Abstract
As China PLA is scheduled to observe its centenary next year, it will be important to note the recent purges in the PLA hierarchy raising question over its combat efficiency. It’s important to note the existing status quo of the Civil military relations and the impact on the operational and strategic impact that PLA will have. The recent purges of senior PLA officers by Xi Jinping are unprecedented in the history of the PLA. The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees China’s armed forces, has been organizationally decapitated. Of the six generals named to the CMC in 2022, only one remains. This will be a precursor for the existing strategic dilemma that China’s Western Theatre Command will face in view of a renewed clash with India or if it has faced the dilemma of invading Taiwan in the years to come. From the perspective of operational effectiveness, the purges in the PLA will hinder the newly created Theatre Commands and as an extension will have great significance to the development of joint operations capability.
Key words: PLA, Centenary, Theatre Command, Chinese President, Western Theatre Command
As China is preparing itself ahead of the centenary of the People Liberation Army next year, it’s important to note the existing status quo of the Civil military relations and the impact on the operational and strategic impact that PLA will have1.
To start with, the PLA is legally and functionally subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), not the state. The Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping, ensures that the party controls the gun. The military serves as the guardian of the CCP’s survival, while also expanding its role to defend increasing territorial claims in the South China Sea and near Taiwan.
The recent purges of senior PLA officers by Xi Jinping are unprecedented in the history of the PLA. The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees China’s armed forces, has been organizationally decapitated. Of the six generals named to the CMC in 2022, only one remains.
On the other hand, as the new data gathered by the CSIS China Power team shows, the significance of this round of purges extends far beyond the CMC to impact the entire PLA leadership which may impact in their operational capability2.
It’s noted that the CMC, the highest grade an officer can hold is theater command leader, which includes the commanders and political commissars of the four services and five regional theater commands, as well as the directors of key departments within the CMC.
Further as per the available data, the focus on grades indicates that the PLA leadership comprises roughly 176 billets or positions. In addition to the six CMC positions (two vice chairs and four members), these include 25 theater command leader positions and another 145theater command deputy leader positions, according to Text Ore’s Directory of PLA Military Leadership 2025.
Further as noted by CSIS Database on Chinese Military Purges shows that 101 senior officers who served in CMC, theater command, or theater deputy command grade positions have been dismissed or gone missing as a part of the purges.
After accounting for positions in which more than one purge has occurred, such as the commander of the PLA Rocket Force, approximately 52 percent of positions in the PLA leadership have been impacted.
This figure is striking and extraordinary, demonstrating the depth of Xi’s campaign and the unprecedented churn in the PLA leadership. It has affected the commanders and political commissars of each service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and each theater command, as well as the directors of six CMC departments, among many other senior leadership positions and deputy leadership positions.
It’s noted that purges have occurred in approximately 38 percent of all theater command deputy leader positions.
First, the depth of the purge suggests that dissatisfaction with the PLA leadership’s performance especially in the operations in Galwan Doklam against India is a major factor in Xi’s calculus (in addition to concerns about corruption, political loyalty, military autonomy, military obedience, or policy differences).
The above will have connotation on rebuilding the PLA leadership will take time which may lead them to lag behind the ambitions of the PLA ahead of the centenary next year or even beyond. A large gap exists at the theatre command leader grade, with 38 officers in such positions having been dismissed or disappeared.
They can only be replaced by officers serving in theatre deputy leader command positions, yet with 56 officers in this grade having been dismissed, the pool of potential officers who can be promoted to theatre command level positions has been cut by more than one-third. Moreover, to be promoted to a higher grade, an officer typically must serve three to five years in their current grade, further complicating efforts to replenish the leadership positions3(a).
On the other hand, the purge underscores the challenges that PLA leadership would face, either with empty billets or newly promoted officers inexperienced in their new roles, in undertaking large-scale military operations such as a blockade or amphibious assault of Taiwan. Although roughly half (53 percent) of theatre command–level officers who were purged came from the command track, this proportion grows to around two-thirds (68 percent) at the deputy theatre command level, highlighting the difficulty that the PLA will face to meet its ambitious modernization goals.
