Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang were amongst the first few global leaders to express condolences to the bereaved families of the deadly terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand on March 14. However, turning the calendar back to 30 days, the Chinese leadership exhibited a more muted response. On February 14, when at least 44 Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel lost their lives to a Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attack in Pulwama, the Chinese Embassy reserved among the last to skimpily tweet Chinese Foreign Minister’s statement.
The Pulwama SVBIED attack on the 76th battalion CRPF was the deadliest attack on security forces inside Indian sovereign territory since the late 1980s Kashmir insurgency. Rawalpindi (Pindi)-sponsored extremist Islamist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for the attack. It prompted the Indian leadership to initiate an intelligence- based“non-military pre-emptive” airstrike on JeM‟s training camps. The Indian Air Force hit the training camps in Balakot of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province – the IAF‟s first flight deep inside the Pakistan territory after 1971 war. This unflinching resolve introduces an uncertainty characteristic induced deterrence in India‟s strategic policy against Pindi‟s asymmetric warfare. The political audacity and pre-emptive strategic posture signals new India to counterpoise any Pulwama like attacks.
Masood Azhar, founder and Commander-in-Chief of JeM, is the principal orchestrator of the first SVBIED attack on Indian soil in2000. Any SVBIED attack consumes great material and reconnaissance resources to perpetrate significant damage. But Azhar‟s earlier associations with Harakat al-Mujahedeen (HuM) terrorist group and the tactical support from Pindi establishment facilitated JeM to explode an SVBIED in less than two months from its establishment. Despite India sharing all evidence of jihadi violence with the United Nation (UN) member countries, China has been blatantly stonewalling the proposal to designate Masood Azhar as a “global terrorist” under the UN Security Council (UNSC) 1267 sanctions committee for almost a decade.
Though India‟s first bid to sanction Masood Azhar entered the UNSC in 2008, the Pathankot Air Force Base attack by JeM terrorists in January 2016 heightened the Azhar threat and intensified diplomatic efforts to declare him a “global terrorist”. As Beijing‟s UN representatives consistently defended Masood Azhar at UNSC, all energies of India turned futile. In the aftermath of Pulwama attack, France in its capacity as the Chairman of UNSC for the month of March moved the proposal to list Masood Azhar in 1267 UNSC sanctions committee. The French proposal co-sponsored by two UNSC permanent members – the US and UK – and four non-permanent member countries. Yet, China persisted to be the 800-pound gorilla in the chambers of UNSC and set a “technical hold” on March 13 that lasts for six months. China‟s consistent stonewalling is not driven simply by a short-sighted policy but has deeper roots in the newly enacted National Security Law (NSL)in 2015.
The NSL were guiding the Chinese leaders to defend the Pindi-sponsored terrorist groups. The financial and strategic support of Pakistan‟s security establishment to the terrorist groups is a great hindrance for peace and security immediately to India. However, the spillover of these groups distresses global peace including a boomerang effect on China.
China‟s endless stonewalling defends its “all-weather ally” Pakistan, serves its real politik but core principle stems from its NSL and its own national interests. The Standing committee of the 12th National People‟s Congress of China adopted the enacted new NSL on July 1, 2015. The new law encompassing 84 articles arranged in seven chapters. It is the most comprehensive document to understand the overarching framework safeguarding China‟s national security interests and the Communist Party of China‟s (CPC) policy priorities to safeguard its regime.
President Xi’s National Security
President Xi centralised the power under his solitary control to realize “Xi Jinping thought” of greater political and social stability, heightened discipline and loyalty in CPC, strong military and large economy for an assertive China. The revised NSL is an unadulterated resemblance of his vision for the Chinese nation‟s rejuvenation. NSL revised in 2015 under the Presidency of Xi defends the CPC regime and “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” in its opening article as a prerequisite to safeguard national security. NSL defines „national security‟ in its article two, where “the regime (under Communist Party of China, CPC), sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively not faced with any danger and not threatened internally or externally...”.The sweeping definition of national security allows the CPC to defend its regime and President Xi to safeguard his policy initiatives domestically and globally.
