Introduction

The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. As the two powers grow, they are bound to change the current international system, with profound implications for themselves and the world. A close examination of Chinese and Indian perspectives on the fundamentals of the emerging international order reveals that Sino-Indian differences on many issues of both bilateral and global significance are stark (Tellis and Mirsky, 2013). The Chinese leaders nourish a clear objective of becoming the most powerful nation in the world. In order to become a superpower, China must first establish a complete swag in Asia and the only factor that stands in the way of realisation of this is India (Joshi, 2006).

China‘s consumption of oil which reached 6.3 million barrels per day is likely to touch 11 million by 2030. China relies heavily on oil imports from the Middle East. For ensuring regular supply, China has evolved a ̳string of pearls‘ strategy involving military bases and diplomatic ties to protect its oil and strategic interests (Lin, 2008). China is building a blue water navy which would enable it to protect sea lanes that connect oil exporting nations in the Gulf to consumers in Asia (Burrows, 2014).

Having established key ̳pearls‘ of states of Iran in the Middle East, Pakistan in South Asia and North Korea in East Asia, China is now procuring additional ̳pearl‘ nodes along the Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh) and establishing naval ports, electronic surveillance, military cooperation, nuclear technology with these nodes (Lin, 2008). The ̳string of pearls‘ are:

• Upgraded military facilities at Hainan Island.
• Upgraded airstrip at Woody Island.
• Container ship terminal in Chittagong.
• Naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.
• Deep water port at Sitte, Myanmar.
• Pipeline through Islamabad over Karakoram Highway to Kashgar in Xinjiang province to transport fuel to China.
• Intelligence gathering facilities on Coco Islands in Bay of Bengal near Malacca Straits.
• Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. (Balachandran, 2014)

China is already wooing most of India‘s neighbours, has struck thick friendly ties with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and these nations are eager to welcome China in the SAARC. As for Pakistan, it is the apple of China‘s eye (Joshi, 2006). China is eager for a greater say in the running of global institutions like United Nations or International Monetary Fund. China is already permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power (Burrows, 2014).

Never in history has one government controlled so much wealth (Reilly, 2013). As China‘s economic power might have grown, so too has its ability to use this power to advance geopolitical ends. China is correctly described as world‘s leading practitioner of geo-economics. China has been staying out of wars and political confrontations and zeroing on business. China‘s global influence far exceeds its existing economic strengths. Nations do not fear China‘s military strength but fear ability to give or withhold trade and investments (Gelb, 2010). Geo-economic statecraft cases by China for establishing dominance in Southeast and South Asia are discussed.

TAIWAN

China has picked off Taiwan‘s remaining international allies through a mix of economic measures, at the same time aiming plenty of geo-economic pressure directly at Taiwan (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). China supported reunification by pressurising Taiwan with full range of geo- economic instruments. China relies on strategy of economic encirclement and penetration to push for reunification. The one-China policy which proclaimed Taiwan as an inalienable part of China and countries cannot have relations with both China and Taiwan simultaneously served as a barrier and worked in favour of China. Because support for China‘s position on Taiwan is a prerequisite, for Chinese support or economic ties, many nations have acceded to China‘s one- China policy, leaving Taiwan with just twenty-two allies, mostly small nations in South America and Africa. China is also hinting at willingness to use economic sanctions against countries that recognise Taiwan‘s de facto independent status (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). In June 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed with the aim of establishing a systematic mechanism for enhancing cross-strait economic cooperation. Taiwan has made available more than 400 sectors to Chinese investment including manufacturing, services, public construction and finance (Xinhua, 2010).

NORTH KOREA

With North Korea, China has a close and complicated alliance. With North Korea becoming difficult to control, China has moved beyond its reliance on economic aid towards a fuller batter of energy, trade and investment and monetary tools to keep North Korea in line (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). China through bilateral assistance to North Korea, which is almost entirely geopolitical in design and objective, has dictated the terms of North Korea‘s stability and its economic relations with the outside world. Expanding Chinese influence in the region is modus operandi for China‘s assistance to North Korea (Nanto and Manyin, 2010). China accounts for between 65 and 85 per cent of North Korea‘s total trade volume (Xu and Bajoria, 2014). China is also North Korea‘s major food supplier. Fertilizer aid totals average 200,000 tonnes per year while annual food aid from China crosses 2 million tonnes (Yeon-cheol and Hyun, 2013).

