Abstract -

Chemical weapons have remained a paramount part of unconventional warfare for decades. Though these weapons were banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention which came into force in 1997, they have been observed to have played crucial roles in conflicts globally. The Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the apex body which ensures that the countries which have signed and ratified the treaty, abide by its clauses. Notwithstanding this, independent think tanks have repeatedly claimed that variegated agents outlawed by this accord have been used by both state and non-state actors in several wars globally. The most significant case remains the alleged usage of these weapons in the devastating civil war which had ravaged Syria over the past decade and a half. Most of these attacks have been attributed to the erstwhile Baathist regime led by Bashar al Assad. However, he has denied employing these measures. Numerous instances were also said to have been brought about by the terrorist organisation - the Islamic State. Analysing these examples reveals the fundamental issue of the proliferation of these weapons in spite of the CWC and their wanton usage by rogue non-state actors like ISIS. Therefore, this paper aims to study these incidents, comprehend the lacunae in multilateral frameworks which enabled them and suggest measures on remedying them. The paper relies upon credible secondary data sources like renowned think tanks, governments, multilateral bodies like the OPCW, etc. The methodology adopted is analytical, critical and interpretive driven by a thorough qualitative analysis of extant literature.

Introduction -

The Chemical Weapons Convention, a landmark accord which put in place a blanket ban on the development and usage of chemical weapons was opened for signatures on the 13th of January 1993 and was enforced from the 29th of April 1997 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.). All State parties were also required to destroy the stockpiles of such armament in their possession. Much before this agreement was even conceived, restrictions on such weapons had been established by certain humanitarian law documents of the 19th century, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Rome Statute which founded the ICC (Becker-Jakob, 2019). The Syrian Arab Republic was not a signatory to the CWC. This pointed to the existence of a covert weapons programme which had remained beyond the scrutiny of international bodies like the OPCW. Reports of their usage in 2012, barely a year after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the admission by the then Syrian foreign minister that his country possessed these arms, led to calls for Syria to be integrated into the CWC as a State Party to enable greater and more extensive examination of its weapons programme and prohibit its usage, especially against civilians (Becker-Jakob, 2019). Subsequently, attacks rose and most of them were attributed to the Assad regime including those at Ghouta and Khan Sheikhoun (Human Rights Watch, 2017). However the focus of this paper is not only on its usage by state actors but also by a non-state actor like ISIS which has utilised such weaponry zealously. The OPCW recognised ISIL as the perpetrator of the chemical attack in Marea in 2015 (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2024).

It is, therefore, necessary to examine this series of attacks to internalise the predicaments facing the security architecture which outlaws’ chemical weapons and the shortcomings which led to the ubiquitous usage of such weaponry in the Syrian civil war. This conflict is by no means the only one to have witnessed the ascendance of this sort of warfare, yet it is certainly the most well documented instance of chemical warfare in the modern era. It is also unique for being the most significant case depicting the employment of such tactics by a non-state terror actor like ISIL. After a thorough study, the drawbacks in nonproliferation frameworks like the CWC and its investigative mechanisms will be underlined which would be followed by measures suggested for the rectification of these lacunae. Though the Syrian civil war is definitely not the only episode of chemical warfare in recent history, it is certainly the most vastly researched and meticulously recorded one. Therefore, this occurrence has been cited to facilitate exhaustive analysis.

The paper will remain focused primarily on reviewing the empirical evidence, devoid of partisanship, and structuring a narrative which clearly demonstrates the failures of multilateral bodies like the OPCW and UNSC in preventing the proliferation and utilisation of chemical weapons in Syria alongside the suggestion of measures to ameliorate the same.

Background of the Syrian civil war -

Bashar al Assad, the son of Hafez al Assad, seized power after his father's demise in 2000 and promised an economic renaissance of the Levantine nation. However, his programme of rolling back certain tenets of Arab socialism did not transpire into success and the unemployment resulting from this economic turmoil translated into widespread discontent. The proverbial spark which ignited the fire was the self immolation of a Tunisian fruit seller named Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010, which led to massive protests across West Asia (Lageman, 2020). Syria witnessed its own moment of reckoning when fifteen boys painted anti regime graffiti on a school wall at Deraa, which led to their arrest and torture (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). These protests intensified in 2011 as opposition forces coalesced to form umbrella bodies like the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council (Plofchan, 2014). The crackdown by regime forces instigated greater anger against it and eventually crystallised the opposition to the Assad government. The resistance transformed itself into a militancy with the formation of terror organisations like the Jabhat al Nusra in 2012 (Plofchan, 2014). The splintering of the opposition into numerous autonomous and often mutually opposed outfits ensured the continuance of a sanguinary civil war with multifarious stakeholders and contradictory interests. This is due, in large part, to the fissiparous tendencies of the Syrian populace, perpetually divided along the lines of ethnicity and sect. The meteoric rise of the Islamic State in Syria too is a symptom of this phenomenon as it consolidated its support amongst the Salafist sections of Syrian society.

