Although landlocked, Afghanistan has always occupied position of geopolitical significance. Afghanistan has been meeting point of four ecological and cultural areas: West Asia, Central Asia, Indian subcontinent and Far East, for Pamir Mountains intrude into Chinese Xinjiang (Dupree, 1973). On its east and south, Afghanistan shares a border with Pakistan, which is the country’s gateway to South Asia. On its west, sits Iran, a major power in Middle East. On north, it shares vast border with Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which were part of Soviet Union during last century. To northeast Afghanistan shares a small border with China and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Krishnan and Johny, 2022).

In nineteenth century, Afghanistan found itself in middle of Great Game between British and Russian empires. In twentieth century, it was caught in cold war between U.S. and Soviet Union. It is important to see how twenty-first century rivalry between U.S. and China mean for Afghanistan. Withdrawal of United States from Afghanistan has left a lasting impact on Afghanistan’s future, on Asian geopolitics and brought China into focus (Krishnan and Johny, 2022).

Debating Insurgency in Afghanistan

Why did an insurgency occur in Afghanistan? Some argue that Afghanistan’s ethnic makeup was largely responsible for insurgency. Afghanistan has four major ethnic groups: Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara, as well as range of minor ethnic groups. The long-standing ethnic fissures in Afghanistan made violence inevitable. The last decade of fighting had pitted Pashtun groups from southern Afghanistan against Uzbek, Tajik and other groups from northern Afghanistan. Afghan insurgent groups were motivated by profit from cultivation and export of poppy. Afghanistan cornered global opiate market after U.S. invasion. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) announced: “No other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007: iv). Two factors were critical for growth of insurgency. One was weak governance, which provided an important precondition for rise of insurgency. Inability of Afghan government to provide key services to local Afghans gutted support for national government and forced citizens to look elsewhere for security. Insurgent groups tapped into resources from individuals in neighboring governments and international jihadi community (Giustozzi, 2007). The second motivating factor for insurgent leaders was religious ideology. Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden advocated jihad to recover “occupied” Muslim lands. They demanded return to radical interpretation of Islam stripped of local customs and cultures. Taliban leaders saw themselves as cleansers of social and political system gone wrong in Afghanistan and an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and infidelity to the Prophet. Al Qaeda leaders were motivated by ideology grounded in works of Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual in Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist thinkers and they advocated establishment of radical interpretation of sharia (Islamic religious law).

Who are Taliban?

In 1993-1994, Afghan Muslim clerics and students, mostly of Pashtun origin formed Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen who had become disillusioned with civil war among mujahideen parties that broke out after 1989 Soviet withdrawal and subsequent collapse of Soviet-supported government in 1992. Many members of the movement had studied in seminaries in Pakistan and chose the name Taliban (plural of talib, a student of Islam) to distance themselves from mujahideen (Rashid, 2000). Pakistan supported Taliban because of group’s potential to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally,” thus giving Pakistan “greater security on one of several borders where Pakistani military officers hoped for what they called ‘strategic depth.’” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 64). Taliban beliefs and practices were consonant with and derived in part from conservative tribal traditions of Pashtuns, who represent a plurality of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic makeup and who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan. Like Taliban founder Mullah Omar, most of senior figures in Taliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, one of major Pashtun tribal confederations. Taliban viewed post-Soviet government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani as weak, corrupt and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between mujahideen groups (1992-1996) created popular support for Taliban as they were seen as less corrupt and more able to deliver stability. Taliban took control of southern city of Kandahar in November 1994 and launched series of military campaigns throughout Afghanistan that culminated in capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments to enforce its decrees, including bans on television, Western music and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care.

U.S. had played major role in supporting anti-Soviet mujahideen, but U.S. attention to Afghanistan declined with withdrawal of Soviet troops after 1988 Geneva Accords. U.S. embassy in Kabul was evacuated for security reasons in January 1989 and remained closed until 2001. U.S sustained some military assistance to mujahideen groups who continued to fight Soviet-supported Afghan government. After that government fell in 1992, there was little appetite to maintain U.S. engagement (Coll, 2005). When Taliban took control of Kabul in 1996, U.S. policy toward Taliban was unclear as, “American officials issued a cacophony of statements—some skeptical, some apparently supportive—from which it was impossible to deduce a clear position” (Coll, 2005: 338). Rising international and U.S. popular attention to plight of Afghan women and renewed focus on human rights under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, led to U.S. policy shifting against Taliban by 1999.

Taliban’s sheltering of Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden eventually became central issue affecting U.S. views of and relations with Taliban. In 1996, Osama bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he was high profile financier and organizer of efforts to aid the mujahideen. Pakistani intelligence officers introduced Osama bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 64). Osama bin Laden established alliance with Taliban whereby he provided millions in financial aid to Taliban and military support for their efforts to complete the conquest of Afghanistan and Taliban provided safe haven for AQ recruits and training camps. Over 10,000 AQ fighters may have trained at AQ camps in Afghanistan (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 66-67). U.S. Ambassador to United Nations Bill Richardson visited Kabul in April 1998. In response to Richardson’s request that Taliban expel Osama bin Laden, Taliban “answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In any case, Taliban said, [bin Laden] was not a threat to United States” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004:111). The threat posed by Osama bin Laden became clearer on August 7, 1998, when Al Qaeda operatives simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing over 200 people. In response, U.S. launched cruise missile attacks on AQ targets in Afghanistan that were unsuccessful in either killing Osama bin Laden or persuading Taliban to expel him. In July 1999, President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions on Taliban that were equivalent to those imposed on governments deemed state sponsors of terror (E.O. 13129). United Nations Security Council travel and economic sanctions against Taliban were added in October with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 and expanded with UNSCR 1333, which included arms embargo against Taliban, in December 2000. Taliban leadership was unmoved, whose relationship with Osama bin Laden was tense but foundation was deep and personal (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 125).

Where and why did the American withdrawal begin?