While the people‟s security remains a “tenet”, the political and economic security are the “fundamental and basis” characteristics under the NSL framework. NSL and “Xi Jinping thought” as the holy script, the party prioritized political and social stability in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on par with policy significance of Hong Kong and Taiwan affairs. The recent appointment of Wang Junzheng as the political and legal affairs secretary of XUAR validates his policy priorities on XUAR. Wang is the former party chief of Changchun city and a close aide to President Xi since graduate schooling at Tsinghua University. The Chinese leadership firm belief in the threats posed by the “three evils” – terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism – is pronounced in article 15 and article 26 of NSL.
In such a framework of national security, the presence of any external separatists or Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in XUAR destabilises the region and matches with a security threat to CPC‟s regime. In line with grand strategy playbook of Beijing, upon identifying all policies to counterbalance the threat, China heightened its economic, security and political relations with Central Asian nations and Pakistan. China deploys either its own forces or relies on state and non-state actors in the neighbourhood to stabilise XUAR, tighten the hold of the party and ensure the political loyalty of XUAR people to the CPC. Masood Azhar‟s JeM and Pakistan‟s security establishment are the two great cronies of Beijing to control the movement of extremists into XUAR and quash the influence of separatists on Uygurs in a “win-win” relationship.
The article 10 of the NSL prompts for mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign governments to uphold national security. Incoherence with NSL, China and Pakistan also maintain a quid pro quo or a “win-win” relationship at the international organisations to shield each other against any sanctions or declarations. For example, Pakistan stonewalls any declaration by Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the solitary international Islamic organisation, against China‟s crackdown on Uyghur minority community. In return, China stonewalls any resolution in the United Nations, with the potential to destabilise the political and economic security of Pakistan. Any tensions in such NSL induced dependency between China and non-state actors like Masood could potentially distress CPC‟s national interests of stabilising Xinjiang.
The Real-politik of CPEC Security
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting XUAR, the Northern terminus in China and Gwadar, the southern terminus in Pakistan is the “flagship” initiative under the framework of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the first Belt and Road summit, President Xi greeted the global leaders from 100 countries and declared BRI as the “project of the century”. The political and social stability in XUAR exceedingly entwined with the realization of CPEC benefits. The CPEC, worth estimated to be at least 62 billion US dollar, is a major economic and critical infrastructure development initiative for realising sustained economic growth and secure energy interests of China.
The development interests of China declared in article 18 and “effective supply of resources and energies” to safeguard the economic and social development interests declared in article 21 underlines the Chinese interests in CPEC for national development. But the article 33 of the NSL intertwines the CPEC with national security beyond the geographical boundaries of China. Article 33 defines the CPC‟s expansive conception of national security, which principally diverges from the national security conception in political democracies. According to the article 33, the Chinese state can “lawfully adopts necessary measures to protect the security and proper rights and interests of Chinese citizens, organizations and bodies abroad, and to protect national interests abroad from threat and harm”.It allows the threat assessment framework of strategists in Beijing to recognise any international factor influencing Beijing‟s economic growth interests as a national security challenge.
Despite Pakistan‟s ban on JeM in 2002, it is fully thrived in several regions of Pakistan and is quite influential along the path of CPEC in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The entire path of CPEC starting from XUAR in China, Gilgit-Baltistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region, PoK, interiors of Pakistan and at the end connecting Gwadar port city in restive Baluchistan province are marked for high terrorist density in the world. Though Pakistan established a dedicated security force of at least 15,000 personnel, the capabilities of Pakistan‟s security establishment hardly comforts the policymakers in China. At least 80,000 Chinese workforces and CPEC personnel residing across Pakistan manifest the challenges for the capabilities of CPEC division. Reliance of Chinese firms operating in CPEC on Chinese private contractors and Beijing‟s push to establish provincial security forces for safeguarding CPEC projects and Chinese nationals espouses unresolved Chinese security concerns.