The sectarian polarisation intensified with the intervention of foreign players into this conflict. Assad, an Alawite, was assisted by the Shia forces of Iran and Hezbollah, which considered the Alawites an offshoot of Shiaite Islam and hence regarded Assad as an ally. The Shia-Sunni schism was also starkly visible in the conflicts between the regime and Daesh as also other Sunni dominated outfits like the Hayat Tahrir al Sham. American aid to opposition forces like the Kurdish SDF coupled with Russian operations in support of the regime, internationalised this civil war (Mellen, 2019). Turkish anxieties over the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish entity on its borders prompted it and its proxies to undertake unilateral military action in order to stave off this emerging phenomenon (Phillips, 2026). The decimation of Daesh had been perceived as a success of multilateral efforts to ensure its downfall and the resultant situation was predicted to remain a stalemate. However, the lightning offensive launched by the HTS under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al Jolani in December 2024, ravaged the Assad regime and ousted Assad from power (Zelin, 2024). The subsequent developments have led to the evisceration of the Kurdish AANES and conflicts between the regime and Druze minorities (Aftandilian, 2026 ; Al Jazeera, 2025). The country has also witnessed increased Israeli military action in its south western region (Chouiref & Junaidi, 2026).

Thus, the situation in Syria is far from stable. The demise of the Assad regime has in no way led to the establishment of peace and sectarian conflict remains rife. As the Americans withdraw from Syria after over a decade of active involvement in the affairs of the nation, regional players are jostling for control over the region (Todman & Yacoubian, 2026). While Riyadh attempts to engage President al Sharaa, Turkish and Israeli security interests are bound to collide in the functioning of an HTS government. The purpose of recounting this was not to provide a thorough understanding of the civil war, which needs both exhaustive research and unhindered examination but to proffer a cursory understanding of the variegated state and non-state actors in the civil war, their conflicting interests and how these dynamics shaped the region for more than a decade. This overview, it is hoped, will help in comprehending the nitty-gritties of the instances of chemical warfare which would be delineated in further sections. The ruthlessness demonstrated in the actions of these stakeholders remains crucial to understanding the usage of chemical weaponry in the war. The inherent morality or the lack of it amongst these actors is a moot point. Their utilisation of such weaponry, in flagrant violation of established international norms and precedents, reveals the scant respect that such laws entail in matters of vital military interests. It also points to the employment of offensive realism by these players in the pursuits of their interests.

History of chemical weapons development in Syria -

The Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the Geneva Protocol (1925) in 1968, thereby agreeing to comply with its norms requiring the abdication of both first and retaliatory uses of any form of chemical or biological agent in warfare (Feickert et al, 2013). Since these assurances did not cover the production or acquisition of such weapons, the state is believed to have received its first tranche of chemical weapons from Egypt in the period 1972-73 in the lead up to the Yom Kippur war of 1973 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008). Reports from well established American think tanks state that the Syrian government obtained either sarin and mustard or mustard only with other reportage pointing to the alleged discovery of certain chemical agents by Israeli forces in the aftermath of the Syrian defeat in the Yom Kippur war (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008).

The Republic had significant stockpiles of Sarin and had begun extensive research to develop the agent VX, while parallelly working towards the production of SCUD missiles meant to deliver these weapons in the forms of warheads or air dropped bombs (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). Allegations were also made that the Syrian Baathist regime under the leadership of then President Hafez al Assad had employed cyanide gas in its military offensive on Hama in 1982, aimed at vanquishing a rebellion spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008). A US intelligence report from 1983 categorised the nation as a key recipient of Soviet assistance in the chemical weapons domain, thereby corroborating a similar report released in the previous year (Bruhl, 2013). Syria had also allegedly procured equipment and precursor chemicals from West European companies (Feickert et al, 2013). As Syria made a foray into unconventional warfare, it remained heavily dependent upon its benefactors for the acquisition of such weaponry. Therefore, Syria did not achieve meaningful indigenous capabilities for manufacturing such armaments during these decades.

