Executive Summary

India, a rising global power remains to be a country with porous borders, surrounded by hostile nations who have for decades, attempted to weaken India’s position as a powerful nation. While on one hand India has to tackle the threat of Chinese economic and military hegemony, there is Pakistan on the other hand which has for more than 75 years continued to bleed India with a thousand cuts.

The wide, deep-rooted network of terrorist organisations in Pakistan has conducted some of the deadliest attacks in India. This research essay delves into the organisational structure of two UN designated terrorist organisations, namely Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which continue to thrive on India’s struggle in maintaining peace and security. The first section is based on network analysis, the second looks into operational strategies, recruitment and training practices and, propaganda activities. The third section is based on terror funding, whereas the final section assesses the role of women in these organisations. In conclusion, there is an examination of India’s counterterrorism policies.

Introduction

Terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan like JeM and LeT are all part of a complex, globally interconnected nexus of like-minded radicals sharing common interests of proliferating their extremist anti-India rhetoric. Nearly 150 terrorist entities and individuals blacklisted by the UNSC Sanctions Committee are based in or share links with Pakistan.i Irrespective of this, Pakistan continues to follow a duplicitous strategy in dealing with its homegrown terrorists, by actively combating groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan which threatens its own internal security but continues to covertly back anti-India terrorist groups by unleashing trained militants into the country who serve as proxies to undertake tasks that the Pakistani state cannot legitimately perform. As a result, these groups have formed several licensed institutions such as the Muttahida Jehad Council (MJC) aka United Jihad Council (UJC) and Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC).

This essay is a composition of primary sources such as comments obtained through expert interviews conducted by the author, as well as an in-depth analysis of written speeches, recorded interviews, government archives, UN reports, terrorism portal databases; and secondary sources such as academic articles, newspaper and media reports and, research published by think tanks.

Lashkar-E-Taiba ~ Army of the Righteous

•Overview

LeT is a Sunni militant organisation co-founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Zafar Iqbal and Abdullah Azzam in 1987, operating in J&K, Pakistan and Afghanistan and headquartered in Muridke, Pakistan. It follows the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought which is a form of South Asian Salafism holding a strong belief in the duty of a Momin (one who believes in Allah) to protect all Muslims around the world from non-Muslims in democratic systems and, therefore, espouses jihad only against the latter.iiIt aims to not only unify Kashmir with Pakistan to govern the entire region under a radical interpretation of the Sharia Law, but also to form an Islamic caliphate in India and liberate all Indian Muslims. Hafiz Saeed on several occasions has publicly declared jihad against India while also stating that it is the only way for Pakistan to move towards dignity and prosperity.iii

• Network Analysis

LeT was established as a militant wing of Markaz-ud Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), a Pakistan-based social welfare organisation (Fig. 2).ivLeT formed a front organisation known as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and a charitable wing named Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation (FiF). Whilst LeT focuses on jihad and violent extremism, JuD focuses on dawa (outreach through non-violent extremism) and, FiF focuses on dua by raising funds for charity and providing humanitarian assistance. After being banned by Pakistan in 2002, LeT renamed itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and continues to operate under the banner of a social welfare organisation.v In 2017, it rebranded itself as Tehreek Azadi Jammu and Kashmir, and in the same year established its political front Mili Muslim league. Although this party remains unrecognised by the Pakistani election commission, it participated in the 2018 general elections with the aim of moulding Pakistan into a “real Islamic and welfare state,” and has also shown resolute support to the development of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.vi

Apart from its own factions, LeT also shares external links with JeM; Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islam (HuJI); the Haqqani network; Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen, Egypt; Jemaah Islamiyah, Indonesia and, International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), UK.vii It actively receives support from Students’ Islamic Movement of India and Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and has been known to provide training, weapons and financial assistance to IM.viii It shares a similar relation with Al Qaeda, facilitating the movement of its members across porous international borders. Moreover, it is closely tied with the Afghan Taliban, thereby hosting training camps for the use of weapons, explosives, surveillance and assassinations in exchange for money.ixLeT operates on a large scale and administers numerous training camps and branch offices across Pakistan and J&K, for recruitment and funding, under the leadership of an intricate mesh of district commanders and departmental heads (Annexure 1).x

Jaish-E-Mohammed ~ Armyof Mohammed

• Overview

JeM is a Sunni militant organisation operating primarily in PoK, headquartered in Bahawalpur, Pakistan. It was formed in 2000 by radical Islamist scholar Maulana Masood Azhar Alvi after being released from jail in 1999. The group endorses the Deobandi school of thought and, had been formed with support from ISI along with various Islamic organisations and militant groups across the region. Its objective lies within the liberation of Kashmir and its unification with Pakistan under Sharia, coupled with the consistent effort to withdraw Indian SF from J&K through violent means.