JAPAN:

With Japan, China has realised that only military strength will not suffice and hence it confronts Japan through geo-economic measures with all of them built to exploit Japanese dependence on China‘s manufacturing and consumer base (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). Relations between China and Japan, typically characterised as ―warm economic ties, cold political relations‖ have become politically cold and economically cool‖ (Chao, 2013, 2014). China has employed the geo-economic statecraft readily and punitively in getting its message to Japan. Behind China‘s use of geo-economic tools towards Japan lie two fundamental geopolitical objectives. First is protecting Chinese claims to territorial sovereignty. Once driven by the desire to develop oil and natural gas reserves around the islands, China‘s claims to the disputed Diaoyu / Senkaku islands now carry the notions of regional strength.(Economist, 2013). Second, China‘s efforts to pressure Japan geo-economically are to weaken strength of Japan‘s alliance with U.S.A.

China has cut trade flows to Japan amid political disputes. China announced 40 to 60 per cent cut in annual quota of automobile imports from Japan after testimonies in a Tokyo court about World War II germ warfare research conducted by Chinese nationals (Marquand, 2001a, 2001b). When Japanese history textbooks discussed Japan‘s wartime atrocities against China, China engineered huge anti Japan demonstrations and consumer boycotts dealing a economic blow (Watts, 2005). Economic retaliations manifested in other mediums also like stricter inspections of Japanese goods imported by sea, delays in approval of work visas of Japanese, Japanese firms being asked to withdraw from trade fair at Chengdu (Agence France Presse, 2012; Japan Times, 2012; Investors Business Daily, 2012). Chinese banking and financial officials withdrew from the annual World Bank IMF meeting held in October 2012 in Tokyo (Reilly, 2013).

China has used regulation of commodity trade flows to influence actions surrounding the Diaoyu / Senkaku territorial disputes. China retaliated by halting shipments of rare earth oxides, rare earth salts and pure rare earth metals to Japan (Bradsher, 2010; Drezner, 2010; Krugman, 2010). These materials are crucial components for Japanese industries and manufacturing. China also incentivised foreign companies reliant upon rare earths to move their production centres and technology to China in exchange for low cost supply of rare earths. Two leading Japanese companies, Hitachi Metals and Toyota relocated their plants to China (Inoue and Gordon, 2011).

China chose to strike out at Japan through geo-economics rather than through military action and achieved far more through smartly adapting geo-economic coercion than it could have obtained through other means, also signaling that China was not afraid to take on a U.S. treaty ally.

China also used cyber tools to weaken Japanese territorial claims. Shortly after cyber- attacks on Japanese parliament in the summer of 2011, Chinese hackers attacked Japanese commercial firms stealing information pertaining to defence equipment, nuclear power plant design and safety from Japan‘s Mitsubhishi Heavy Industries (Asahi Shimbun, 2011). China denied having any hand despite Japan finding Chinese language script in both instances of hacking.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

China‘s leverage in the region is helped by strong bilateral trade levels. Trade between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reached $ 350 billion in 2013. In the year bilateral trade reached $ 36.4 billion with the Philippines, $ 40 billion with Vietnam, $ 60 billion with Indonesia. China‘s emergence as the most important trade and investment partner for virtually all Southeast Asia lends a preemptive, foreshadowing quality to any geo-economically coercive threats China may issue (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). China‘s geo-economic efforts in Southeast Asia in addition to policing territorial disputes, have been also pinned on the broader goal of disrupting and supplanting U.S. influence (Zakaria, 2013).

CAMBODIA

In December 2009, under heavy pressure from China and despite UN objections, Cambodia agreed to deport twenty ethnic Uighurs seeking asylum back to China to face prosecution in connection with the violent antigovernment protests that had occurred in Xinjiang months earlier. Shortly, China‘s vice president, Xi Jinping, arrived in Phnom Penh bearing gifts: $ 1.2 billion in grants and loans (Reilly, 2013). The U.S. State Department responded to the Cambodia‘s decision by scuttling a shipment of 200 military trucks to Cambodia (Reilly, 2013). Three weeks later, China sent 257 trucks (Reilly, 2013). China pledged $ 2.7 billion worth of loans and grants in 2012. When Cambodia took its turn as ASEAN Chair, China‘s benevolence paid off. Cambodia used its power as chair of ASEAN to block a joint statement criticising China‘s approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

