Water is an important strategic resource and geopolitical issue in West Asia. The region has three river basins viz., the Jordan River basin, The Nile River basin and the Tigris and Euphrates River basin. The Jordan River flows to the Dead Sea and is only 251 km long flanked by Israel and the West Bank (Palestine) to the west and the Golan Heights (Syria) and Jordan to its east. Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians have been trying to control the river.1 Second, the Nile river passes through Egypt and has issues with some upstream countries to protect its water.2 The third and most contentious river basin of the region is the Tigris-Euphrates basin, shared by Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers originate in Turkey forming a basin which encompasses territories of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Tigris is 1,850 km long, rising in the Taurus Mountains of southeastern Turkey about 25 km southeast of the city of Elazig. The river then flows for 400 km through Turkish territory before becoming the border between Syria and Turkey for 32 km. This stretch is the only part of the river that is located in Syria. Then the river enters Iraq for its rest of the journey. Originating in eastern Turkey, Euphrates flows for 1,230 km. in Turkey, for 710 km in Syria and it enters Iraq to flow for 1,060 km before entering into the Persian Gulf. Both the rivers join near al-Qurnah (Iraq) and flow together forming Shatt al-Arab waterway for about 200 km. Of the Tigris Basin 12 percent lies in Turkey, 0.2 percent in the Syria, 54 percent in Iraq and 34 percent in Iran. Of the Euphrates Basin 28 percent lies in Turkey, 17 percent in the Syria, 40 percent in Iraq.3 These have been historically important and had provided water to ancient Mesopotamia in Iraq. The Tigris-Euphrates basin was the birthplace of ancient civilizations of Assyria, Babylonia, and Sumer.
Hydrography of the basin
As both the rivers originate from Turkey, the country contributes 98 per cent of the water of the Euphrates while Syria contributes around 12 per cent. Out of this, however, 10 per cent again originates from the northern tributaries of Khabur and the Balikh lying in Turkey. Annual natural flow of the river is estimated at 33.4 billion cubic meters (bmc). Turkey contributes around 51.8 per cent water to Tigris River with Iraq contributing 49.2 per cent.4Tigris annually records a maximum average flow of 70.4 bmc. Despite their modest contribution of water to Euphrates, Syria has been demanding 22 per cent of the water and Iraq 43 per cent. Turkey envisages utilising only 35 percent of the total flow, compared to its major contribution to this river. Turkey uses a limited portion of the waters of the Euphrates and only a minimal fraction of the waters of the Tigris River. To utilize its water resources, Turkey started Southeastern Anatolia Development project, (called GAP) to harvest water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers by constructing 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on these rivers for irrigation and hydroelectric energy. Conceived in 1950s and 1960s, Turkey completed the construction of Keban Dam near Elazığ, in the upper Euphrates River in 1974 and used its waters to irrigate about 700,000 acres of land for agriculture and provided 7.44 billion kWh of electricity. The area to be irrigated through these dams account for 19 percent (8.5 million hectares) of the economically irrigable area of Turkey. It amounts to annual electricity generation of 22 per cent of the country’s economically viable hydropower potential.5
Syria has constructed 165 dams with a total storage capacity of 19.6 km3 on the Euphrates for the production of hydropower, irrigation and storage of water for drinking. Syria alsohas plans to irrigate its agriculture by pumping water from the Tigris. Both the rivers help in irrigating large tracts of arable land in Syria.6 Iraq also uses the waters of both the rivers. It has constructed many dams and reservoirs on Euphrates such as Duban Regulator, to regulate the flow of the Euphrates into Lake Habbaniyah; Fallujah Barrage; Haditha Dam, Ramadi Barrage; and Warrar Regulator on Euphrates Adhaim Dam, Beduhe Dam,Bekhme Dam, Darbandikhan Dam, Dukan Dam, Duhok Dam, Hemrin Dam, on the Diyala River, etc. Iraq has also built dams in waterways connecting the Tigris and Euphrates basins. Out of the current operational dams, the Mosul Dam is used for hydropower production, irrigation, and flood control, and the Samara Dam and the al-Kut Barrage regulate the river for irrigation. The Bekhme Dam, the Dokan Dam and the Dibbis Dam, the Darbandikhan Dam and the Hamrin Dam are operational on the Tigris River.7The total area irrigated in the Euphrates–Tigris River Basin is estimated to be around 6.5–7 million hectares, of which Iraq accounts for approximately 53 percent, Iran for 18 percent, Turkey 15 percent and the Syria14 percent. Iran also has its interest in the Tigris-Euphrates as their water is used to irrigate its land.
