Abstract

History has repeated itself and this time it seems forever. Taliban usurped power in Afghanistan in August 2021 leading to flight of people, worsening humanitarian crisis at all levels and giving space to terrorist groups to use Afghanistan as their launchpad. This threatened the entire world, particularly India.

India held the chair at UNSC in August 2021. This paper examines some of the UN Resolutions under India's leadership at having a durable peace in Afghanistan since the return of Taliban 2.O. India has always stood with the Afghan people giving them different kinds of aid and relief material. Afghanistan also gets a considerable amount of funding in India's Union Budget.

India was also caught in a dilemma as to how far it should approach and recognize Taliban 2.O. Over numerous contacts and bilateral visits later, India settled with the policy of ‘engagement and not isolation’ as a hard-pragmatic choice as Kabul matters to Delhi’s security calculus. The bloodless Fall of Kabul also saw a worsening Afghan-Pakistan relation. Thus, it became urgent for India and Taliban 2.O to strike a stable working chord. Though, this relation has its own challenges rooted in morality, ethics, human rights, democracy and also diplomacy.

This paper mostly attempts to trace the events and incidents of India’s approach and engagement with Afghanistan led by Taliban 2.O after the events of August 2021.

Keywords: India, Afghanistan, Taliban 2.O, Pakistan, S. Jaishankar, Amir Khan Muttaqi.

Background

15 August 2021 - while India celebrated its 75th Independence Day, a magnanimous event was unfolding in Kabul, Afghanistan - the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan after 20 years of semi - abeyance. Once again, the churn in Afghanistan confirmed the saying that ‘Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires’. The British, the Soviets and now the Americans had to leave Afghanistan - exhausted and defeated.

Afghanistan and India share historical and civilizational ties since many centuries. With a shared baggage of colonialism and two common neighbours - Pakistan and China, India understands the necessities and demands of the Afghan people. From 1996-2001, India had supported the Northern Alliance in its resistance against the Taliban. The events happening in the last 2 decades were of great impact, interest and significance to the world’s most populous country but sadly India had little to no say in determining the final outcome of the ‘War on Terror’. Speaking of Afghanistan for the decade of 1980s, India's External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, quotes in his book, The India Way, “it appears that India misjudged the extent to which Western countries would utilize it to damage the USSR”. [1]

Whatever happens in Kabul, stays in Kabul - was not going to be a reality as multiple countries had a stake in the events, including India. This political earthquake will also affect the fractured India-Pakistan ties.

Initial Days and UN initiatives

When it became imperative for America & NATO to exit Afghanistan, they raced to sign the Doha Peace Agreement with Taliban 2.0 on 29 February 2020. One of the points of the ‘Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ was “The United States re-affirms its commitments regarding support for the Afghan security forces and other government institutions, including through ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of Afghan security forces to deter and respond to internal and external threats, consistent with its commitments under existing security agreements between the two governments. ” [2] Despite these guarantees, the Americans fled Afghanistan on their warplanes in August 2021. The scenes from that departure were reminiscent to the Fall of Saigon, 1975. The then Indian ambassador to Qatar, P. Kumaran had represented India at the ceremony. India was extremely cautious about the agreement keeping in mind the concerns that will emerge once Afghanistan falls to Taliban 2.O. This was seen in India’s subsequent response to media queries, wherein Delhi did not “welcome” the agreement nor mentioned “Taliban”. [3]

There were attacks at Gurudwara Har Rai Sahib in Kabul in March 2020, and Gurudwara Dashmesh Pita Sahib Sri Gobind Sahib Ji in Kabul on 18 June 2022. The attacks led to the loss of life of around 25 people and injured around 11 people, including one Indian national. India had strongly condemned both the terrorist attacks which targeted innocent civilian life.

Fast forward to August 2021, India had the UNSC presidency. Under India’s chairship, the UNSC unanimously adopted 5 press statements of which 3 were on Afghanistan. On 3rd August 2021, the UNSC adopted a press statement that recalled the UNSC Resolution 2513 which affirmed that there was no military solution to the situation pertaining in Afghanistan. The press statement reiterated that the UNSC does not support the restoration of an “Islamic Emirate” in Afghanistan. Only time will tell if states across the world would adhere to this ideology.

