Introduction:
After the end of the Cold War, a vibrant and resource rich region, Latin America opened its horizons in engaging various countries of the world. During the 20th century, the United States regarded Latin America as its strategic sphere of influence and drawing from the Monroe Doctrine (US Department of State 2023), disallowed other nations to play a key role. In the era of globalization, Latin American countries opened in creating active partnerships and diversifying their foreign relations. In this context, it would be important to highlight the roles of China and Russia in Latin America and their various points of engagement. The approaches of China and Russia have certain commonalities such as deepening their economic and strategic engagement and countering the United States in its vicinity. The differences are in terms of levels of engagement, such as China’s engagement is mostly economic in nature while Russia seeks a more strategic aspect to its relations with Latin America.
China aims to deepen its political and strategic ties in addition to advancing its economic goals. In response to US actions in the Taiwan Straits and the Indo-Pacific area, China may potentially aim to oppose the US in its neighbourhood. It wants to separate Taiwan from Latin America on a diplomatic level. China recently inked a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Ecuador, opened diplomatic ties with Honduras, and reached out to Colombia. It came to an arrangement to settle payments for trade transactions in Yuan with Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina. Additionally, it restated support for Argentina's Islas Malvinas claims.
Russia in the current situation seeks to diversify its export and import basket, focussing on Latin America and seeks support in the light of the Ukraine crisis. Except for the Bahamas, Latin American nations have not placed sanctions on Russia. Despite promises from the West to strengthen their arsenals in exchange for military support, nations like Chile, Brazil, and Peru declined to transfer arms to Ukraine. From the standpoint of the Latin American nations, the area aims to diversify its foreign and commercial ties while maintaining access to a steady supply of fertiliser and fuel. Thus, relations between Latin America, China and Russia remain unaffected.
China and its engagement with Latin America
As a rising power, China is active in the Latin American region and poses challenges to the prevalence of the United States. It has adopted measures which while being predominantly economic in nature, includes other areas. Since the 1970s (Chen 2021) with economic modernization and increasing diplomatic recognition, China turned towards Latin America with certain specific interests. Primarily, it focussed on the region’s vast resources and sought to capture its market, which would ensure a steady supply of raw materials for its burgeoning industries and possibilities to export products. China’s interests also encompassed diplomatically restricting Taiwan, which would enable it to isolate it and counter the United States and gain a strong strategic presence.
In 2008 and 2016 (Xinhua 2016) it published two white papers delineating its strategy of engagement with Latin America. Its main focus was on economic partnership and investments in raw materials and strategic resources such as lithium. In 2017 Beijing introduced the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) to the region which has participation from 22 Latin American countries (Myers 2022). In terms of economic engagement, it secures access to raw materials and exports a wide array of commodities such as mechanical and electronic goods, integrated circuits and data processors. While its economic engagement began in a modest way, today China is a leading economic partner to the region. In 2000 for instance bilateral trade was US$ 12 billion which increased to US$ 480 in 2022 (Roy 2023). In the same year while Latin America exported goods worth US$ 184 billion, China exported products worth US$ 265 billion (Albright 2023). China’s trade with the region witnessed a 5 percent increase in the earlier half of 2023 (Xinhua 2023) and 18 percent of Latin America’s global trade is with China (The Economist 2023). This highlights economic inter-dependency with Latin America being rendered as a provider of raw materials.
Apart from direct trade, China is also a leading lender in the region. In terms of Chinese Overseas Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI), it has invested around US$ 12 billion in 2022 alone out of which a majority is concentrated in the extractive sector along with manufacturing and energy sector (Roy 2023). On a similar note, Chinese Policy Banks have made substantial investments with Venezuela being the largest recipient of such loans, followed by Brazil and Ecuador. Loans from Policy Banks are directed towards infrastructure and in the energy sector.
China’s BRI has been implemented in this region since 2017 and it focusses on enhancing cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, logistics, telecommunications and of late it has begun to focus on renewable energy. Under the BRI US$4.2 billion has already been invested in various projects such as the creation of a nuclear plant in Argentina, infrastructure building around the Panama Canal, hydroelectric dams in Ecuador and China intends to invest further US$ 250 billion (Myers 2022) in the next decade under the ambit of the BRI.
However, China’s engagement is not limited to the economic realm and over a period of time it has exhibited strategic dimensions. Based on its economic approaches, China seeks to carve a strategic niche in the region as a direct counter to the United States. Broadly, there are aspects ranging from military engagement, and cooperation in space, technology, and telecommunications. It has focused on a series of interactions between military officials of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and personnel from Latin America. It has conducted military exercises with Peru in 2010, Argentina in 2013 and with the navies of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela in 2017 (Creutzfeld 2023). Chinese arms sale in the region has increased over the years, particularly to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Mexico. However, one of the most controversial features of such arrangements is China’s infiltration with its surveillance technology.
Apart from direct military engagement and sale of armaments, it has also invested in technical cooperation. Research and development, laying focus on the development of clean energy, artificial intelligence and has invested greatly in strategic minerals such as lithium. In terms of space and telecommunications it has engaged countries like Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela. The creation of the China-Brazil Research Satellite, Venezuela Remote Sensing Satellite, the Tupac Katari Satellite of Boliva and the Espacio Lejano Space Station in Argentina are some prime examples of cooperation in this field (Ellis 2020). Chinese telecommunication companies are active in the region and firms such as Shanghai Alcatel Bell, Huawei and ZTE have established bases for operation.
Besides economic and military engagements, China has adopted diplomatic approaches to enhance its position in the region. China has used its soft power, aside from diplomatic exchanges, to advance its interests in the region and project an image of being a responsible partner. Chinese soft power includes its culture, media outreach, and people-to-people diplomacy (Delgado 2023). China has emphasised its development, presenting itself as a counter to Western ideals and capturing convergences with Latin America.
In Latin America, there are around 44 Confucius Institutes and 18 related organisations; Chinese language is taught in a number of these institutions; and Beijing has provided funding for a number of cultural and educational initiatives. Under the China-CELAC plan, scholarships are given to academics and students; in 2022, almost 6,000 scholarships were given out. China has also made investments in the region's medical diplomacy, tourism, and cross-cultural exchanges (He 2019). China has placed significant importance on cultivating relationships with diverse parts of Latin American society and political organisations when it comes to public outreach. To further Chinese interests, it holds meetings with the assistance of specific organisations. Chinese media outlets that broadcast in vernacular languages include China Daily, Xinhua, and CGTN.
China's diplomatic strategies aim to deepen strategic cooperation, strengthen economic ties, and isolate Taiwan. In addition to bilateral interactions, China participates in multilateral organisations like AIIB, CELAC, OAS, CARICOM, and IADB. In the 1970s and 1980s, ideology dominated the formation of relationships, particularly with administrations that leaned left. Diplomatic contacts have increased since China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001; since 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has made eleven trips to the area (Ellis 2022). China then shifted its attention from ideological foundations to strategic and economic ones.
Since 2007, it has succeeded in convincing a number of nations to transfer their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China as it works closely with its allies to uphold the "One China" policy. China's economic might and sway are important contributors to these developments. Taiwan now has just Paraguay, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia as allies after Nicaragua and Honduras became China's newest allies (Ellis 2018). This not only impacts Taiwan, but it also calls into question US dominance in the area.
Despite China’s engagement with the region there are certain shortcomings. Even with these extensive economic ties, some areas deserve special attention. Due to their negative effects on the environment, several projects, such the Ituango Hydroelectric dam in Colombia, the Las Bambas mining operations in Peru, and hydrocarbon exploration in Ecuador and Bolivia, have sparked protests from local and indigenous people. In response, nations like Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil implemented measures like ecological assessment and prior consultation. China has promulgated rules for stakeholder discussions and dialogues aimed at promoting the adoption of environmentally sustainable practices. There are, nevertheless, implementation gaps, and local support for the Chinese projects is still not entirely assured (Koop 2023). Also, there is no incentive for economic diversification because loans and investments are mostly focused in extractive and energy sectors. The Chinese projects have little effect on employment creation as well because they mostly target low-skilled labourers. Furthermore, a number of nations, like Ecuador, Suriname, and Guyana, are financially fragile because China is the primary beneficiary of a sizable amount of their external debt (Myers & Ray 2023).
China's strategic participation in Latin America is not without constraints, though. Despite building deep-water ports and aiming to establish a Joint Military Training Complex in Cuba, China's lack of military outposts is notable (Mural 2018). Access to a wide range of armaments and partners fits well with the military needs of Latin American nations. They do not, however, want to participate in the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. China's influence in Latin America is strategically limited, as seen by its inability to forge deep strategic cooperation such as security pacts.
Russia and its engagement with Latin America
Russia has been actively seeking to strengthen ties with Latin America. In order to demonstrate its global political and economic engagement, get around sanctions, and diversify its supply chains, Russia is looking to rekindle its ties with a number of nations, including Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Brazil, in light of the ongoing Ukraine crisis and the economic sanctions imposed by Western nations. To strengthen connections, it has attempted to concentrate on enhancing commerce and strategic cooperation. In an effort to improve ties, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov travelled to Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua in April 2023. Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasised the need of multipolarity and the continuation of mutually beneficial partnerships throughout his discussions (TASS 2023).
Russia's involvement in the area dates back to the Cold War, when it solidified ties with Cuba and a few other nations. Ideology was a major factor during this time. However, its involvement was curtailed once the Soviet Union fell apart and the Cold War ended, as the newly formed Russian Federation concentrated more on its near vicinity. It changed from its prior ideologically focused participation in the 2000s when it recognised the importance of developing ties through diplomatic, strategic, and economic methods. Since then, its outreach has increased. Russia has excellent economic ties with Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Ecuador, but its military and geopolitical ties are stronger with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Russia today exports a significant amount of coal, fertilisers, and petroleum and its by-products, while it imports a sizable number of agricultural products and other raw materials from the area (Rouvinski 2017). It is important to remember that the foundation of the region's ties, especially with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, is military and strategic collaboration.
Currently, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are Russia's top trading partners, accounting for about US$12 billion of bilateral commerce with Latin American nations. In 2016, there was around US $4.3 billion in bilateral commerce; this rise in data can be due to increased trade in fertilisers, agricultural items, machinery, and petroleum products. Fertilisers, iron and steel, and mineral fuels are among Russia's principal exports to the area (Ellis 2022). Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, and Argentina are Russia's principal trading partners, making for 60% of its exports and 68% of its imports. Conversely, Latin America exports soy, oilseeds, cattle meat, and agricultural products. Although Latin America makes up 2 percent of Russia's overall international trade, in 2022 Russia will make up 0.64 percent of all foreign trade in Latin America. Russia's trading habits with nations in Latin America are quite variable. For example, iron and steel are significant components of commerce between Mexico and Russia, whereas fertilisers play a significant role in bilateral trade between Brazil and Russia (Yana 2023).
Due to its 2012 late arrival into the World trading Organisation and its predominance in its immediate neighbourhood, Russia's trading with the region is restricted in comparison to China. Other reasons for constrained commercial links include logistical problems, physical isolation, and rivalry from nations like China, Japan, and the US.
Russia's overall direct investment in the region does not exceed US $40 billion until 2022, making it a low investment relative to China and the US. Peru receives US $15 million in investments from Russia, followed by Ecuador and Brazil with US $9 million and Colombia with US $6 million. The majority of these investments are made in industries that extract minerals, oil, and gas. For example, Russian investments in the oil and gas sector in Venezuela, which has the highest proven worldwide oil reserves, total more than US$ 4 billion by 2022. Russia's energy corporations, including Rosneft, Zarubezhneft, Lukoil, and Gazprom, are involved in the energy industry in nations including Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Similarly, US$1.5 billion has been invested by Russia in Ecuador's oil and gas industry (Kuznetsov. A.V. 2023).
Russia has agreements with the Dominican Republic, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic to further cooperation in civilian nuclear energy. As of 2015, Russia has been planning to construct a nuclear power station in Argentina, although it has already finished testing a nuclear reactor for Bolivia that can run at higher altitudes (Pelcastre 2023).
In addition, there are investments in Guyana, Jamaica, Peru, and the automotive, information technology, and aerospace industries. Since 2014, there has been a slow but steady increase in investments in the chemical industry, especially in Brazil, Guyana, and Jamaica; nevertheless, aside from Nicaragua, there is no notable presence in industries like telecommunications.