Analysts from the USA and Israel have alleged that the Centre for Scientific Studies and Research under the Syrian Ministry of Defence was involved in the research and development of chemical weapons and stated that CW production facilities were present in the areas around Damascus, Homs and Aleppo with chemical warheads being built with assistance from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and technicians from West Europe (Diab, 1997). These observations are crucial in establishing the postulate that the Syrian programme was primarily a result of external assistance rather than indigenous innovation, at least in the formative years of this initiative. Defence department reports vindicated these claims and went on to further declare that Syria was years away from developing indigenous CW capabilities (Feickert et al, 2013). Through these years, it continued to receive assistance from the Soviets and when this flow of aid dried up, the Germans stepped in with their companies (Bruhl, 2013). While some companies remained ignorant of the final use of these materials, there is reason to believe that others deliberately overlooked conjecture surrounding this and proceeded to export tons of critical precursor dual - use chemicals like hydrogen fluoride and Sarin (Bruhl, 2013). A German magazine claimed that US officials had warned their German counterparts that firms from their country were involved in the establishment of a poison-gas factory near Aleppo (Diab, 1997). Apart from allegations of Russian support in the production of VX, which were vociferously denied by Moscow, Syria also allegedly procured critical materials from China and North Korea (Diab, 1997).

This covert CW programme was brought to the fore by a statement given by former CIA Director William Webster in front of a Senate Committee in 1989 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008). Testing of these capabilities was carried out in 1992 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008). The history of the development of the CW programme in Syria reveals that the assistance provided by state and non state actors was crucial in the regime's efforts to obtain and test these weapons. It also highlights a crucial void in the global CW arms control architecture which prevailed till the CWC was conceptualised and enforced. This void was a consequence of a loophole which persisted till the advent of the CWC and the subsequent outlawing of even the production, acquisition and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol only prohibited the use of these agents in warfare but was silent on the hoarding of these weapons by state actors. Ergo, every transaction which involved the sale or transfer of critical technology instrumental for the development of these weapons was completely legal, albeit covert in many cases. It also shows that the international community failed in deterring state actors like the Soviet Union and commercial entities like the aforementioned German companies from supplying such technology to the Syrian regime.

Instances of the usage of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war -

As the civil war ignited in 2011, concerns around the CW programme heightened. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson for the regime confirmed this speculation in 2012 and declared that the regime did indeed possess a CW programme, prompting then US President Barack Obama to issue a ‘red line’ pertaining to the movement and usage of these weapons (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The same year witnessed the first instance of the alleged usage of the chemical weapon Agent 15 by the regime in Homs, which was soon followed by two other alleged cases of the utilisation of chemical weapons in 2013 near Aleppo and Damascus (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). These two attacks were attributed to opposition forces by the Assad regime which proceeded to call for UN mandated investigations into these matters (Sen, 2018). Later that year, on August 21, Syria suffered the deadliest recorded chemical attack in history, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in the Damascus suburbs of Eastern and Western Ghouta (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The usage of the Syrian made 330mm wide surface to surface rockets and the Soviet manufactured 140mm wide surface to surface rockets in the delivery of the weapons grade nerve agent, most likely Sarin, to known opposition strongholds, points to the attack having been conducted by the Assad regime (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This massacre led to a rise in international scrutiny and opprobrium resulting in the Syrian government acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013 and making an initial declaration of its stockpile of weaponry which catalysed the formation of an OPCW-UN Joint Mission to deal with this issue (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). The Ghouta incident was a turning point in modern era discourse surrounding chemical warfare and the accompanying security challenges. It proved to be a turning point in ensuring increased international intervention and scrutiny of the Syrian civil war. The sheer scale and brutality of the Ghouta attack triggered widespread international condemnation and exposed the regime's CW programme to vituperative criticism from global actors including the UN and other multilateral bodies. Over 1144 individuals lost their lives, including 1119 civilians and 25 opposition combatants (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2023). The Ghouta casualties amount to around 76 percent of the cumulative victims from the chemical attacks which are believed to have taken place in Syria till 2023 (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2023).

The Eastern Ghouta attack was succeeded by a series of similar ones at Homs, Al-Ateiba, Khan al-Asl, Adra, Aleppo and Saraqeb (Priya, 2020). Data compiled by the Global Public Policy Institute suggest that there were nearly 336 chemical attacks documented in Syria till 2019, out of which an estimated 98 percent were carried out by regime forces while the rest were conducted by the Islamic State (Priya, 2020). Apart from repeated strikes on Aleppo and Ghouta, the regime allegedly carried out the largest coordinated CW attack since the Syrian accession to the CWC, in Khan Sheikhoun in 2017 through the means of an aircraft laden with Sarin (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Human Rights Watch also found evidence suggesting that the Islamic State had carried out 3 CW attacks using sulphur mustard and the opposition had carried out one assault involving chlorine (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The battle for Aleppo and the combat around Damascus also witnessed alleged chlorine attacks by Syrian regime forces (Human Rights Watch, 2017). These incessant CW offensives, testimonies by doctors and the OPCW finding trace amounts of Sarin and VX at a military facility in Syria, prompted the UNSC to pass Security Council Resolution 2235 in a bid to determine the parties responsible for these attacks (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). Notwithstanding the passage of this landmark resolution in 2015, the regime remained unfazed in leveraging its CW capabilities in military offensives targeting opposition strongholds. 2017 was a particularly brutal year with the regime allegedly carrying out Sarin attacks at Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib and Al Salaliyah and Jrouh in the Hama governorate (Priya, 2020). Military retaliation from the US in the aftermath of the Khan Sheikhoun attack also failed to debilitate Syrian capabilities significantly as the regime persisted in utilising its CW capabilities as seen in the repeated chlorine assaults on Douma, Damascus in the following year (Priya, 2020). The Douma attack marked the last major chemical attack carried out in Syria. The OPCW, in 2019, validated these claims while the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, established in 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council also concluded in 2018 that the government had employed one specific agent nearly four times that year (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). A report from 2019 asserted that nearly 91.5 percent of all chemical attacks in Syria since 2012 were chlorine bombs (Lombardo, 2019).