Water disputes between the co-basin states
Tigris and Euphrates basins were effectively managed during the Ottoman Empire. Its dismemberment at the end of First World War created independent states of Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Waters of Tigris and Euphrates were now shared by them creating the conflict of interest. Iraq has historically used maximum water from these rivers and had built a large network of man-made underground irrigation channels. This was not a problem in the early and mid-twentieth century, as Turkey and Syria had not developed expansive systems using dams and irrigation systems. When this began to change in the 1970s, availability of water to Iraq came suddenly under threat. Low flow of water allowed salt water to infiltrate nearly 150km inland from the Persian Gulf. Tensions gradually, became visible between these countries because of the issue of water management. Successive droughts in Iraq in 2007-09 further increased the likelihood of conflict. After the completion of GAP Projects on Euphrates, Turkey is expected to withdraw up to 70 per cent of the Euphrates’ water, which is likely to lead to acute shortage of water in Iraq and strain relations between the two countries. Iraq threatened to take its case for an increase in water flows from Turkey and Syria to the UN.8 Iraq takes the possible water shortages seriously and maintains that it has ‘Acquired Rights’ relating to its 'ancestral irrigation' from the Euphrates and Tigris for thousands of years. Therefore, no upstream riparian country can take away the rights of Iraqi people.9 Iraq has 1.9 million hectares of agricultural land in the Euphrates basin and to feed its agriculture water of these rivers is an absolute necessity.
Similarly, Euphrates being the only reliable source of water for Syria, it requires waters to irrigate its agriculture and keep the water levels high in the Assad Lake to sustain its hydroelectric production. After the completion of the GAP projects in Turkey and reduction in water flow, there is possibility of serious escalation of hostilities between Syria and Turkey. Syria also claims Acquired Rights dating from antiquity over the rivers that pass through Syrian territory and that the Euphrates and Tigris are 'international watercourses' which are 'shared resources'.10Syria has accused Turkey of bad neighbourliness and damaging Syrian agriculture and hydroelectric generation. Syria also accuses that by creating water shortage, Turkey wants to exert political pressure on its neighbours. Syria wants arbitration through International Court of Justice, or by involving independent international observers. Syria also retaliated by extending support the PKK --the Kurdistan Workers' Party-- a left-wing militant organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan --in its campaign against the Turkey.11
On the other hand, Turkey contends if a downstream State has first developed its water resources, it has no right to foreclose later development by an upstream State by demonstrating that the later development would cause it harm. The Turkish President Suleyman Demirel's said, "Neither Syria or Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. We have a right to do anything we like. The water resources are Turkey's, the oil resources are theirs. We don't say we share their oil resources and they cannot say they share our water resources."12 Turkey has also offered Syria and Iraq a plan for the more rational utilisation of the waters of the basin which is Optimum, Equitable and Reasonable.13
The dispute is not confined to Turkey versus the rest; there have been water related issues between Syria and Iraq too. As an upstream riparian to Iraq, Syria developed its irrigation facilities especially filling the Lake Assad in late 1960s taking the hostilities between the two nations to its peak as it significantly reduced the water flow in Euphrates river. In 1970s relations further deteriorate as Iraq accused Syria on holding back water and asked the Arab League to intervene. Syria pulled out of the Arab League Committee on the water sharing issue. By May 1975, relations between Iraq and Syria looked to turn violent. Syria closed its borders and airspace to Iraq and both countries began to amass troops on borders.14Saudi Arabian brokered a deal in which Syria agreed to keep 40 percent of available water from the Euphrates River and let 60 percent flow into Iraq.
During the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) created turmoil in Syria, water crises further aggravated. A lot of blood spilled to capture the giant dams that regulate the Tigris and Euphrates waters. Their engineers flee as the ISIS advanced, and these reservoirs could have fallen in their hands bringing catastrophe. The ISIS used water resources as a tool to achieve political and economic objectives and as a weapon of war during the civil war in Syria and the crisis in Iraq. The ISIS could instrumentalized water resources and water systems, particularly large dams and water supply facilities. Managing water works along the Tigris and Euphrates requires a highly specialized and skilled engineers and knowhow which the ISIS did not possesses. If water resources and their regulation came--even for a short time-- under ISIS, it could have created serious crisis for Syria and Iraq. Islamic State had captured the structurally unstable Mosul Dam in August 2014 on the Tigris, which was later retaken by Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Such dangers cannot be ruled out in future if all co-basin states do not collectively protect their rivers and dams.15
Water management agreements
Efforts of cooperation to share the waters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been going on since 1946 when Turkey and Iraq agreed to regulate the flow in Turkish areas share data. In 1980, Turkey and Iraq established the Joint Technical Committee (JTC). Syria became a member of the JTC in 1982 to include all the riparian states. However, the completion of Ataturk Dam in 1990, created problems that eventually led to the dismissal of the Committee. Turkey and Syria held bilateral talks over the waters of the Euphrates River, and during a visit by then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal signed an agreement with Syria and promised to allow 500cubic meter per second (m3/s) water to Syria.Iraq and Syria signed a water-sharing agreement in 1989 under which a maximum of 42 percent i.e. 210 m³/s of water inflow through the Euphrates granted by Turkey to the downstream riparian (500 m³/s) were considered as Syria’s share. In 2005 a group of scholars and retired officials from Syria, Iraq and Turkey was formed to initiate Track II diplomacy under the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation and to promote cooperation among the three countries, including through a joint data inventory.
