India and China are not friends for four key reasons: Deep seated differences over their perceptions of each other, their territorial perimeters, and their strategic partnerships with big powers, as well as asymmetry of power between them. Negative perceptions of each other and profound differences over their perimeters are compounded by the fact that they have not been strategic partners. They have both partnered Soviet Union / Russia and U.S. at various times but never have been in partnership with each other. There is a power- gap between them.

India and China are also divided by number of other differences. Growing Chinese influence among India’s other neighbours in South Asia; India’s coalition building with Japan and Vietnam in China’s backyard; their diplomacy in other parts of the world and in multilateral forums; international status seeking by both powers; India’s huge trade deficit with China; Chinese dam building on Yarlung Tsangpo / Brahmputra river. They are additional points of friction driven by four more basic causes. Differences over perimeters – the borderlands and Tibet are at heart of much of India - China conflict. If India and China had been partners internationally, they would have a history of strategic collaboration to draw on to balance against their negative perceptions of each other and their conflicts in the perimeters. The moments of diplomatic convergence have been ephemeral and the two leaderships, civil and military have lacked robust structures of trust and communication. Also, India has increasingly fallen behind China, in terms of economic, military and soft power. Economic power-gap is tremendous and insurmountable in foreseeable future. Negative mutual perceptions, differences over perimeters, rival partnerships, power-asymmetry affect each other. These four drivers of conflict are intertwined and they magnify each other and make conflict more complex.

The crisis in Ladakh in 2020 showed how quickly India – China differences can turn violent. Indian analysts are still trying to understand why Chinese troops moved into areas in Ladakh, particularly in Galwan area that had been peaceful since 1962. Was the crises triggered by Chinese perceptions that series of Indian policies were attempts by an ‘inferior’ power to embarrass China? Was it due to continuing differences over perimeters and Chinese worries over Indian infrastructure expansion? Was it Beijing’s response to Delhi’s increasing strategic partnership with Washington? Was it a demonstration of power in consonance with China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo – Pacific with Taiwan, Japan, Southeast Asia and Australia? It is too early to tell but India – China relations always seem to be framed by combination of these four elements. What is future of mutual perceptions, differences over perimeters, rival partnerships and power - gap? Does the future look positive or negative?

If India and China are to mend their relations and deal with other differences, their deeply rooted negative perceptions of each other have to change. Beyond India’s and China’s long – standing tensions over their perimeters is the question of their strategic partnership with Great Powers. India has drifted closer to U.S. to balance China, while China has partnered Russia to balance U.S. India has signed three foundational military agreements with U.S. since 2002. The fourth one, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) was signed in October 2020. These allow for access to each other’s intelligence, secure communication, logistical facilities and U.S. surveillance systems. India is associated with Quad and agrees that Quad with U.S., Australia, Japan should be held at ministerial level. China is suspicious of India’s partnership with U.S. and thinks India is working with Quad powers to ‘encircle’ China.

What is future of China’s power and its role in international system? Will it challenge and surpass U.S. to become the global hegemon? Martin Jacques in his book When China rules the World, argues inevitability of Chinese hegemony. Aaron L. Friedberg in his book A Contest for Supremacy thinks Chinese hegemony is not inevitable. He sees a struggle for mastery in Asia and concludes that U.S. with various partners can balance China. Michael Pillsbury in his book The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower argues that U.S. still has a chance to stop Chinese hegemony.

All three analysts share more or less conventional view that China is likely to overtake U.S. Contrarian views have been expressed by Micheal Beckley in his 2016 book Unrivalled: Why America Will Remain the Sole Superpower. In 2020, he published an article in U.S. Journal Foreign Affairs, titled ‘Rogue Superpower: Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century’ where he gives his argument why China will not match U.S. in twenty-first century, which is based on demography and automation. Broad conclusion about China’s place in the world is that it will continue to strengthen but will not be dominant. U.S. is likely to remain number one in comprehensive national power even if not in strict GDP terms. The world will be bipolar, with two more or less equal Great Powers.

The challenge for India in its dealings with China is clear. The negative perceptions of each other’s societies, border quarrels, questionable reliability of U.S. as partner suggest that power balance is most dynamic element in India – China relationship. It is one thing that India can change by its own policies and choices. One key element of power is desire for power. It requires a systematic social effort by the government to ‘produce’ the power.

India’s China challenge is fourfold: the political challenge of dealing with a one-party state, which is keen to offer its authoritarian-capitalist model to the world and shape global institutions in line with its own values. The military challenge of managing an unresolved border which is manifested in India’s difficult diplomatic and military engagement with China. The economic challenge of learning both from China’s remarkable and unique growth story and navigating an increasingly lopsided economic relationship driven by Indian dependencies on Chinese manufacturing and building a closer relationship. Tying the four challenges together is the greatest challenge: the conceptual challenge of reassessing how we think about and engage with our most important neighbour.