PHILIPPINES

In 2012, the Philippines came for geo-economic treatment amid territorial disputes with China. After a Philippine naval ship attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen working off a disputed area, China refused to allow 150 containers of bananas to enter its markets, claiming that the bananas were ̳crawling with insects‘. This was a symbolic move with the suggestion of more to come. It hit the core of the agricultural sector in Philippines and cost the farmers around $ 760,000. Chinese also slowed down the inspection of papayas, mangoes, coconuts and pineapples from Philippines. This targeted geo-economic steps dealt a substantial blow to the Philippine exports as more than 30 percent of local fruits go to China (Glaser, 2012).

VIETNAM

Vietnam has softened its approach to territorial claims as a result of what has happened to Philippines. China‘s economic hold over Vietnam is such that it remains more vulnerable than Philippines to Chinese coercion. Vietnam is dependent on China for rubber and major Chinese imports are used in goods Vietnam ultimately exports. China‘s claims are aggressive against Vietnam, threatening 70 percent of Vietnam‘s exclusive economic zone, when the country is reliant on fishing as a food source.

INDONESIA

In Indonesia, China‘s geo-economic influence is partly aimed at checking Indonesia‘s desire to play a leading role in Southeast Asia (Poling, 2013). China timed investment deals to coincide with October 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bali and the two sides signed $ 28 billion worth of investment agreements, with bilateral trade exceeding $ 50 billion annually.

MALAYSIA

Two new Malaysia – China industrial parks were launched in 2013, Kuantan Industrial Park and Qinzhou Industrial Park. These deals solidified Malaysia‘s place China‘s ―maritime silk road‖ allowing China to stake a claim to the Malacca Strait, challenging the United States‘ geopolitical advantage in those waters (Jiao and Yunbi, 2013)

INDIA and PAKISTAN

In South Asia, with both India and Pakistan, after decades of military dynamics largely dictating the mood between China, India and Pakistan – nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, border skirmishes between China and India, Chinese military aid to Pakistan – China has now come to rely more on geo-economics in its dealings with both the countries. This includes budget support and pipeline politics directed at Pakistan and blocking multilateral aid to India amid tensions of territorial disputes. It also includes solidifying Pakistan‘s place in China‘s New Silk Route (Blackwell and Harris, 2016).

When it comes to China‘s current relationship with India and Pakistan, China – Pakistan relationship can only be understood within context of each‘s relationship with India (Diplomat, 2013). Pakistan was one of the first countries to end official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, initiating start of an enduring friendship between China and Pakistan. China‘s relation with India has swung from friendship in 1950s to confrontation that escalated in the border war of 1962 to various forms of conflict and cooperation in 1990s that continue today (Wagner, 2012).

China and Pakistan have long valued each other as a strategic hedge against India (Sengupta, 2010). As this triangle has grown deeper and more complex, it has also come to rely more on geo-economic strategies. Chinese leaders appreciate that if China is to expand its influence vis-à-vis India or Pakistan, without escalating military tensions or regional rivalries between them, which would inevitably draw in United States much of what they have at their disposal is geo-economic in nature (Macfie, 2013; Blackwell and Harris, 2016). The reason behind China‘s greater focus on geo-economic ties with India and Pakistan is that India has become economically and politically valuable to China to risk intensifying tensions (Blackwell and Harris, 2016).

China has played a major role in building up Pakistan‘s defence capabilities by supplying arms factories and weapon systems (Shahzad, 2013). But China turning to geo-economics in its relationship with Pakistan is due to limitations to its traditional military means. United States has overshadowed China‘s military contribution since 9/11. U.S. – Pakistan relations have grown dramatically as they collaborated in the war on terror (Jetley, 2012). U.S. designated Pakistan as a non- NATO ally and sent it massive economic and military aid as a front line state in the war on terror. U.S. military aid totaled $ 15.8 billion between 2002 to 2012 (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2013). Hence, China is likely to gain more strategic influence in Pakistan through geo-economic means (Blackwell and Harris, 2016).

China‘s dealings with India and Pakistan seem increasingly motivated by a silent fourth party: the United States. Pakistan is an enduring serious problem for U.S. foreign policy. For China, having strong ties with one of Americans‘ greatest geopolitical headaches is itself considerable source of leverage over United States (Blackwell and Harris, 2016).