In addition, the purge is being led by the CCP office, which accuses high ranking Chinese General Zhang of trampling on the ‘Chairman Responsibility System’. This is code for Zhang challenging Xi’s supreme authority, and the episode therefore has tell-tale signs of a political power struggle. Moreover, the PLA is a secretive organisation and has historically often been at the forefront of resisting Party initiatives, even during Mao Zedong’s era.
Therefore, even individuality and independent expression of thought can be interpreted as defiance, especially by Xi, who has become extremely apprehensive in the run-up to next year’s leadership renewal. The purge is being led by the CCP office, which accuses Zhang of trampling on the ‘Chairman Responsibility System’.
This is code for Zhang challenging Xi’s supreme authority, and the episode therefore has tell-tale signs of a political power struggle
Another noticeable feature of this investigation is the media drip-feeding of multiple allegations, including the leak of nuclear secrets, corruption in promotions, and other reasons cited for the case. However, this also reflects Beijing’s concealed anxiety and a weak justification for this round of top-level removals. Predictably, Zhang and Liu are being accused of exceptionally grave, unpatriotic conduct, intended to discipline elite dissent, the rank and file, and the wider military community3(b).
China’s approach to Civil Military relationship and its relevance today
The fissures between CCP and PLA are evident from the days of Mao itself when he developed PLA as a praetorian revolutionary group Mao suggested three methods: permanent revolution, ideological rectification, and self-transformation through struggle. This effectively introduced a siege mentality in the CCP, which has endured through generational changes in its leadership.
Coming to the present days of Xi Jenping response to this fundamental question has been encapsulated in his concept of ‘self-revolution’: treating corruption and disloyalty not as governance failures but as existential political threats thereby creating a new layer in Civil Military relations4.
Xi, therefore, drives a vertical self-revolution through surveillance, discipline, fear, and bureaucratic penetration, keeping technological control over economic and administrative domains while enhancing ideological purity in political and military realms.
This also underpins his continuous search for adversaries, real or imagined, reining in corporate czars such as Jack Ma, pursuing dissidents abroad, and side-lining elder politicians such as former President Hu Jintao.
Xi, therefore, drives a vertical self-revolution through surveillance, discipline, fear, and bureaucratic penetration, keeping technological control over economic and administrative domains while enhancing ideological purity in political and military realms.
This also underpins his continuous search for adversaries, real or imagined, reining in corporate czars such as Jack Ma, pursuing dissidents abroad, and sidelining elder politicians such as former President Hu Jintao.
Xi, therefore, drives a vertical self-revolution through surveillance, discipline, fear, and bureaucratic penetration, keeping technological control over economic and administrative domains while enhancing ideological purity in political and military realms. This also underpins his continuous search for adversaries, real or imagined.
His anti-corruption campaigns are a crucial part of the permanent struggle, ensnaring thousands of “tigers and flies,” especially in the PLA. Gradually, Xi has dismantled the entire CMC, barring Zhang Shengmin, his anti-corruption enforcer. If Zhang and Liu were not spared, there is no guarantee that Zhang Shengmin himself will not eventually fall. Chinese history is replete with examples of emperors purging their top aides and lieutenants, along with their family and patronage networks, once doubts arose over their loyalty or continued utility.
Earlier, the CMC exercised command and control over the seven Military Regions (MR) of the PLA, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps through the four general headquarters, namely, the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Armament Department (GAD) and General Logistic Department (GLD).
In order to integrate and strengthen the joint structure in line with its military doctrine ‘integrated joint operations under conditions of informationisation,’ the seven Military Regions headquartered in Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou were reorganised in 2016 into five new ‘Joint Battle Zone Commands’ (Joint Commands) working directly under the CMC. As it reorganized its Command Matrix, China started to have five Theater Commands, namely the Eastern Theater Command, the Southern Theater Command, the Western Theater Command, the Northern Theater Command and the Central Theater Command of the PLA.
Further, in order to attain a leaner structure without compromising on its efficiency, China started to cut down the strength of military by 3,00,000 personnel from late 2015 onwards. The process eventually ended in 2018 and it was the 11th time that the military’s size has been reduced since the founding of New China in 1949.