As anticipated, chaos and mayhem followed. On 26th August 2021, a blast rocked the Hamid Karzai International Airport in which over 300 people were killed. It was claimed by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province. The fear that Afghanistan could not be managed by Taliban 2.O, and other terrorist groups controlling it, came true.

The UNSC Resolution 2593 also showed a subtle shift in India’s earlier reticence about recognising Taliban’s new role in the country. Showing a pragmatic acceptance of the Taliban’s role as security provider in the country from thereon, it noted the Taliban’s commitment to allow for the safe passage of both Afghan and foreign nationals wanting to leave the country and urged the “relevant parties” to work with international partners to strengthen security. This tacit acknowledgement of the Taliban’s new role was also evident in the press statement of 27 August which preceded the resolution. In a break from the statement passed on 16 August which still considered the Taliban as one of the actors supporting terror inside Afghanistan, the 27 August statement dropped the reference to the Taliban’s support to other terror outfits. [4]

It was India’s humble and pure efforts at bringing the world together through the UN to speak in unison in affairs relating to Afghanistan. Apart from the high-level meetings in New York, the political tremors will give rise to yet another humanitarian crisis that will require India's attention to be on ground in Kabul through Operation Devi Shakti.

Operation Devi Shakti

Due to India's huge population and ever-expanding diaspora, it always has to play some role in conflicts across the globe. The threats emanating from Afghanistan to the well-being, security and life of Indians in Afghanistan and also to the people from minority religions in Afghanistan made it necessary for India to launch Operation Devi Shakti.

Under this operation, a total of 669 people were evacuated from Afghanistan comprising 448 Indians and 206 Afghans. This also included 74 members of the minority community from Afghanistan, primarily Afghan Sikhs, who carried with them 2 Swaroops of Guru Granth Sahib and some ancient Hindu manuscripts. A total of 15 people of other nationalities from Nepal, Lebanon and Uganda were also rescued. Seven flights - six operated between 16 and 25 August 2021 and the last flight on 10 December 2021 had brought these people back. All Indian nationals who had sought repatriation to India were evacuated. [5] [6]

In view of the rapid deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan, especially after 15 August 2021, a 24 * 7 Special Afghanistan Cell was set up in the Ministry of External Affairs to facilitate repatriation and other requests from Afghanistan. In the month of August alone, the Cell responded to 3436 telephone calls, 9581 WhatsApp messages and 4569 emails. [7]

The rescue efforts are in sync with India's approach of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (which will be the theme of India's G20 Presidency in 2023) and its vision to be a ‘Vishwa Guru’ especially to the Global South (which will culminate into the Voice of the Global South Summit).

Aid

To heal Afghanistan from its wounds was utmost necessary. India carried out multiple humanitarian tranches to Afghanistan for the welfare and well- being of Afghan people that share brethren ties with Indians.

An earthquake struck Afghanistan on 22 June 2022. As a true friend, partner and a ‘First Responder’, India immediately dispatched 27 tons of emergency relief assistance in two flights consisting of essential items including family ridge tents, sleeping bags, blankets, sleeping mats, etc. The relief consignments were handed to the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) in Kabul. [8] This was a crucial step in India's ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief’ approach.

The first ever India Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Afghanistan had its first meeting on 07 March 2023 in New Delhi, India. Some outcomes of the JWG were [9]

● India announced that it will dispatch 20,000 MTs of wheat assistance to address the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan in partnership with the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) through the Chabahar Port in Iran.

● On the request of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), India offered capacity building training courses for the relevant agencies/ stakeholders in the area of countering illegal drug trafficking.

As of December 2024, several shipments of humanitarian assistance consisting of 50,000 MTs of wheat, 300 tons of life saving essential medicines, 1.5 million doses of COVID vaccines, 27 tons of earthquake relief aid, 40,000 litres of pesticides, 100 million polio doses, 11,000 units of hygiene kits for the drug de-addiction programme and 500 units of winter clothing to Afghanistan. These consignments were handed over to the Indira Gandhi Children Hospital, Kabul and UN specialized agencies, namely, World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO). [10] India also gifted one million doses of India made COVAXIN to Iran to administer to Afghan refugees in Iran.