When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, approximately 11,000 U.S. troops were in Afghanistan, with U.S. force levels having declined from 2009-2011 high point of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops (Peters, 2017; Lubold and Youssef, 2017). In June 2017, President Trump delegated to Secretary of Defense James Mattis authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to around 3,500 additional troops. Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September 2017 (Copp, 2017). Those additional forces arrived in Afghanistan within months, putting total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan between 14,000 and 15,000 by end of 2017 (Lamothe, 2017; Jaffe, 2018). As of September 30, 2017, total number of active duty and reserve forces in Afghanistan was 15,298 (Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017). By mid-2018, President Trump was frustrated with lack of military progress against Taliban and ordered direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan government participation. As those talks developed under Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump continued to express frustration with U.S. military mission in Afghanistan and desire to withdraw U.S. forces, saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so “as quickly as we can” (Baron, 2019; TOLOnews, 2019). U.S. force levels began to contract in 2019: at October 9, 2019, news conference, General Austin S. Miller, top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that number of U.S. forces had been gradually reduced by 2,000 over past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000 (Gibbons-Neff & Mashal, 2019). In February 2020, U.S. and Taliban signed agreement in which U.S. committed to withdrawing all its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian personnel from Afghanistan, with drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 2020 and complete withdrawal by end of April 2021. In return, Taliban committed to prevent any groups, including Al Qaeda, from threatening U.S. or its allies by not allowing those groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan. U.S. withdrawal commitment was not conditioned on Taliban reducing violence against Afghan government, making concessions in intra-Afghan talks or taking other actions. The agreement stated that up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by Afghan government and up to 1,000 Afghan personnel captured by Taliban “will be released” in March 2020. The prisoner release was completed in early September 2020.

Throughout 2020, U.S. officials stated that Taliban were not in full compliance with the agreement, U.S. force levels continued to drop, reaching 8,600 one month ahead of mid-July 2020 deadline in U.S.-Taliban accord (Atwood & Browne, 2020; Burns, 2020; Reuters, 2020a). Confusion about U.S. future military posture grew in October 2020 due to contradictory visions expressed by senior Trump Administration officials, including President Trump’s tweet that, “We should have small remaining number of our Brave Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!” (Reuters, 2020b). On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “We will implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces” from Afghanistan and that 2,500 U.S. forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021. Acting Secretary Miller characterised the drawdown as “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,” and said it “does not equate to change in U.S. policy or objectives” (Department of Defense, 2020). On January 15, 2021, Acting Secretary Miller confirmed that number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500 (Department of Defense, 2021).

President Biden, who took office on January 20, 2021, opposed Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels as Vice President in 2009 and expressed skepticism about troop levels in Afghanistan as candidate during 2020 primary campaign (Coll, 2018; CBS News, 2020). As President, he said in March 16, 2021 interview that U.S.-Taliban agreement was “not a very solidly negotiated deal” and that meeting its May 1 withdrawal deadline “could happen” but would be “tough” (ABC News, 2021). He also said an Administration review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was “in process” and that reaching a decision would not take “a lot longer.” At a March 25, 2021, press conference, he said “I can’t picture” U.S. troops in Afghanistan next year (C-SPAN, 2021). On April 14, 2021, President Biden announced that U.S. would begin “final withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021 (The White House, 2021b). In a written response, Taliban accused the United States of breaching the February 2020 agreement and stated that the U.S. decision to stay beyond May 1 “in principle opens the way for [Taliban forces] to take every necessary countermeasure, hence American side will be held responsible for all future consequences” (Voice of Jihad, 2021). A senior Administration official said “We have communicated to Taliban in no uncertain terms that if they do conduct attacks against U.S. or allied forces, we will hit back hard” (The White House, 2021a).

Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement

After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” guarantees: withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten U.S. and its allies (Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 2020). In the months after agreement, several U.S. officials asserted that Taliban were not fulfilling their commitments under the accord, especially with regard to Al Qaeda (Reuters, 2020a). U.S. officials also described increased Taliban violence as “not consistent” with the agreement (TOLOnews, 2020). Although no provisions in publicly available agreement address Taliban attacks on U.S. or Afghan forces, Taliban reportedly committed not to attack U.S. forces in non-public annexes accompanying the accord. In March 2020 testimony, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told Senate Armed Services Committee panel that committee members “have all documents associated with this agreement” and that Taliban pledged not to attack U.S. or international forces, as well as Afghan provincial capitals and other high-profile targets” (CQ Congressional Transcripts, 2020).

U.S. Military Drawdown

U.S. began withdrawing forces before February 2020 agreement was reached and continued to do so afterwards, despite U.S. assertions that Taliban violence and other actions were inconsistent with the agreement (Gibbons-Neff & Mashal, 2019; Atwood & Browne, 2020). On January 15, 2021, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that number of U.S. forces had reached 2,500, lowest level since 2001, completing drawdown ordered by President Donald Trump in November 2020. On April 14, 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States would begin a “final withdrawal” on May 1, to be completed by September 11, 2021 (The White House, 2021b). In his April 14 address, President Biden said, “We’ll reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in the region to prevent reemergence of terrorists” in Afghanistan (The White House, 2021b). The final stage of planned U.S. military withdrawal began on May 1, 2021, and by June, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that as much as 44% of “retrograde process” was complete (CENTCOM, 2021). Most NATO allies and other U.S. partners withdrew their forces by July (Moulson and Gannon, 2021). On July 8, President Biden announced that “our military mission in Afghanistan will conclude on August 31st.” A rapid Taliban advance, culminating in August taking of Kabul and emergency evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and some Afghans out of Afghanistan, prompted United States to deploy several thousand additional troops to facilitate the evacuation. On August 14, President Biden released a statement saying, “One more year, or five more years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if Afghan military cannot or will not hold its own country. And an endless American presence in the middle of another country’s civil conflict was not acceptable to me” (The White House, 2021c). On August 15, 2021, Taliban entered Kabul, completing rapid takeover over Afghanistan with a speed that surprised many. Taliban’s advance came as U.S. was completing military withdrawal which it agreed in February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord. U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal and evacuation operation concluded on August 30, 2021, with departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

Fall of Afghan Government and takeover of Taliban

Throughout 2020 and 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay potential detrimental impact of U.S. troop withdrawal while emphasizing need for continued U.S. financial assistance to Afghan forces (Rahimi, 2021). In May 2021 press conference, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterised as strengths of Afghan government and military (Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021a). In its 2021 annual threat assessment, Office of Director of National Intelligence reported that “the Afghan Government will struggle to hold Taliban at bay if Coalition withdraws support” (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2021).