• Network Analysis

JeM aka Tehreek-e-Khudam-ul Islam aka Tahreik-e-Furqan was formed as a sub-splinter of HuJI which initially splintered into Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Fig.4). These two groups merged to form Harkat-ul-Ansar in which Azhar served as the General Secretary in 1994. After being designated as a terrorist organisation by the US, HuA was renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen which broke into Al Farhan and JeM. In 2003, JeM split into Khuddamul-Islam headed by Azhar and Jamat ul-Furqan headed by Abdul Jabbar (JeM’s former military operations commander). JeM also founded charitable trusts such as the Al Rehmat Trust Organisation and Al Furqan Trust for fundraising purposes; and a proxy militant group named People’s Anti-Fascist Front (banned by India in 2023) which aids the organisation in conducting arms trade, civilian killings and recruitment,xi and shares affiliations with Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznabi Force, an offshoot of LeT.xii

JeM had been formed with support from other militant organisations such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, HM, LeT, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; ISI and chiefs of three Pakistani religious schools.xiii Apart from sharing affiliations with Lashkar-e-Omar, the group continues to maintain links with Pakistani political parties like Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman.xiv

The group consists of a decentralised, cellular structure dividing the leadership into various departmentsxv and regional commanding officesxvi – each serving as a school of jihad – headed by regional commanders reporting to Azhar (Annexure 2)

The Role of ISI

In order to keep the threat to Islam from India alive and retain its influence on the public of Pakistan, by portraying the state as a legitimate protector of the people, Pakistan’s ISI utilises JeM and LeT as proxies, thereby playing a critical role in the survival of these organisations and acquitting them with military and financial assistance. It has on many occasions provided infrastructural support for their operations by helping build mosques, madrasas and hospitals, and was reported to have built and renovated LeT’sMuridke headquarters. It has aided the group in hosting two dozen camps across the country for training and launching fighters across the LoC. In exchange for this, the group has provided its trained militants to the Pakistani Army for fighting in armed conflicts and border skirmishes against India.xvii

The testimony to Pakistan’s connivance in state-sponsored terrorism lies in the government’s insufficient efforts in cooperating with the global counterterrorism community and permitting these Jihadi groups to thrive under its watch. The ISI not only countenances the groups to endure their fundraising, recruitment and training activities with the assurance of not undertaking any punitory measures, but also provides protection to their leaders to continueholding meetings and planning attacks; many a times even sitting alongside them to strategize attacks.xviii Young militants arrested by Indian SF in J&K have on many occasions confessed to receiving training, funding and instructions from ISI officers. Technical intelligence reveals coded conversations about recruitment, weapon procurement, attack planning and directive instructions between ISI and sleeper cell operatives in India.xix

It is also necessary to note that these two groups do not seem to target any establishments/individuals on Pakistani soil. Political scientist Stephen Tankel notes that following the 26/11 attacks, Pakistani SF conducted a ‘crackdown’ on JuD offices, prior to which, the group’s leaders were notified and assured leniency by government officials.xx, The ISI on some occasions, has openly showcased affiliations to these groups – such as in January 2010 when UJC’s public meeting was chaired by former ISI chief Lt Gen Hamid Gulxxi and former PM Pervez Musharraf’s statement to a news channel claiming the use of Pakistani intelligence by JeM to carry attacks.xxii Although LeT has been the closest confidant of the ISI, its growing loyalty to the state had been resurfacing causing the latter to reduce dependence on it and instead revive JeM as its proxy.xxiiiLeT expert Dr Christine Fair affirms that while JeM has been assigned to conduct India-centric attacks, LeT has been allotted domestic duties like countering Al Qaeda and ISIS.xxiv

The Kashmir-Khalistan Alliance

To add on to the ongoing threat, India’s security agency has brought out reports of the ISI’s efforts in creating Lashkar-e-Khalsa,xxv a new terror outfit to recruit youth from J&K and Afghanistan, which would jointly operate to achieve Pakistan’s ‘K2 Strategy.’ A study by Hudson Institute highlights the deep cohesion between LeT and Sikh separatist groups like ISYF and Babbar Khalsa not only in terms of carrying out joint anti-India protests and demonstrations in Western countries, but also in terms of sharing some of the same lawyers, donors and accountants.xxviReportsxxvii outline the collaborative efforts of ISYF providing financial support to LeT and LeT providing the former with logistical support for attacks in India and, the two conducting joint infiltration and weapons training. The reports also highlight the existence of a common office of LeT and ISYF outside Nankana Sahib in West Punjab, Pakistan and, Sikh separatists being harboured by ISI in bunkers close to the LoC.

Infrastructure and Manpower

The UNSC’s 2020 Sanctions Monitoring Report stated that LeT has around 800, and JeM around 200 armed militants co-located with Taliban forces in Afghanistan, acting as infiltrators and trainers in IEDs.xxviiiLeT has two dozen known training camps with 16 of them concentrated in the regions of PoK, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistani Punjab.xxix It runs recruitment offices in Pakistan and has support bases across India. Recent reports have also stated that LeT has been shifting its bases to Afghanistan and building check posts across the border with the help of the Afghan Taliban.xxxLeT’sMuridke headquarters operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, numerous mosques and medical clinics across Pakistan,xxxi whereas JeM has been expanding its 15-acre Jama-e-Masjid Subhanallah and Sabir Madrasa complex in Bahawalpur where 600+ students are reportedly being radicalised to adopt violent jihad.xxxii

Both these groups recruit foreign fighters from several countries (Fig. 5). Bahukutumbi Rahman, India’s external security agency’s Counterterrorism Head noted that while JeM mostly trains foreign fighters from Malaysia and Singapore in its Binori Madrassa Complex, Karachi; LeT trains Indonesian fighters in its MuridkeComplex.xxxiii

Propaganda and Recruitment Activities

The interviews of militants captured by Indian SF during their operations in Kashmirxxxiv have revealed how young, unemployed men, oevreburdened with family responsibilities are targeted by these groups and radicalised into conducting terrorist activities.