In June 2025, India organized a five-day Jaipur foot camp in Kabul. Around 75 prosthetic limbs were successfully fitted by Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti (BMVSS), Jaipur, giving hope of further deepening our Track 1.5 diplomacy with Afghanistan. [11]

On 14 April 2026, India delivered 13 tons of BCG vaccines and related dry material to the Ministry of Public Health, Afghanistan to augment Afghanistan’s child immunization programme against tuberculosis. Earlier, 7.5 tons of life saving cancer medicines were also delivered. [12] [13]

Allocations to Afghanistan in India's Budget

Following the US invasion, India emerged as the largest regional donor for Afghanistan with pledges of almost US$ 3 billion. Flagship initiatives included but not limited to - Afghanistan India Friendship Dam (Salma Dam), Afghan Parliament building, 218 km. Zaranj Delaram highway and the restoration of Stor Palace. [14] Dr. S. Jaishankar mentions in his book, The India Way, that “India positioned itself as a sympathetic but understanding partner willing to work to American comfort levels”. [15]

In the Union Budget 2022-23, the first full financial year under Taliban, India slashed its developmental assistance to the war-torn country to Rs. 200 crores, down 43% from Rs. 350 crores in Budget 2021-22, when Kabul was under a democratic government. [16]

The allocation to Afghanistan remained the same in Budget 2023-24, Rs. 200 crores. Indian Parliament was informed that, through the allocation from the same Budget, approx. Rs. 57 crores were utilized as Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance (HADR) on 15 countries, mostly from Global South, including Afghanistan, under budget heads ‘Technical and Economic Co-operation’. [17]

The return of the Taliban negatively affected multiple projects in Afghanistan. For example, restoration work on the 65-hectare ancient fortress Bala Hissar in Kabul remained on pause. The Agha Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) Afghanistan planned to complete it by 2022 after the work began in 2020. The Indian government had signed a MoU with Kabul pledging approximately US$ 1 million. Taliban has been pressing India to resume these works back. [18]

In the fiscal year 2023-24, the country got aid worth Rs. 220 crores, Rs. 20 crores more than allocated. Afghanistan saw an allocation worth Rs. 200 crores in the Union Budget 2024-25. In the revised budget, the figure had got down to Rs. 50 crores.

The Union Budget 2026-27 hiked India’s development assistance to Afghanistan by 27%, raising the allocation from Rs. 100 crores in 2025-26 to Rs 150 crores. [14] One also has to look at the figures retrospectively, India had allocated Rs. 350 crores to Afghanistan in the 2021-22 Budget, in comparison, the cumulative allocation has dropped down. The budget allocation to neighbouring states also aligns with the Indian foreign policy principles of ‘Gujral Doctrine’.

The allocation to Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban has been met with criticism from certain quarters. The then Delhi Chief Minister, Arvind Kejriwal, had criticised this move believing that this was at the expense of cutting the funds of education, health and Delhi! [19]

Looking beyond India - another view emerging from US’ the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is that the Taliban has no legal right to access billions of dollars allocated for Afghanistan, as it is a United Nations sanctioned terrorist group, not recognized as a de jure legitimate government and remains subject to severe sanctions.

Shashi Tharoor, who chairs India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, believes that “Engagement without ethical guardrails risks normalising repression; isolation without pragmatic engagement risks strategic setbacks”. [20]

It is projected that the monetary disbursement would not be directly given to the Taliban but through different international organizations/ NGOs (some of the names have been mentioned in this piece) as a ‘gift to the people of Afghanistan’ as seen pasted in many consignments sent across from Delhi. It is for Delhi to cautiously and skilfully navigate the sandstorm that has arisen from the Hindu Kush.

Contacts and Bilateral Visits

The upswing in ties as observed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Afghanistan, first on 25 December 2015 while returning back from Russia and then on 04 June 2016, were severely affected after 2021.