The third report of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism stands out as it named not only the regime for its attacks in Talmenes and Sarmin but also attributed the Marea sulphur mustard attack to the Islamic State (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). This attack, which took place on 1 September 2015, is believed to have been carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant from territory controlled by the terrorist organisation, through the means of artillery guns loaded with 122 mm projectiles primed to disperse a liquid payload across several locations in Marea (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2024). Daesh also reportedly executed mustard attacks in al Hasakah against the Kurdish YPG and against Assad's troops near Deir el Zour (Roul, 2017 ; Strack, 2017). Sulphur mustard was utilised by the terror outfit in attacks in Aleppo and Hama governorates (Roul, 2017). A 2016 analysis by IHS Markit pegged the number of chemical attacks by IS in Syria at 52 (Ynet, 2016). IS remains the sole non-state actor to have mastered the weaponisation of chemical agents and deployed them in active conflict in furtherance of its military objectives. Slain ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is believed to have personally sanctioned and encouraged the use of chemical weapons by members of his terrorist outfit (United Nations, 2023). This is plausible considering that the terror group was accused of carrying out mustard attacks against the Kurds in Kobani as early as 2014 by an Israeli think tank (Logan, 2014). Daesh began carrying out these assaults after the establishment of its ‘Caliphate’ in 2014 and the foundation of its CW production facility in Mosul and halted them only after the fall of Mosul in 2017 and the consequent loss of control over its facility in the Iraqi city (Strack, 2017). Reports state that the IS utilised sulphur-mustard, chlorine and other toxins delivered through artillery shells, missiles or improvised explosive devices with the terror outfit encouraging its members to develop such weaponry by using the Mosul University's chemical laboratories (Adkins, n.d.). These concerns were heightened when the IS took control of the Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex in Iraq which had been a crucial cog in the chemical weapons programme of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime (Logan, 2014). Though there were allegations that Daesh moved its facilities to Raqqa in Syria after the fall of Mosul, the frequency of its chemical offensives tapered off (Adkins, n.d.).

These quoted incidents highlight a few critical aspects of chemical warfare in Syria during the civil war. Firstly, it is apparent that the Syrian regime not only possessed a veritable arsenal of chemical agents but also utilised it in warfare even after the accession to the CWC. These actions, proven by multilateral institutions like the OPCW and the UN and bodies like the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the Fact Finding Mission, reveal that the Assad government was in clear violation of its commitments to both the Geneva Protocol and the CWC. It is also clear that the regime did not fully disclose the extent of its CW capabilities and chose to retain a significant portion of its weaponised arsenal and further deployed it in warfare with the goal of targeting opposition strongholds. However, as established above in the case of the 2013 Ghouta attack, most casualties were civilians with combatants constituting a minuscule amount of those affected. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that these attacks, apart from being blatantly in violation of international norms, did not yield any strategic dividend to the perpetrators. They only served to terrorise the population and worsen the festering discontent amongst the masses. These attacks also left the regime isolated from the global community and made it increasingly difficult for its international backers like Russia and Iran to defend their support to the Assad government. It can be argued that these CW assaults proved counter productive for they gave western powers, specifically the United States, a reason to intervene militarily in the civil war which resulted in the bolstering of forces opposed to Assad. The usage of CW capabilities by Daesh is another troubling aspect of this conflict. While the CWC is binding upon State Parties, it is silent on the acquisition, stockpiling and usage of chemical agents by non-state actors. The advent of the IS CW programme and the prolific utilisation of agents like sulphur-mustard exemplify the failure of the global chemical arms control frameworks. This facet of the chemical warfare in Syria sheds light on the lacunae inherent in preventing the proliferation of unconventional weaponry amongst terror outfits. That a proscribed nascent terrorist organisation like Daesh was able to not only produce these agents but also conduct sophisticated attacks against targets like the regime troops and YPG units should evoke disquiet globally. It points to the ease with which outlawed organisations can acquire deadly weapons and reiterates the need for the global community to strengthen multilateral enforcement mechanisms to avert such an eventuality.