Russia's military collaboration with several Latin American nations is a key component of its involvement in the area. Russia views the area as a counterbalance to NATO's actions in Europe, which are spearheaded by the US and which it believes are harmful to Russian interests. It is possible to view military cooperation as a venture that helps Russian businesses economically and fosters ties with other nations whose interests diverge from the US's. Notably, Russia has established strong military connections with three main nations: Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua (Farah & Richardson 2022). Russia's overt military actions include joint military drills, equipment upgrades, service contracts, the sale and expansion of military hardware, and the training of military personnel from Latin American nations. Information dominance and cyber capabilities are also included in this.
In addition to these three nations, Russia has also had some interaction with Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and other nations. The total amount of arms sales from Russia in 2022, including equipment upgrades, exceeds $4 billion USD (Ramani 2021). Russian sales of weaponry in the area include everything from assault rifles and small guns to highly specialised weapons like fighter planes and helicopters. In addition to carrying out naval drills in 2013 and 2018, Russia sent two TU-160 bombers and carried out military drills with Venezuela in 2008. The Russian naval training ship Perekop visited Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in July 2023 to carry out exercises with their respective navies. In order to increase bilateral strategic and military cooperation, the defence ministers of Cuba and Russia met in Moscow in June 2023 (Ellis 2023). Russia also hopes to establish a permanent military presence in Cuba, similar to what happened in Nicaragua, where several Russian military personnel have been enrolled in training programmes since 2014 (MFA 2023).
However, political upheaval in Latin America remains the primary barrier to military cooperation. For example, talks were underway on the transfer of Su-24 fighter aircraft to Argentina; however, the agreement collapsed with the election of Mauricio Macri, a conservative, to the presidency of the Argentine Republic. Similarly, Jair Bolsonaro's administration in Brazil faced challenges in cultivating relations with Russia due to the country's close proximity to Venezuela. Cuba continued to be Moscow's only significant ally, despite the former USSR having diplomatic ties with the majority of the nations in Latin America during the Cold War. Ideology was less important in the post-Cold War era, with a greater emphasis placed on forging alliances with nations that held opposing views to the US. In order to strengthen its position, Russia also seized the chance to interact with nations in the area diplomatically and economically (Tarasenko 2022). Russia's ambitions in Latin America were rekindled in 1997 during a visit by Yevgeny Primakov, the country's foreign minister at the time. Russia steadily increased its engagement with these nations in a more multipolar world, particularly after 2004, in order to establish itself as a geopolitical counterweight to the US.
Bilateral diplomatic ties have been more intense since 2008. Examples of high-level visits that have occurred since 2008 include those to Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru in 2014, and to Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua in 2010. The Russian Federation's Concept of Foreign Policy for 2023 mentions a multipolar world and active cooperation between Russia and Latin America as one of its components, building on the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia's commitment to fortify bilateral relations with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, Russia sees keeping friendly ties in Latin America as a way to broaden its foreign policy relationships and acquire strategic depth close to the US (Green 2023).
Outside of formal diplomatic ties, Russian media outlets like Sputnik and Russia Today are highly involved in the area, providing news and information about Russia and creating narratives that support Moscow and its supporters in Latin America. In the area, Telesur and HispanTV are actively partnered with Russia Today and Sputnik.
Conclusion
It is evident that China and Russia have entrenched their position in Latin America, although in this case China’ success is clearer. The Latin American countries, in a bid to recast their foreign policy options look forward in developing relations. For these countries, access to economic benefits is of prime concern, while for Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba military and strategic cooperation is also a main theme. Russia’s main concerns are related to its gradual international isolation, circumventing West sponsored sanctions and access to the international market. It has stressed more on military and strategic cooperation with Latin America countries and on multipolarity in a bid to diminish the influence of the West. China on the other hand, as adopted a strong economic approach followed by its diplomatic and strategic overtures. In this process, it not only seeks to influence the influence of the United States in Latin America, but also challenges its global presence. China’s presence in the region is certainly a cause of concern for the United States. While Russia’s major drawback is its inability to engage these countries comprehensively on the basis of economic relations, China’s obscure engagements on many counts has at times proved to be a drawback. Latin America’s preference is rather restricted to economic and political engagement and diversifying their relations without willing to encamp on any side, in the era of strategic competition.
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