The 2007-09 drought in Iraq sparked new negotiations between Iraq and Turkey over the quantum of water flow. Although the drought had affected Turkey, Syria and Iran as well, Iraq showed more concern about reduced water flows. Turkey agreed to increase the flow several times.16In March 2008 the three co-basin countries formed a joint "water institute" based in Turkey to "work toward the solution of water-related problems among the three". On September 3, 2009, Turkey, Iraq and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in order to strengthen communication and develop joint water-flow-monitoring stations. On September 19, 2009, Turkey formally agreed to increase the flow of the Euphrates River from 450 to 500 cu. cms., but only until October 20, 2009. In exchange, Iraq agreed to trade petroleum with Turkey and help curb Kurdish militant activity in their border region.
Notable agreements on sharing Euphrates-Tigris waters include; Iraq-Turkey Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations1946. This was the first legal instrument of cooperation to addresses flow regulation on the Tigris, Euphrates and their tributaries. Iran–Iraq Agreement 1975 on the use of shared watercourses and share Tigris tributaries: Iraq–Syria Agreement 2002 on the establishment of a pumping station on the Tigris River in Syria and Syria-Turkey Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement 2009 according Turkish approval of Syria's pumping project on the Tigris River.17Besides, there are many other geopolitical concerns which affect relations between them. In addition, border disputes, conflicts over the Kurdish issues, and the lingering crisis in Syria can also lead to trans-boundary water disputes. The danger of interstate conflict over declining water supplies may escalate and involve countries like Iran and Russia into broader regional conflicts. Syrian threat to support anti-Turkish, Kurdish movement (PKK) if Turkey withholds water is another concern.
Conflict on sharing Shatt al-Arab
Tigris and Euphrates flow at a distance apart of some 400 Km. near the Turkish-Syrian border. Their middle courses gradually approach each other, making a triangle known as Al-Jazīrah. In the vicinity of Fallūjah and Baghdad, the distance separating the rivers comes down to about 50 Km.Tigris flows through marshes, and the Euphrates flows through Lake Al-Hammār, (an open stretch of water) to join the Euphrates below Al-Nāsiriyyah. Finally, they join atAl-Qurnah and flow for 185 Km as the Shatt al-Arab to join the Persian Gulf.Some areas of Iraqi rivers are navigable which have long been used for localtransport. Large vessels, and smaller crafts can travel upstream to Mosul. Oceangoing ships can reach up to Basra, 135Km. upstream on the Shatt al-Arab, only through regular dredging. Shatt is flanked by Iraq on one side and Iran on the other.18
Iraq has claimed sovereignty over the entire waterway and Iran has insisted on the application of the Thalweg Principle to the river to determine the boundary. Waterway was used according to the treaty of 1937 between the two countries which recognized Iran’s control over two areas each about 4.8 km long and extending to the Thalweg at the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr.19Both agreed to the general lines of the old boundary. While this arrangement resolved Iran's major grievances, it failed to respond to the issue of freedom of navigation in the Shatt al-Arab. In 1969 Iraq claimed that Shatt al-Arab is an integral part of Iraqi territory and that Iranian vessels must lower their flags while navigating it. Iraq warned of resorting to force and deny access to vessels leading towards the Iranian ports to enter the waterway, if the demands were not fulfilled. In exercise of Iran’s sovereign rights, Iranian vessels began entering the waterway on 22 April 1969 to which there was no Iraqi reaction.
The Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pehalvi) and Saddam Hussain the then Iraqi Vice-President signed the Algiers agreement on 6 March 1975 to demarcate their land frontiers and delimit their river frontiers according to the Thalweg Principle.20 The two agreed that henceforth their land and river frontiers were to remain forever final. At this time Iran was a powerful country and has American support of United States while Iraq was weak and suffered from many internal disturbances, so it agreed to Iranian position on the boundary line in Shatt al-Arab. Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran in February 1979 and Iran became involved in internal conflicts. It fell out with United States and the King had to flee away from the country. In this strife Iraq felt an opportune time to attack Iran in 1980 to settle the Shatt al-Arab dispute through military means. Both the countries tried to defeat each other militarily and preserve their existence. The war which went for eight years (1980-88) caused uncountable losses of life and property. Shatt al Arab waterway became un-navigable cluttered with the hulks of sunken ships.21The waterway was Iraq's only outlet to the Persian Gulf, and thus, its shipping lanes were greatly affected by continuous Iranian attacks. At the end of the Iran–Iraq War both sides agreed to once again treat the Algiers Accord as binding.