Out of several channels of recruitment (Fig. 6)xxxv, mosques and madrassas are the two popularly misused to spread extremist propaganda. Madrassas in Pakistan run by these groups are funded by external donors such as Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen, while also being heavily funded by Saudi Arabia.xxxvi While 57% of LeT militants were found to have attended madrassas xxxvii ; these institutions have acted as catalysts in promoting jihad and building a toxic network of hysterical militants driven by vengeance and bitter resentment against the enemy.

While very few are aware of the aftermath of the Kargil War when Indian soldiers buried martyred Pakistani soldiers with full military honours when the latter’s own government refused to take back their bodies,xxxviii Pakistani madrassas return the favour by training their mujahedeen to mutilate Indian soldiers and apply brutal force. “Since it is not possible to bring their captives back to Pakistan, and the Indian government does not bargain for the return of hostages, all Indian prisoners are killed in the valley. The Lashkar fighter will usually execute an Indian soldier by slitting his throat. However, beheading and disembowelling are also common tactics, employed mostly for psychological reasons,” states LeT’s commander Abdur Rehman al-Dalkil.xxxix

Students radicalised in madrassas are often used as foot soldiers and although the threat from these religious institutions persists, private and public educational institutions also play a big role in proliferating extremism, by disseminating the propaganda more readily and effectively. This was reiterated by Pakistan’s former I&B Minister Fawad Chaudhary who said that intolerance in schools and colleges is what spreads extremist ideology.xl There are around 34,000 madrassas in Pakistan schooling over 2.5 million studentsxli and these terrorist-breeding platforms remain to cause a considerable security threat by projecting their influence on the 24,000 madrassas in India, leaving 200 million Indian Muslims susceptible to Jihadi extremism.

Training and Strategies

The training programmes of these groups are holistically planned, having the components of professional military training and weapon usage; and religious, intelligence and civic education including lessons about the Kashmir conflict, India’s demography and security agencies. Training is also provided on gathering intelligence, conducting reconnaissance activities and spreading propaganda to recruit more militants.xlii LeT has been regarded as one of the finest militant training providers due to its efficacious training plans (Fig. 8),xliii allowing it to attract other terrorist groups to undertake training for their own cadres.xliv

Through these training programmes LeT prepares its mujahideen to undertake suicidal missions, the cadres of which are divided into two groups,xlv i.e., Jaan-e-Fidal (highly motivated, trained terrorists) and Ibn-e-Tayamiah (terrorists with uncurable diseases), which operationalise two types of strategies, namely suicide bombings (mostly using VBIEDs) and fidayeen (redeeming oneself by sacrificing). LeT is the architect of the fidayeen strategy which has been adopted by other Jihadi groups including JeM. In this, armed militants conduct pre-planned attacks as suicide squads who storm into high security bases/camps, fortify and kill as many security personnel before escaping or getting killed. Similarly, the cadres dress up as Indian SF, march into remote villages and hilly areas inhabited by religious minorities, fortify civilians and massacre them.

Changes in Strategy

Tankel notes that up until the early 2000s, LeT, with the help of ISI would send militants in large numbers into India to conduct their activities. However, a surge in Jihadi terrorist attacks across the world during this period, brought ISI-led terrorist groups under the global scanner, forcing them to reduce operations and change their strategiesxlvi which led to increased infiltrations by groups of smaller but highly trained mujahideen, and the launch of numerous sleeper cells in India. Simultaneously, religious riots created a conducive environment for proliferating jihad into those corners of the country which had so far remained untouched. These Indians who joined in, not only provided easy access into India, but also local intelligence about the developments and demographics, thereby acting as the perfect proxies for the ISI.Ever since, the results of this have been-

1.Increased cross-border terrorism (CBT) via the LoC (MoD’s annual reports from 2002-2019 consistently highlight the increasing cross-border terrorist incidents and infiltration attempts)xlvii.

2.Involvement of local Kashmiri guides and porters who got paid to help militants infiltrate.xlviii

3.Opening up of operational bases in neighbouring Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.xlix

4.A shift from J&K to conducting attacks in densely populated, economically important, metropolitan Indian cities which brought more attention to the cause.

5.The use of ‘hybrid militants’l who unlike sleeper cells (trained agents) or overground workers (OGWs) (militant support-providers), are terrorists disguised as civilians without being listed in any police or security records.

6.The rise of ‘samundari jihad,’ wherein reports by Hindustan Timesli reveal how Indian intelligence agencies have discovered LeT and JeM’s efforts towards developing a ‘naval wing’ possessing sea-strike capabilities, thereby amplifying the threat to a two-front challenge.

The impact of the Abrogation of Article 370

The revocation of the special status to J&K under Article 370 led to a significant drop in terrorist activities in the region. FM Nirmala Sitharaman in 2021 accentuated this by stating that post revocation, the UTs of J&K and Ladakh had seen a 33% drop in infiltration attempts, 90% drop in ceasefire violations, 61% drop in terrorist related incidents, 80% drop in abductions by terrorists and 33% drop in deaths of SF.lii The Ministry of Home Affairs’ response to an unstarred question in the Rajya Sabha in 2021 also brings to light important statistics with regard to the terrorist situation in the region before and after revocation (Fig. 9).liii

Following the abrogation, a geographic shift in terrorist activities has been witnessed from the Kashmir Valley to the South of Pir Panjal encompassing Jammu. Suicide terrorism expert Prof Rupali Bhusari confirms this by stating that this change can be considered as a retaliation against the abrogation, wherein terrorists have been discovering new and easier routes to target Hindu-majority regions, thereby amplifying the “Kashmir unrest” issue into a “J&K unrest” issue.