Responses by multilateral institutions to this crisis -

The beginning of the civil war and reports surrounding the alleged instances of chemical warfare triggered reactions from state actors and multilateral bodies globally. This section delves into the actions undertaken by institutions, including the constitution of investigative mechanisms and their efficacy. The admission by the Syrian Foreign Ministry of the regime possessing chemical weapons and reports of their alleged usage in Homs in December 2012 and in Aleppo and Damascus in March 2013, led to heightened international scrutiny and prompted the regime to approach the UN to request an investigation into the March attacks (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). This was closely followed by requests from France and the United Kingdom, soliciting UN mandated investigations, culminating in the UN Secretary General announcing an investigation in conjunction with the WHO and the OPCW (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). While the Assad regime remained reluctant to allow widespread access to inspectors, the usage of chemical weapons in Ghouta in August 2013, widely attributed to the regime, and which resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths, forced the government to provide access to the site to UN inspectors (Sen, 2018). The Ghouta attack fundamentally transformed the landscape of the investigations. The UNSC convened an urgent meeting, the UNSG promised “a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation” into the attack and the OPCW Director General confirmed that OPCW experts had already reached the nation in conjunction with the UN inspections (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). While President Obama hinted at military strikes in the eventuality that diplomacy failed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that the Russian Federation had reached an agreement with the regime about the handover of its CW programme (Sen, 2018). The USA too agreed with the plan calling for the declaration of chemical weapons by the regime which would lead to their destruction and the eventual accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention (Sen, 2018). The OPCW and the UN were also granted permission to investigate all CW sites in the nation with thorough inspections mandated (Sen, 2018).

This accord was subsequently approved by the OPCW Executive Council and the UN Security Council passed a resolution supporting it (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). After the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the CWC in October 2013 and the initial declaration by the regime of its chemical weapon stockpiles, an OPCW-UN Joint Mission was established resulting in the complete removal and substantial obliteration of declared CWs by June 2014 (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). The regime had declared 41 CW facilities at 23 sites containing just under 1300 metric tonnes of chemical warfare agents (Gade, 2014). Most of the chemical weapons were shipped out of the Latakia port and later transferred to US Navy vessels to be destroyed by hydrolysis (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The OPCW constituted a Fact Finding Mission the same year as the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission came to an end (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). Before its mandate ended, the Joint Mission had undertaken the decimation of the equipment used for the production of chemical agents (Gade, 2014). One of the key accomplishments of the Fact Finding Mission was the report stating that chlorine had been used in attacks in Syria (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). Another major outcome of the FFM's reports was the first documented evidence of the use of chemical weapons by a non-state actor (Daesh) in the conflict (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The UNSC passed UNSCR 2235 in 2015, leading to the formation of a UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism whose mandate was renewed by the UNSCR 2319 in the following year (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). 2016 also witnessed a declaration by the OPCW stating that the last of the declared Syrian chemical weapons material had been destroyed (Sen, 2018). Reports filed by the UN-OPCW JIM in 2016 are considered a watershed development in the response by multilateral mechanisms owing to the fact that they categorically attributed blame to the alleged perpetrators of the chemical attacks. This was in stark contrast to previous reports which had resulted from investigations aimed primarily at establishing the facts of the attacks and not investigating the perpetrators of these assaults. The OPCW Executive Council passed a resolution censuring the usage of chemical weapons as reported by the JIM (Davenport & Kimball, 2023).

Russia and China vetoed a UNSC Resolution in early 2017 which aimed to impose sanctions on the Assad government over its use of chemical weapons (Sen, 2018). A devastating chemical attack followed this development in Khan Sheikhoun in April 2017 leading to an emergency UNSC meeting and unilateral military strikes by the US armed forces (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The UNSC attempted to pass a resolution condemning this attack and calling on the regime to provide full access to investigators which failed due to a veto by the Russian Federation (Davenport & Kimball, 2023).

The UNSC also remained unsuccessful in renewing and extending the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). Taking into account the expiration of the JIM, France spearheaded the creation of the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons to facilitate information sharing amongst partners and list individuals and entities sanctioned for the usage of chemical weapons (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The deadlock in the UNSC continued with US sponsored resolutions being blocked by Russia and the latter's resolutions being vetoed by the former. Meanwhile, the OPCW Fact Finding Mission commenced its investigations into the reports of chemical weapons attacks which took place on April 7, 2018 in Douma (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). The OPCW followed this up by instituting, in its fourth special session of the Conference of State Parties, measures which ensured that the chemical attacks identified by the Fact Finding Mission were properly attributed to the actors who conducted them and that they were held accountable (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2018).