China’s Civil Military relations and it’s context within institutions
Coming back to the recent purges, the recent purge is bound to create anxiety in the PLA, eroding trust in promotions, command structures, and institutions. The worst sufferer is the CMC. Xi will eventually strive to populate the CMC with a younger generation of military officers untainted by the politics of the old guard — a much more difficult vetting exercise. Even the more enterprising recruits in the future are likely to be cautious after observing the predicament of their predecessors.
However, it’s noted that coup fears or an immediate leadership threat to Xi from the military remain low, as the PLA is institutionally fragmented into theatre commands and party-controlled organs and remains answerable to Xi through parallel command structures.
However, the elite fragmentation will occur, as officers allied to or promoted by purged generals may feel insecure or sidelined, thereby creating space for factionalism. This could lead to micro-level disobedience, leaks, sluggish implementation of directives, and a loss of cohesion, accompanied by copious mistrust in the PLA.
As the PLA appears to be entering a phase where institutional cohesion, professionalism, and higher command effectiveness may become brittle. The pre-eminent emphasis on political work and ideological purity risks political commissars dominating the PLA rather than commanders. This renewed emphasis on the ‘Red Over Experts’ dynamic will be net negative in the long run.
Earlier, the fissures between PLA and CCP were evident during the the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). It’s noted that the bridge between the closing phase of the 14th Five-Year Plan and the preparation of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) — a stage that will lay the groundwork for China’s basic modernisation by 2035.
Externally, sluggish global growth, rising protectionism and fragmentation of supply chains threaten export stability. Domestically, the economy continues to grapple with weak consumption, debt overhangs and a need for deeper supply-side reforms. Against this backdrop, the Fourth Plenary re-anchors the 15th Five-Year Plan around a few central propositions5.
Recent developments within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership, including the high-profile purge of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia. Exposing the internal tensions for civil-military relations in China, including how Xi’s consolidating authority over the PLA affects military modernisation, strategic decision-making, and China’s regional posture.
The theoretical models of Chinese civil-military relations that exist within the literature during the period divide into three distinctive categories.
“Traditional models” including the Factional, Symbiosis, Professionalism, and Party Control models, dominate the literature from 1989 to 1995. Scholars worked to integrate information becoming available as the PRC opened to the world into these already existing models of Chinese civil-military relations.
However, evolving political dynamics within the PRC following Tiananmen marginalized the utility of the models. From 1995 to 1997 many scholars argued that these traditional models should not be considered mutually exclusive but complementary.
This concept of a “combination model” was short lived as it became increasingly apparent that even a combination of traditional models had little predictive or even explanatory power in light of rapidly changing political dynamics. Two new models, the Conditional Compliance and State Control models, emerged in the period of 1997–2003. Both incorporated elements of the traditional models while attempting to address the implications of new political and military dynamics in the PRC.
Examining the predictions of these models against four case studies involving major developments in civil-military relations, we found that although each model had some descriptive and explanatory power, none possessed strong predictive ability.
The traditional models help explain the PLA’s reaction to intensified Party control following Tiananmen, but none was able to predict how Chinese civil-military relations evolved subsequently.
Civil-military models offered their most specific (and ultimately least accurate) predictions regarding the leadership succession from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. Most models predicted a strong role for the PLA in the succession that did not materialize. This was the period when traditional civil-military models began to run up against the reality of changing political dynamics within the PRC.
When the PLA was forced to withdraw from most commercial activities in the mid-1990s, the models predicted a far slower, more contentious, and less complete divestiture than ultimately occurred. Most analysts correctly predicted that the PLA would have only limited involvement in the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao following the 16th Party Congress in 2002, but subsequent explanations for why the transition went smoothly emphasize different factors.
The models did agree in their emphasis on the importance of greater political institutionalization in reducing PLA influence and highlighted the implicit role and future potential importance of the PLA in elite politics, especially if divisions among the civilian leadership produce a political crisis in the future.