Fundingand Assistance

• Donations and Charitable Funds

The Pakistani diaspora and businessmen based in foreign countries heavily fund these organisations legally through charitable foundations,liv which are then diverted into militant activities; meaning various donors from across the world knowingly and unknowingly aid in proliferating terrorism (Fig. 10). Saudi Arabia’s extremist Salafi-Wahhabi followers and powerful business tycoons have funded thousands of madrassas in Pakistan which have remained the lifeline of promoting jihad and training militants.lv Adding to this, Rtd DGP of Maharashtra and former IPS Officer Praveen Dixit suspects that although the support from Saudi Arabia has reduced over the recent years due to India’s proactive diplomatic efforts in mending ties, the support for these groups from Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran is on the rise.

JeM supports over 300 Islamic institutions in Pakistanlvi and collects donations from attendees which it propagates is for developmental activities for the welfare of students, widows, orphans, migrants and disaster victims. Although LeT follows similar methods, it also makes additional income through the sale of its written publicationslvii and crores by selling animal hides.lviii Earlier this year during Ramzan, Twitter users in Pakistan made shocking revelations of JeM workers openly collecting funds outside mosques, in the midst of being surrounded by Pakistani SFlix; an income strategy being used by LeT for years, by placing donation boxes outside shops, MDI offices, public gatherings, and martyr commemoration ceremonies.lx These groups have even implemented lucrative strategies of applying ‘jihad tax’ on consumers productslxi and ushrlxii meaning agricultural tax imposed on farmers.

Weapons and Narcotics Smuggling

Increasing cases of narcoterrorism via peddlers and handlers across the LoC and via fishermen through the coasts have also been surfacing, wherein 85 cases had been registered by the J&K Police against 161 people in 2022 alone.lxiii Terrorists from Pakistan have illegally pumped tonnes of heroin into India through the Golden Crescent, which sell in the market for crores of rupees, leading to an increase in drug use, addiction and easy recruitment into terrorist outfits. Moreover, weapons smuggling, narcotics trade and counterfeit currency circulation have remained as important sources of income, for which these groups have consistently received covert operational assistance from the ISI and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company.lxiv

During the ‘No Money for Terror Ministerial Conference’ held in New Delhi in December 2022, Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated the growing concern arising from the increased use of the dark net, technology and UAVs by terrorist groups.lxv More specifically, the increased use of end-to-end-encrypted text-based-messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram and Threema for arms procurement, fundraising, attack planning and radicalisation of youth. Another illicit tool being used for untraceable communication is ‘YSMS technology’lxvi which involves communication via Very High Frequency, which can be paired with radio headsets to relay messages and share locations.

Raids conducted by the J&K SIA in 2022 across seven locations in the UT,lxvii lead to the seizure of hidden digital devices, SIM cards and documents from local residents, revealing the use of cryptocurrency for terror funding, and ISI’s involvement in the use of Bitcoin for transferring funds to secessionists and militants based in J&K. Cases registered by the NIA following counterterrorist operations reveal the increased use of technology and drones for conducing attacks on Indian SF bases and for the facilitation of these activities. These include the transfer of illegal funds through imported California almonds through LoC Trade Facilitation Centreslxviii and heroin packages wrapped as import consignments of semi-processed talc stones from Afghanistan through a ship from Iran at the Gujarat coast;lxix as well as transfer of weapons, communication devices, narcotics by droneslxx lxxi and hexacopterslxxii to J&K, Punjab and Rajasthan,lxxiii and to Maharashtra and Gujarat via ports.lxxiv Moreover, in 2022, 215 drone activities were detected by the BSF in Punjab and 22 incoming drones were seen in J&K.lxxv

Hawala Systems and FICN

Hawala systems have acted as dangerously successful banking systems for terrorists allowing them to thrive all over these years. Several NIA reports reveal how JeM, LeT and HM have received funds through hawala operatives and sleeper cells situated in the donor countries (primarily Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE),lxxvi have collected the funds in cash through couriers or as donations to charitable organisationslxxvii lxxviii , and channelled them into terror networks through their operatives located in Delhi and J&K.

Insufficient access to legal tender pushes these terrorist organisations to manufacture Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) in huge quantities, with the help of the Pakistani state. High-quality FICN have been produced and used by Pakistani terror groups which are suspected to be printed in the state-run printing presses in Quetta,lxxixPeshawarlxxx and Malir Cantonment, Karachi,lxxxi which are smuggled via land, sea and air from neighbouring countries.lxxxii

The Impact of Demonetisation

The initial brunt of demonetisation was heavily felt across the terror financing network as these groups mostly printed the ₹500 and ₹1000 FICN. After the scrapping of these denominations, the groups found it very difficult to make hawala cash transfers and channel the stockpiles of extortion money into terror funding activities.lxxxiii However, post demonetisation, the terrorist groups started reprinting the new FICN, following which global COVID-19 lockdowns impacted their smuggling activities.lxxxiv Although FICN production is on the rise again, demonetisation served its purpose by significantly reducing terror related violence in J&K by 60% and weakening the over ground activities reliant on financing.lxxxv Moreover, the recent decision of the RBI to withdraw the ₹2000 notes will also aid in countering terror funding. It is also important to note that the increasing use of digital payment methods and acceptance of UPI have reduced the reliance on FICN, thereby putting added pressure on the Indian administration to curb terror financing.