The final report of the Fact Finding Mission revealed, with absolute certainty, that toxic agents had been used in the Douma 2018 attacks (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2019). A separate body known as the Investigation and Identification Team was also formed in the period of 2018-2019 (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). Reports filed by this body culminated in the OPCW attributing multiple attacks in 2017 to the Assad regime and calling for the declaration of its CW facilities along with its stockpiles, especially those linked to the abovementioned attacks, in under 90 days (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2020). Consequently, the OPCW convened the 25th Session of the Conference of State Parties in 2021 wherein it suspended certain rights and privileges enjoyed by the Syrian Arab Republic (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). CWC State Parties further agreed to impose, on Syria, export control measures pertaining to certain chemicals and technologies in 2023 (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, paved the way towards renewed dialogue between the Syrian authorities and the OPCW with the latter recommending a 9 point action plan to normalise ties (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, n.d.). The ascendance of the HTS regime under President Ahmed al Sharaa has transformed the ties between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic. The meeting held between the Director General of the body and President Sharaa reaffirmed this transformation (Mimran & Shamay, 2025). UN officials reported to the Security Council that their inspectors have discovered chemical weapons and facilities previously undeclared by the Assad regime (United Nations, 2026). The Sharaa regime has expressed its willingness to participate in the complete dismantling of the CW programme and the elimination of the remnants of the Assad era chemical weapons (Kimball, 2026).

The multilateral bodies constituted by the UN and OPCW were fairly successful in their mandate. They irrefutably established the facts pertaining to the chemical attacks and attributed blame to the perpetrators. Their reports were instrumental in ensuring that the UNSC and the international community were seized of the facts and applied measures to ensure compliance. The possible lacunae in these institutions have been deliberated upon in the following section.

Frailties in multilateral infrastructure -

It is necessary now to examine the shortcomings in multilateral frameworks which enabled the unprecedented rise of chemical warfare in Syria. The paramount reason remains the vast chasm in the timing of the emergence of the CWC as opposed to the NPT. The latter was contrived in 1968 and enforced in 1970 while the former was opened for signatures in 1993 and only came into force in 1997. Although the existence of the Geneva Protocol is widely considered as having delayed the need for the creation of the CWC, an important distinction in the clauses of both treaties remains the wellspring of the extensive Syrian chemical weapons programme. As stated above, the Geneva Protocol only banned the deployment of these chemical agents in warfare while remaining silent on the development and production of them by signatories. The Syrian regime exploited this loophole and persisted in its CW programme while maintaining plausible deniability. Therefore, it was able to develop and stockpile large amounts of Sarin, chlorine and VX without facing any meaningful international censure. While it maintained a stipulated level of secrecy about its operations, the regime was confident that it could justify itself legally if its clandestine actions were brought to light. It was evident that the simultaneous development of both the chemical agents as well as SCUD missile variants capable of delivering them constituted a single, well-defined push towards the attainment of a cutting edge militarised chemical weapons programme.

A universal mandate to accede to the CWC would have perhaps, it is believed, ensured that the regime refrained from acquiring these agents in the first place. Another issue pertaining to the CWC needs to be highlighted. If it is argued that the regime would have been deterred by this accession, it is necessary to establish that this effect occurred after the eventual accession in 2013. That is, as stated above, not possible. While the scale of the attacks in terms of casualties had declined in the aftermath of the regime becoming a member of the CWC, the sheer frequency of the attacks actually rose. This is testimony to the fact that the regime gradually became far more brazen in its CW offensives, in face of increasing opposition from the global community.