China‘s interest in Pakistan as an indirect hedge against United States is heightened by the fact that India and the United States have been steadily transforming their relationships since 2001. On his 2014 visit to India, the then Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel quantified the U.S. – Indian partnership by noting ―Since 2008, over $ 9 billion in defense contracts have been signed between United States and India, compared with less than $ 500 million for all the years prior‖ (Blackwell and Harris, 2016).

Chinese anxieties at the warming ties between India and United States surfaced in May 2013 when the Chinese premier Li, shortly after taking office, made a visit to India, his first trip outside China. In a press conference of Li‘s trip, China did little to hide its concerns. ―We would not like to see India become a tool of other major countries, especially the U.S. to counterbalance or check or contain China‖. Li‘s trip itself was a display of China‘s power of geo-economics. Li, travelling along with forty-one Chinese companies in tow, called on the two countries to do more business together instead of relying on others for development (Daniel and Singh, 2013).

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor marks one of China‘s ambitious efforts to keep Pakistan within China‘s sphere of influence. With a total investment of $46 billion, it is a centre- piece of China‘s New Silk Road initiative (Aftab, 2014). As a part of the agreement, China has promised to enhance transportation and trade by constructing an airport at Gwadar as well as renovating roads from Lahore and Karachi and upgrading the rail system. Other long-term initiatives are building two 1100 megawatt nuclear power plants near Karachi under a $ 9 billion deal, financed largely through concessional loan from China and developing Gwadar as a major international oil port between Middle East and East Asia, as well as Specialised Economic Zones modeled on China‘s Shanghai free trade zone. The planned corridor will originate at Gwadar and pass through the Karakoram highway in Pakistan before going to the Pakistan – China border and on to Urumqi and Western China (Aftab, 2014). On completion more than one quarter of China‘s foreign trade will travel through the corridor (Clover and Hornsby, 2015). Built by China, the Gwadar port will be a nexus between Pakistan, Iran, China and Central Asian States. It will be under the control of China Overseas Ports Holding Company, ensuring that the entire control will remain firmly under the Chinese influence (Perlez, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). This will also bypass South China Sea choke points and minimizing the distance of Chinese shipping. The aim of China‘s New Silk Road is to reduce China‘s dependence on maritime trade routes that remain under control of the U.S. Navy. The China – Pakistan Economic Corridor will allow Chinese goods to travel overland to Pakistan before embarking for Europe at Gwadar. China announced in 2015 that it will construct a 2000 km power line from Xinjiang province to Lahore by 2020.

Another variant of geo-economic display by China is simply undermining Indian political will when it comes to territorial disputes still simmering along the Sino-Indian border. In 2009, China has blocked approximately $3 billion in multilateral aid to India in 2009 (Blair, 2009).

India and China have viewed each other‘s influence in South Asia as a competing one, rather than complimentary. India‘s late entry in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation only came together with that of Pakistan. China‘s desire to become member of SAARC is and will continue to be heavily contested by India. India also views China‘s growing strategic influence with its immediate neighbours Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal with caution (Rabbani Khar, 2016).

India is turning more towards geo-economics led foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Jaishankar, 2014). There are reasons to think that India‘s nascent geo-economic instinct is partly in response to China‘s geo-economic statecraft (Balazs, 2015). India‘s ―Act East‖ policy as an upgrade to ―Look East‖ policy comes as an effort to strengthen strategic and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries that would possibly act as counterweight to influence of China in the Region (Jacob, 2014). India and China may look to economics as a means to anchoring relations amid rising geopolitical struggles. China needs big Indian markets, while India looks for Chinese investments to build transit and other infrastructure critical for its own revival (Sahoo, 2014). ―Acrimony over borders and geopolitical rivalry in the region notwithstanding, trade will be the centerpiece of India‘s policy towards China‖ (Sahoo, 2014).

BANGLADESH

China‘s trade levels with Bangladesh have surpassed India‘s trade numbers with Bangladesh. China has provided Bangladesh with military hardware, economic assistance and technical support (Aneja, 2006). Chinese has ambitions to tie Bangladesh into the network of port, pipeline and road links that feed resources into China. Chinese funds have been allocated to upgrade Chittagong port facility, to finance highway between Chittagong and Kuming, China via Mynamar and to fund construction of deep sea port at Sondia (Aneja, 2006).

SRI LANKA

China‘s exports to Sri Lanka, at $4 billion, are coming closer to India‘s. In past three years, China has disbursed up to $2.5 billion in large infrastructure projects such as an airport and a port in Sri Lanka (Khurana, 2008). In 2013, this relationship was declared as Strategic Cooperative Partnership. China is underwriting the modernisation of Sri Lanka ports as trans- shipment hubs for its exports. China invested $1.5 billion in Colombo‘s port complex (Khanna, 2016). Under former President Rajapaksa, infrastructure and weapons made Sri Lanka China‘s ally in the Indian Ocean, as they helped terminate the country‘s civil war. The current president, Maithripala Sirisena, warned Sri Lankans that Rajapaksa had put Sri Lanka on the path to becoming a colony of China, to which it owes more than $8 billion (Khanna, 2016). Sri Lanka is situated on the East-West Shipping lane, where all goods shipped from Europe, Africa and the Middle East have to pass to reach East Asia. China provided $360 million for development of Hambantota port by signing agreement on 12th March 2007 between Sri Lanka Ports Authority, Consortium of China Harbor Engineering Company Lid. and Sino Hydro Corporation Limited.

NEPAL

China sees Nepal as a strategic location for its geo-political objectives in South Asia. Nepal is crucial from Beijing‘s security perspective because of frequent protest movements and vulnerable conditions in Tibet. Greater trade and commercial contacts with Nepal has been the principal objective in China‘s recent policy towards Nepal. China has signed a $1.6 billion agreement to develop the West Seti hydro power plant in Nepal. Nepal has shown greater support and affiliation with China, which was evidenced in Nepal‘s open support for China‘s application for ―observer status‖ in SAARC. More recently, Nepal has also not openly opposed the prospect of China becoming a ―full member‖ in SAARC. Nepal and China signed Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation where China agreed to provide 1 billion RMB and technical cooperation for restoration of earthquake-damaged infrastructures. Nepal and China have reached Framework Agreement on Promotion of Investment and Economic Cooperation which seeks to bring in investment from the Chinese private sector for infrastructure development in Nepal. Nepal and China have also exchanged letters on oil and gas resources exploration in Nepal.

MYANMAR

China supported the ruling military junta and was its biggest ally for decades investing in infrastructure, hydropower dams and twin oil and gas pipelines to help feed Southern China‘s growing energy needs, before the army backed government came to power in 2011. Myanmar is on path to democratisation and is gradually aligning with Western powers. China is concerned that Myanmar may become an ally of the United States. As early as 1991, naval facilities at Hianggyi and Akyab have been the subject of speculation as to the nature of Chinese involvement (Roy-Chaudhury, 1995). Many observers viewed Myanmar‘s position as geostrategic; an ocean outlet through Myanmar would allow resources to flow into China without passing through the vulnerable waters of the Malacca Strait. The port at Sitwe is seen as an input into Yunan province and as potential naval base. The Chinese are funding road links from Sitwe to Yunan province and building oil pipeline from Sitwe to Yunan (Khurana, 2008).

AFGHANISTAN

China is the largest single country investor in Afghanistan. The Aynak copper mine alone has the potential to give up to $400 million in royalties to Afghanistan annually. Afghanistan‘s keenness on China‘s involvement can be seen by President Ghani made Beijing one of his first destinations after being elected (Rabbani Khar, 2016).

The fundamental question, after the analysis of the cases is, Does geo-economic pressure work for China? The answer is yes. It has been successful in advancing Chinese geopolitical interests. Geo-economic success is sometimes exaggerated with respect to China as there are internal tensions which are running through China‘s attempts to use geo-economics to advance geopolitical aims (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). China‘s geo-economic performance is about advantage of size and speed. As former foreign minister Yang Jiechi puts it ―China is a big country and other countries are small countries may work to its advantage in using economic instruments in pursuit of the country‘s geopolitical objectives‖ (Pomfret, 2010). China‘s use of geo-economic instruments has produced a robust diplomatic tool to shape other nation‘s policies. ―By buying companies, exploiting natural resources, building infrastructure, giving loans all over the world, China is pursuing a soft but unstoppable form of economic domination‖ (Araujo and Cardenal, 2013).

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