New Delhi was unwilling to question assumptions about U.S. being principal external challenge for India, reliability of Russia and benign nature of Chinese power. It was only after China blocked India’s entry in Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2016 and confrontation with China at Doklam Plateau in summer of 2017 that there was rethinking on nature of Chinese power, consequences of Beijing’s expanding economic and political influence in the subcontinent as well as Indian Ocean, and threats from China’s growing weight in international institutions. After China responded to Indian move of changing constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 by raising question in United Nations Security Council and its aggression in Ladakh sector in summer of 2020, there was little room left for ambivalence about Chinese power and unprecedented problems it poses for India. Thanks to rapidity of China’s rise in twenty-first century, New Delhi’s power differential with Beijing has become massive. Although Washington has extended much support for India in coping with Chinese aggression and Russia continues to sell arms to India, New Delhi once again finds itself in tricky place among great powers. As India rises, questions will be asked as to what kind of power it will be. It is also something that Indians should be asking of themselves.

India is yet to develop soft, hard and social infrastructure for determined, responsible pursuit of power if it wants to catch up with China. Soft infrastructure consists of ideas, data, rules, laws and other politico-administrative structures that allow for mobilisation of people and their coordination towards collective goals. Hard infrastructure consists of material elements of power – mass education facilities, health care, skilled population, energy, transport, agricultural and industrial capabilities, communication and computing systems, science and technology and military capabilities. A country that wants to attain power globally must also have social infrastructure which means a population that has been emancipated from feudal servitude, which means radical political reforms and a society which has changed from substantially rural to largely urban, reducing inequalities. To reduce power – gap with China, these are huge challenges which need to be dealt with quickly. Indian strategic thought most notably Kautilya’s writings, underline importance of Sama, Dana, Danda and Bheda (alliance, compensation, force and trickery) as ways of approaching political challenges. How does India straddle the dilemma? India will have to come up with its own set of answers and will have to show a mix of fortitude, creativity and perseverance. Building and maintaining alliances may be one avenue of influence but accessing technology and utilising knowledge of others is no less effective, particularly in case against stronger opponents, a strategic predicament to which India today needs to give more thought. Those who advocate strengthening comprehensive national power are certainly right. India will have to take a call on its own narratives. A society that would soon be most populous and prominent in its economic size cannot be without its message. As global architecture opens up and India’s own capabilities strengthen, it has greater freedom than in past to organise its rise.

The road ahead for India is not impossible. We are now at cusp of change. With more confidence, pursuit of seemingly divergent goals and straddling of contradictions are being attempted. Taking risks is inherent to realisation of ambitions. A nation that has aspiration to become a leading power cannot continue with unsettled borders and under exploited opportunities and cannot be dogmatic in approaching a changing global order. Deep fundamental changes are required – almost a civilisational change, moving forward to a society that is more equal, experimental and ecological, which are essential attributes of a society which that wants to accrue power in twenty – first century. As Indians prepare for greater contributions, they must rely on their own traditions to equip them in facing a tumultuous world. That is certainly possible in India that is now more Atmanirbhar Bharat. As we make our choices in a world of all against all, it is time to come up with our own answers. The world that awaits us not only calls for fresh thinking but a new consensus as well. Putting dogmas behind us is a starting point for that journey. Changing global discourse in its favour is also essential at this time. But end goal of ‘Many friends, few foes, great goodwill, more influence’, even in a volatile world is clear, which must be achieved through the India way. India’s recent turn to realism has its task cut out.

Articles in this edition of the Journal examine various dimensions of Diplomacy and Security related issues.

References:

Ananth Krishnan (2020). India’s China Challenge – A Journey through China’s Rise and What it Means for India. Noida: HarperCollins Publishers.

Bajpai, K. (2021). India versus China – Why They Are Not Friends. New Delhi: Juggernaut Books.

Baru, S. and Sharma, R. (Eds,) (2021). A New Cold War – Henry Kissinger and Rise of China. Noida: HarperCollins Publishers.

Beckley, M. (2016). Unrivalled: Why America Will Remain the Sole Superpower. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Beckley, M. (2020). Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century. Foreign Affairs, 99 (6), 73 – 86.

Friedberg, A.L. (2011). A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. New York: W.W. Norton.

Jacques, M. (2009). When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Order. New York: Penguin Random House.

Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India Way – Strategies for an Uncertain World. Noida: HarperCollins Publishers.

Pillsbury, M. (2016). The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. New York: St. Martin’s.

Editorial Board

Adv. S. N. Desai

Lt. Gen. (Dr.) D. B. Shekatkar

Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri

Dr. Seshadri Chari

Shri. Nitin Gokhale

Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Dr.Uttara Sahasrabudhe

Prof. Dr.Shrikant Paranjpe

Prof. Dr.Manish Srivastav

Prof. Dr.Dattesh Parulekar