Women In Terrorism

Women’s roles in these organisations are primarily auxiliary in nature and although they have not been allowed to undertake combat roles, JeM and LeT have permitted women to participate in jihad in defence of Islam and for the survival of the ummah. Dr Christine Fair notes that women, have for years been mobilised to promote and support jihad by letting their sons and husbands fight the holy war,lxxxvi and advocate support for the movement. As noted by Prof Farhat Haq,lxxxviiLeT women in the early 2000s were prohibited from undertaking training but female leaders were taken to training camps to observe their male counterparts.

However, reports by India TVlxxxviii show a video of LeT’s lady brigade under training, consisting of 68 women being trained in weapon use. Moreover, the use of women as OGWs by these groups has also surfaced as The Statesmanlxxxix has reported several cases of females - often Burqa-clad - throwing grenades and petrol bombs at SF bunkers in J&K, transporting grenades and ammunitions on behalf of terrorists across J&K and, radicalising and recruiting youth through the internet. Additionally, in a recent interview,xc Lt Gen AS Aujla, the former GOC of 15 Corps, stated that since many OGWs operating in J&K had been picked up by Indian SF, terrorists have increasingly been using women, girls and juveniles to carry messages, drugs and weapons, on behalf of them, thereby giving terrorists a tactical edge in conducting their activities.

INDIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

A change in India’s defence policy has been the biggest contributor to countering terrorism in the country. Around 90 counterterrorism operations conducted in 2022 in J&K have led to the elimination of 172 terrorists,xci thereby corroborating that the realistic, target-oriented policy approach has been adopted by the Modi-led government keeping national security as its utmost priority. The positive implications of abrogating Article 370, as discussed previously, have not only helped in countering the threat from Anti-India terrorist groups but also aided in the economic development of the region by generating employment opportunities in numerous avenues such as agriculture, tourism, handicraft production and retail;which besides providing the locals safe and legal sources of income, have also helped them in fending for their families without relying on illicit means to do so. Moreover, Prof Bhusari notes that the decision was undertaken by the Indian government at an appropriate time, taking into consideration the broader geopolitical scenario, i.e., months before the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, thereby blockading the entry of Afghani mujahedeen into J&K following the takeover by the Taliban.

Amendments have been made in counterterrorism strategies by advocating more people-friendly operations and undertaking civil-military initiatives such as the ‘Sahi Rasta’ programxciifor deradicalization, skill and personality development of radicalised and vulnerable youth. Additionally, India’s multilateral efforts at combating terrorism and terror funding have been evident through the formulation of its multi-faceted Delhi Declarationxciii as a part of the UN Security Council – Counter-Terrorism Committee’s (UN-CTC) special meeting in October 2022, which was most recently adopted by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as wellxciv.

THE WAY FORWARD

It is necessary for India to continue advocating a pragmatic, interest-based approach in dealing with neighbouring states ruled by unsteady, sensitive regimes like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the military junta in Myanmar, in order to keep in check the threat posed due to their close ties with the Pakistani state and its proxies. With the growing threat from the Sikh separatist groups in Western countries, mutual steps must be taken to reassess diplomatic engagements between India and, Canada, the US and UK, to counter the possibility of a two-front challenge resulting from an unchecked cohesion amongst Kashmiri and Khalistani separatists.

A rise in the use and involvement of female terrorists in combat roles has opened up various fields requiring further research and this issue should not be ignored by policymakers. The prevailing threat of CBT, greater reliance on UAVs and the impending threat of ‘samundari jihad,’ cumulatively, have uncovered the pressing need for enhanced tri-services cooperation in joint counterterrorism operations. A strenuous challenge for Indian policymakers would be to further investigate into the Sino-Pak nexus and divulge the diplomatic, logistical and financial assistance provided by the former to the latter; as well as counter China’s assertive tactics with regard to its consistent support for Pakistan’s terrorists at the international level and the development of those Belt-and-Road Initiative projects in PoK that violate India’s territorial sovereignty, which are uninterruptedly progressing due to assistance from local jihadi militants. Lastly, India must take advantage of its position as a rising global power and spokesperson of the Global South, in order to influence multilateral counterterrorism initiatives like that of the FATF and UN-CTC, and aid in bolstering the effectiveness of their policies and their commitment towards countering the threat posed by international terrorism.

ANNEXURE 1

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (QDe.118)

LeT Central Leadership Structure

Office of the Founder and Leader (Emir): Hafiz Mohammed Saeed (QDi.263), 73 y/o; Office of Deputy Leader: Abdul Rehman Makki (QDi.433), 68 y/o; Office of Deputy Supreme Commander: Abdul Rehman al-Dakhil (not listed).

LeT Operational Leadership Structure

Office of Chief of Operations: Zakir Ur-Rehman Lakhvi (QDi.264), 62 y/o; Office of Chief Operator of Overseas Operations Team: Sajid Mir (not listed), 45 y/o; Office of Chief Operations Commander, Valley: Abdullah Shehzad alias Abu Anas (not listed), Office of Head of Muzaffarabad Office: Hafiz Talha Saaed (not listed), 47 y/o; Office of Head of Lahore Office: Khalid Waleed (not listed), 54 y/o; Office of Chief of Finance: Haji Muhammed Ashraf (QDi.265), 58 y/o; Office of FiF Chairman: Hafiz Abdul Rauf (not listed), 50 y/o; Office of Chief Spokesperson: Yahya Mujahid (QDi.272), 62 y/o; Office of Spokesperson for International Media: Abdullah Muntazar (not listed).