Since 2023, at least 15 full generals and admirals19 have been removed due to charges or even suspicions of corruption, disciplinary violations, bribery, economic graft and political disloyalty (Kumar 2024).20 Most of these terminations have taken place in the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which is responsible for the vast majority of the PLA’s conventional and nuclear missile arsenals, as well as in the Equipment Development Department (EDD), which is in charge of military procurement as one of the CMC’s functional departments.
The extensive nature of this prosecution calls into question (for some) Xi’s strongman persona. Despite more than a decade of effort, Xi has not been able to successfully eradicate corruption
In August 2023, the entire PLARF leadership was removed, including its Commander General Li Yuchao and Political Commissar General Xu Zhongbo, due to suspicions and subsequent investigations. Of note, the PLARF had been acquiring large tracts of land in Western China to build silos for their growing arsenal of fixed, nuclear and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. These land purchases may have produced many opportunities for fraud by senior officers, including (for example) the reselling some of these lands at far higher prices than the original purchase price, as well as other procurement irregularities 19 In the PLA, full general/admiral rank is three stars.
The numbers cited of removed officers may vary given differences among researchers in their understanding of the current state of ongoing prosecutions and convictions versus also counting those officers who have disappeared from public view but have not been formally dismissed or charged.
Since assuming power, Xi has removed at least 78 PLA officers at the rank of two stars or above. The number of those targeted is currently changing on an almost weekly basis. 21 In 2016, Xi made the PLARF into a full service of the PLA, putting it on equal organizational footing with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF) and the PLA Navy (PLAN).
Furthermore, there may also have been concerns about these activities degrading the operational state of China’s quickly expanding land-based nuclear forces or the tactical level or the operational level of warfare. Credible media reports, for example, describe missiles filled with water rather than fuel, and silos in Western China with retractable openings that did not function correctly, preventing effective launch capabilities.
The appointment of officers from other services to take command of the PLA Rocket Force also indicated that President Xi had lost all confidence in this service to manage its own affairs, in particular, to maintain discipline and root out corruption
In July 2023, the PLA announced that all procurement programs dating back to 2017 would be investigated. Furthermore, then-Vice Chairman General He Weidong, a loyalist of Xi, stated that the CMC would crack down on “fake combat capabilities” at a speech in March 2024.
In conclusion
The recent purges within the PLA and the existing fissures in the PLA and the Chinese Presidency is supposed to widen the civil military intension in China6. This will be a precursor for the existing strategic dilemma that China’s Western Theatre Command will face in view of a renewed clash with India or if it has faced the dilemma of invading Taiwan in the years to come. From the perspective of operational effectiveness, the purges in the PLA will hinder the newly created Theatre Commands and as an extension will have great significance to the development of joint operations capability.
End Notes:
1) The Purges Within China’s Military Are Even Deeper Than You Think (China Power, February 24, 2026) https://chinapower.csis.org/china-pla-military-purges/
2) Assessing Xi’s Unprecedented Purges of China’s Military (CSIS, February 2026) https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2026-02/260224_Lin_Xi_Purges.pdf?VersionId=JwvU3rl5SpP74Ly.LrjCZps.Hn_CByZq
3) a) Bill Gertz -More than 100 senior PLA officers purged for corruption, says Air Force think tank report Washington Times - Monday, July 20, 2026 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jul/20/100-senior-pla-officers-purged-corruption-think-tank-
b) Zi Yang Elite Fragmentation and Anxiety in the PLA (Jamestown Foundation, February 11, 2026) https://jamestown.org/elite-fragmentation-and-anxiety-in-the-pla/
4) Lim, J. (2022). Explaining military reforms under Xi Jinping: military effectiveness, power consolidation, and party-military relations in China. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 11(2), 264–281
5) Balaji Chandramohan Strategic impact of the Fourth Plenum and its impact on Beijing’s polity (Centre for China Studies, November 11, 2025) https://www.c3sindia.org/post/strategic-impact-of-the-fourth-plenum-and-its-impact-on-beijing-s-polity-by-mr-balaji-chandramohan
6) Atul Kumar Xi Jinping’s Rectification Campaign and Power Consolidation in China ( Obsevervor Research Foundation, March 13, 2026) https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/xi-jinping-s-rectification-campaign-and-power-consolidation-in-china