Conclusion
Many countries in the Middle East are facing water shortages and rising tensions over the sharing of river water resources. Most of the water in this dry region comes from three river basins: The Niles, the Jordan and the Tigris-Euphrates. As far Tigris-Euphrates basin is concerned, Turkey is located upstream and can control the ebb and flow of water in these rivers. Turkey is building many dams and hydro-electric projects. Once complete, the flow of water in these rivers is bound to slow down. This is going to cause conflict between Turkey and Syria and Turkey and Iraq. It will also cause conflict between Iraq and Syria. As the population and multiple uses of water increases it becomes incumbent on the river sharing countries to reach water management agreements. Active water cooperation between countries sharing trans-boundary water resources is directly correlated with security and peace of countries involved. Absence of active water cooperation is directly correlated with risk of war between countries sharing trans-boundary water resources. The co-basin countries of Tigris-Euphrates risk a conflict even war if they avoid regional cooperation for too long. These countries have experienced tense moments in the past and it may happen in future too. Similarly, Iran and Iraq have already fought for eight years on demarcating the boundary of Shatt al-Arab waterway and they need to settle the dispute for all times to come. Such initiatives can prove as important measures to bring cooperation among these countries.
References:
1. Lowi, Miriam R. (1995): Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-55836-0, p 25
2. T Tafesse. (2001): The Nile Question: Hydropolitics, Legal Wrangling, Modus Vivendi and Perspectives. London, Transaction Publishers
3. J Selby, “The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies and Realities”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, 2005, pp 329-349: Kolars, J.F, Mitchell, W.A. (1991): The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press. pp. 6–8. ISBN 0-8093-1572-6.
4. See, John Daly,“Turkey’s Water Policies Worry Downstream Neighbors”The Turkey Analyst, vol. 7, no. 16, September 2014;Asit K. Biswas: International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile. Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.53.
5. See, http://www.gap.gov.tr/english
6. Today's Zaman:Turkey, Iraq, Syria to initiate water talks, 12 March 2000; Marwa Daoudy, “Syrian-Turkish Hydro-diplomacy”, Syria Today, January 2010.
7. For list of dams and reservoirs in Iraq visit, http://america.pink/list-dams-and-reservoirs-iraq_2676966.html
8. A K Chaturvedi (2013): Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, Vij Books, ISBN-9382573615
9. Ayșegül Kibaroğlu (ed) (2002):Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
10. “Water: A source of conflict of coopeariton in the Middle East?”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/WaterASourceofConflictofCoopintheMiddleEast.pdf, retrieved on 17.1.2016
11. "Syria and Iran 'backing Kurdish terrorist group', says Turkey". The Telegraph. 3 September 2012. Retrieved 17 October 2012; Bilgin, Fevzi; Sarihan. Ali (2013). Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question, Lanham, Lexington Books. p. 96. ISBN 9780739184035.
12. See, John Daly Turkey’s Water Policies Worry Downstream Neighbors, op.cit.,
13. Aaron T. Wolf and Joshua T. Newton, “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates basin”, College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University, available at, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Tigris-Euphrates_New.htm
14. Wendell Gary M.DIV (2011): Save Me in the Night, Bloomington, Authorhouse, ISBN 978-1-4634-3095-5, p. 568
15. See, Catherine Shakdam, “Vying for control over water: Why ISIS' grand ambitions put everyone at risk”, available at, https://www.rt.com/op-edge/266365-water-resources-isis-vying-control/. Retrieved on 12.1.2016
16. A K Chaturvedi: Water: A Source for Future Conflicts, op. cit.,
17. “Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia: Tigris River Basin”, report published by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). UN Publication.
18. Emile S. Siman, “The Shatt Al-Arab: Obstacle to Iran-Iraq Peace”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1989, p. 8.
19. Peter Hunseler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute," ed. M.S. El Azhary, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 11; Bulloch, John and Adel Darwish. Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East. London: Victor Gollancz, 1993; Kaikobad, Kaiyan Homi. The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question: A Legal Reappraisal, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
20. For full text of the treaty and delimitation description , see, UN Treaty Series Vol. 1017, 1985; Abdulghani, J. M. (1984): Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. London. p. 142.
21. Emile S. Siman,op.cit.,