After the Taliban took over, India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met top Taliban negotiator Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, the Head of Taliban’s Political Office in Doha, at the Indian embassy in Qatar on 31 August 2021. The meeting was arranged on the request of the Taliban. It marked the first officially acknowledged meeting between the two sides in recent years. [21] Stanekzai is also a former Afghan military officer who had received his training at Indian Military Academy (IMA). He was 20 years old when he joined 44 other foreign cadets of the Bhagat Battalion’s Keren Company at IMA, Dehra Dun. [22]

Multiple neighbouring countries were quick to ‘accept’ the Taliban. India proceeded with caution and deployed a technical team in Kabul in June 2022 “to closely monitor and coordinate the efforts of various stakeholders for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and in continuation of our engagement with the Afghan people”. [23] Prior to this, another Indian team had visited Kabul to oversee the delivery operations of Delhi’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and met with senior members of Taliban as well. During the visit, an assessment of the security situation was also conducted. This team which was led by the then Joint Secretary J.P. Singh, who headed the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran (PAI) desk at the Ministry of External Affairs, also met the acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Amir Khan Muttaqi. It is important to note that India’s contact with Kabul was for the ‘Afghan people’ and not for the de facto establishment ruling Afghanistan. Vivek Katju, who served as Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan during 2002-05 welcomed the visit by the Indian team believing that “An engagement with the Taliban would at least give an opportunity to convey Indian concerns directly and encourage those elements within the group who wish to open up its diplomatic choices”. He also hoped for a permanent Indian presence in Kabul as it would be “better for the pursuit of national interests in the external sphere. This is not an exercise in evangelism but the cold and undeterred pursuit of interests, which often requires supping with the devil — of course, with a long spoon”. [24]

This psychological warfare and emphasis on imagery is also put forth by Robert Greene in multiple of his books. This is also an example of soft feminist diplomacy which was earlier seen when India’s then External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj met President Hassan Rouhani of Iran on 17 April 2017 where she was wearing a pink sari and covered her head with a shawl. Her attire fired up Twitter (now X) with one tweet referring to her as “a pink potato sack”. [25] Similarly, IFS Jharwal had worn a salwar kameez with full sleeves and head cover. India cannot afford to leave the space vacuum with respect to our ties with Islamic states, not everyone has the liberty to have a Marietje Schaake moment. [26] Critics, mostly trolls, opined that India has kow-towed to the medieval thinking of Taliban but what they fail to understand is, in realpolitik, such steps act as a springboard - one takes a step ‘back’ to leap multiple steps forward for a larger cause and benefit. Diplomacy doesn’t always work on morality or ethics but also on difficult pragmatic choices.

On 05 November 2024, J.P. Singh met Taliban’s acting defence minister Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid for the first time in Kabul. Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, had not publicly interacted with Indian interlocutors in the past. During the same meeting Singh also met with acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and former President Hamid Karzai. Karzai, while appreciating India’s cooperation with the people of Afghanistan, said that more attention should be paid to the education and training of Afghan youth along with developing trade and easing travel between the two sides. [27]

On 08 January 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary met the acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai, UAE. The two sides evaluated the ongoing Indian humanitarian assistance programmes. The Afghan Minister appreciated and thanked the Indian leadership for continuing to engage and support the people of Afghanistan. Keeping in mind the urgent need for development activities “it was decided that India would consider engaging in development projects in the near future, in addition to the ongoing humanitarian assistance programme”. In this meeting it was mutually agreed upon that the two sides would promote sports cooperation, mainly cricket which was deeply valued by the young generation of Afghans, and to promote the use of Chabahar Port for furthering trade and commercial activities which will also give a boost to the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). [28]

The events of 2025 will take the bilateral relations between India and Taliban 2.O led Afghanistan to more significant levels.

On 22 April 2025, a deadly terrorist attack was carried out in Pahalgam, Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, India which claimed the lives of 26 innocent civilians. This was the most severe attack in terms of civilian casualties since the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008. In response to this attack, backed by and originating from Pakistan, India carried out Operation Sindoor beginning from 07 May 2025 until a mutually agreed ceasefire was implemented from 10 May 2025. This operation was a precision based military strike on 9 terror camps, 4 located deep within Pakistan and 5 in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. These locations were key command centres of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. [29]

It is ironic that the Taliban regime, a globally recognized and sanctioned terrorist outfit, condemned the attack and expressed their sympathy “to the families of those who lost their lives in this incident. Such acts threaten the security and stability of the region”. This is the same regime in its earlier version from 1996-2001 that had given a safe haven for the hijackers of Indian Airlines Flight 814 to land in Kandahar in December 1999. Nevertheless, this tragic terrorist attack in Pahalgam paved the way for a diplomatic thaw via a telephone call and a landmark visit 5 months later.

Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister, officially spoke to Amir Khan Muttaqi on 15 May 2025. In a post on X, S. Jaishankar deeply appreciated the acting Afghan Foreign Minister’s condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack. India also trashed reports that appeared in Pakistan media that attempted to link the Taliban with the developments in Kashmir. “We welcomed his firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports,” S. Jaishankar added in his message. [30]

In the same phone call, according to Taliban’s Director of Communication Hafiz Zia Ahmed, Muttaqi requested the Indian Minister to provide more visas to Afghan nationals especially to those seeking medical attention. He also mentioned that bilateral trade, release and return of Afghan prisoners in Indian jails, and development of the Chabahar Port in Iran were discussed. [31]

Before the debut phone call, senior Indian diplomat Anand Prakash visited Kabul on 27 April as tensions between Delhi and Islamabad, in fact Rawalpindi, peaked over cross-border terror links. Mr. Prakash held a meeting with Amir Khan Muttaqi as well.

October 2025 visit of acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi to India

The highlight between India and Taliban 2.O relations came when the acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Amir Khan Muttaqi, visited India on a week-long visit from 09-15 October 2025. This marked his first high-level trip to India since Taliban snatched power in 2021. Muttaqi, who is sanctioned by the UNSC, was given a travel ban exemption to visit India. During the visit, the minister interacted with India’s EAM S. Jaishankar, visited think tanks like Vivekanand International Foundation, and the Darul Uloom Deoband. Muttaqi also interacted with the Afghan refugees and business communities and attended several press conferences.

At the meeting, between Dr. S. Jaishankar and Muttaqi, in Hyderabad House, there were no flags of either side — India, thus evaded a diplomatic challenge and a probable faux pau. The Indians addressed him as Foreign Minister of Afghanistan — not getting into the Republic vs Emirate debate. [32]

Some of the outcomes of the visit were [33]

● construction of a 30-bed hospital by India in Kabul’s Bagrami district.

● construction of an Oncology Centre and a Trauma Centre in Kabul.

● establishment of five Maternity Health Clinics in the provinces of Paktika, Khost and Paktia.

● as a special gesture, India will gift 20 ambulances to the Afghan people.

● welcoming of the commencement of India Afghan Air Freight Corridor.

● importantly, the Afghan Minister reiterated the commitment that the Afghan government will not allow any group or individual to use the territory of Afghanistan against India.

● India also agreed to upgrade its financial mission in Kabul and receive Taliban diplomats.

Muttaqi also attended a high-level interaction with industry leaders, organized by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). During this meeting, resumption of direct flights between Amritsar and Kabul was announced. This announcement was hailed by Vikramjit Singh Sahney, a Rajya Sabha MP, who chaired the meeting, believing that “this is a historic step that can be a game changer for trade and industry in Punjab”. He emphasized that the resumption of flights will significantly benefit farmers, traders and MSMEs on both sides, with a strong focus on trade in agri-products, dry and fresh fruits, handicrafts, and pharmaceuticals. [34]

A delegation of persecuted Afghan Hindus and Sikhs also met the Minister and urged him for the restoration of ancient Hindu temples and Gurudwaras in Afghanistan. The delegation also requested the government in Kabul to appoint Hindus and Sikhs in high-ranking positions. The exodus brought around 5000 Hindus and Sikhs from Afghanistan to India, many are now Indian nationals. The delegation, led by Afghan Minorities Council in coordination with the Indian World Forum, comprised around 30 prominent members from both the communities who had come to India. Indian World Forum President Puneet Chandhok said that “we hope that the present regime will ensure fool proof rights of minorities living there”. [35] The ghosts from the past might wonder whether Taliban commits to this on ground.

