports, which are dependent on global crude prices. The demand supply, geopolitical situation affects the international crude prices. India is more vulnerable to price fluctuation as approximately 64 % of India’s oil need is imported from volatile Middle East region. The volatility of oil price affects GCC as well as India. Whenever oil price goes up, India’s import bill soars. If oil price goes down it effects economy and investment scenario of GCC, which results in less exports from India to GCC and shortfall in remittance to India from GCC region. Thus, India is vulnerable to oil price volatility. In light of this, India needs safety net to manage impact of oil price volatility in better way. The INR priced oil imports and special lines of credit to GCC countries in terms of bilateral trade with India may help in better management of international trade and finance (Kulkarni & Bandekar, 2019).

India has a high economic and commercial stake in the Region as it receives a huge amount of remittance from the GCC Countries. Trade, remittance, investments, and expenditure by Gulf citizens visiting India etc. would total up to $ 200 billion or more in 2011 -2012 (Gupta, 2013). This total volume in terms of value is much more than the values of India’s financial ties with any other groupings in the world including the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or North America (Ahmad, 2013). A new level of socio-cultural exchanges between India and Saudi Arabia takes place due to a large number of Indian hajj pilgrims to the holy shrine and these pilgrims also add a new dimension to this relationship. Saudi Arabia had reached out to India to upgrade and expand the confines of its economic activities and as a result a low profile relation was transformed into a strategic relationship with Riyadh Declaration signed in 2011. The Riyadh Declaration commits both sides to significant expansion of its defence, security, economic and cultural ties (Ahmad, 2013). This extensive economic engagement and interdependence has been reciprocated with political warmth for India by Gulf countries. Trade and investment are vital factors in evolving Indo-GCC relationship.

China Factor and GCC

It is not only India has substantial interest in GCC, but China is also interested in GCC due to its oil richness. (Nader, 2011). According to Qian and Fulton (2017) China-GCC economic relations can be expected to intensify due to FTA. The FTA will also enhance cooperation opportunities for China and GCC under the “Belt and Road” Initiative, which will play an important role in expanding China’s regional presence. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce, trade between China and GCC countries exceeded $ 171 billion in 2017 (Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2017). China is aggressively pursuing Gulf region for signing FTAs for which nine rounds of talks have been completed (Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2016). If China secures FTA from GCC, it is likely that Indian economic interests will be negatively affected since each is competing for cheaper oil agreements and export of non-oil goods such as textile, iron, steel, rice, wheat, kitchen items, household articles and electronics, in which India is currently lagging behind China. GCC-China Business Forum and GCC-China Strategic Dialogue are strategic forums for institutionalisation of bilateral trade and investment (Pradhan, 2011). China has also been promoting cooperation with GCC countries under Belt and Road Initiative (Qian, 2017). India considers growing Chinese influence in Gulf region a challenge to its economic and strategic interests. India also considers China a challenge to their energy and maritime security. This is apparent from Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004 and India’s Maritime Strategy of 2015, which point to China as major security threat to its maritime security. India wants to secure four major entry points — Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Strait of Bab-el-Mandab and Cape of Good Hope (Indian Navy, 2015). Therefore, Indian Navy has been extensively engaged with naval forces of GCC countries through regular exercises to ensure its active presence in the region. China has emerged as another factor behind India’s evolving relationship with GCC.

Security Cooperation between India and GCC

From the strategic point of view, India and GCC share the desire for political stability and security in the region. The common political and security concerns of India and GCC translate into efforts for peace, security and stability in the Gulf region and South Asia. The emerging common security perceptions create further opportunities for GCC-India cooperation in the future. The GCC States are going through important changes and transformation; the process of understanding and integration is coming of age. Along with-it areas for cooperation are also widening beyond investments, trade & commerce and sharing & development of human resources to security. If one looks at emerging relations between India and some GCC countries, their engagements are no longer restricted to traditional oil-energy related cooperation or remittance related financial activities but are gradually entering security domain as well. The rising importance of security and defence cooperation is evidenced by Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) that have been signed by India with its GCC partners recently. India has bilateral defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman and Qatar for military training, intelligence sharing, combating terrorism and money laundering. This is a paradigm shift in their relations which have been dominated by oil and energy trade while security ties remained dormant. Such engagements with GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar are on the rise. Among all GCC states, Oman holds special attention as it signed a military protocol in 1972; Air Force-to-Air Force staff talks in 2009 (Kemp, 2010) and signed MoU on military cooperation which provides Indian Navy access to Duqm Port in 2018 (Roy, 2018). The two have signed several defence agreements such as MoU on Crime and Combating Terrorism 1996; Defence Cooperation MoU 2005 and formed Military Cooperation Committee in 2006. According to Grare (2016), such agreements are part of India’s strategy to keep an eye on and act as balancer to China. India and UAE signed Strategic Dialogue in 2003 which allows import and export of arms (Kemp, 2010). Both regularly hold meetings under India-UAE Defence Cooperation Committee which was established in 2003. UAE has extradited number of terrorists to India (Kemp, 2010). The extradition of around twenty alleged Indian terrorists from Saudi and UAE in recent years suggests deep routed nature of growing security cooperation and concern in both the countries (MEA, 2020). Saudi Arabia’s decision to train its cadets at National Defence Academy of India is a strategic change (Hassan, 2018). Defence and security cooperation in addition to the commercial ties have added another boosting dimension to core feature of India’s relation with the GCC. Security cooperation has emerged as vital component of India’s deepening ties with Arab world. Issues like counter terrorism, terror financing, money laundering and sea lane of communication figure prominently in talks between India, UAE and Saudi Arabia (Siddiqui, 2022). The growing importance given by India as well as some GCC countries towards strengthening security cooperation is due to evolving geopolitical dynamics and security challenges in South Asia and Gulf region.