The horrendous 2007 Lal Masjid standoff between the Pakistani security forces and jihadists in the Pakistan capital region is off the China-Pakistan nexus‟ playbook. The role of JeM and Masood Azhar is notable in the aftermath of terror attacks across Pakistan. Lal Masjid is in the close neighbourhood of ISI headquarters and falls within 7-kms radius from the Chinese Embassy in Third Avenue of Islamabad‟s high-security Diplomatic enclave. The demonstrated sharp capabilities of Jihadi groups, including JeM, in Lal Masjid standoff and the lacking confidence in the capabilities of Pakistan state security apparatus is significant for the Beijing‟s policymakers to formulate the asymmetric strategies in Pakistan. This motivated China to establish nexus with the “good terrorists” in Pakistan to hinder any potential attacks on CPEC investments and Chinese workforce. Though Masood Azhar like “good terrorists” never attacked Chinese interests, the “bad terrorists” Baluchi Liberation Army attacked Chinese interests 12 times in the year 2018 alone. Since then, Masood Azhar emerged as one among the point persons in China‟s CPEC playbook. The “good terrorists” are a glimmer of hope for China, complementing the 15,000 personnel CPEC security force, to thwart the attack and movements of “bad terrorists” against China‟s interests in Pakistan and Xinjiang.
These major assessments of the NSL validate the deep sense of national security interest motivates the Chinese leadership to stonewall India‟s bid for UNSC sanctions against Masood Azhar. China expressed “deep condolences and sympathy” to the families affected in Pulwama and strongly condemned “all forms of terrorism” without pronouncing all three keywords, JeM, Masood Azhar and Pakistan. The Ministry of External Affairs’ April 13 press statement after China blockade expressed “disappointment” without naming China and affirmed to wait patiently “as long as it takes” to list Masood Azhar under UNSC 1267 committee. The statement signals Beijing of Indian diplomat‟s unwillingness to involve in any “silent and transactional diplomacy” on Masood Azhar‟s issue.
The history of Pakistan‟s enforcement of international sanctions against terrorist groups and individuals reiterates Masood designation is more a symbolical gesture than a pioneering triumph for India. India is only facing a bump in its path to gradually mount pressure on Pakistan to cut down on its nexus with terrorist groups but did not lose the war on terror. The Balakot airstrikes is a powerful posture to threaten the terrorist ecosystem in Pakistan. China might have secured its interests in Pakistan but lost the moral leadership it aspiring to hold against global terror and also a strengthening relationship with India, the would-be second major economy by 2035.
The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou’s unprecedented meeting, in the diplomatic playbooks, with Pakistan‟s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Bajwa is an indication of China-Pakistan deep security nexus. It also serves as a diplomatic signal to India and the global leaders to confirm its commitment against global terrorism and regional peace. The meeting with COAS should have dealt to pin down Masood Azhar and other terrorists threatening regional peace that has spillover effects on CPEC and China. The Chinese leverage on Pakistan always has the potential to motivate the Rawalpindi security establishment to crackdown on Masood Azhar network. China‟s regional and global ambitions and sincere China India “reset” possible only by recognising the boomerang effects of “good terrorists” and “bad terrorists” syndrome just like “good emperor and bad emperor” syndrome in China.
Articlesix of NSL prompts for continuous improvisation of the national security strategies to accommodate international and domestic security developments in the mid-term and long-term. The current international pressure and wide sponsorship to designate Masood Azhar as a “global terrorist” might compel China to support India‟s appeal as per the developing security circumstances mentioned in article six. However, India should not be complacent, as China‟s policy is not an all-encompassing but case-to-case as per article six of NSL.
Nevertheless, symbolic gestures, of designating Masood Azhar in the 1267 sanctions committee, alone cannot wash the blood off China‟s hands of all the deceased CRPF personnel in Pulwama. The diplomatic posture of China, under its Presidency of the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the coming October sessions, against India‟s appeal to mount incremental pressure on Pakistan by extending Pakistan‟s status to the “blacklist” remains the puzzle for next few months.