In October 2018 Taliban controlled around 40% of Afghanistan and continued to make gradual gains in subsequent years. In early May 2021, Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of country’s rural areas, solidifying their hold on some areas in which it already had significant presence. Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021 (Clark & Ali, 2021). Speed of Taliban’s advance surprised some within Taliban, with one commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals before departure of U.S. forces (De Luce, Yusufzai & Smith, 2021). On July 21, 2021, General Milley estimated that over 200 districts were under Taliban control but emphasized that Taliban had not seized any provincial capitals where Afghan forces were consolidated (Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021b).

On August 6, 2021, Taliban captured their first provincial capital. Taliban’s capture of half of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals in following week surprised many (Miller et al., 2021). By August 13, U.S. officials were concerned that Taliban could move on Kabul within days. With fall of Jalalabad in east and Mazar-e-Sharif in north, Taliban captured last major cities and eliminated final outposts of organized Afghan government resistance. On morning of August 15, 2021, Taliban began entering Kabul, completing their effective takeover of Afghanistan. The central and historically significant province of Panjshir, where some former Afghan leaders attempted to establish an armed resistance to Taliban, was captured by Taliban forces in September 2021 amid reports of Taliban killings of civilians (BBC News, 2021b). While Taliban faced stiff but unsuccessful resistance from government forces in some areas (BBC News, 2021a) some provincial capitals and other areas were taken with minimal fighting. In many areas, Taliban reportedly secured departure of government forces and handover of their weapons through payments or through mediation of local elders seeking to avoid bloodshed (George, 2021).

President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterised by electoral crises, factional infighting and gradual deterioration of Afghan forces, fled Afghanistan on morning of August 15, 2021 to U.A.E. and same day evening, Ghani posted on Facebook that he left Kabul to prevent bloodshed and that “Taliban have won judgment of sword and guns and now they are responsible for protecting the countrymen’s honor, wealth and self-esteem” (Da Silva, Mengli & Yusufzai, 2021). Militia commander and former Herat governor Ismail Khan was captured by Taliban in fighting in Herat before being allowed to relocate to Iran. Marshal Abdul Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor, another former governor, convened their forces in northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and subsequently fled to Uzbekistan. Another group of Afghan political leaders, including High Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah, former President Hamid Karzai, and former Islamist insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, met with Taliban officials after Taliban’s takeover, but did not play role in Taliban government. One August 26 media account described Karzai and Abdullah as “effectively under house arrest” (Robertson, 2021).

Former First Vice President Amrullah Saleh claimed on Twitter on August 17 to be “legitimate caretaker President” and to be “reaching out to all leaders to secure their support & consensus” (Saleh, 2021). Saleh had previously vowed to never submit to Taliban rule and called on Afghans to join him in resisting the group. He relocated to central province of Panjshir and was joined by son of late Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. They stated that they have formed an armed resistance to Taliban and appealed for international support (Massoud, 2021). Taliban claimed to have taken control of Panjshir on September 6, amid reports of continued sporadic fighting and Taliban killings of Afghan civilians (Turak, 2021). With taking of Panjshir, Taliban effectively controlled entire Afghanistan.

As Taliban consolidated power, observers speculated on how much they had changed and how they might govern (International Crisis Group, 2021a). The hardline “caretaker” government announced by Taliban on September 7, 2021, did not indicate a more inclusive approach to governing. On September 7, 2021, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid announced names of 33 individuals who were described as “acting” ministers that fill a “caretaker cabinet” to administer Afghanistan. Taliban refer to this government as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (International Crisis Group, 2021b). Despite Taliban’s promises that they would form an inclusive government, almost all thirty three members of cabinet announced by the group’s spokesperson Zabihullh Mujahiid were from Taliban’s old guard (Asian News International, 2021). All but three were Pashtun, two were from Tajik ethnic minority, one was Uzbek. Hazara Shias and women were excluded.

Afghanistan and China

Afghanistan was among the first countries to recognise People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950 with diplomatic relations between the nations established in 1955. Most significant development in early years was border agreement to settle China Afghan boundary negotiations in December 1962. On 2nd March 1963, China signed provisional border agreement with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

China has emerged as a major player in Afghanistan. When Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on 15th August 2021, most countries closed down their diplomatic mission in Kabul and started evacuating their citizens out of Afghanistan. But there were four notable exceptions – China, Pakistan, Russia and Iran, who decided to continue (Ghosh, 2022). China was among the first nations to develop diplomatic channel with Taliban regime and declared that it was ready for ‘friendly and cooperative’ relations with the regime (France 24, 2021). The groundwork for that decision was laid down much earlier. Over years, China had maintained direct communication with Taliban, and both sides had met on several occasions underscoring China’s warm ties with Taliban (Ghosh, 2022). Following withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, China was first country to pledge emergency humanitarian aid (worth $ 31 million) to Afghanistan (BBC, 2021). The Taliban regime which had been facing humanitarian catastrophe and economic meltdown welcomed China’s prompt delivery of food and medical supplies and that set the stage for deepening political and economic ties between two sides. (Ghosh, 2022)

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi made surprise visit to Afghanistan and met his counterpart in Kabul (Deutsche Welle, 2022). Beijing also invited Taliban to send representative to Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting among neighbouring countries of Afghanistan in city of Tunxi on March 31 2022, first time a Taliban official has attended gathering of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Al Jazeera, 2022) China held two meetings to discuss economic and humanitarian crisis facing Afghanistan. It was Beijing’s effort of a diplomatic push for Afghanistan’s stability and development under Taliban. Afghan acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi attended two- day meeting. China has avoided mentioning limits on girls’ education and other human rights abuses, particularly those targeting women. When Chinese foreign minister visited Kabul and met acting foreign minister to discuss economic and political ties, including starting work in mining sector and Afghanistan’s possible role in China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, China in line with international community, has not recognized Afghanistan’s so called “Islamic Emirate” but has refrained from making harsh criticism against Taliban (Siddique, 2023).