It would suffice to say that lacunae in several multilateral frameworks and bodies have resulted in the persistence of chemical attacks. One of the primary reasons for this was the inability to carry out independent verification of Syria's chemical arsenal till the state itself agreed to it in 2013 (Davenport & Kimball, 2023). State sovereignty rightfully dictates that the host nation must provide its assent before any external investigation is conducted. Yet, this also meant that the Syrian regime had amassed significant CW capabilities by the time the UN and the OPCW intervened. Another point which merits discussion is that the initial investigations focused only on establishing the facts of the attacks without attributing them to any state or non-state actor. The mandate of the Fact Finding Mission was limited to collating evidence underlining that the attacks had occurred and that toxic agents had been utilised. Apportioning blame was beyond the scope of the Fact Finding Mission. Thus, international pressure did not reach an apogee till the Joint Investigative Mechanism, tasked with filing reports holding actors responsible, became operational. As it is evident that diplomatic pressure and outrage across the globe played a role in the Assad regime desisting from conducting major CW attacks after the 2018 Douma offensive, perhaps a more prompt approach towards attributing these attacks to the perpetrators might have prevented the assaults which had occurred previously. Furthermore, the OPCW itself was able to credibly state that only the arsenal revealed to it had been successfully eviscerated and could not independently declare that the country or the regime had been rid of these weapons. This was owing to the fact that the Assad government had kept its operations clandestine and had not completely revealed the extent of its CW arsenal. Since there was no way by which an autonomous body like the Joint Investigative Mechanism could verify the regime's claims, undertaking action against the government became exceedingly difficult. Thus, despite the destruction of nearly 1300 tons of declared CWs, the regime persisted in its alleged chemical warfare owing to its clandestine production and incomplete declarations (McMahon and Murray, 2018). It is also important to keep in mind that the OPCW is merely an investigative body with few enforcement mechanisms of its own. It needs to be supported by an institution like the UNSC which can ensure compliance through legitimate, multilateral coercive measures. However, the UNSC was riven by factionalism and the use of the veto by the Syrian regime's allies like Russia and China further impeded progress in the direction of the dismantling of the Syrian CW programme. Russia and China had consistently vetoed UNSC resolutions advocating the imposition of sanctions on the entities allegedly responsible for the usage of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict (Melling and Dennett, 2017). Russia, in particular, also nixed action on four UNSC resolutions seeking investigations into the chemical warfare observed in the Syrian civil war (RTÉ, 2018). The deadlock in the UNSC meant that while unilateral sanctions could still be imposed by member states, legitimate multilateral sanctions through established channels had been effectively shelved.

The dearth of legitimate coercive mechanisms to back the OPCW led investigations proved to be a major pitfall. A similarly disquieting shortcoming was the inability of international bodies to prevent ISIL from acquiring chemical weapons capabilities. One of the reasons behind this was the failure of the global community in fulfilling the objective of total and absolute chemical disarmament. It must be reiterated that Daesh developed its facility from the remnants of the programmes of the Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria. While it is understood that the sweeping military victories of the terror outfit in its early years could not be prevented, the timely decimation of these facilities could have avoided their misuse by the IS. Similarly, sanctioning lethal dual use chemical agents, forestalling their stockpiling and obstructing the development of delivery systems for these agents remain steps which should have been considered to tackle the unprecedented threat posed by the ISIS CW programme. Maintaining a proactive approach in dealing with the peril of a rogue non state terror actor gaining these weapons is paramount.

Since nearly every state actor, including those with conflicting interests, were opposed to the menace brought about by the IS, a stronger multilateral response should have entailed the realisation that the terror group had made rapid progress towards achieving a functional CW programme and had weaponised it successfully against its opponents on the battlefield.

Measures to remedy these drawbacks -

Before suggesting palliative steps, it would be useful to analyse what led to the relative lull in CW attacks post the 2018 Douma assault. One factor could be the rising diplomatic pressure from states across the world. Another plausible reason might be the imposition of economic sanctions on individuals and financial institutions as stipulated under the Caesar Act (Priya, 2020). An oft-quoted reason is also the 2020 OPCW report which unequivocally held the regime responsible for the use of chlorine and Sarin in attacks on Ltamenah in 2017 (Priya, 2020). One of the major conundrums faced by the international community was the deterioration in the perception of the OPCW. While it had traditionally been perceived as an unbiased stakeholder merely focused on standard arms control measures, the central role played by it in a theatre of conflict as volatile as Syria, has opened it up to allegations of geopolitical partisanship and eroded its standing globally. Whether these allegations carry merit is a moot point. It is, nonetheless, necessary to restore credibility to this institution and ensure that it does not get tainted by geopolitical oneupmanship. Russian and Chinese support to the regime's alleged chemical warfare in the UNSC was another cause for concern. This would only be remedied by resorting to reformed multilateralism and contriving paths to work around the unilateral, arbitrary and binding powers of the veto. However, knowing that all of the P5 nations have vested interests in perpetuating the veto, reform in this direction is well-nigh impossible. Reinforcing the taboo around chemical weapons is also necessary as the globe witnesses a rise in their usage in conflicts. That they are relatively easier to acquire also makes verification and compliance significantly more challenging while making their proliferation and clandestine stockpiling much easier. Therefore, multilateral export control regimes like the Australia Group might prove to be useful measures for ensuring compliance (Chor, 2025). Developing independent mechanisms to monitor the trade of dual use chemicals is another method to prevent the development of CW capacities. Inventing effective methods to tackle chemical warfare would also serve to discourage their deployment in conflict zones. A disparity in compliance from different actors reveals the lack of credible enforcement mechanisms with the OPCW which is considered primarily as a body engaging in compliance, verification, authorisation and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

