Background
At the peak of the Cold War, drones like Firebee were used in Vietnam for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions1. Endurance of Firebee was seventy-five minutes. Modern drones, on the other hand, can remain in the sky for long hours and perform tasks that a manned military aircraft can do. Drones like Harop are designed to perform Kamikaze (suicide) missions. It can loiter over targets for hours and provide intelligence before performing offensive action. Modern drones are armed with sophisticated guided missiles. Besides, drones, with the ability to land and take off from surface vessels, can be a game-changer for maritime forces2.
Drones in the business
With the advancement of technology, unmanned systems have become attractive option for short and limited conflicts. Almost all countries in the northern hemisphere are seeking armed drones3. Without the capacity to develop Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) domestically, countries have turned to China, Israel, Turkey or the United States for procurement.
American Predator drone has been operational since 1995. The United States has been using weaponized UAVs for nearly two decades. In 2000, the US Predator drone helped identify Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. However, it was not weaponized at that time for offensive action. The incident intensified development of weapons carrying UAVs4. Today’s UAVs can carry sniper attacks on individuals or a group of people5.
Israel, a major exporter of UAVs, sold Harpy drones (loitering drones meant to perform kamikaze strikes) to China in 1994 for around $55 million6. From 2005 to 2013, Israel exported $4.6 billion worth of UAVs to Europe, Asia, America7. Israel exports drones to 56 countries, while the United States and China export UAVs to 55 and 37 countries respectively8.
India recently bought 50 Heron UAVs from Israel. India is also exploring MQ-9 Reaper drones from the US. Indigenous Rustom II developed by DRDO, a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) combat drone is in the testing phase. India is the top buyer of drones as indigenous drones are in the development and testing phase9.
Drones in conventional frontline warfare
While drones have been the choicest weapon for covert and ISR operations, successful use of UAV in frontline operations in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh has changed the dimensions of limited conflict. These events have propelled countries to integrate drones in their conventional war tactics.
The United States used drone strikes against ‘technologically weaker’ terror groups such as Hakkani network and ISIS. These insurgent elements did not have the air defence network that a modern nation-state would have.
In this context, use of drones in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh is crucial on four parameters – cost, technology, firepower, tactical edge in the battlefield.
Operation Spring Shield
Earlier in 2020, Turkey deployed Bayraktar TB2 and satellite-linked ANKA-S UAVs against Syrian ground forces in operation ‘Spring Shield’10. In the operation, Turkey claimed its drone strikes and artillery fires had eliminated more than hundred armoured vehicles and artillery systems. This was the first major UAV offensive by one military against another military in an operational theatre. Turkey used UAV for reconnaissance, targeting, aerial engagement, destruction of enemy’s air defences and ground assets.
The Turkish offensive has been largely carried out using drone-launched missiles and precision artillery strikes with UAVs flying forward as artillery spotters. Intelligence provided by drones enhanced precision of artillery strike against conventional military formations.
Turkey was also able to engage conventional airpower with drones as UAVs flew in swarms to overwhelm and destroy Syrian air defence systems. Multipronged tactical use of UAVs provided Turkey decisive edge in the battlefield.
Turkish side lost three ANKA-S drones that were shot down by Syrian air defence and man-portable air-defence systems. Video posted on social media showed what appeared to be the wreckage of four Turkish UAS (3 Bayraktar TB2s and 1 Anka-S).
An additional Anka-S was probably shot down on 25 February and two other Bayraktars were downed in Syria in February before Spring Shield11. Losing four to six drones was a marginal cost against operational victory. Operation Spring Shield was the first live demonstration of Turkish drone power. The military operation turned out to be a perfect commercial for Turkey’s drone business. Since then Ankara’s drone export is growing rapidly12. In June 2020, Azerbaijan and Turkey reached an agreement to buy Turkish drones.
Azerbaijan and Armenia
Azerbaijan and Israel have long-standing military cooperation on numerous areas of the defence industry. Israel is Azerbaijan’s largest weapon supplier with $4.85 billion in sales during 2016 alone13.
Azerbaijan deployed Combat drones from Turkey and Israel against Armenia. UAVs provided Azerbaijan air superiority at a lesser cost. The Armenian air defence inventory consists of Russian made mobile SAM systems such as long-range S-300 and medium-range 2K11 Krug surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The quantitative data about Armenian air defence is not very clear.
Armenia, Azerbaijan share a 1000km long border. Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact is 200KM long. The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in the South-west is an autonomous territory of Azerbaijan. Sandwiched between these two geographies, Armenian SAM systems are spread over a long territory. It is unlikely that there were effective concentrations of overlapping air defence batteries to create a credible air defence network. Without overlapping SAM network, standalone SAM systems will be very effective and could become easy target.
Armenian air defence
Armenian air defence consists of Russian and Soviet-era SAM systems. Soviet-era Strela-10 is a mobile, visually aimed, optical/infrared-guided, low-altitude, short-range surface-to-air missile system with a 5KM maximum target destruction range. The Armenian Air Defense deployed Strela-10 missile systems during the conflict.
Video released by Azerbaijani military showed that several Armenian Strela-10 and 9K33 Osa vehicles were destroyed by Bayraktar TB2 armed drones.
The Osa SAM, designed in 1972, is not capable of identifying small drones due to small radar signatures. With a range of 15KM, Osa SAM can be outranged by missiles carried by drones or by loitering ammunition. Osa is not capable of handling bidirectional threats effectively.
Systems such as the S30014 (older version of S400) are expensive against cheap drones as each S300 missile costs over a million dollars. Engaging drones with S300 will also expose the location of its surveillance radar. In such scenario, adversary can use drone swarms or Kamikaze drones to destroy air defences like S300, prior to launching conventional manned air offensive.
Armenia recently acquired Russian Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems, capable of handling UAVs. However Pantsir-S systems were destroyed by Azerbaijani forces.
The Pantsir system is equipped with up to twelve 57E6 missile15 and two 30mm 2A38M cannons. The system can engage four targets simultaneously. The 57E6 is a two-stage missile with radio-command guidance and 20 kg blast-fragmentation warhead. A variant of the 57E6, the 9M335, features a continuous-rod fragmentation warhead.
Using 57E6 missiles, the Pantsir-S1 can engage drones at a maximum range of 20 km and altitude of 10 km, subsonic cruise missiles at a range of 12 km and altitude of 6 km, and high-speed air-to-ground missiles at a range of 7 km and altitude of 6 km. At targets perpendicular to the system’s orientation, missile engagement ranges are halved. The 57E6 has a minimum engagement range of 1.5km. Using its guns, the Pantsir-S1 can engage airborne targets at 4 km at a maximum altitude of 3km. Each gun can fire up to 40 rounds per second and has a secondary capability to attack ground targets.
The Pantsir is designed to deal with drones. It has guns which can cost-effectively deal with very cheap drones and it can intercept suicide drones. It also has fairly cheap missiles which can deal with small and medium-sized drones from a decent distance. However, Pantsir systems were successfully destroyed in Syria both by Turkey and Israel. Advanced jamming systems and drone swarms can overwhelm Pantsir which cost $14 million.
The Pantsir system, which is designed to tackle drones, is not effective against drone warfare. Russia understands that its air defence system did not detect low-speed targets. Russia investing in upgrading its air defence system to tackle drone attacks. However, the bottleneck is the cost to eliminate enemy UAV against the replacement cost of that UAV for the enemy. Drones with lower replacement cost will significantly reduce deterrence of air defence systems. Russian Pantsir costs about $14 million. While the standalone price of a Bayraktar UAV is approximately $3 million. 23 Pantsair systems were destroyed in Libya and Syria16.
In Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia lost two S300 air defence systems. In total, Armenia lost 18 air defence systems worth $485 million17. Furthermore, loss of combat vehicles, tanks, radars, howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems, and electronic warfare systems destroyed by armed drones cost approximately $515million. Azerbaijan lost two Bayraktar TB2 drones worth $6 million in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
What unmanned systems offer?
The best part about UAV is that it is unmanned. The moment you put human in the machine, the system loses design and operational flexibility.
Furthermore, unmanned systems are best suitable for long-endurance missions with the heavily defended targets that are riskier for manned missions.
Countries with lower defence spending can enhance airpower by spending more on drones instead of costly manned combat aircraft. As technology is improving, low-cost drones will storm the skies as well as seas. With sizable numbers, small and medium combat UAVs are cost-effective boost to the country’s air capabilities on the tactical front-line with limited escalation.
Self-reliance in manufacturing low cost, fast replaceable drones (like ammunition) is the need of the hour to effectively utilise drone power.
The UAVs are capable of providing real-time operational intelligence with dual ability to engage enemy targets on the battlefield for a long duration without being detected. UAVs with loitering ability can provide immediate firepower in remote and unreachable areas.
Drones are best suited for anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments. Undetected, UAVs can reach targets without jeopardising human lives. Unmanned systems are a critical component of network-centric warfare.
The drone swarm tactic makes it possible to detect and destroy enemy air-defence systems. Cost-effective and efficient countermeasures are needed to counter the threat of drone attack from nation-state as well as terrorist groups.
Drones have a detrimental effect on the psychology of soldiers, as they are unaware of the direction of the next attack. The Nagorno Karabakh incident showed that soldiers didn’t feel secure in their safe zones with drones loitering in the sky. Detrimental psychological effect can reach civil society as in the case of Armenia18.
Drones are able to achieve a tangible result without the risk of human engagement. It is advantageous that future warfare will limits human losses by allowing machines to perform missions that would have involved troops or human pilots. This advantage will provide major impetus for the coming revolution in remote warfare.
Drones may not completely replace the manned strike force in the near future. Perhaps, the combination of manned and unmanned systems in close coordination could be a key to superior hard power projection capabilities not just in the sky but also on land and ocean. In such coordinated scenarios, a drone can be sacrificed to save life of a human operator in a manned system.
Challenges Posed By Drone Technology
Twenty-first-century drones offer wide capabilities including stealth at a much lower price. It is not that they are invincible war machines. Perhaps, kinetic air defence systems are a relatively costly countermeasure against small and medium drones. The weak link among these advanced drones could be its remote connectivity and electronics suites as in case of American RQ-170 Sentinel drone lost over Iranian airspace19.
Hacking is a critical threat to remote-controlled unmanned military systems as there is no human operator onboard for manual control of the aircraft. Nation-states and even terrorist organisations can spoof and manipulate singles to take control of the drone and eventually reverse engineer its technology.
The relatively low cost of UAVs has allowed smaller nations and even terrorist groups to develop offensive drone capabilities of varying degrees. For countries, low cost also translates into lowered risk of operational loss as compared to expensive manned aircraft. Countries that could have been able to afford a couple of modern costly fighter jets can easily augment air-power with UAVs. Also, higher numbers (swarms) can change the outcome of the operation.
Deployment of drones is making airpower more rewarding for its user and riskier for defending side. UAVs are becoming a dilemma for the air defence not just at the frontline but also at crucial civilian, military and strategic infrastructure such as airports, oil refineries etc; as cheaply made drones can jeopardize a billion-dollar system. In 2017, Saudi Arabia launched a $2 million Patriot Surface to Air missile to protect its oil installation against a crude drone20. A $2 million sophisticated countermeasure against a $15 thousand drone is a very costly affair. Apart from that, financial losses due to drone attacks were in the millions per day for Saudi Arabia21. Furthermore, the attack on the Saudi oil facility poses a big question about the accuracy of advanced air defence systems against drone swarms and loitering ammunition.
Drones and drone swarms put a question mark on the utility and cost-effectiveness of air defence systems. With great cost disadvantages against economically and militarily strong defenders, terrorist groups as well as nations (with power disparity) could effectively utilise drones to overwhelm the advanced air defences.
It would be too risky to deny the possibility of an unmanned terrorist attack in the future. Such attacks can achieve psychological impact similar to 9/11 New York or 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.
Strong airpower (offensive and defensive) was a function of financial might and technological superiority. However, with drones that equation is in question. With drones, even small terror groups can possess crude but damaging air-power and sophisticated systems may not be effective against these crude drone bombs. Dirty bombs (small tactical nuclear weapons) launched through crude small drones are a real threat.
In 2004 Hezbollah first used drones to conduct reconnaissance and to carry explosives over the border into Israel22. Use of drones by terrorist groups in parts of India, especially in Kashmir is not farfetched thinking. The terrorist attack via drones could have a devastating impact.
Uncertainty and shock of drone strike have a psychological impact on people’s minds as a 12-year-old child told the US Congress that “I no longer love blue skies. In fact, I now prefer grey skies. The drones do not fly when the skies are grey”.23 Deployment of armed drones has created immense hatred towards the United States in Iraq, North Waziristan and Yemen.
Lesson From Unmanned Warfare
Turkey has emerged as an epicentre of drone warfare. Its focus on developing indigenous defence industry has paid off well. An interesting lesson from Turkey’s defence indigenisation is that it did not try to develop every military technology. Its focus remained very much on drone technology to tackle its security challenges effectively. A solution centric investment in defence technology will be a game-changer for any country aiming for self-reliance in defence.
The growing defence exchange between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan is a point of scrutiny. Turkey’s drone industry is rapidly expanding with new orders from abroad. In future, Pakistan can be the next buyer for Turkish drones and its experience in drone warfare. China is also providing Pakistan with 50 cheaper ($1 million) Wing Loong 2 armed drones24, which has seen action in Libya. 13 Wing Loong drones were shot down in Libya.
Shoulder launched Stinger missiles changed the dynamics of war in Afghanistan in favour of Taliban against all-powerful Soviet force, similarly, drones are posing a potent danger against a conventionally superior force.
India has developed strategic weapons as well as a few conventional systems. However, the future of warfare may not be conventional or strategic. In all probability future warfare would be unmanned and connected with the backbone of artificial intelligence and robotics in all three fundamental terrains of warfare – land, air and ocean. So the discussion about unmanned aerial systems will not be sufficient for India. As India faces complex threats in all three terrains over vast geography. In such scenarios, developing aerial and maritime autonomous platforms would be crucial.
Evolving nuclear powered submersible platform into an unmanned drone carrier will provide India with an agile offensive system without any range limitation. Such unmanned nuclear-powered platforms can eliminate constraints of manned aircraft carriers.
Low-cost electronic countermeasures (instead of kinetic) are key against drone offensive. Indian electronics companies can deliver on that front.
Another advantage of unmanned systems is its dual utility; drones are useful in the war as well as for commercial purposes. Commercial drones services are growing at 55% CAGR. Drones are becoming an integral part of environmental monitoring, photography, films, journalism, agriculture, construction, mining, and logistics etc.
Makers of military drones are also expanding into commercial drones such as air taxis. Turkish Bayker, makers of Bayraktar TB2 military drone, tested a prototype flying car named ‘Cezeri’.
Robotics, autonomous systems, AI have military utility. However, it’s commercial and industrial utility goes into hundreds of billions. Development of the defence industry in this sector will also spur the modern commercial industry underpinned by these technologies. The broad commercial utility of unmanned systems will reduce sole dependence on defence contracts for manufacturers. Drones and autonomous systems would be the next big thing after the internet revolution. It could be a low hanging fruit for India with the availability of human resources and industries that can deliver.
India needs to consider challenges and opportunities offered by evolution in warfare while investing in future defence systems. As the country faces tactical as well as strategic threats, focused investment in cyber and electronic countermeasures will have its advantage along with indigenous industry for unmanned systems. Perhaps, aerial, land-based and amphibious autonomous systems are key to future conflicts in our geographically vast region.
References
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