As Afghanistan completes two years of Taliban’s return to power, China stands out for its active engagement of regime, though it is treading cautiously and has not extended formal recognition. Beijing’s growing influence in war-torn country is driven by desire to check militants that threaten its own interests, such as Uyghur groups and Pakistan Taliban (Rehman, 2023).

Chinese companies continue to visit Afghanistan to explore business opportunities and sign deals, especially in mining. In July 2023, Taliban administration announced that Fan China Afghan Mining Processing and Trading Company, a Chinese company plans to invest around $ 350 million in Afghanistan across sectors such as electricity generation, cement manufacturing, health care. Kabul’s state –run Bakhtar news agency reported. In January 2023, Taliban struck deal with China’s Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co. for gas extraction from Amu Darya basin in northern Afghanistan. The agreement starts with $ 150 million annual investment escalating to $ 540 million in three years (Rehman, 2023). China’s diplomatic and trade relations with Taliban are based on cold, pragmatic geopolitical calculations. For Taliban, Chinese money acts as crucial financial lifeline while West imposes sanctions. But in an unstable region where myriad militant groups are operating, stakes are even higher. Any danger to security of Chinese nationals working on projects would almost certainly end China’s involvement in Afghanistan and Taliban knows it (Rakisits, 2022).

In exchange for economic and developmental support, China is demanding that Taliban administration address its security concerns. These primarily center on preventing Uyghur militant groups in Afghanistan from attacking Chinese interests and also curbing Pakistani militant groups that target projects related to Belt and Road Initiative across Afghanistan – Pakistan Border. In Beijing’s eyes, Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) – Uyghur militant group formerly known as East Turkestan Islamic Movement is responsible for destabilising its western province of Xinjiang. TIP aims to free Xinjiang and Uyghurs from Chinese rule, often targeting Chinese interests. In meeting with his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts in May, China’s then foreign minister Qin Gang pressed Taliban to address concerns of neighbouring countries and take more decisive actions to confront various terrorist forces operating within Afghanistan. Officially, Taliban maintains consistent position against militant groups using Afghanistan as safe haven. In practice, reality is more complicated (Rehman, 2023).

U.N. Security Council Report issued on July 25 estimates TIP’s strength from 300 to 1200 members. These fighters have acquired weapons and created new operational bases, while retaining their presence in Afghan provinces, including Badakhshan in northeast, along country’s 78 kilometer border with China. Taliban has relocated Uyghur militants further into interior in an attempt to ease China’s fears. China might tolerate this arrangement as long as Taliban maintain control on these groups. China’s apprehensions extend to threat posed by Tehreek–e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistani militant group and IS – K, Islamic State group’s regional affiliate. In December 2022, IS – K had targeted a Kabul hotel popular with Chinese business persons. The UNSC report highlights links between members of TIP and ISIS- K. The report also says that TTP fighers use TIP training camp in Kunar province. Taliban is cautious about pressurizing TIP and TTP militants at behest of China and Pakistan as Taliban are concerned that such pressure may drive TIP and TTP to align with IS – K and this could pose serious challenge for Taliban administration in governing Afghanistan (Rehman, 2023). In June 2022 a severe earthquake struck southeastern Afghanistan. In its immediate aftermath of disaster, China announced that it will provide 50 million RMB in emergency aid, including tents, blankets, cots, and other supplies to affected areas. Beijing’s investments in Afghanistan are to further its long term economic, strategic and political interests. Since U.S. withdrawal last year, China had an opportunity to advance its interests and deepen its clout in Afghanistan. When Kabul fell, China did not condemn the move and announced that it respected choice of Afghan people.

China’s interest in Afghanistan has intensified since U.S. departure two years ago. Much of this interest stems from Beijing’s desire that Afghanistan achieves peace and stability so that it ceases to be hub for terrorist and militant groups. For its part, Taliban government has high expectations that China can provide needed economic and political support. Taliban expects that China extend Diplomatic recognition. Despite close engagement between China and Taliban over last decade whether such move is forthcoming is uncertain. The efforts by China to promote peace over last decade demonstrates that Beijing understands that stable and peaceful Afghanistan is integral to its broader political, economic and strategic interests (Yousafzai, 2021).

China’s Broader Strategic Interests in Afghanistan

China has long promoted economic development as cornerstone of achieving peaceful, stable Afghanistan, but its strategic interests in Afghanistan are to forestall the country from becoming an arena of geopolitical competition; prevent the country from falling back into orbit of West; and promote stability to prevent country from becoming a safe haven for extremist groups. Beijing wants to promote more moderate Taliban in Kabul who can run Afghanistan effectively and extricate Afghanistan from its economic crisis through engagement with outside world. However, promoting functioning government in Kabul is also motivated by China’s desire to hold Taliban to its promise not to allow Afghan soil to be used by terrorist and extremist groups. The risk for China is that still comparatively radical Taliban will not be able to stabilise Afghanistan politically nor integrate it economically with the world. Taliban remains a paraiah in West due to its negligence of human rights; including girls’ education and providing safe haven to Al-Qaeda, as demonstrated by U.S. strike in downtown Kabul that killed Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al – Zawahiri in late July. China is no stranger to Taliban. Using channel of Pakistan, China was in constant touch with its leadership (Kondapalli, 2021).

Chinese have pushed Taliban for assurances that it will not permit operations within its borders by members of China’s Turkic Muslim Uyghur minority. A month before Taliban took power, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister had hosted high-power nine member delegation from Taliban led by Abdul Ghani Baradar on 28th July 2021, meeting in Chinese port city of Tianjin. In his statement Wang Yi referred to Afghan Taliban as important military and political force in Afghanistan and hoped that Afghan Taliban will make clean break with all terrorist organisations including ETIM and effectively combat them to remove obstacles. Chinese have pushed Taliban for assurances that it will not permit operations within its borders by members of China’s Turkic Muslim Uyghur minority. This top level Taliban delegation promised that Afghanistan would not be used as a base for militatnts. Abdul Ghani Baradar has been quoted saying that Afghan Taliban would not allow any forces to do anything harmful to China in Afghanistan’s territory (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). In exchange, China offered economic support and investment for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. China said that it ‘welcomed’ the chance to deepen ties with Afghanistan, a country that has for generations been coveted for is geo-strategic importance by bigger powers (Siddique, 2023).