The press conference done by the Minister on 11 October 2025 at the Afghan Embassy was marred with controversies as women journalists were not ‘allowed’ to attend. The Afghan side responded that only a select few invitees had gone to journalists who were all men. This gender apartheid policy was met with severe backlash. The Editors Guild of India, the Indian Women’s Press Corps (IWPC) and the Network of Women in Media, India (NWMI) issued strong statements, calling the exclusion “highly discriminatory”. [36] Also, the irony of the setting for Muttaqi’s 30-minute press conference could not have been more visible – the Taliban flag on a table in front of him, and a painting of the Bamiyan Buddhas (destroyed by the Taliban in 2001) on the wall behind. 2 days later, after severe pressure and condemnation, the minister did another press conference wherein female journalists attended occupying front row seats. “There can be no normalisation of a regime that erases women”, opined Zahra Nader, the editor in chief of Zan Times, which covers human rights issues in Afghanistan, on this press conference episode. [37]

Another major event of this almost week-long trip was Muttaqi’s visit to the Darul Uloom Deoband in Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh. Historically, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Deoband Islam played a significant role in the nation-building process through the movement of scholarly networks that extended from India via Afghanistan to the vast lands of the Arab world. Considering Afghanistan’s historical trajectory with Deoband Islam (from an intellectual pursuit to ideological extremism), the Minister’s visit to India's Deoband underscores many concerns for New Delhi’s strategic community. Apparently, the ideological foundations of the Taliban is rooted in the religious doctrine associated with the Darul Uloom Deoband in India. Therefore, India should tread with caution over Taliban’s attempt to revive its strategic interests as a part of intellectual and ideological diplomacy. This visit could not have been possible without the knowledge and tacit or explicit consent of the Indian government. The Deoband should not be used by both sides as just gaining strategic leverage over Islamabad but rather how Delhi and Kabul can use it as a bridge between them. [38] [39]

Subsequently, in November 2025, Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban’s Minister of Commerce and Industry visited India for discussions on bilateral trade, investment and broader economic cooperation. This was followed by a visit in December 2025 by the Taliban Health Minister, Noor Jalal Jalali, focused on strengthening cooperation in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceuticals.

Apart from meeting India’s External Affairs Minister, Minister Azizi also held delegation level talks with India's Commerce and Industry Minister, Piyush Goyal and met Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Jitin Prasada. Minister Azizi also visited the India International Trade Fair (IITF 2025), where several Afghan traders had set up stalls. He interacted with various exhibitors and toured the cultural display at the IITF. Minister Azizi’s delegation held meetings with the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA), Cotton Textiles Export Promotion Council (TEXPROCIL), Cotton Corporation of India (CCI), Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC), Manmade and Technical Textiles Export Promotion Council (MATEXIL), PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHDCCI), Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), and Pharmaceutical Export Promotion Council of India (PHARMEXCIL). They discussed modalities for the long-term supply of agricultural products, medicines, and other essential commodities to Afghanistan. [40]

Taliban’s Health Minister Jalali held a bilateral meeting with India’s Health and Family Welfare Minister, J.P. Nadda. He also met MEA’s Minister of State, Kirti Vardhan Singh and Ayush Ministry’s Minister of State (Independent Charge), Prataprao Jadhav. The Afghan Minister participated in the 2nd WHO Global Summit on Traditional Medicine held in New Delhi. To gain an understanding of India’s tertiary healthcare system, the Afghan delegation visited AIIMS, New Delhi and a few other hospitals. A technical visit to Centre of Excellence in Unani Medicine, Jamia Hamdard University, was also arranged. The delegation also held meetings with the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), and Hospital Services Consultancy Corporation Limited (India). They also participated in interactive business sessions with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHDCCI) and Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council of India (Pharmexcil). [41] Prior to the Minister’s visit, India delivered 63,734 doses of Influenza and Meningitis vaccines to Kabul. [42]

The dilemma on who should run the Afghan Embassy?

Going with the international consensus, India has not recognized the Taliban government.

Soon after Taliban took charge of Afghanistan in 2021, the functioning of the Afghan Embassy at Delhi and Consulate General in Mumbai and Hyderabad remained with the diplomats appointed by the democratic government of the Afghan Republic. Whom to give the charge and recognize as the official representative from Afghanistan remained a thorny issue for Raisina Hills.