LeT Divisional Commanders Structure (not listed under UN Sanctions Regime)

a) Central Division Command: Abdul Hassan

b) North Division Command: Kari Saif-Ul Islam

c) Area Commander, Sopore: Masood

d) Deputy Commander, Bandipora: Hyder-e-Krar

e) Deputy Commander, Lolab: Usman Bhai

f) Deputy Commander, Sogam: Abdul Nawaz

g) Deputy Divisional Commander, Baramulla: Abu Rafi

h) Deputy Commander, Handwara: Abdul Nawaz

i) Deputy Commander, Budgam: Abu Museb

Senior LeT Leaders listed under UN Sanctions Regime

Abdul Rahim Ba’aysir (ODi.293), 45 y/o

Mahmoud Mohammed Ahmed Bahazia (OQi.266), 79 y/o

Arif Qasmani (QDi.271), 79 y/o

Senior LeT Leaders not listed under UN Sanctions Regime

Zafar Iqbal

Maulana Abdul

Nazir Ahmed

Saifullah Khalid, 55 y/o

Maulana Amir Hamza, 64 y/o

Naveed Qamar, 51 y/o

Naser Javed, 68 y/o

Shahid Mahmood, 42 y/o

Shazidullah

Sheikh Sajad Gul

Mohammed Amin

Muhammed Sarwar

ANNEXURE 2

JAISH-E-MOHAMMED (QDe.019)

JeM Central Leadership Structure

Office of the Founder and Leader (Emir): Maulana Masood Azhar Alvi (QDi.422), 54 y/o; Office of Second-in-Command: Abdul Rauf Azhar Alvi, 46 y/o; Office of Nazim of Military Affairs: Maulana Abdul Jabbar; Office of Chief Commander of J&K: Shah Nawaz Khan; Office of Nazim of Propaganda Wing: Maulana Qari Mansoor Ahmed; Office of Launching Commander: Maulana Mufti Mohammed Asghar; Office of Head of Finance: Maulana Sajjad Usman.

JeM Departmental Structure

a) Majlis-e-Shura -11-member committee headed by Emir

b) Military Department - in charge of training

c) Aseerin Department - in charge of prisoner affairs

d) Dawa-o-Irshad - in charge of martyred mujahedeen affairs

e) Martyrs Department - in charge of martyr affairs

f) Ehya-e-Sunnah - in charge of marriage affairs and revival of sunnah

g) Broadcasting (media) and Publications Department

h) Department of Amar Bil Ma’aruf-o-Nahi Annal Munkar-Ehtesab (in charge of maintenance of Sharia and communication with madrassas leaders)

Senior JeM Leaders listed under UN Sanctions Regime

Abdur Rehman (QDi.309), 57 y/o

Senior JeM Leaders not listed under UN Sanctions Regime

Yousuf Azhar

Athar Ibrahim

Shahid Latif

Maulana Umar Farooq

Abdul Jabbar

Abdullah Shah Mazhar

REFERENCES

i Singh, Y. (2022, January 17). About 150 terrorist entities, individuals based or linked with Pakistan blacklisted by UN. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/about-150-terrorist-entities-individuals-based-or-linked-with-pakistan-blacklisted-by-un/articleshow/97065502.cms

ii Macander, M. (2021, October 28). Examining Extremism: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-lashkar-e-taiba

iii Jamaat-ud-Dawa reincarnates itself. (2009, January 1). The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/jamaat-ud-dawa-reincarnates-itself/articleshow/3923010.cms

iv South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

v University, S., Stanford, & California. (2018, November). Mapping Militant Profiles: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Centre for International Security and Cooperation. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/lashkar-e-taiba#text_block_25834

vi Fair, C. (2018, June). The Milli Muslim League: The Domestic Politics of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba. Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-milli-muslim-league-the-domestic-politics-of-pakistan-s-lashkar-e-taiba

vii South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

vii South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

ix Meyer, J. (2007, December 18). Extremist group works in the open in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-dec-18-fg-lashkar18-story.html

x South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-letxi PAFF, a proxy of JeM, declared a terrorist organisation. (2023, January 6). The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-bans-paff-a-proxy-outfit-of-jaish-e-mohammed/article66347897.ece

xi PAFF, a proxy of JeM, declared a terrorist organisation. (2023, January 6). The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-bans-paff-a-proxy-outfit-of-jaish-e-mohammed/article66347897.ece

xii 5 shocking revelations in Poonch terror attack, exclusive on NewsX. (2023, April 22). NewsX. https://www.newsx.com/poonch-terror-attack-3/

xiii South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM). https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm

xiv Ibid.

xv Howenstein, N. (2008). The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir. Pakistan Security Research Unit.

xvi South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM). https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.

xvii Kulungu, M. (2021). Understanding the Cozy Relationship between Pakistan ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba. OALib, 08(10), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1107884

xviii Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

xix Operation Sleeper Cell: Terrorist Conversations Revealed. (2016, January 22). India Today. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Py_25qzszYg&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=7

xx Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

xxi Akbar, M.J. (2010, March 7). Promise-delivery gap. Deccan Herald. https://www.deccanherald.com/content/56801/promise-delivery-gap.html

xxii Pakistan intelligence used Jaish-e-Mohammed to carry out attacks in India: Pervez Musharraf. (2019,March7).WION. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24sCNhiedEs&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=12

xxiii Verma, R. (2017). Pakistan and Jaish-e-Mohammad: An unholy alliance. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pakistan-jaish-e-mohammad-unholy-alliance