There are doubts raised in strategic community in China about assurances given by Taliban to China on countering terrorism in view of their past atrocities. There are doubts over capacity and intentions of Afghan Taliban to stop terrorist activities targeting China (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022). “If security situation in Afghanistan does not improve soon, terrorist activities may flare up in the country and threaten China’s Xinjiang and regional countries where China has interests (Zhang Han and Liu Caiyu, 2021). Despite appearance that China and Taliban are become allies, relationship is limited and largely transactional. Beijing’s primary concern in Afghanistan is threat posed by members of Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) – an Uyghur extremist group Beijing blames for unrest in its western province of Xinjiang and refers to by its former name, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Taliban has been accused of sheltering Uyghur militants and done little to alleviate China’s security concerns. Policymakers in Beijing also continue to worry about instability spreading from Afghanistan into South and Central Asia, where China has economic and political interests. China is averse to Taliban’s ideological and terrorist agenda. Chinese government is concerned about probable inspirational effect of Taliban’s success in Afghanistan on militancy across the region, including Pakistani Taliban. “As Afghanistan’s neighbouring country that also severely suffers from terrorism, extremism and separatism, Beijing does not want Kabul to become hotbed of those horrible acts and beliefs” (Zongyi, 2022). Taliban released prisoners from Kabul jail linked to Al-Qaeda, IS terror groups just after takeover of Kabul. This incident indicates that Taliban is not going to end their associations with terrorist groups (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022).

Speaking at an emergency meeting of UNSC on situation in Afghanistan held on 17th August 2021, Geng Shuang, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to UN said that, “Afghanistan must never become haven for terrorists. This is bottom line that must be held firmly for any future political solution in Afghanistan.” (Xinhua, 2021). This is warning to Afghan Taliban that China’s relationship with Afghan Taliban will not be smooth and will be tested in future, especially on issue of countering terrorism (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022).

China’s Broader Strategic Interests in Afghanistan

In past, China has used Pakistan to meet its broader foreign policy objectives including terrorist groups out of China’s troubled Xinjiang region. In 2017, China proposed and established a trilateral dialogue mechanism among foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. By establishing this mechanism, China acknowledged important role of Pakistan and wanted to use Pakistan’s influence on Taliban in its favour. The fourth meeting of trilateral dialogue was held in June 2021 and during the meeting all three sides agreed to strengthen joint efforts to combat ETIM and other terrorist groups (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022).

China desires to play larger regional and global role under leadership of President Xi Jinping. But it does not want to fill the vacuum created by withdrawal of U.S. in Afghanistan as there are serious risks involved. It wishes to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan by cooperating with Taliban through help of Pakistan. The issue of countering terrorism will be litmus test for relationship between China and Afghanistan.

Xinjiang Factor

China shares a 76 kilometre border with Afghanistan. China has long feared that Afghanistan could become staging point for minority Uyghur separatists in sensitive border region of Xinjiang. Stability in Xinjiang is subject of critical importance to China due to political, strategic and economic reasons. Xinjiang is largest administrative region of China and occupies approximately one-sixth of its land mass. Xinjiang borders Afghanistan, Mongolia, Russia, Kazakastan, Kyrgyszstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. It has vast mineral resources and is home to China’s nuclear test site (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022). Chinese government has maintained that East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is big threat to China as it keeps sending members to China to plot terrorist attacks. Chinese concerns are significant as reports from UNSC have noted that ETIM has maintained close relations with Taliban, Al-Qaida and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (UNSC, 2021). Some branches of Afghan Taliban have joined ETIM as members (Zhang Han and Liu Caiyu, 2021). ETIM has several hundred fighters in Afghanistan, primarily in Badakhshan and neighbouring provinces (Hindustan Times, 2021). ETIM and other anti – China terrorist groups have found safe haven in Pakistan – Afghanistan tribal regions. This is grave threat to national security of China and hence China promulgated series of laws, especially National Security Law (July 2015) and China’s first Anti- Terrorism Law (December 2015) to counter these threats (Sanjeev Kumar, 2022). There are more than 22 million Muslims in China, including Hui, Uyghur and Kazakh minorities.. Hui are around 10 million, concentrated mainly in Ningxia and in China’s northwest. Uyghurs, an ethnic Turkic minority residing in Xinjiang are biggest Muslim minority in China, with around 12 million. China’s Muslims are country’s third biggest religious group. In Ningxia, Huis have flourished and thrived for centuries, developing their unique brand of Islam and assimilating in Chinese culture. Xinjiang has more troubled relationship. Unlike slow assimilation of Hui, Xinjiang’s integration has been abrupt and rough (Krishnan and Johny, 2022). Even after Qing conquest brought parts of Xinjiang nominally into empire’s fold, China’s imperial presence remained thin and distant. In 1940s, an independent East Turkestan Republic briefly existed as satellite of Soviets before it was brought under control of People’s Republic of China in 1949. A decade of horrors, violence and turmoil was unleashed during Mao’s Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang which saw mosques being burnt down. A brief period of moderation followed in 1980s, when liberal party leader Hu Yaobang supported progressive law on ethnic autonomy that guaranteed some degree of autonomy for minority regions. Hardline change in focus from autonomy to assimilation was seen since 2012 in Xinjiang. This hardening of policy coincided with China’s Stepped-up Diplomacy to Afghanistan (Krishnan and Johny, 2022).