The diplomats appointed by the previous regime continued to work as a stateless mission, mostly helping Afghan nationals in India. It was reduced to a ceremonial and a symbolic role. Power struggle soon arose between the diplomats and Taliban which asked the ambassador to be removed and be replaced with their own appointee. On 02 June 2023, the then MEA’s spokesperson Arindam Bagchi commented that this was an “internal matter” for the embassy to resolve. [43] Critics argued that on India's part, it was sadly an abdication of duties as the host country.

Farid Mamundzay, the ambassador appointed by President Ashraf Ghani reportedly left India sometime in mid-2023. In late September 2023, a statement carrying the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (not to be confused with Islamic Emirate, the name given by the Taliban) announced the closure of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Delhi. The announcement had been anticipated for a while, especially after a report which stated that a letter had been sent from the mission to the Ministry of External Affairs informing it of the impending closure. In its official communication, the Embassy of Afghanistan blamed multiple factors including lack of cooperation from the Government of India and a lack of resources to operate any further. Furthermore, the embassy urged the Indian government to fly the flag of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan over embassy premises. It also urged Delhi to hand over the mission to a “legitimate government” of Afghanistan sometime in the future.

As the Embassy saga continued, Afghan Consul General in Mumbai, Zakia Wardak, and Acting-Consul General in Hyderabad, Sayed Mohammad Ibrahimkhil, confirmed that they would continue carrying out their duties. On 04 May 2024, Zakia Wardak resigned after she was caught smuggling/ concealing gold at the Mumbai Airport. [44]

As relations between India and the Taliban eased and came closer, it became necessary to have Taliban representatives taking charge of the Embassy. As noted earlier, 2025 marked a drastic change in relations between Delhi and Kabul. This sentiment was further observed, after Afghan Minister Muttaqi’s visit to India in October 2025, when it was agreed upon that the charge of the Afghan Embassy would be given to the Taliban. In mid-January 2026, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, who previously served as the Director General of the First Political Department at Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formally assumed charge as the Charge d’Affaires (CDA) at the Afghan Embassy in Delhi. Around the same time, the Taliban had assigned Ikramuddin Kamil, an Afghan student in India, responsibility for consular affairs in Mumbai, reflecting the regime’s improvised yet pragmatic approach to overseas representation under conditions of non-recognition. Along with this, India upgraded its technical mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy and appointed Karan Yadav as CDA.

The Muttaqi visit thus laid the institutional groundwork for the subsequent embassy transition and signalled India’s readiness to deepen functional ties, falling short of diplomatic recognition.

As Muttaqi & Dr. S. Jaishankar were securing ties between their respective states in Delhi in October 2025, the after effects of a courtship gone sour could be seen happening simultaneously as Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Afghanistan

India, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Tim Marshall writes in his book, Prisoners of Geography, “Geography is clearly the fundamental part of the ‘why’ as well as the ‘what’. It might not be the determining factor, but it is certainly the most overlooked”. This annotation can be best seen in the bilateral and multilateral relations between India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, more importantly in the events that have occurred after 15 August 2021.

History is witness that the West, led by USA, funded the mujhahids in Pakistan to wage a war against the Soviets after it invaded Afghanistan in 1979. This singular event has given birth to almost all the catastrophes in Afghanistan and Pakistan and as a common neighbour India got affected in unfathomable ways never seen before with respect to the issue of insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan (2008-10), Jayant Prasad, writes "India has a stake in ensuring that terrorist groups against India do not use Afghan territory. Despite assurances, Indian security forces have been reporting the recovery of US made M-4 carbines from deceased terrorists after encounters in Kathua, Reasi, Kishtwar, Akhnoor, Poonch, Rajouri, Kupwara, and most recently in the Dachigam area near Mount Mahadev. The M-4s were left behind in Afghanistan when US forces withdrew from Afghanistan”. [45]

In this section, the paper attempts to trace and understand the incidents that will bring India and Taliban closer due to the actions of Pakistan after 2021. Op. Sindoor has been addressed in the above section.