While the OPCW took action against Syria, which was a member state, for alleged violations of the treaty, it remained powerless when a non-state terror actor like the IS conducted similar attacks albeit at a smaller scale (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2021). Ensuring compliance from non state actors will remain a hurdle for which the international community must contrive a solution. Promptness in instituting mechanisms like the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) upon the advent of a crisis will be of paramount importance in the future. The release of information pertaining to alleged chemical attacks, which would aid bodies like the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, must be streamlined by the OPCW (Ward, 2021). An increase in multilateral economic coercive measures like sanctions and asset freezes through the UNSC and UNGA as well as strict action against State parties violating the OPCW are steps which must be undertaken to target the perpetrators of these attacks (Ward, 2021). A rise in funding coupled with the appointment of skilled technocrats would inevitably result in the better functioning of the OPCW (Ward, 2021). Expanding the support base for multilateral UN instituted investigation bodies, especially in the developing world, must be prioritised to ensure international accountability. Agreements like the 2013 accord, which called for the “destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner", must be promoted. This is especially so as the landmark accord was signed after intense negotiations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation with the final agreement being inked with American approval (Kallenborn and Zilinskas, 2013). Unanimous resolutions like the UNSCR 2118, which endorsed this framework must be promoted devoid of narrow partisanship for the CWC as well as the larger cause of chemical weapons elimination remains ever susceptible to geopolitical flux (Kallenborn and Zilinskas, 2013).

A major challenge faced by the OPCW inspectors was not unlike the one often faced by IAEA personnel. Owing to them belonging to a multilateral body supervising state actions, allegations of violations of state sovereignty and of officials serving interests inimical to those of the nations they were deployed in, were rampant. This was also fuelled by the fact that the countries most vociferously supportive of the inspections like the USA were also geopolitically opposed to the alleged perpetrators of the majority of these attacks, viz. officials of the Bashar al Assad regime. Their political posturing and support to the rebels tainted the image of the OPCW investigations and lent heft to the allegations of the ostensible partisanship of the organisation. This could have been averted if these states would have discriminated between their national interests and international responsibilities and avoided conflating the two.

Threats of unilateral military action in response to alleged chemical attacks instead of a stance which would have prioritised OPCW referral further reinforced regime anxieties over the intentions of the OPCW inspectors. Such pronouncements of military interventions further deepened the distrust in the OPCW and bolstered the regime's belief that stonewalling the examination undertaken by the technical arbiter was the only way to safeguard regime stability. Accusations of bias helped the regime justify its lack of cooperation with the inspectors thereby leading to a diplomatic stalemate. Prioritising negotiations and international arbitration over unilateral coercive actions must be the way forward for all stakeholders who wish to resolve such transgressions. Ensuring the security of these officials, from all actors, would also be of paramount importance since inspectors have come under attack from armed groups in the country (Tasch, 2014). Greater surveillance, intelligence sharing and the creation of mobile destruction facilities are other recommendations provided by analysts (Kallenborn and Zilinskas, 2013). Smoothening out of bureaucratic hurdles, red tape and access denial remain key issues. They have repeatedly resulted in delays in the investigations, prompting furious volleys of accusations and counter accusations (Middle East Eye, 2018). Once again, one witnesses institutional investigations being sacrificed at the altar of geopolitical polarisation.

Proper verification of stockpiles necessitates the creation of viable long term monitoring and inspection mechanisms. A proposal to examine dual use facilities, estimate their production and tally it with the usage of such chemicals must be adopted. Operationalisation of the ‘Challenge Investigation’ mechanism of the OPCW can be considered as well to ensure absolute compliance with its norms. This consideration must, however, be tempered with legitimate concerns around state sovereignty. Better utilisation of existing provisions in the CWC and established mechanisms of the OPCW would yield the desired results (Becker-Jakob, 2019). Reinforcing the taboo against the use of chemical weapons and bolstering the prosecution of perpetrators through legitimate international mechanisms are effective methods to maintain the status quo regarding the well-founded illegality of weaponising lethal chemical agents.

Conclusion -

This paper has focused on instances of the usage of chemical weapons in Syria while delving into the history of the development of the Syrian CW arsenal and the civil war which ravaged the nation for more than a decade. It has aimed to examine the major CW offensives of the civil war, the involvement of both state and non-state actors in perpetrating them and the response of multilateral bodies. The shortcomings evinced by these institutions have been highlighted along with a section showcasing the measures which are necessary to remedy them. With the change in regime which occurred in 2024, a thorough decimation of the remnants of the chemical weapons programme is underway. It is hoped that the global community will work to bolster the architecture necessary to eradicate the scourge of chemical weapons by ensuring absolute compliance to the CWC by its signatories.

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