Development Assistance of China to Afghanistan under Taliban 2.0

Beijing has provided ‘limited development assistance to Afghanistan and large mining projects backed by Chinese companies have failed to get off the ground. China is not ‘friend’ of Taliban and can be relied on only to pursue its national interest. During its rule in 1900s, Taliban allowed Uyghurs group operate in Afghanistan. Since Taliban regained power, Taliban has relocated Uyghur fighters from northeastern province of Badakhshan, which is located along Afghanistan’s 76-kilometer border with China, in bid to allay Beijing’s fears. But China has demanded that Taliban cut any ties with militants and hand them over to Beijing. The exact number of Uyghur fighters based in Afghanistan is not known, although it is believed that they number in hundreds (Siddique, 2023). China’s top priority in Afghanistan is to persuade Taliban to turn these militants over to China. If Taliban refuses, then China expects Taliban to keep activities of Uyghur militants “under strict surveillance and control”. Chinese interests in Afghan economy are likely to incentivise Taliban to cooperate on counter terrorism. For cash-strapped Taliban government, which remains internationally unrecognized, securing investment and economic assistance is seen as top priority as it seeks domestic and international legitimacy. Taliban takeover triggered economic collapse and aggravated major humanitarian crisis, with international donors cutting financial assistance to Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s economic catastrophe overshadows all other problems in the country. Beijing has faced criticism for its infrastructure projects in developing countries all over the world, which have been described as exploitative. But this has not put off Taliban, which has actively sought Chinese investment in Afghanistan’s vast untapped mineral resources. In April 2023, Taliban claimed that Chinese firm was interested in investing $ 10 billion in lithium extraction, a project that would employee 120000 Afghans. Afghans are looking forward to exploiting their lithium and other mining deposits for their benefit. However, China may not invest heavily in Afghanistan, which lacks infrastructure. Afghanistan is still scene of sporadic attacks by Islamic State – Khorasan extremists. Taliban benefits from maintaining a relationship with Chinese government and would also like to use it both as an insurance and leverage against Western nations (Siddique, 2023).

Since Taliban’s return, economy has failed; There is food insecurity; Banks ran out of cash; Children are suffering from malnutrition (World Food Programme, 2021). First few months of Taliban after withdrawal of U.S. Troops has led to humanitarian catastrophe. Afghanistan is becoming world’s largest humanitarian crisis. 8 million people were ‘at acute risk’ while 8.7 million faced ‘emergency levels of hunger’ (World Food Programme, 2021). In October 2021, leaders of China and Pakistan issued rare joint appeal asking international community to send humanitarian assistance as well as unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets with central banks $ 9 billion in reserves, held mostly by New York Federal Reserve, inaccessible to Taliban regime (Associated Press News, 2021). Amid humanitarian crisis, economic collapse and public emergency, Islamic State – Khorasan was rising rapidly posing serious security challenge to Taliban across Afghanistan country. Taliban’s mindless extremism of keeping young girls out of school, women from government offices faced resistance from Afghan civil society. Taliban has not changed, but people of Afghanistan have over past two decades (Krishnan and Johny, 2022).

The Changing Power Equations

This is at a time China is trying to rewrite global rules. Taliban are looking towards China as an economic and developmental partner. The BRI may be extended to Afghanistan and linked to CPEC (Gupta, 2021). But now that the coffin of U.S. is lowered in proverbial graveyard of empires that the war-torn country is so often called, question amidst an unfolding humanitarian crisis is simple one: Who is next in line to brave security challenge that Afghanistan poses regionally and globally now that the last American is out? A new phase of great power rivalry between Washington and Beijing could be tested in Afghan theatre, as Chinese seek commitments from Taliban to keep its border areas in Wakhan corridor free from Islamist support to separatist Uyghurs in Xinjiang province, in exchange for Chinese recognition of Taliban and economic aid to Afghanistan. As part of Russia, China, U.S. Troika on Afghanistan, Beijing has moved swiftly to say it is willing to support “friendly relations” with ‘new’ Taliban. Russia is biding its time to see “how regime will behave”, before committing to formal recognition of Taliban (Mirchandani, 2021). With evolving security paradigm in Afghanistan, importance of Afghanistan in China’s foreign policy thinking has increased. The stability of Afghanistan would aid China in its long-term economic plans in the region. While China has attained diplomatic success as mediator and aid provider, overall Chinese economic engagement and investment remains limited. The goal of securing financial gains by Afghanistan’s strategic position in CPEC remains elusive (Chia, Kalachelavam, Haiqi, 2021).

Epilogue

Recent developments in Afghanistan do not augur well for global or regional stability. The regional power vacuum created by withdrawal of U.S. from Afghanistan has created further turbulence. It may be curtains for America’s war on terror in Afghanistan, but chaos it leaves in its wake makes China look up to the opportunity to expand its circle of influence. China is now courting and supporting Taliban. China’s frequent hosting of Taliban delegations and support for peace process were part of strategy to get U.S. out of Afghanistan. China’s economic aid and investments aim to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan. The current situation in Afghanistan confronts China with both opportunities and challenges and whether Beijing can succeed, particularly in long term in transforming Afghanistan into a peaceful, stable station on the Belt and Road remains to be seen. Two years after fall of Kabul to Taliban in August 2021, relations between China and Afghanistan have not progressed significantly. Big Powers have failed to remake Afghanistan as per their vision and have left behind devastation, destruction and chaos. There has been cycle of invasion and civil war. In the great game, inspite of all the churn and changing positions on chessboard, there is one thing constant and that is the suffering of Afghan people. That is the tragedy of Afghanistan.

References

• ABC News (2021). Transcript: ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos interviews President Joe Biden. March 17, 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/full-transcript-abc-news-george-stephanopoulos-interview-president/story?id=79535643

• Al Jazeera (2022), China holds multinational meetings to discuss Afghanistan, Al Jazeera, 30th March 2022,https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/30/china-holds-multinational-meetings-to-discuss-afghanistan

• Associated Press News (2021). Pakistan, China urge world to send humanitarian aid to Kabul, Associated Press, 26th October 2021.

• Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (2020). Text of agreement.https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.

• Krishnan, A. and Johny S. (2022). The Comrades and the Mullahs – China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics. Gurugram: HarperCollins Publishers.

• Atwood, K. and Browne, R. (2020). US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule. CNN, April 30, 2020https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/30/politics/us-troops-afghanistan-drawdown /index.html

• Baron, K. (2019). Trump Says US Troops Shouldn’t be ‘Policemen’ in Afghanistan. So Why Are They There? Defense One, July 22, 2019. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/07/trump-says-us-troops-shouldnt-be-policemen-afghanistan-so-why-are-they-there/158602/

• BBC News (2021a). Taliban continue attacks on three major cities, August 1, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58040141

• BBC News (2021b). Afghanistan crisis: Taliban kill civilians in resistance stronghold. September 13, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58545892

• BBC (2021). China offers $31 million in emergency aid to Afghanistan, BBC, 9th September 2021 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-584966867

• Burns, R. (2020). US General: Taliban Not Yet Met Conditions for US Withdrawal. Associated Press, June 10, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/politics-afghanistan-international-news-troop-withdrawals-islamic-state-group-0327f93d39632e6 732417d548def1ef5

• CBS News (2020). Transcript: Joe Biden on Face the Nation. February 23, 2020. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-joe-biden-on-face-the-nation-february-23-2020/

• CENTCOM (2021). Update on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan May 31, 2021. June 1, 2021.https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2640121/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-afghan istan-may-31-2021/

• Chakraborty, S. (2021). Taliban controlled Afghanistan won’t be part of 4 nation grouping on Chabahar port and INSTC, say sources. Money Control, August, 23, 2021 https://www.Moneycontrol.com/news/economy/policy/exclusive/Taliban-controlled-Afghanistan-won’t-be-part-of-4-nation-grouping-on-Chabahar-port-and-INSTC,-say-sources

• Chia, C., Kalachelavam, K. and Haiqi, Z. (2021). Exploring China’s Afghanistan’s Policy. 25th June 2021, ISAS Insights, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg

• Clark, K. and Ali, O. (2021). A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance,’ Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/a-quarter-of-afghanistans-districts-fall-to-the-taleban-amid-calls-for-a-second-resistance/

• Coll, S. (2005). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin, p, 239.

• Coll, S. (2018). Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Penguin Press, pp. 353-354, 367

• Copp, T. (2017). Mattis signs orders to send about 3,500 more US troops to Afghanistan. Military Times, September 11, 2017. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/09/11/mattis-signs-orders-to-send-about-3500-more-us-troops-to-afghanistan/

• CQ Congressional Transcripts (2020). Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Defense Budget Posture. March 4, 2020. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-03-04-department-of-defense-budget-posture-

• C-SPAN (2021). President Biden Holds News Conference. March 25, 2021. https://www.c-span.org/video/?510139-1/president-biden-holds-news-conference

• Da Silva, C., Mengli, A. and Yusufzai, M. (2021). From Afghan nation-builder to life in ‘exile’: Ashraf Ghani flees country in defeat. NBC News, August 16, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-nation-builder-life-exile-ashraf-ghani-flees-country-defeat-n1276826

• De Luce, D., Yusufzai, M. and Smith, S. (2021). Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they’re advancing in Afghanistan. NBC News, June 25, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/even-taliban-are-surprised-how-fast-they-re-advancing-afghanistan-n1272236

• Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country Quarterly Report, September 2017.

• Department of Defense (2020). Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq. November 17, 2020. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2418641/acting-secretary-miller-announces-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-and-iraq/

• Department of Defense (2021). Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan. January 15, 2021. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2473337/statement-by-acting-defense-secretary-christopher-miller-on-force-levels-in-afg/

• Deutsche Welle (2022). China’s foreign Minister makes surprise Afghanistan trip, Deutsche Welle, 24th March 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-foreign-minister-makes-surprise-afghanistan-trip/a-61249265

• Ellis-Peterson, H. (2021). India weighs up new security risks in wake of Taliban Takeover. The Guardian, September 13, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/13/India-weighs-up-new-security-risks-in-wake-of-Taliban-Takeover

• France 24 (2021) China ready for friendly relations with Taliban, welcomes Afghan development projects. France 24, 16th August 2021 https://www.france24.com/em/asia-pacific/202110816-china-ready-for-friendly-relations-with-taliban-welcomes-afghan-development-projects

• Frayer, L. (2021). With The U.S. Exit From Afghanistan, India Fears An Increasingly Hostile Region. NPR, August 27, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/08/27/1031613191/india-taliban-afghanistan-us-exit-china-power

• George, S. (2021). Afghanistan’s military collapse: Illicit deals and mass desertions. Washington Post, August 15, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse-taliban/

• Ghosh, A. (2022). Is there a Taliban 2.0? Reflecting on the Past to Understand the Present. In N. Ray and A. Ghosh (Eds.), Recent Developments in Afghanistan – ICWA Reflections. KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. pp. 1 – 13.

• Ghosh, A. (2022). Taliban Takeover Afghanistan: What’s Next? In N. Ray and A. Ghosh (Eds.) Recent Developments in Afghanistan – ICWA Reflections. KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. pp. 14 – 24.

• Ghosh, A. (2022). Is China looking for a greater role in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan? 20th April 2022, ICWA, New Delhi. www.icwa.in

• Gibbons-Neff, T. and Mujib Mashal, M. (2019). U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan. New York Times, 21st October, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troop-reduction.html

• Giustozzi, A. (2007). Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan London: Hurst & Company, pp. 7, 15–21.

• Gupta, A. (2021). Implications of Takeover of Taliban, Vivekanand India Foundation (VIF), September 11, 2021 https://www.vifindia.org/2021/september/11/implications-of-taliban-takeover-of-afghanistan

• Haider, S. (2021). Talibans gains complicate India’s options. The Hindu, August 13, 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/taliban-gains-complicate-indias-options/article35898057.ece

• Hindustan Times (2021). Taliban delegation meets Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. Hindustan Times, 28th July 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taliban-delegation-meets-chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-1016274546097 63.html

• International Crisis Group (2021a). Taliban Rule Begins in Afghanistan. August 24, 2021 https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/taliban-rule-begins-afghanistan

• International Crisis Group (2021b). Who Will Run the Taliban Government? September 9, 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/who-will-run-taliban-government

• Jaffe, G. and Ryan, M. (2018). Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this spring. Washington Post, January 21, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/up-to-1000-more-us-troops-could-be-headed-to-afghanistan-this-spring/2018/01/21/153930b6-fd1b-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html

• Kondapalli, S. (2021). Beijing too is worried over how to deal with Taliban. Deccan Herald, 18th July 2021. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panoorama/beijng-too-is-worried-over-how-to-deal-with-taliban-1009903.html

• Krishnan, A. and Johny S. (2022). The Comrades and the Mullahs – China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics. Gurugram: HarperCollins Publishers.

• Kuchay, B. (2021). Taliban takeover a ‘body blow’ to Indian interests in Afghanistan, Al Jazeera, August 29, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/Taliban-takeover-a-‘body-blow’-to-Indian-interests-in-Afghanistan

• Lamothe, D. (2017). Trump added troops in Afghanistan. But NATO is still short of meeting its goal. Washington Post, November 9, 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/11/09/trump-added-troops-in-afghanistan-but-nato-is-still-short-of-meeting-its-goal/

• Lubold, G. and Youssef, N. (2017). U.S. Has More Troops in Afghanistan Than Publicly Disclosed. Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-has-more-troops-in-afghanistan-than-publicly-disclosed-1503444713

• Massoud, A. (2021). Opinion: The mujahideen resistance to the Taliban begins now. But we need help. Washington Post, August 18, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/18/mujahideen-resistance-taliban-ahmad-massoud/

• Miller, Z. et al. (2021). Biden team surprised by rapid Taliban gains in Afghanistan. Associated Press, August 15, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-afghanistan-taliban-5934ef05b0094d0189b5d900d2380179

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2021). Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Beijing, 28th July 2021 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895950

• Mirchandani, M. (2021). The realignment of geopolitics after the Taliban takeover and what it means for India, Observer Research Foundation, Raisina Debates, August 18, 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-realignment-of-geopolitics-after-the-taliban-takeover-and-what-it-means-for-india/

• Moulson G. and Gannon, K. (2021). Most European troops exit Afghanistan quietly after 20 years. Associated Press, June 30, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/europe-afghanistan-health-coronavirus-pandemic-9c1c4f5732c032ba85865aab0338 a7a3

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2021). Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, April 19, 2021. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf

• Peters, H.M. (2017). CRS Report R44116, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2020. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf

• Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense (2021a).Transcript: Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley. May 6, 2021. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2916567/secretary-of-defense-austin-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-mille/

• Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense (2021b). Secretary of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley. July 21, 2021 https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2916567/secretary-of-defense-austin-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-mille/

• Rahimi, Z. (2021). ANDSF Showcases Air Force as Country Braces for US Pullout. TOLOnews, April 26, 2021. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-171777

• Rakisits, C. (2022). Afghanistan: China’s Challenging Relationship with the Taliban. 15th September 2022. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au

• Rehman, Z. U. (2023). China Cultivates transactional Taliban ties as Afghan regime turns 2. Nikkei Asia, 13th August 2023. https://www.asia.nikkei.com

• Reuters (2020a). Taliban not living up to its commitments, U.S. Defense Secretary says. May 5, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-military-idUSKBN22H2XH

• Reuters (2020b). U.S. troops in Afghanistan should be ‘home by Christmas’: Trump. October 7, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-afghanistan-idUSKBN26S3NN

• Robertson, N. (2021) Taliban removes security from ex-Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, source says. CNN, August 26, 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/afghanistan-news-taliban-refugees-08-26-21-intl/h_882f03d866cef7715276e2f09cae2e46

• Rubin B.R. (1995). The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 7; Saleh, A. (2021). Twitter, August 17, 2021, 9:59AM https://twitter.com/amrullahsaleh2/status/1427 631191545589772

• Sanjeev Kumar (2022). China’s Domestic Debate and Strategic Objectives vis-à-vis Recent Developments in Afghanistan. In N. Ray and A. Ghosh (Eds.) Recent Developments in Afghanistan – ICWA Reflections. KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. pp. 48 – 56.

• Siddique, A. (2023). The Limits of China’s Budding Relationship with Afghanistan’s Taliban, RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, 4th June 2023 https://www.rfel,org

• The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. https://9-11commission.gov/report/

• The White House (2021a). Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Afghanistan. April 13, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/04/13/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-on-afghanistan/

• The White House (2021b). Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan. April 14, 2021 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanis tan/

• The White House (2021c). “Statement by President Joe Biden on Afghanistan,” August 14, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/14/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-afghanistan/

• Thomas, C. (2021). U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, CRS Report R46670. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46670

• TOLOnews (2019). Trump Wants to Get Out Of Afghanistan ‘As Quickly As He Can’. August 1, 2019. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/trump-wants-get-out-afghanistan%C2%A0%E2%80%98%C2%A0quickly-he-can%E2%80%99

• TOLOnews (2020). Violence ‘Not Consistent’ with US-Taliban Deal: US Envoy. October 13, 2020. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-167017

Turak, N. (2021). Fighting continues in Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley as anti-Taliban resistance vows to hold out. CNBC, September 7, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/07/afghanistan-update-anti-taliban-resistance-vows-to-hold-out-in-panjshir-valley.html

• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007: Executive Summary. Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. iv. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2021). Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement. New York, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement

• Voice of Jihad (2021). Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding recent announcement by US President Joe Biden. April 15, 2021.

• World Food Programme (2021). Afghanistan Emergency. https://www.wfp.org

• World Food Programme (2021). Annual Country Report 2021 Afghanistan. https://www.wfp.org

• Xinhua (2021). Chinese envoy warns against Afghanistan being heaven again for terrorists. Beijing http://www.xinhuanet.com/English/2021-08/17/c_1310131115.htm

• Yousafzai, Z.I. (2021). The Troubled Triangle: US – Paklstan Relations under the Taliban’s Shadow. Abingdon/ New York: Routledge.

• Yousafzai, Z.I. (2022). China’s Interests in Afghanistan One Year After the U.S. Withdrawal. China Brief, 22 (18), 4th October 2022. The Jamestown Foundation Globlal Research and Analysis.

• Zhang Han and Liu Caiyu (2021). China, Pakistan Push for Regional Security as Taliban Announces New State Amid Lingering Uncertainty. Beijing, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231978.shtml

• Zongyi, L. (2022). Afghan-Led, Afghan-Owned, Is a Way Forward in US Aftermath? Shanghai http://www.siis.org.cn/Research/EnInfo/5386