Imran Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan is reportedly to have said that Afghanistan has broken the shackles of slavery after the Taliban captured Kabul. Little did he and Pakistan know that the euphoria emerging out of this takeover will come to bite Pakistan harder through Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State, al Qaeda and other terror groups. Pakistan asserts that the Afghan Taliban safely harbours the TTP - a claim Afghan Taliban repeatedly denies. Taliban does not recognize and accept the Durand Line that divides the Pashtun tribe. [46]

Pakistan believes that its Pashtun population is sympathetic to the terrorist that harbour in Afghanistan. Due to this sentiment, the two forces have often clashed at the border leading to military and civilian deaths. Pakistan has routinely carried out airstrikes in Afghanistan. The Taliban has responded in the same language. Thus, the Defence Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, has termed this as an “open war”, undermining a fragile ceasefire that was signed in October 2025.

On 22 February 2026, India’s MEA strongly condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes on Afghanistan as “It is another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures. India reiterates its support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.” [47] On 14 March 2026, India again condemned yet another strike by Pakistan that caused the “... destruction of civilian infrastructure. This is yet another act of aggression by a Pakistani establishment that remains hostile to the idea of a sovereign Afghanistan”. [48]

The politics of language was seen at its peak when India released a statement that unequivocally condemned Pakistan’s airstrike on the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul on the night of 16 March 2026 calling it “barbaric”, “cowardly”, “unconscionable act of violence”, “criminal” and a “massacre”. India rightly believed that the facility can by "no means be justified as a military target”. [49] The WHO estimated that more than 400 people were killed and another 250 were injured. [50]

India, once again, asked Pakistan to respect Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity and criticised its “reckless behaviour” that were a “direct threat to regional peace and stability”. Further, India noted that “this attack was carried out during the holy month of Ramzan, a time of peace, reflection, and mercy among Muslim communities across the world, makes it all the more reprehensible. There is no faith, no law, and no morality that can justify the deliberate targeting of a hospital and its patients”.

It is noteworthy to observe that in the same month Israel and the USA waged a war on Iran. The statements and observations put forth by India were mild as compared to the strong words used by India with respect to the actions of Pakistan.

Conclusion and End Thoughts

The world might have seen the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 as undemocratic and unacceptable but over the course of time it accepted the Ayatollah and the Islamic regime as sovereign representatives of Iran. Similarly, this time the Taliban is here to stay unless another invasion happens, most likely not, therefore it is prudent for India to engage and not isolate Taliban and Afghanistan.

The meetings and outcomes from the visits of the three Afghan Ministers in late 2025 should see its successful completion and implementation otherwise it would just be reduced to rhetoric. Kabul and Delhi must overcome the challenges that are not in their control and which negatively affects them, so that they do not become another Chabahar or meet the fate of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.

India must actively participate in the regional forums like Moscow Format, SCO - Afghanistan Contact Group, Heart of Asia - Istanbul Process, for a durable and inclusive peace in Afghanistan. India must continue to place its ‘Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled’ principle at the centre of all discussions. This thought process was evident when India aligned with countries like Pakistan, China, Russia at the 7th Moscow Format Consultations for Afghanistan, in October 2025, to indirectly reject US President Donald Trump's plan to takeover Bagram Air Base. [51]

Pakistan should not be the determining factor in binding or breaking Indo - Afghan ties. Also, India must realise that any efforts at peace in Afghanistan would require strong backing and support from Pakistan. Therefore, it is necessary for Pakistan to be at the table.

The Taliban seem to have an optimistic outlook towards India. The people from the land of the Ganga do not carry any negative feelings to the people from the land of the Helmand. Hence, it becomes utmost important for Delhi to continue to press issues of human rights particularly of women and children, democracy, right to education for all, welfare of minorities, with Kabul. Delhi seems to be not in favour of voicing out the concerns openly; even if it addresses these issues behind closed doors, it's a game well played.

The Taliban seem to have an optimistic outlook towards India. The people from the land of the Ganga do not carry any negative feelings to the people from the land of the Helmand. Hence, it becomes utmost important for Delhi to continue to press issues of human rights particularly of women and children, democracy, right to education for all, welfare of minorities, with Kabul. Delhi seems to be not in favour of voicing out the concerns openly; even if it addresses these issues behind closed doors, it's a game well played.

A stable, durable and peaceful Afghanistan is beneficial not just for India but for the entire world.

Disclaimer: Events in the paper are covered upto April 2026.

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