Indian Diaspora in the Gulf - India’s unique soft power advantage

The presence of Indian diasporic communities’ abroad acts as source of influence through spread of culture, faith, languages, skills which they transcend to host countries along with reinforcing positive image of India. India is developing close cooperation with hosting Gulf countries for security and well-being of its Diaspora and has signed various protocols and agreements with hosting GCC nations for protection and better treatment of its citizens. According to Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, India-UAE is world’s second largest migration corridor, with 2.8 million Indians migrating to UAE between 1995 and 2015 (Deulgaonkar, 2017). Since oil boom of mid-1970s, number of Indians living and working in GCC countries has grown rapidly. In GCC countries, number of Indians was estimated at around 5.7 million in 2012, rising to 8.5 million by 2018 (Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar, 2015; MEA, 2018; Abraham, 2012). India as world’s highest recipient of remittances (World Bank, 2017) receives 50 per cent of its total remittances from GCC countries; and among GCC, nearly 38 per cent comes from UAE (Bundhun, 2015).

The World Bank estimates that non-resident Indians remitted around $ 79 billion to India during 2018 – 2019 and significant proportion of this came from the Diasporas in the Gulf countries (Economic Times, 2019). GCC countries account for more than 54 per cent of annual $ 83 billion foreign remittance to India in 2019. Saudi Arabia continues to be most favoured destination for Indian workers, followed by UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. There are no accurate figures on actual number of Indian workers in GCC countries. Current estimates suggest that there are around 9 million Indians in GCC countries, who are the backbone of the remittance part of the Indian economy, with over 3 million in Saudi Arabia. followed by about 2.8 million in UAE. There are about 923,000 in Kuwait, 316,000 in Bahrain, 600,000 in Qatar, and 796,000 in Oman (MEA GOI, 2016).

In West Asia, one of India’s most distinct soft power assets is the diaspora and its role in shaping a positive image of the country. Indian workers are known for being tolerant and willing to work hard under harsh conditions. The diaspora builds upon, cements and acts as present-day reminder to public in West Asian countries of historical and cultural links between two regions (Pethiyagoda, 2017b). Indians continue to be preferred migrant community due to their high quality of expertise, discipline, capacity to easily adjust to social lifestyle in Gulf and their reputation for being peaceful and accommodative individuals (Panda, 2009). For India, Gulf states are viable source of remittances migrants send to India and for Gulf region, India provides favourable environment for development of its economies with presence of skilled Indians.

Cultural Diplomacy

India’s overall positive image has been strengthened due to India’s cultural diplomacy. Here Indian film industry has played a significant role. In October 2007 Abu Dhabi organised an International Film Festival where Bollywood dominated the show. Indian government started ‘Project Mausam’ to highlight India’s historic maritime trade and civilisational links with Gulf countries (Ayres, 2018). Through this project, Indian Ministry of Culture is organising cultural events in GCC states on regular basis. It is because of such cultural initiatives and positive image that UAE allowed establishment of Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi (Sankar & Ashwani Kumar, 2018). Despite being non-Arab state India enjoys its observer status in the Arab League. India was invited by Foreign Minister of UAE Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan to attend meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as ‘guest of honor ‘(Times of India, 2019). These developments indicate that India enjoys positive image, which helps it further expand its economic and political interests in GCC region.

Strategic Realignments in Gulf

The Gulf region is a volatile place because of prevalent threats to internal and external security to nations found in the area (Ulrichsen, 2009). Gulf region has been going through massive strategic realignments in aftermath of Arab Spring in 2011. The fall of dictatorial regimes, war in Yemen, rise and fall of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), intra-Arab conflicts such as Qatar diplomatic crisis, Iran’s nuclear deal and subsequent US exit, have shaped strategic thinking of Arab ruling elite. The sharp fall in global oil prices has intensified debate among Arab elite regarding need to rethink socioeconomic structures in order to address challenges to social and political sustainability (Ulrichsen, 2009). These countries are diversifying their economies as well as expanding diplomatic relations with Asian countries in general and India in particular, to seek international support for their regimes, reduce their overwhelming reliance on US-led Western countries in terms of economic, political support and arms sales. India has voted thrice against Iran’s nuclear programme in the UN, which is explicit support to Arab ruling elite against their perceived threat from Iran (Bhatnagar, 2018). India has adopted policy of neutrality in intra-Arab conflicts. GCC states realise India’s significance as an emerging political and economic power in Asia and beyond. India is aspirant for important positions in various international foras, like UNSC which is likely to be seen positively by GCC states. Modi’s effort is to “transform transactional nature of bilateral ties and add economic and strategic substance” (Kumarswamy, 2018). India’s expanding regional aspirations across the Indian Ocean are also a factor. India sees the Gulf and South Asia as strategically interactive and interrelated regions and has increased its focus on the Gulf accordingly (Pethiyagoda, 2017a).

Epilogue

Indian policymakers seem determined to raise India’s profile internationally, shed old mindsets and to help India position itself in a positive role rather than just a balancing force, adding that India engages the world with greater confidence and assurance. The growth of India’s power and standing and its active diplomacy can be seen in its renewed focus on GCC countries. Acknowledging that India’s ‘footprint’ in the region has been relatively autonomous of strategic calculation, Indian policymakers recognise the need to develop a holistic engagement strategy, which seeks to strengthen economic ties and institutionalise long term security cooperation. PM Modi's visits to Gulf countries and engagement with their leaders have provided critical political content to bilateral relations. These developments indicate that India enjoys positive image, which helps it further expand its economic and political interests in GCC region.

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