For most authors, India – China relations revolve around boundary dispute or border wars.

Moreover, most base their thinking on historical accounts. For neo-liberals, India and China are driven to secure support of other powers to maximize their interest in the condition of anarchy.1 Many earlier studies assumed that any improvement of relations between Indo –China would involve settlement of boundary disputes.2 Here India needs to get first hand pulse of China for formulating China Policy instead of relying on western sources and thinking.3

Constructivists depend on the perception studies. Robert Jervis has identified perception on a variable in analyzing international politics and foreign policy.4 Here, the common forms of misperception being centralization, over estimating one‘s importance as influence and target, the influence of desire and fears on perceptions and cognitive dissonance.

The threat perception could be an expected of harm to assets values of the state.5 Here the assets might be in the areas of military economic, strategic, National Sovereignty and national prestige. There are three major sources of threat perception. Historical enmity, where historical memories help to transform vague suspicion into concrete hostility.6 Besides, existence of historical enmity will often amplify present perceptions of threat.7 Here 1962 Indo – China war looms large.

Secondly, threat perception in a sense of separate identity. Since a state identity informs its interest and preference, states which do not hold shared identity are uncertain as to each other‘s intentions and plots.8 like communist regime and democratic state.

Thirdly, a power gap between competing states could lead to threat perception.9

The realistic draw attention to another phenomenon. The communist party of China endorses Hong Kong based newspaper article – Six wars to be taught by China in next 50 years‘. This article10 states, unification of Taiwan in 2020-25, re – conquest of Spartly island in 2020-25, re conquest of Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) in 2035-40, re conquest if Senkuku and RyuKyu island in 2040-50 and sixth war, taking back lands lost to Russia in 2055-60.

China‘s internal ministry has approved a ―Map of China‖, to be taught in elementary schools in China, which encompasses Taiwan, East China Sea, almost entire South China Sea, entire Indo – China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, entire North – East India, parts of J & K, parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and parts of Iran and almost entire Central Asian Republics as extent of China‖. While not reading too much from the map, the very idea that it is being taught in the elementary schools is a cause of concern.12

The perceptions of intent one becoming increasing important as geography may not offer clear guidance.13

The offensive realists have a different perspective. They have different assumptions.14 Assumptions:

• The international system is anarchical. There is no Government over Government(5)
• Great Power inherently possess some offensive military capability(6)
• States can never be certain about other state intentions(7)

Survival is the primary goal of power(8)

Great actors are rational power(9)

̳The only way to survive in this kind of system is to gain power. Defensive realists would try to maintain status – quo, but for offensive realists states would like to become egemonic. The quantum of power would depend upon how power is distributed. In any case, a revisionist power would not like another growing power in the same region, else it would get entangled in the regional completion.(10)

And therefore, China may not like India to be another power center in the same region, another peer power in south Asia. Hence, Dragon‘s rise may not be peaceful.

People Republic of China is not accommodating India:

• Ideological / Normative Accommodation: Communist China Vs democratic India
• Territorial Accommodation: Boundary dispute & C – PEC.
• Economic Accommodation: Protectionism and trade deficit
• Institutional Accommodation: Permanent membership of UNSC & NSC for India.

Various scholars have put forth different major to deal with the threat:

• 1. Balancing: Internal balancing is to increase ones‘ own strength and reduce vulnerability; external balancing is used to ally with states which share common concern.15 One has to be careful, not to trigger security dilemma while pursuing internal balancing or else it may start arms race.

For Stephen Walt,18 Balance of threat is more fundamental than Balance of Power Theory. T.V. Paul has suggested Soft Balancing, which is based on tacit balancing short of formal alliances. The features of Soft balancing are limited arms building, ad hoc co-operative exercises or collaborations in regional or international institutions.17

2. Band wagoning the Perceived Threat:

Weak and Small states are more likely to jump on the bandwagon as per Kenneth Waltz.18

3. Constructive Engagement: Conducting confidence building measures as per Krepton. Threat perceptions can vary in terms of intensity. David Singh and Zrev Maoz have attempted to quantify this. Depending upon the situation the activities could be planned.

The author has used Delphi technique to develop scenarios. There have been 37 respondents from multidisciplinary backgrounds and technique used was Cross Impact Analysis using Scenario Wizard 4.2 software. The output is as attached. Four internally consistent Scenarios were developed.

Here, the author is not claiming that the confrontation is inevitable, but while strategizing,19 multifuture robustness need to be ensured and however low the probability, 20 undesirable and catastrophic outcomes should be avoided.

Some of the suggestions could be,

• Internal balancing
• Frustrating Chinese attempts for CPEC
• As China is taking active interest in IOR, India should consider the possibility of engaging with nations in South China Sea.
• Engaging economically with ASEAN
• Extending soft & hard power to nations around China
• Improving relations with US, Russia and Japan

References:

• Tien – sze Fang, ̳Asymmetrical, Threat perception in India – China relations‘, Oxford University Press, 2014, India
• Rao, Gondker Naveyana, The India – China Border: a repraisal, Asia Publishing House, 1968, India
• Singh, Bhartendu Kumar, ―India –China relations: rising together‘, McMilan Publication, 2011, New Delhi, India
• Jerus, Robert, ̳Perception and misperception in international politics‘, Princeton University Press, 1976, U.S.A.
• Maoz, Zeev, ̳National Choices and international processes‘, Cambridge University Press, 1990, U.K.
• Singer J. David, ̳Threat perception and the armament – tension dilemma‘, Journal of Conflict reservation‘, 1958, U.S.A.
• Buzan, Barry,‘et.al, ‘Security, a new framework for analysis‘, Lynne Rienner Publication, 1998, U.S.A.
• Roussean, David, ‘Identifying threats and Threatening identity, ̳Stanford University Press, 2006, U.S.A.
• Tien – sze Fang, ̳Asymmetrical, Threat perception in India – China relations‘, Oxford University Press, 2014, India
• Wen Wei Po, ̳Six wars to be fought by China‘, Hong Kong Dailly, 8.7.2013
• Asian expansion, The historical experiences of polity expansion of Asia by Geoff Wade
• Gen. P.G. Kamath, ̳Strategising for a two Trent war‘, War College Journal, 2015, India
• Walt, Stephen, ̳The origins of alliance‘, Cornell University Press, 1987, London, U.K.
• Mearsheimer, J.J., ̳The tragedy of great power politics‘, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, New York, U.S.A.
• Buzan, Barry,‘et.al, ‘Security, a new framework for analysis‘, Lynne Rienner Publication, 1998, U.S.A.
• Walt, Stephen, ̳The origins of alliance‘, Cornell University Press, 1987, London, U.K.
• 17. Paul T.V., ̳Soft balancing in the age of US Primacy‘, International Security, 2005, U.S.
• Waltz Kenneth, ̳ Theory of international politics‘, McGraw Hill, 1979, U.S.A.
• Rosenhead, Jonathan, ̳Robustness analysis‘, John Wily & Sons, 1989, New York
• Ibid