xxiv Christine Fair on Pakistan, Terrorism & Lashkar-e-Taiba. (2019, July 11). HTN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwpFFeApixA&list=PLASKoo1mqEneB2HHNQiBvCrmzi7Xz9Rbb&index=5

xxv Pakistan creates new outfit “Lashkar-e-Khalsa”, to recruit Afghans, and Khalistanis to spread terror in India. (2022, May 11). OpIndia. https://www.opindia.com/2022/05/pakistan-creates-new-lashkar-e-khalsa-terror-outfit-punjab-recruit-afghani-khalistan-supporters/

xxvi Pande, A. Fair, C. Westrop, S. Oldmixon, S. Rubin, M. Haqqani, H. (2021). Pakistan’s Destabilization Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism Within the US. Hudson Institute. https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Pande_Pakistan's+Destabilization+Playbook+-+Khalistan+Separatist+Activism+Within+the+US.pdf

xxvii Khan, M.A. (2009). India’s Sikh Militants Forming Ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Pakistani Intelligence. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/indias-sikh-militants-forming-ties-with-lashkar-e-taiba-and-pakistani-intelligence/

xxviii Chair, U. S. C. C. E. pursuant to R. 1988 (2011), & Entities, U. S. C. A. S. and S. M. T. E. pursuant to R. 1526 (2004) concerning A.-Q. and the T. and A. I. and. (2020). Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council. Digitallibrary.un.org. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3862716?ln=en

xxix Kulungu, M. (2021). Understanding the Cozy Relationship between Pakistan ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba. OALib, 08(10), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1107884

xxx Sources: Pak terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba built check posts in Kabul | Afghanistan | English News. (2021, August 18). WION. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCoqd0Jvz2o

xxxi South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

xxxii Fatima, P. S., Heena. (2022, October 20). As terror watchdog FATF considers reprieve for Pakistan, Jaish-e-Mohammed is expanding seminary. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/world/as-terror-watchdog-fatf-considers-reprieve-for-pakistan-jaish-e-mohammed-is-expanding-seminary/1174622/

xxxiii Sakthivel, P., &Sakthival, P. (2010). TERRORISM IN INDIA : THE UNHOLY NEIGHBOURS. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 71(1), 153–162. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42748376

xxxiv Arrested Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist Ajaz Gujri praises Indian Army for humane treatment. (2018, May 10). IndiaTV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z3ksSbBzobM&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=3

xxxv Rassler, D., Fair, C., Ghosh, A., Jamal, A., &Shoeb, N. (2013). The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death Harmony Program. https://www.christinefair.net/pubs/Fighters-of-LeT_Final.pdf

xxxvi Sakthivel, P., &Sakthival, P. (2010). TERRORISM IN INDIA : THE UNHOLY NEIGHBOURS. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 71(1), 153–162. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42748376

xxxvii Rassler, D., Fair, C., Ghosh, A., Jamal, A., &Shoeb, N. (2013). The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death Harmony Program. https://www.christinefair.net/pubs/Fighters-of-LeT_Final.pdf

xxxviii Rawat, R.B. (2019). Kargil: Untold Stories from the War. Burying the Dead, pp. 91-95. Penguin Random House India Private Limited.

xxxix Mehrotra, O. N. (2000). Madarsa in Pakistan: The chief promoter of Islamic militancy and terrorism. Strategic Analysis, 23(11), 1879–1894. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455168

xl Major reason behind extremism in Pakistan is schools & colleges, not madrasas, says Fawad Chaudhary. (2021, November 19). WION. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FGjMX7UhMIQ&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=9&t=333s

xli Pakistan Wants To Reform Madrassas. Experts Advise Fixing Public Education First. (2019, January 10). NPR. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/10/682917845/pakistan-wants-to-reform-madrassas-experts-advise-fixing-public-education-first/

xlii Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

xliii South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

xliv Meyer, J. (2007, December 18). Extremist group works in the open in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-dec-18-fg-lashkar18-story.html

xlv South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) Terrorist Group, India. https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india/lashkar-e-toiba-let

xlvi Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

xlvii Ministry of Defence | Home. (n.d.). Mod.gov.in. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://mod.gov.in/annual-report

xlviii Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

xlix Ibid.

l Ahmad, M. (2022) Emerging Contours of Security in Jammu and Kashmir. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/emerging-contours-of-security-in-jammu-and-kashmir-mahamad-210222#footnote11_7k1y5ae

li India on alert against possible Lashkar, Jaish attacks from sea. (2018, October 12). Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-on-alert-for-terror-attacks-from-sea/story-Z3sbBaWORD4X6R0QZqymaN.html

lii Post removal of Article 370, terror activities declined & investment environment created in J&K: FM. (2022, March 23). The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/post-removal-of-article-370-terror-activities-declined-investment-environment-created-in-jk-fm/articleshow/90397357.cms

liii “Killings in J&K”, Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 358, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1 December 2021.

liv Macander, M. (2021, October 28). Examining Extremism: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-lashkar-e-taiba

lv Rotella, S. (2012, August 9). Militant Reaffirms Role of Pakistan in Mumbai Attacks. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/09/militant-reaffirms-role-of-pakistan-in-mumbai-attacks/

lvii Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

lviii Mehrotra, O. N. (2000). Madarsa in Pakistan: The chief promoter of Islamic militancy and terrorism. Strategic Analysis, 23(11), 1879–1894. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455168

lix Terrorist group Jaish-E-Mohammed in Pakistan, OPENLY collecting funds in Peshawar. (2023, April 23). WION. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDQuJiZfXK4&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=5&t=2s

lx Tankel, S. (2011). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10499?seq=23

lxi Ibid.

