Introduction

Today, India – United States (U.S.) relationship encompasses the most intense bilateral engagement that India enjoys with any nation. India and United States have cemented their bilateral relations to new heights in trade, strategic cooperation and geopolitical negotiations in the last ten years. During the period of Donald Trump and Joe Biden India has been seen as the main contender of US pivot making in Indo-Pacific to counter China (Chattopadhyay, 2022). Given the steady expansion of bilateral partnership over last two decades, the range of joint activities today is breath-taking: from frequent bilateral summits between heads of government to regular senior-level dialogues, United States and India today engage in numerous strategic consultations, wide-ranging defence, counterterrorism, homeland security, cybersecurity and intelligence cooperation, as well as myriad activities in energy, education, science and technology, public health and culture (Tellis, 2018). The rise of China means that Washington needs regional powers to buttress its own strength more than it did in the past. As a populous, democratic, market economy, India’s size and values make it a natural partner for the United States (Pande, 2019). India’s rapid economic growth, around seven percent per year for last few years, makes it a contender for world’s fastest expanding economy (World Bank, 2021). The average income in India has nearly doubled in past ten years and economic modernisation promises to bring more jobs and advanced industry. From being ‘estranged’ democracies during the Cold War, India and United States today are, in the words of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the “two bookends of stability — on either side of the globe — standing for greater security and prosperity for our citizens and people around the world” (Hindustan Times, 2017). The World’s largest and the oldest democracies have traversed significantly, from the hithero “estranged democracies” epoch in mutual equations of a bygone era, peregrinating through three decades of constantly evolving naturally allied strategic compact (Parulekar, 2022). India and United States bilateral relations have developed into a “Comprehensive global strategic partnership”, from being “estranged democracies” of the Cold war era. Officially articulated as “based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues”, the partnership has established a long-term framework for a robust engagement through regular high-level visits and multisectoral dialogue mechanisms set in place over the last two decades. The strategic and commercial dialogue involving trade and investment, defence and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, civil nuclear energy, space technology, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health have paved way for deepening cooperation. It has also provided space for strategic consultations. Vigorous people to people interaction and support across political spectrum in both countries helped to foster synergistic relationship. The bipartisan support under various administrations in both countries has further sustained momentum on initiatives in different fields (Vijayalakshmi, 2022). From a shaky history of disagreements during Cold War era to a swiftly evolved comprehensive engagement, with beginning of New World Order, India and United States have maintained a roller – coaster ride of unique bilateral relations with each other (Arshed, 2022). There seems to be an uphill trajectory in recent years that have a marked improvement in bilateral relations. India and U.S. have come a long way in understanding each other’s perceptions on important potential themes impacting global security. There is an acknowledgement on the part of U.S. that India is a responsible player and it has all the potential to assume the responsibilities to lead world affairs (Thakur, 2022). United States has gone from being an offshore balancer in South Asia during the Cold War to championing a serious strategic partnership with India in last two decades. Washington has also acknowledged India as the dominant regional power and as an emerging global power (Pande, 2019). While India U.S. relationship remains consequential for holding the line in Asia against a hegemonic and revisionist China and in advancing normative and operational public goods in pursuance of beneficence across commons, yet, the relationship can substantively alter the trajectory and destiny of regional and global security, stability and prosperity, only through a genuinely deepened mutual interests dividend, ostensibly steeped in cogent bilaterally conditioned engagement of trade and investment, spatial connectivity, omni-sphered security capacitation and technological integration, enabling the leverage of values convergences into constructs at securitisation (Parulekar, 2022). The strategic cooperation has been progressively positive due to developments in geopolitics, especially with regard to China. The American perception of China as a strategic competitor since 2000, the growing maritime threat from China to Asian countries and India’s border conflicts with China has changed the security equations between the two. As both countries note, the vital role that India plays in achieving the “shared vision for a free, open and inclusive Indo – Pacific” is a major landmark in this partnership. Beginning with Obama and later with Trump, American thinking and strategy reveals an India centered Indo – Pacific strategy, while Indian concern over maritime safety and security in Indo – Pacific region has led it to be part of Quad initiative that implicitly aims at pushback against China. India’s defence planning and preparedness continues to be an important factor in its strategic security partnerships with U.S. (Vijayalakshmi, 2022).

U.S.-India Trade and Investment Relations

United States is India’s largest trading partner, goods and services combined. In 2019, overall U.S.-India bilateral trade in goods and services reached $146.1 billion compared to S$ 139.6 billion in 2018 [Source: U.S. Department of State]. Two-way merchandise trade stood at around $ 92 billion. Of this, India’s goods exports to the United States were valued at $ 57.7 billion and India’s goods imports from the United States were valued at $ 34.3 billion. The India - U.S. trade in services stood at $ 54.1 billion. Of this, India’s services exports to the U.S. were valued at $ 29.7 billion and India’s imports of services from U.S. were valued at $ 24.3 billion. U.S. Foreign Direct Investments in India has increased to $ 45.9 billion in 2019 (MEA, 2021).

U.S.-India trade ties are key part of bilateral relations, but have faced heightened challenges in recent years. U.S. goods and services trade with India accounts for 2.5% of total U.S. world trade. Bilateral trade is more consequential for India, for whom U.S. is top trading partner, representing about 17% of India’s exports and 7% of its imports (WTO, 2019).

Bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) is limited, but growing. Market access and other barriers to U.S. trade with India have been long-standing concerns. The Biden Administration’s inaugural trade policy report states, “While India’s large market, economic growth, and progress towards development make it an essential market for many U.S. exporters, a general and consistent trend of trade-restrictive policies have inhibited the potential of the bilateral trade relationship.” (USTR, 2021a). In terms of investments, United States is 5th largest foreign investor in India with cumulative Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) equity inflows of close to $ 30 billion from April 2000 to June 2020. FDI equity inflows in India from U.S. stand at around $ 4 billion during FY2020.

India has limited foreign investment in sectors such as insurance and banking for decades. While India has substantially liberalised foreign direct investment (FDI) procedures, issues remain. Insurance industry has a FDI limit of 49 percent and a requirement that companies be Indian controlled. In banking, foreign ownership is capped at 74 percent. Media also face foreign investment limits differently for different categories. In single brand retail, Indian rules permit 100 percent FDI but have some local sourcing requirements. Multi-brand retail is permitted upto 51 percent FDI, however Indian states can opt in or opt out of allowing this type of foreign investment, only nine of India’s twenty nine states permit it plus one union territory. Additional requirements for multi-brand include at least $ 100 million in infrastructure investment, as well as local sourcing conditions. This makes FDI difficult and complex (Ayres, 2020).

Indian FDI in United States is estimated at $ 18 billion (according to a CII Survey) (MEA, 2020a). Both countries have made a commitment to facilitate actions necessary for increasing the bilateral trade to $500 billion. During Prime Minister's visit to the United States in September 2014, the two sides set target to increase bilateral trade in goods and services to $500 billion. In recent years, growing Indian investments into the U.S. has been a novel feature of bilateral ties. According to CII and Grant Thornton survey released in August 2015, 100 Indian companies have made $ 15 billion worth of tangible investments across 35 states, creating more than 91,000 American jobs. There are several dialogue mechanisms to strengthen bilateral engagement on economic and trade issues, including Ministerial level Economic and Financial Partnership and Ministerial Trade Policy Forum. For greater involvement of private sector in discussion on issues involving trade and investment, there is a bilateral India-U.S. CEO's Forum. India and United States have set up bilateral Investment Initiative in 2014, with special focus on facilitating FDI, portfolio investment, capital market development and financing of infrastructure. U.S.-India Infrastructure Collaboration Platform has also been set up to deploy cutting edge U.S technologies to meet India’s infrastructure needs. USAID will serve as knowledge partner for Urban India Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) alliance to help leverage business and civil society to facilitate access to clean water, hygiene and sanitation in 500 Indian cities (MEA, 2017).

The Trump Administration, which took issue with India’s “unfair” trade practices, sought to address certain frictions in limited bilateral trade deal, which was not achieved. It is expected that under the Biden Administration, bilateral trade relations may be less strained and resolving frictions will remain a priority (Raghavan, 2021). In March 2021, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai and Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal discussed importance of bilateral trade and investment relationship and committed to strengthening cooperation on shared objectives (USTR, 2021b).

U.S.-India engagement on trade issues takes place amid uncertain growth outlook for India’s economy. After several years in which it attained world’s fastest growth rate (above 7%), India’s economy grew more slowly in 2019 and was hit hard by the pandemic. The World Bank estimates that Indian economy contracted by 7.3% in 2020, and that it will expand by 8.3% in 2021, flanked by policy support from Indian government (World Bank Group, 2021). India’s COVID-19 outbreak appears to be constraining previously expected stronger economic recovery in 2021. Over the years, India-U.S. bilateral relations have intensified beyond realms of trade and investments based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues. The volume of merchandise trade between India and U.S. has significantly increased from around $ 62 billion in FY2014 to around $ 89 billion in FY2020. India’s exports to U.S. have increased from around $ 39 billion in FY2014 to around $ 53 billion in FY2020 while imports from USA have increased from around S$ 23 billion to around $ 36 billion during the same period. Further, services trade between India and U.S. has increased from around $ 34 billion in 2013 to around $ 54 billion in 2019. India’s exports of services to U.S. have increased from around $ 20 billion in 2013 to around $ 30 billion in 2019 while India’s imports of services from USA have increased from around $ 13 billion in 2013 to around $ 24 billion in 2019. Accordingly, the bilateral trade of goods and services between India and U.S. has increased from around $ 96 billion in FY2014 to around $ 143 billion in FY2020 (PHD Research Bureau, 2020).

The spread of pandemic COVID-19 and associated global supply chain disruptions have greatly impacted economic activities and created unusual degree of uncertainty in all countries. Dynamic economies such as India and United States hold immense potential for refueling global growth to higher trajectory in coming times. Based on strong complementarities and growth prospects, both countries have significant potential to enhance bilateral trade to $ 300 billion by 2025-26 from current level of around $ 150 billion. Both sides have expressed desire to conclude initial limited trade package and discussed possibility of Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The intent to negotiate for preferential trade agreement in around 50-100 categories of goods and services is highly encouraging. The initial trade deal should set stage for comprehensive full-fledged FTA resulting in manifold increase in bilateral trade and investments and progressive economic growth of both economies. There is need to outline contours for sustainable full-fledged FTA between two countries which is broad based and encompasses wide ranging potential sectors of development. There exist immense synergies in expanding trade and investments horizons between two economies in areas such as defence, space, energy, aviation, insurance, infrastructure, engineering, agriculture, food processing, manufacturing, entrepreneurship, healthcare & pharmaceuticals, water & environment, financial services, ICT & digital infrastructure including frontier technologies of 5G, big data analytics, quantum computing, blockchain and Internet of things, among others (PHD Research Bureau, 2020).

Under the Biden administration, India’s trade with United States could recover from the dip since 2017 -18. India has always had a trade surplus with U.S. The trade surplus had widened from $ 5.2 billion in 2001-02 to $ 17.3 in 2019-20. Trade surplus had peaked at $ 21.2 billion in 2017–19 and has moderated to some extent. In 2019-20, India exported goods worth $ 53 billion to U.S. which is roughly 17 per cent of all Indian exports that year and imported goods worth $ 35.7 billion in return which is around 7.5 per cent of all Indian imports.

Bilateral Talks / Bilateral free trade agreement

U.S.-India do not have bilateral free trade agreement, but previously engaged in now-stalled negotiations on a potential bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Under the Trump Administration, the two sides sought to negotiate limited trade deal, to address heightened trade frictions over tariffs and other trade restrictions. U.S. aims included “resolution of various non-tariff barriers, targeted reduction of certain Indian tariffs and other market access improvements.” Restoration of GSP benefits has been top priority for India. Despite concerted efforts in 2019 and 2020, trade deal did not materialise. Under the Biden Administration, the two sides have agreed “to work constructively to resolve key outstanding bilateral trade issues and to take comprehensive look at ways to expand the trade relationship.” They also committed to revitalizing their engagement through Trade Policy Forum, for which they agreed to hold next Ministerial-level meeting in 2021 (USTR, 2021b).

Multilateral Engagement

U.S. and India often have opposing stances on trade issues in WTO (Cimino-Isaacs, Fefer and Fergusson, 2021). With India’s growing integration in global economy, some U.S. policymakers have called on India to be more responsible stakeholder in rules-based global trading system. They blame India for impeding WTO progress on issues such as moratorium on e-commerce customs duties, disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and previously on Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). U.S. is also critical of India and others for self-designating as developing countries to claim special and differential treatment under WTO rules — criticisms that these countries including India refute (Cimino-Isaacs, 2021).

Active debate is underway in WTO on whether to waive WTO IP rules in relation to prevention, containment, or treatment of COVID-19, a concept initially proposed by India and South Africa in October 2020. U.S. previously was opposed to general concept of waiver, but in May 2021, Biden Administration announced U.S. support for waiving IP protections for COVID-19 vaccines (USTR, 2021d).

Selected Trade Issues: Tariffs and Trade Preferences

Bilateral tensions have grown over both countries’ tariff policies. India’s average most-favored-nation (MFN) applied tariff rate (17.6%) is highest of any major world economy. India’s bound tariff rates under its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments are even higher. This allows India to increase its applied rates further without violating its WTO commitments and has created longstanding source of uncertainty for U.S. exporters. India’s tariff hikes on range of labour-intensive products and on mobile phones, televisions and other electronics and communication devices under its “Make in India” campaign remain particular U.S. concern.

India opposes 25% steel and 10% aluminum national-security-based tariffs imposed by Trump Administration in 2018, which remain in place (Fefer, 2021a). India delayed retaliating against U.S. in hope of resolving issues bilaterally, but it ultimately imposed higher retaliatory tariffs of 10% to 25%, affecting U.S. exports such as nuts, apples, chemicals and steel. The two sides are challenging each other’s tariffs in WTO. India applied retaliatory tariffs soon after President Trump in June 2019 terminated India’s eligibility for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a U.S. trade and development programme, based on India’s failure to provide “equitable and reasonable” access to its markets according to U.S. The termination followed U.S. investigation into India’s market access practices and petitions by U.S. dairy and meal technology industries (Jones and Wong, 2021).

U.S.’ Generalized System of Preference:

India’s exclusion from U.S.’ Generalized System of Preference (GSP) could come up for reconsideration under Biden. In 2019, President Donald Trump had terminated India’s designation as a beneficiary developing nation under GSP trade programme after determining that it has not assured United States that it will provide “equitable and reasonable access” to its markets. The termination followed U.S. investigation into India’s market access practices and petitions by U.S. dairy and meal technology industries (Jones and Wong, 2021). India was largest beneficiary of the program in 2017 with $ 5.7 billion in imports to U.S. given duty-free status. India was largest beneficiary of the programme in 2017 with $ 5.7 billion in imports to US given duty free status. Under GSP around 10% of U.S. imports from India previously entered duty-free. GSP is designed to promote economic development by allowing duty free entry for thousands of products from designated beneficiary countries.

Digital Trade

With rise of digital economy and with India’s growing heft as hub for information technology services and for digital businesses, new frictions have emerged over data localisation, data privacy and e-commerce. India uses many U.S. platforms and many U.S. companies have back office operations in India. U.S. is concerned with how India has handled this resource. In 2018, India’s central bank ordered companies that operate a payment system in India to store all data on local servers. This led to confusion about jurisdiction for cross border transactions and then a clarification that such data could be processed abroad but must be stored in India. India allows for 100 percent FDI in business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce but prohibits foreign investment in business-to-consumer (B2C) electronic commerce. India also does not allow foreign-owned e-commerce firms to take ownership of inventory that requires them to operate, as a marketplace-based electronic retailing model. In December 2018, India announced new regulations that expressly prohibit subsidiaries of foreign-owned marketplace-based e-commerce sites from selling products on their parent companies’ sites. The rules prohibit exclusivity arrangements by which e-commerce retailers can contract to offer any product on an exclusive basis. The only exception allowing FDI in B2C electronic commerce permits investment in single-brand retailers that meet certain conditions, including operation of physical stores in India. This narrow exception limits ability of most potential e-commerce investors to access Indian market (Ayres, 2020).

In March 2020, India adopted 2% digital services tax (DST) that applies only to non-resident companies. The Trump Administration concluded that India’s DST is discriminatory, inconsistent with international taxation principles and burden to U.S. commerce, but it deferred taking specific action (Schwarzenberg, 2020). India has defended its DST as a way to level the playing field between domestic and foreign companies.

In early 2021, Biden Administration announced its determination to apply additional tariffs of 25% on certain products from India, as well as to immediately suspend additional tariffs for up to 180 days to provide additional time to complete ongoing multilateral negotiations on international taxation at Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in G20 process (USTR, 2021c). Other bilateral issues for U.S. businesses include India’s restrictions on business activities of e-commerce platforms and requirements for data localisation of certain financial flows (Fefer, 2021b). Guidelines for social media, including requirements to remove content deemed by government threat to national security, public order and decency or morality, with imprisonment for non-compliance, have raised concerns (Horwitz and Purnell, 2021).

US Temporary Visa Policies H1-B Visa Issue

A key issue for India is U.S. temporary visa policies, which affect Indian nationals working in U.S. Under President Trump, who severely curtailed the visa regime, owing to his policy of “America First”, India had suffered the most. H-1B visa is a non-immigrant visa that allows American companies to employ foreign workers in specialty occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise. The Indian government has continued to highlight services trade and the “movement of natural persons” procedures typically involving the visa regime by which a citizen of one country can perform services work in another country. For India, this squarely falls in the world of trade, but for U.S. these are immigration matters that cannot be deliberated in trade deliberations. Of top ten companies with H-1B approved petitions in 2018 petitions, four were Indian firms, three of which were at very top. Over past fifteen years, proportion of approved H-1B Petitions from India went from just under 40 percent to more than 70 percent (Ayres, 2020).

India’s treatment of intellectual property (IP)

For the United States, India’s treatment of intellectual property (IP) is a critical issue since 1989. Concerns include piracy of software, film, music and weak patent protections. India was one of the eight countries placed on priority watch list in 1989. India amended its Patent Act to recognise product rather than process patents. This came into effect in 2005. However, U.S. continues to seek further improvements. In 2018 U.S. cited insufficient patent protections, restrictive standards for patents and threats of compulsory licensing. USTR continued to identify India on the U.S. 2021 Special 301 Priority Watch List, identifying as of concern India’s treatment of patents and lax trade secret protection (Ayres, 2020).

India - U.S. Defence Relations

When United States looks to Asia, it no longer sees rise of China but sees an economic and military rival that seeks to undermine the international liberal order that U.S. helped establish after World War II. Washington now seeks like-minded, democratic, free-market societies as allies and partners in upholding this rules-based order. United States views India as counterweight to rising China. As world’s largest democracy with a multicultural society and expanding military heft, India has the potential to balance China’s expansion (Pande, 2019). From having almost no military relations during Cold War to India becoming “Major Defence Partner” of United States, the two countries have come a long way. The designation of “Major Defence Partner” allows India to purchase advanced and sensitive technologies on par with many of America’s closest allies and partners. At $20 billion in bilateral trade in 2000, the figure stands at $115 billion in 2018 (USTR, 2019).

India and United States agree on need for upholding rule-based liberal international order. The January 2015 “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” spoke of how the two countries seek “a closer partnership” to promote “peace, prosperity and stability” by boosting regional economic integration, connectivity and economic development (White House, 2015). India’s growing economic and security relationships and interest in the Indo-Pacific region are aligned with its deepening partnership with United States. Two years after signing U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision of 2015, India joined the Quad. Today India and United States share, a “growing strategic convergence.” United States also increasingly views India as a potential regional security provider and seeks to build India’s security capacity through commercial and Defence cooperation (Pande, 2019).

Defence relationship has emerged as a major pillar of India-U.S. strategic partnership with intensification in Defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy. India conducts more bilateral exercises with U.S. than with any other country. Some important bilateral exercises are: Yudh Abhyas, Vajra Prahar, Tarkash, Tiger Triumph, and Cope India. Aggregate worth of defence-related acquisitions from U.S. is more than $ 15 billion. The Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) links up Defence component of the relationship with commercial and economic aspects, which is a new mode of diplomatic engagement between the two nations. In June 2016, United States recognised India as a "Major Defence Partner", which commits U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners. A number of significant outcomes in area of Defence cooperation were achieved during India- U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues held in September 2018 and December 2019. Apart from 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, some other important dialogue mechanisms on Defence cooperation are: Defence Policy Group, Military Cooperation Group, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative and its Joint Working Groups, Executive Steering Groups for Army; Navy; and Airforce, Defence Procurement and Production Group, Senior Technology Security Group, and the Joint Technical Group. Cooperation in counter-terrorism has seen considerable progress with enhanced intelligence sharing, information exchange and operational cooperation. The bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism is an important mechanism in this regard. It last met in Washington in March 2019. Both sides have also initiated Designations Dialogue to discuss designations of terrorists and entities. Both sides also cooperate on counter-terrorism and security issues in various multilateral bodies. Cyber security cooperation between India and United States is carried out under India- U.S. Cyber Framework signed in September 2016. The two important dialogue mechanisms in this domain are – India-U.S. Cyber Security Dialogue and India-U.S. Joint Working Group on ICT (Dwivedi and Nayan, 2021). The Defence relationship received initiation with visit of U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry in 1995, when India and U.S. signed first Memorandum of Understanding. Since signing of new framework for Defense cooperation in 2005, India continues to hold more military exercises with Washington than any other nation state. On June 3, 2015, U.S, Secretary of Defence signed Framework for the Indo-U.S. Defence Relationship with India’s Defence Minister. The agreement reflects need for Defence agreements between both the nations and strengthening of Defence capabilities. The transformation in the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) were also deliberated upon in the Carter visit in 2015. Joint production of next generation protective ensembles and mobile electric hybrid power sources, cooperation in development of jet engines, aircraft carrier designs and construction, are also concerns of Framework agreement (Dwivedi and Nayan, 2021). The three foundational elements of order of CISMOA (Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement), Logistics support agreement (LSA) and Basic Exchange and the Cooperation Agreement (BECA) (Verghese, 2016) are the ones which have been signed agreements when U.S. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter visited New Delhi in April 2016. It is reported that CISMOA and BECA would help India to make better use of equipments it has already procured from United States. LSA would allow each other to access their military bases without any conflict. Peri (2016) states that LEMOA gives access to both nations to designated military facilities on either side for purpose of refueling and replenishment. LEMOA is a customised version of LSA which has been signed with India. Sekhon (2018) provides useful insight into larger framework of Defence cooperation between India and U.S. in context of mutually agreed upon “Cooperative Engagement”. He comments that, “Beginning with the 1991 visit to India of Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, the then Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army Pacific Command. The so-called Kicklighter proposals were described as key element in transforming India- U.S. defence relations. The proposals comprised service-to-service exchanges and expansion of defence cooperation framework: steering groups were established among three services within both countries to intensify military-to-military cooperation. These proposals made it possible to hold first ever joint military exercises between India and U.S. in February 1992. This was in keeping with U.S. policy of “cooperative engagement” with militaries of friendly countries” (Sekhon, 2018). Kicklighter proposals laid foundation of proper institutionalisation of India- U.S. Defence partnership in shadows of fact that Soviet Union was biggest Arms supplier to India since long time period. “Another major achievement in Indo-U.S. defence ties was U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry’s visit to India from 12th to 14th January 1995. Perry and then Indian Minister of State for Defence, Mallikarjun, signed first Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation, aimed at strengthening as well as expanding defense cooperation to meet requirements of new post-Cold War world” (Sekhon, 2018). Strategic cooperation is actual cornerstone of larger relationship. “The New Framework for U.S.-India Defence Relationship has established an institutionalised framework. With Defence Policy Group and its four sub-groups — Procurement and Production Group, Joint Technical Group, Military Cooperation Group and Senior Technology Group — it covers entire spectrum of defence cooperation” (Mallik, 2018).

The MOD Annual Report, 2016-2017 informs us that, “Defence cooperation with U.S. was elevated to higher trajectory based on signing of new Framework agreement for India- U.S. defence relationship on June 3, 2015. The U.S. Secretary of Defence, Dr. Ashton Carter visited India from April 11-13, 2016. Raksha Mantri visited USA from August 29- 30, 2016. Secretary Carter visited India again in December 2016. Both countries signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement [LEMOA] in August 2016. U.S. initiative to engage India as a major defence partner is expected to foster greater cooperation in defence industry. Both countries held their first Maritime Security Dialogue, with participation of their Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, in Delhi in May 2016” (MEA, 2018). In October 2020, 3rd bilateral two plus two Ministerial Dialogue (The Statesman, 2018) was held amid India and U.S. in New Delhi and both partners signed the landmark defence pact BECA. The signing of BECA is momentous as it allows India to use universal geospatial maps of U.S. for accuracy of stand-off weapons like cruise and ballistic missiles (News-on-air, 2018) India signing foundational agreements in defence sector (GSOMIA, BECA, LEMOA, COMCASA and ISA) increased bilateral defence trade as did United States designating India as Major Defence Partner in 2016 that elevated India to “Strategic Authorisation Tier 1” status in 2018, by which India can receive license free access to wide range of military and dual use technologies (Vijayalakshmi, 2022). Kamat (2021, 2022) discusses changing contouors of India – U.S. Bilateral relations - perspectives, challenges and prospects of India.

India-U.S. Dialogue Architecture:

There are more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments. The first two meetings of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the level of Extenal Affairs Minister and Minister of State (Commerce & Industry) were held in Washington DC in September 2015 and New Delhi in August 2016. This apex-level dialogue has added commercial component to five traditional pillars of bilateral relations on which the erstwhile Strategic Dialogue of Foreign Ministers had focused, namely: Strategic Cooperation; Energy and Climate Change, Education and Development; Economy, Trade and Agriculture; Science and Technology; and Health and Innovation. The second meeting of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue took place on 30 August 2016 in New Delhi. In addition, there are Ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue) (Kamat, 2021; 2022).

High-Level Dialogue Mechanisms: India and U.S. have more than 50 bilateral inter-governmental dialogue mechanisms for exchange of views on issues of mutual interest. A number of such dialogue mechanisms are held at the Ministerial-level including:

India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue: India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue is led by heads of foreign and defence ministries of India and U.S. Two rounds of this Dialogue have been held so far in September 2018 and December 2019.

India-U.S. Commercial Dialogue: The India-U.S. Commercial Dialogue is led by Minister of Commerce and Industry (CIM) and U.S. Secretary of Commerce. This was last held in Delhi in February 2019.

India – U.S. Economic and Financial Partnership: The India – U.S. Economic and Financial Partnership is led by Finance Minister (FM) and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. This was last held in Delhi in November 2019.

India-U.S. Trade Policy Forum: The India-U.S, Trade Policy Forum is led by CIM and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). This was last held in Washington, D.C. in October 2017.

India-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership: The India-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership is led by Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas and U.S. Secretary of Energy. This was last held in Delhi in April 2018.

India-U.S. Homeland Security Dialogue (HSD): The India-U.S. Homeland Security Dialogue is led by Minister of Home Affairs and Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This was last held in Washington, D.C. in May 2013 (Kamat, 2021; 2022).

India and Biden administration In January 2021, Joseph R. Biden took charge as 46th President of United States of America and during a telephonic conversation held amid President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, US President expressed committing that U.S. and India will work closely together to win the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, renew their partnership on climate change, rebuild global economy in a way that benefits people of both countries and stand together against the scourge of global terrorism. The leaders agreed to continuing close cooperation to promote a free, stable and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity and stronger regional architecture through the Quad (White House, 2021a). President Biden’s earlier policies towards India have remained largely positive. In 2008, as a senator he voted to approve the 2008 nuclear deal that had a huge bearing on India-U.S. relations. He was chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time and had led effort to ratify the agreement, despite having criticised India for carrying out nuclear tests in 1998. In 2013, Vice President Biden had visited India with aim of raising bilateral trade to $ 500 billion. President Trump’s Iran policy put India in a difficult position, while President Biden’s approach is more flexible. India relies on Iran’s crude oil and was left scrambling for energy security after President Trump’s sanctions on Iran. Under Biden, other points of contention between India and U.S., such as issue of data localisation or capping prices of medicines and medical devices have chance of getting towards a resolution. Biden has promised to rejoin Paris Climate Accord and this may help countries such as India (Bhatnagar, 2021; Economic Times, 2021). At the height of Covid – 19, cooperation on vaccines has continued to reflect strength of partnership that involves Indo – Pacific strategy as well. Yet, trade concerns, Russian defence ties to India, differences over nuclear cooperation, impediments in vaccine cooperation are some irritants that continue to impact the relationship. Following Trump, the Biden administration put cooperation with India at heart of its foreign policy in Indo – Pacific. As Biden completes a year in office, Biden administration seems to be poised to rebalance the bilateral relationship away from focus on security issues to include global health, energy and climate change and technology cooperation (Vijayalakshmi, 2022).

Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership

The President of U.S.A., Donald Trump, paid State Visit to India on 24-25 February 2020 at invitation of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi. Giving concrete shape to “Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” was the biggest achievement of this visit for both nations.

As leaders of sovereign and vibrant democracies recognising the importance of freedom, equal treatment of all citizens and a commitment to rule of law, Prime Minister Modi and President Trump vowed to strengthen a India - U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, anchored in mutual trust, shared interests, goodwill and robust engagement of their citizens. They pledged to deepen defence and security cooperation, especially through greater maritime and space domain awareness and information sharing; joint cooperation; exchange of military liaison personnel; advanced training and expanded exercises between all services; closer collaboration on co-development and co-production of advanced defence components, equipment and platforms; and partnership between their defence industries. Noting that a strong and capable Indian military supports peace, stability and a rules-based order in Indo-Pacific and reaffirming his pledge to support transfer to India of advanced U.S. military technology, President Trump reaffirmed India’s status as a Major Defense Partner affording it highest consideration for procurement and technology transfer purposes. They resolved to enhance security of their homelands through cooperation and to jointly fight international crimes like human trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism, drug-trafficking and crimes in cyberspace.

Prime Minister Modi and President Trump recognised increasing importance of trade and investment dimension of India - United States relationship and the need for long-term trade stability that will benefit both American and Indian economies. They welcomed growing links between India and United States in trade and investment in hydrocarbons. Through their Strategic Energy Partnership, India and United States are seeking to enhance energy security, expand energy and innovation linkages across respective energy sectors. They also welcomed endeavour by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for development and launch in 2022 of a joint mission with world’s first dual-frequency Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite. In support of global efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks such as COVID-19, Prime Minister Modi and President Trump committed to continuing their successful efforts in the areas of prevention, early detection and rapid outbreak response (MEA, 2020b).

Strategic Convergence in the Indo-Pacific

A close partnership between India and United States is central to a free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. This cooperation is underpinned by recognition of ASEAN centrality; adherence to international law and good governance; support for safety and freedom of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the seas; unimpeded lawful commerce; and advocacy for peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with international law.

The United States appreciates India’s role as a net provider of security, as well as developmental and humanitarian assistance in Indian Ocean Region. India and United States remain committed to sustainable, transparent, quality infrastructure development in the region and look forward to new partnership between USAID and India’s Development Partnership Administration for cooperation in third countries.

India and United States took note of efforts towards a meaningful Code of Conduct in South China Sea and solemnly urged that it not prejudice legitimate rights and interests of all nations according to international law.

Prime Minister Modi and President Trump decided to strengthen consultation through India-U.S.-Japan trilateral summits; 2+2 Ministerial meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of India and United States; and India-U.S.-Australia-Japan Quadrilateral consultations (MEA, 2020b).

Partnership for Global Leadership

Prime Minister Modi and President Trump committed to working together to strengthen and reform United Nations and other international organisations. President Trump reaffirmed support of United States for India’s permanent membership on a reformed U.N. Security Council and for India’s entry to Nuclear Suppliers Group. Prime Minister Modi and President Trump denounced any use of terrorist proxies and strongly condemned cross-border terrorism in all its forms. They called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks and to expeditiously bring to justice perpetrators of such attacks. They called for concerted action against all terrorist groups (MEA, 2020b).

Advancing “Comprehensive Strategic Global Partnership” – Biden and Modi

President Biden met Prime Minister Modi in White House on 24th September 2021 for their first in-person Leaders’ engagement and charting new course to advance “Strategic Global Partnership” between India and U.S. They affirmed a clear vision that will guide U.S.-India relationship forward: building a strategic partnership and working together with regional groupings, including ASEAN and Quad to promote shared interests in Indo-Pacific region and beyond; developing trade and investment partnership that increases prosperity in both countries; finishing fight against COVID-19 pandemic; galvanising global efforts to scale up climate action; strengthening democratic values and institutions in support of respective peoples; and enhancing people-to-people ties that have made both countries stronger. They expressed deep pride and appreciation about their nations’ close cooperation to fight COVID-19 pandemic over the past year. Having administered hundreds of millions of doses of vaccine to protect their own citizens at home and abroad, they reiterated their commitment to lead global effort to end this pandemic. President Biden welcomed India’s announcement that it will resume exports of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines including to COVAX. The Leaders also hailed finalisation of Memorandum of Understanding on Health and Biomedical Sciences to bolster cooperation on key areas affecting global health, including pandemic preparedness and biomedical research, to reduce risk of future pandemics. Prime Minister Modi welcomed President Biden’s initiative to convene the Global COVID-19 Summit on Ending the Pandemic and Building Back Better to Prepare for the Next, given our shared commitment to combat the Covid-19 pandemic.

Prime Minister Modi welcomed U.S. leadership on climate action, including return of United States to Paris Agreement. President Biden expressed support for Prime Minister Modi’s intention to achieve a domestic goal of installing 450 GW of renewable power by 2030 and acknowledged importance of mobilising finance for investments in renewables, storage, and grid infrastructure that will guarantee clean, reliable power for millions of Indian households. Through two main tracks of Strategic Clean Energy Partnership (SCEP) and Climate Action and Finance Mobilization Dialogue (CAFMD) under U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership, United States and India will accelerate clean energy development and deployment of critical technologies to advance a clean energy transition.

President Biden reaffirmed strength of the defence relationship between United States and India and unwavering commitment to India as a Major Defense Partner through close defence engagements in information sharing, sharing of logistics and military-to-military interactions, strengthening cooperation in advanced military technologies, and expanding engagements in multilateral framework. The Leaders reaffirmed that United States and India stand together in a shared fight against global terrorism, will take concerted action against all terrorist groups, including groups proscribed by the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee, condemned cross-border terrorism, and called for perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai attacks to be brought to justice. They denounced any use of terrorist proxies and emphasised importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist groups which could be used to launch or plan terror attacks. They noted that upcoming U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, Designations Dialogue and renewed U.S. - India Homeland Security Dialogue will further strengthen counterterrorism cooperation between India and United States.

The Leaders resolved that Taliban must abide by UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which demands that Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks and underscored importance of combating terrorism in Afghanistan. They called on Taliban to adhere to all commitments, including safe, secure and orderly departure from Afghanistan of Afghans and all foreign nationals. They called on Taliban to allow full, safe and unhindered access for United Nations, its agencies and all engaged in humanitarian relief activity.

The Leaders further called for urgent implementation of ASEAN Five Point Consensus. The Leaders welcomed increased cooperation under Quad, given their shared vision of a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region with respect to territorial integrity and sovereignty, and international law. In this context, President Biden also reiterated U.S. support for India’s permanent membership on a reformed UN Security Council and for other countries who are important champions of multilateral cooperation and aspire to permanent seats on UN Security Council. He also reaffirmed U.S. support for India’s entry to Nuclear Suppliers Group. They welcomed extension of Statement of Guiding Principles on Triangular Cooperation for Global Development to leverage combined capacities of India and United States to address global development challenges around the world, particularly in Indo-Pacific and Africa. They further discussed how United States and India will work together to set sustainable and transparent rules of the road that will lift economies throughout Indo-Pacific. They noted that movement of highly skilled professionals, students, investors and business travelers between their countries enhances their economic and technological partnership and highlighted importance of resilient and secure supply chains between two countries. The Leaders decided that United States and India must continue and expand their partnership in new domains and many areas of critical and emerging technology – space, cyber, health security, semiconductors, AI, 5G, 6G and future generation telecommunications technology and Blockchain, that will define innovation processes and economic and security landscape of next century. They recognised foundational need to address vulnerabilities and threats in cyberspace, including promote critical infrastructure resilience and welcomed increasing partnerships among governments to counter ransomware and other cyber-enabled crime, including efforts to combat cybercriminals that operate from within their borders. Reflecting shared values and principles, and growing strategic convergence, President Biden and Prime Minister Modi resolved to advance U.S.-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership and looked forward to what United States and India will achieve together (White House, 2021b).

Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership - Way Forward for US – India Bilateral Relations – A Critical Analyses

In recent times, Indo – US relations have witnessed a sea change in their bilateral approaches towards understanding each other and dispelling their existing misperceptions. It was United States which publicly acknowledged India’s potential as a rising power and also reflected in number of their key policy statements that India has the attributes of a responsible player in the international system. India’s credentials are high and it has reached to a position where it can assume the responsibilities of leading the world affairs. More particularly in last two decades, India and United States have experienced robust engagement at every level across Presidencies whether led by ‘Republicans’ or ‘Democrats’. India is perhaps the only country on U.S. radar which has experienced continuity in terms of their foreign policy (Arvind Kumar, 2022). Trade liberalisation matters because deepened two-way trade contributes towards increasing prosperity in both countries and creates enduring stakes in each other’s success (Tellis, 2018). The varying irritants which existed in past have now led to quantum shift in building mutual perceptions. In changing dynamics of geopolitics, where India and U.S. have found convergences on number of pertinent global security issues, including threats from terrorist networks and have committed to robust counter terrorism cooperation shows high degree of commitment in enhancing their mutual understanding. The emerging geopolitical developments have paved the way for bilateral constructive engagement in Indo – US relations with greater focus on strategic domains like nuclear, outer space and emerging technologies. In Biden’s Presidency, there has been continuity of strategic legacy which it inherited and ongoing strategic convergences have boosted India – U.S. ties (Arvind Kumar, 2022).

U.S. and Indian policies are also not congruent in all areas. Becoming global strategic partner would imply India partnering in policies, areas and issues, including in United Nations, on which our interests as a regional power and a developing country differ from those of U.S. as a global power and an advanced economy. The question of U.S. walking the talk in 2022 of India being a global strategic partner suggests that India is ready to be one in all domains, but U.S. is reticent. The reality is that both countries want to retain their freedom of choice in this regard. The U.S. does not want to assume responsibility for India’s Defence, and India is not looking for it either. For U.S. this would mean a fundamental change in its policy towards Pakistan and broadening risks of direct conflict with China. For India, handling of our ties with Russia, which remains our biggest Defence partner, with more long-term relations being built in this area, would become unmanageable. Already Russia-China strategic nexus is becoming stronger. If India and U.S. boost their ties to levels that effectively alliance-like situation develops, strengthening of Russia-China axis could become a response. India has preserved its strategic options fairly effectively by strengthening ties with U.S. without loosening its ties with Russia and looking for ways to broaden those ties in economic domain. India is conducting itself already as a major power, demonstrating its capacity to manage conflicting relationships. India subscribes to Indo-Pacific concept, has deepened its commitment to Quad, has instituted 2+2 dialogues (Foreign and Defence Ministers) with U.S., Japan, Australia and Russia, is developing another Quad with U.S., Israel and U.A.E. and is also member of BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and still participates in Russia-India-China dialogue. This policy is best suited to advance India’s interests as a rising country in whose future all other major powers have some stake. With this policy India can still strengthen its ties with U.S. in areas of mutual interest and benefit. Despite differences, nature of ties with U.S. has changed from mistrust and feelings of grudge to friendly and constructive engagement. A global strategic partnership between U.S. and India means a strong understanding on global issues and a sharing of global responsibilities. If India supports multipolarity, wants a reform of international system hitherto dominated by West, has developing country perspectives in negotiations on various issues confronting international community, wants international inequities to be reduced, such an across-the-board strategic partnership is an unrealistic proposition. What can be achieved and is in process of becoming a reality is closer alignment on issues of shared concern and a non-contentious, continual friendly dialogue on issues on which we still have different perspectives and interests (Sibal, 2022).

The deep and vibrant ties between people of both nations, underpins special bond between U.S. and India and has sustained their partnership for nearly 75 years which has committed them to pursue efforts towards sustainable development, global peace and security. India - U.S. relations have become increasingly multi-faceted, covering cooperation in areas such as trade, defence and security, education, science and technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology, environment and health. The density of these interactions makes clear that U.S. seeks closest possible relationship with India, while remaining respectful of India’s constraints. The partnership still lacks requisite depth. Mitigating this deficit remains key task for both countries in years ahead. The strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi will remain perpetually handicapped if trade relations between two countries remain un-reformed (Kamat, 2022). It is pertinent to assess how Biden Presidency has dealt with India and what does it bode for future of relationship. Is Indo - US partnership resilient to face irritants and continue the trajectory observed so far? Is there scope for widening the partnership? There are strong structural and geopolitical factors that favour intensification of strategic relationship (Vijayalakshmi, 2022).

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