lxii Ibid.

lxiii Service, I.-A. N. (2023, January 9). Pakistan pushes narco-terror strategy in Kashmir Valley. The Siasat Daily. https://www.siasat.com/pakistan-pushes-narco-terror-strategy-in-kashmir-valley-2498897/

lxv Ful text of concluding remarks of Union Home Minister Shri Amit Shah at the closing session of 3rd “No Money For Terror” Conference (Counter-Terrorism Financing) in New Delhi today. PIB. (2022, December 19). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1877280

lxvi Militants outsmart Indian agencies with new tech tool. (2015, September 10). The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Militants-outsmart-Indian-agencies-with-new-tech-tool/article60501843.ece

lxvii Pakistan’s ISI using Bitcoin to fund terrorism in J-K: SIA. (2023, June 25). The Tribune. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/j-k/pakistans-isi-using-bitcoin-to-fund-terrorism-in-j-k-sia-418469

lxviii Case Detail. RC-24/2020/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?152

lxix Case Detail. RC-26/2021/NIA/DLI (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?416

lxx Case Detail. RC-20/2021/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?406

lxxi Case Detail. RC-03/2021/NIA/JMU. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?398

lxxii Case Detail. RC-04/2020/NIA/JMU. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?346

lxxiii Case Detail. RC-31/2021/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?418

lxxiv Case Detail. RC-24/2020/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?328

lxxv No anti-drone technology installed, BSF downed 22 Pakistan drones in Punjab in ’2022. (2023, January 1). The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/amritsar/no-anti-drone-technology-installed-bsf-downed-22-pakistan-drones-in-punjab-in-2022/articleshow/96656371.cms

lxxvi Case Detail. RC-20/2017/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?180

lxxvii Case Detail. RC-20/2018/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?294

lxxviii Case Detail. RC-37/2020/NIA/DLI. (n.d.). https://www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?363

lxxix Sastry, V. V. L. N. (2019, January 12). India’s Demonetization: Pros and Cons, pp. 79. Papers.ssrn.com. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314670

lxxx Neeraj Chauhan. (2016, November 9). Pakistan won’t be able to copy new notes: Intelligence agencies - Times of India. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pakistan-wont-be-able-to-copy-new-notes-Intelligence-agencies/articleshow/55343029.cms

lxxxi Taking out Pakistan’s terror mints. (2016, November 21). India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20161121-black-money-pakistan-terrorism-fake-currency-narendra-modi-fake-indian-currency-notes-829871-2016-11-10

lxxxii FICN and terror-financing: New considerations in view of demonetisation-India News. (2016, November 14). Firstpost. https://www.firstpost.com/india/ficn-and-terror-financing-new-considerations-in-view-of-demonetisation-3104488.html

lxxxiii Sastry, V. V. L. N. (2019, January 12). India’s Demonetization: Pros and Cons, pp. 79. Papers.ssrn.com. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314670

lxxxiv Recovery of fake notes shows a spike of 1342%. (2022, September 1). The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/recovery-of-fake-notes-shows-a-spike-of-1342-ncrb-data-shows/articleshow/93918956.cms

lxxxv Sastry, V. V. L. N. (2019, January 12). India’s Demonetization: Pros and Cons. Papers.ssrn.com. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314670

lxxxvi Fair, C. C., & Hamza, A. (2018). Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(6), 962–983. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481313

lxxxvii Haq, F. (2007). Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the Lashkar‐i‐Tayyabia in Pakistan. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32(4), 1023–1046. https://doi.org/10.1086/512729

lxxxviii Lashkar-e-taiba’s Lady brigade to attack India-1. (2013, September 27). IndiaTV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7UGmuG0J1U&list=PLASKoo1mqEnd4rCLg9YdCEG6790NDjFGt&index=12

lxxxix Service, S. N. (2022, May 17). Women involvement in terrorism- a new challenge for security forces in Kashmir. The Statesman. https://www.thestatesman.com/india/women-involvement-terrorism-new-challenge-security-forces-kashmir-1503073105.html

xc News, I. T., & Kumar, R. (2023, June 11). Pakistani ISI changes its strategy; roping in women, juveniles to carry weapons, messages: Top army official | India News. India TV. https://www.indiatvnews.com/amp/news/india/pakistani-isi-changeds-its-strategy-roping-in-women-juveniles-to-carry-weapons-messages-army-official-2023-06-11-875442

xci India: 172 terrorists killed in 2022, Jammu & Kashmir Police calls it a successful year. (2022, December 31). WION. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/214-terrorists-killed-in-2022-jammu-kashmir-police-calls-it-a-successful-year-548258

xcii Dutt, K. (2022, November 7). Visible change seen in radicalised youths after “Sahi Raasta” programme: Army. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/india/visible-change-seen-in-radicalised-youths-after-sahi-raasta-programme-army/1202224/

xcii Dutt, K. (2022, November 7). Visible change seen in radicalised youths after “Sahi Raasta” programme: Army. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/india/visible-change-seen-in-radicalised-youths-after-sahi-raasta-programme-army/1202224/

xciii Delhi Declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. (2022, 29 October). United Nations Security Council – Counter-Terrorism Committee. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2022/Dec/english_pocket_sized_delhi_declaration.final_.pdf

xciv New Delhi Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (2023). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36751/New_Delhi_Declaration_of_the_Council_of_Heads_of_State_of_Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization