Introduction:

In wake of ravages of Second World War, regional groupings were established in various parts of the world including Middle East, where seven former Arab possessions of Ottoman empire came together to form the Arab League in 1945. Since then idea of unity has played important role for an organisation which can today boast of twenty two states and territories as members. Despite its growth and impressive achievements in some areas, the Arab League had poor track record in promoting cooperation at regional level. Due to lack of cohesion, persistent rivalries among members, and influence of external powers on inter-Arab politics, Arab unity has been an elusive goal for the Arab League (Miller, 2016). In 1981, Arab Gulf States, all members of the Arab League came together at sub-regional level to form Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Gulf Cooperation Council is a consortium of following six oil - exporting countries:

1. The Kingdom of Bahrain – Its 1.2 million people enjoy GDP per capita of $50,700. .

2. Kuwait – Its 2.8 million residents enjoy 11th highest standard of living in the world ($71,900 per person). The country holds 6 per cent of world’s oil reserves.

3. The Sultanate of Oman – It has 3.4 million residents and its GDP per capita is $46,100.

4. Qatar – The second richest country in the world, with GDP per capita of $125,100 for each of its 2.3 million residents. It has 25 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 13% of world’s natural gas reserves.

5. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – The largest of GCC countries (28.5 million people) has 16 per cent of world’s proven oil reserves. Its GDP per capita is $55,300.

6. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Its 6 million people enjoy per capita GDP of $68,100 (Amadeo, 2017).

GCC was established in 1981 as a response to Iranian Revolution and outbreak of Iran– Iraq War in 1980 (Goldman & Rapp-Hooper, 2013). The initial hope for formation of GCC was that this would provide security in wake of revolution in Iran. One thing that has bound GCC together is shared belief among Gulf States that they are vulnerable to external actors who view them as rich and militarily weak states. This has engendered a deeply held belief among Gulf rulers that safety of their kingdoms is more likely to be achieved by working together than by acting apart. When their sovereignty has been threatened, GCC states have put their grievances on hold and have given out united response in political, economic and military realms. Despite sharing same security challenges, Arab Gulf States do not share same national interests. They have engaged in stand-offs over oil, borders, Iran, Israel etc. Though there have been intra-Gulf disputes over territorial rights, hampering development of bonds needed for GCC member states to trust each other fully with their own strategic security, they have never militarised their differences with each other beyond localised clashes. The belief in benefits of collective security is very strong in GCC (Miller, 2016). The quest for regional security in midst of political upheavals prompted these countries to consider different options for security cooperation especially as oil wealth began to attract more attention from their larger neighbours. The fall of Arab regional system, wider instabilities in Afghanistan compounded threat perceptions. Similar political systems, shared values and common bonds between Gulf nations have contributed to emergence of GCC (Ramazani, 1988). The Arab Gulf States are central players in world economy because of oil. Oil wealth enabled them to deal with global financial crises better than any other regional grouping (Miller, 2016). Hydrocarbons will continue to drive the Gulf for foreseeable future. There is perceptible shift towards converting hydrocarbon resources into world’s largest refinery and petrochemical projects, especially led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE (Ramady, 2012).

Aware of problems of relying on finite resources such as oil, GCC countries embarked on massive diversification programmes to reduce their dependence on those resources for income (Sultan, 2012). During the last decade, GCC countries embarked on massive infrastructural programmes aimed at diversifying their economies and creating job opportunities for their citizens, spending hundreds of billions of petrodollars on building new cities; accumulating massive financial reserves known as Sovereign Wealth Funds and using them to invest internationally through buying commercial outlets and shareholdings in major foreign businesses (Sultan, 2012). UAE wants to become world’s new tourist attraction. Qatar hopes to become destination for world events and conferences. Saudi Arabia is trying to become region’s economic powerhouse. They have invested heavily in urban spaces to turn them into attractive destinations for the more refined traveler. This ‘instant urbanisation’ (Abu-Lughod, 1983), has taken place alongside with an aggressive campaign to attract major sporting and cultural events to their new cities. Qatar’s success in being awarded world’s most popular sporting event, the FIFA Football World Cup is an example of this (Miller, 2016). Some GCC countries like UAE have invested in renewable and potential future energy fuels such as solar and nuclear (Sultan, 2012). Kawach (2009) believes that GCC countries could spend about US$ 200 billion on such projects in next two decades. In Dubai non oil sector in mid 1990s were already contributing 82 % of the emirates GDP and in 2006, the figure may have been 95 % (Davidson, 2008). Projects in infrastructure and utilities are carefully selected and implemented according to predetermined framework and linked to macro indicators (Saif, 2009). The massive infusion of oil wealth and ambitious attempts to rapidly modernise societies with only small pools of citizen labour explain huge rise in number of foreign workers entering the Gulf from Arab and Non-Arab worlds. They provided cheap labour needed to build and staff airports, hotels, hospitals, schools, universities, communication networks (Sayigh, 1978). Major constraint on GCC countries is limited supply of local skilled manpower resulting in reliance on huge expatriate labour force (Ramady, 2012).

The 36th annual GCC summit took place in Riyadh on 9th December 2015 which saw broad consensus on political, social and economic issues such as combating extremism, security cooperation, economic integration, support for political solution to crises in Yemen and Syria, and firm support for Palestinian cause (Gulf News, 2015). The 37th annual GCC summit was held in Manama, Bahrain on 7th December 2016 (Arab News, 2016). The promotion of GCC unity and economic integration among GCC member states was important point of discussion (Khatana, 2018). GCC states control 29% of world’s crude oil reserves, highlighting relative global importance of Gulf petroleum sector. GCC states also held 22.3% of world’s natural gas reserves. Fueled by massive oil revenues, value of GCC real GDP was US$ 1,479.3 billion in 2017 enjoying one of world’s highest GDP per capita. State Revenues are largely driven by exports of hydrocarbons that stood at US$ 345 billion in 2018 (U-Capital, 2018). GCC states’ financial surpluses and sovereign wealth funds are among highest in the world. Combined GCC funds are close to US$ 2.9 trillion in total assets, which is 40% of global sovereign wealth funds (Rachman, 2017).

Gulf and India

The Gulf region occupies pivotal place in India’s political, economic and strategic interests and policies. About 7.5 million Indians living in the region remit huge amount of money to India. The amount of remittance coming from abroad was estimated to be US$ 71 billion and around fifty per cent of remittance is from Gulf region. The Gulf region has always been significant to India because of geo-strategic location, availability of energy resources, and home for Indian diaspora. India’s trade and economic ties with the region which are around US$ 160 billion are growing. About 60 per cent of oil is imported from this region. India has definite interest in balanced and peaceful strategic environment in Gulf countries which are source of two-thirds of India’s crude oil requirements and form largest trading regional bloc for India, accounting for 23.7 per cent of Indian trade. India adopted Look West policy in 2005 for deepening engagement with West Asian countries who have been considered as ‘extended’ neighbours. India’s former Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, attending 9th ministerial meeting of GCC in 2015, pushing for GCC – India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) said that Gulf was an “extended part of India’s neighbourhood” (Taneja, 2020). A reorientation of Indian foreign policy in Gulf region is seen since Mr. Narendra Modi became Prime Minister, as the region has been receiving considerable political, diplomatic, strategic, economic attention and new focus towards the Gulf region was brought about by Mr. Modi’s active role and engagement with overseas Indian community in the Gulf (Kumarswamy, 2018). Prime Minister Modi galvanized it by creating an exceptional personalised style at highest level of leadership, with results in form of investment commitments, extradition of wanted criminals, counter terrorism cooperation, security cooperation, energy security, diaspora welfare and business expansion having multiplier effect on bilateral relationship (Trigunayat, 2020).

Reorientation of India – Gulf region Foreign Policy

In contemporary world no state can remain in isolation at international level. They must engage with other states in a systematic way with well-defined goals, with goals and objectives of the state reflecting in its foreign policy. Broad parameters of India’s Middle East policy were largely in place when Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India in 2014. The new government followed same course, intensifying what was known as “Look West” policy, by focusing on three main axes: Arab Gulf countries, Israel and Iran (Burton, 2019). Modi became first Indian prime minister to visit Israel in 2016. During this tenure, he visited UAE twice, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Jordan and Palestine. These visits cemented a renewed and revitalized outreach for India towards West Asia. The joint statement concluded during these visits had recognized India as ‘strategic partner’ of these competing countries. History is littered with strong ties between India and West Asia, capitalised efficiently and effectively, by Narendra Modi. Modi’s visits to Gulf countries can be seen as an effort to consolidate economic ties. The interest has been reciprocal as Saudi Arabia, UAE and other GCC countries increasingly see India as an important emerging market for their energy exports, foreign investments and joint venture opportunities. Upon his victory, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Modi over a telephone call. UAE conferred Modi with their state’s highest state honour, the Zayed Medal for bringing ties between two regions to an all new level. In 2016, Saudis also conferred Modi with their highest civilian honour, the King Abdulaziz Sash during his visit to Riyadh. The answer to success lies more within interests of Gulf nations than Modi government’s outreach. These cash rich states looked towards Indian economy to secure their own future financial interests. As US becomes mostly self-sufficient on oil, Asian economies led by India and China, are expected to lead purchases of crude. This market capacity makes for ideal destination for Gulf’s rich wealth funds. The convergence of Israel and Arab world’s backdoor diplomacy gave New Delhi lot of breathing space. The launch of direct flight operated by Air India to Tel Aviv using Saudi Arabian airspace in 2018, becoming first such route, was monument more for growing Arab – Israel thaw than India – Israel dynamic (Taneja, 2020). India is emerging as swing state in global balance of power and will have opportunity to shape outcomes on most critical issues of twenty-first century: construction of Asian stability, political modernisation of Middle East and management of globalisation (Raja Mohan, 2006).

When manifestation of Qatar crisis occurred in mid-2017, India was under pressure to take sides. Instead it resisted and adopted neutrality as a way of maintaining economic relations with both sides (Al-Tamimi, 2017; Siyech, 2019). The absence of an adverse outcome in Qatar crisis arguably reflects India’s wider experience in Middle East under successive Indian governments and Modi’s Look West policy to date. India’s present approach has been helped by wider structural context in which the region finds itself (Burton, 2019). The Middle East has become more multipolar, with power diffused among regional and extra-regional actors (Cavatorta, 2014; Kamrava, 2018). India’s approach balances different parties (Burton, 2019).

Challenging Gulf Scenario

The changing dynamics of domestic and regional politics in Middle East ensured continued turbulence during 2015 and 2016. GCC monarchies remained embroiled in firefighting issues, ranging from economic troubles due to lower oil prices, Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, ISIS threat, and growing Iranian regional influence (Khatana, 2018). The 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ had been fundamental change for many Arab countries, but with exception of Bahrain and Oman, GCC countries seem to have been an oasis of relative calm compared to rest of Middle East (Ramady, 2012). Regional upheavals have brought about internal tensions among GCC member-states. The Qatari support for Egyptian Islamists angered al-Saud and contributed to temporary breach of diplomatic relations in 2014 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and U.A.E. withdrew their Ambassadors from Qatar (Kirkpatrick, 2014). While Oman did not join hands with this Saudi-led move, Kuwait sought to mediate. Even though three ambassadors returned to Qatar in December 2014, tensions continued. Saudi-led military offensive against Yemen, Operation Decisive Storm (March–April 2014) and Operation Restoring Hope (April 2015– present) highlighted differences within GCC. Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for Yemeni crisis. Oman maintained its neutrality, partly due to its traditional policy of regional autonomy and partly due to closer ties with Iran. Other GCC countries joined Saudi-led military offensive. With exception of Yemen, Arab states along Persian Gulf have largely weathered Arab Spring. The Gulf monarchs settled for popular co-option through financial largesse to blunt demands for political reforms (Kumarswamy, 2018). The oil prices—which had reached US$ 60 per barrel in December 2014—continued to fall, and dropped to US$ 50 per barrel in December 2016 due to slow growth of global economy and energy alternatives. Falling oil prices affected oil-rich Gulf Arab countries. GCC countries were forced to introduce small portion of taxes to meet budgetary deficits. Saudi Arabia imposed limits on overseas remittances by expatriate workers (Flanagan, 2011). Bahrain reduced subsidies on key issues such as water, electricity and fuel (Naar, 2016). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were forced to dip into sovereign wealth to bridge current account deficits (Townsend, 2016). According to Al-Rasheed (2017) economic prosperity, the back bone of Gulf political ambitions, is stumbling under pressure of drastic decline in oil prices. Many GCC countries already adopted economic and social visions for reform. Saudi Arabia was the last country to join visionary trail of economic transformation in April 2016 when it announced implementation of Vision 2030. The visions are bound to impact traditional domestic Gulf politics and ability of governments to continue to convince domestic and global audiences of merits of stability and security at expense of political dynamism. The visions are confined to moving state centric oil-based capitalist economies into open liberal finance, privatisation, diversification, without any visible political transformations (Al-Rasheed, 2017).

The 2017–18 Qatar diplomatic crisis began when Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017 withdrawing ambassadors and imposing trade and travel bans. The crisis is escalation of Qatar-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict. The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism as main reason for their actions. Saudi Arabia and other countries criticised Qatar’s relation with Iran. On 27thJuly 2017, Qatari foreign minister indicated that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were showing ‘stubbornness’ to Qatar and had not taken any steps to solve the crisis. On 24th August 2017, Qatar announced restoration of full diplomatic relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE notified ports and shipping agents not to receive Qatari vessels or ships owned by Qatari companies. Saudi Arabia closed border with Qatar. Saudi Arabia restricted its airspace to Qatar Airways. Qatar was forced to reroute flights to Africa and Europe through Iranian airspace. Saudi Arabia’s central bank advised banks not to trade with Qatari banks in Qatari riyals. The Foreign Ministry of Qatar criticised the ban, arguing that it undermined Qatar’s sovereignty. All GCC countries involved in the announcement ordered their citizens out of Qatar. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain gave Qatari visitors and residents two weeks to leave their countries. The foreign ministries of Bahrain and Egypt gave Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave their countries. Kuwait and Oman remained neutral. Kuwaiti mediators in Riyadh were presented with list of Saudi demands of Qatar. These included cutting off all links with Iran and expelling resident members of Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood, curbs on freedom of al-Jazeera, to stop ‘interfering’ in foreign countries’ affairs and to stop support for terrorist organisations (Wikipedia, 2018). Regional tensions, sectarian divide, Arab-Persian rivalry, falling oil prices marked 2015 and 2016 (Kumarswamy, 2018).

India and GCC Economic Relations

Importance of GCC for India lies in its energy security, volume of trade, and large presence of Indian expatriates. Due to lower oil prices and international slowdown, trade figures witnessed more than 30 per cent decline between 2013 and 2016 (Khatana, 2018). India’s trade deficit with GCC has fallen from US$ 46 billion to US$ 14 billion in last three years (The Hindu, 2016). The drop in oil prices impacted remittances from the region, leading to 2.2 per cent fall. In 2014–15, remittances to India from GCC amounted to US $ 36.7 billion, and dropped to US$ 35.9 billion in 2015–16 (The Hindu, 2016). According to World Bank, if oil prices stay low for prolonged period, or undergo unforeseen drops, remittances from GCC to India could fall further in future (Bundhun, 2016). GCC countries are biggest source, contributing 60 per cent of total remittances received by India in 2015–16 which contributed nearly 3.3 per cent to its GDP. Remittances help develop organic link between India and GCC countries (The World Bank, 2016). In 2015–16, India’s exports to GCC stood at US$ 41.71 billion (Embassy of India Riyadh, 2016). India’s economic engagements with GCC countries during 2015 and 2016 were dominated by two challenges: continuing global economic slowdown and falling oil prices. While latter meant lesser hydrocarbon imports, former meant considerable drop in foreign trade. Since 2011–12, India’s total trade has been declining: from being close to US$ 800 billion, it dropped to US$ 758 billion in 2014–15 and reached US$ 642 billion in 2015–16—that is, slightly more than in 2010–11 when its foreign trade stood at just over US$ 620 billion. The fall in trade as well as in oil prices were reflected in India’s economic engagement with GCC countries. Indian export sector has gained 2.6 per cent in the Gulf region during FY 2017-18 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2018).

UAE, which for short period remained India’s largest trading partner, has been losing its position since 2012–13 and became third largest partner after China and US, followed closely by Saudi Arabia. Gap between India’s trade with UAE and China has been widening and, during 2015–16, it was more than US$ 20 billion. With about US$ 49.7 billion in trade, UAE accounts for 7.5 per cent of India’s total foreign trade. Because of domination of energy trade, GCC countries continue to be among India’s leading trade partners and in 2015–16, three countries were among India’s top 25 trade partners; Saudi Arabia was in fourth slot; Qatar in 19th (Kumarswamy & Singh Roy, 2018). The Persian Gulf countries account for substantial portion of known oil and natural gas reserves in the world. Because of low cost of production and logistical considerations, the region will continue to be of vital importance to India. India’s growth story will remain intrinsically linked to Persian Gulf region (Kumarswamy & Singh Roy, 2018). GCC as a bloc is India’s largest trading partner. In period from March 2018 to April 2019, bilateral trade touched US$ 121.25 billion. India’s imports from Gulf countries reached US 79.70 billion compared to US$ 41.55 billion worth of exports from India to Gulf region. GCC countries account for 15 per cent of India’s total imports and 12 per cent of the country’s total exports in value terms. UAE accounted for major chunk of India’s exports and imports with US $30.08 billion and US$ 29.77 billion respectively for fiscal year 2019. GCC countries account for more than 54 per cent of annual US $ 83 billion foreign remittance to India in 2019. Energy supplies from Persian Gulf are closely linked to large expatriate labour force working in GCC countries. Saudi Arabia continues to be most favoured destination for Indian workers, followed by UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. There are no accurate figures on actual number of Indian workers in GCC countries. Current estimates suggest that there are around 8.5 million Indians in GCC countries, with over 3 million in Saudi Arabia. This is followed by UAE, with about 2.8 million Indian workers. There are about 923,000 in Kuwait, 316,000 in Bahrain, 600,000 in Qatar, and 796,000 in Oman (MEA GOI, 2016).

India’s strong linkages with GCC are analysed by Kulkarni and Bandekar (2019). According to them, inter linkages of Indian Economy with trade blocs and financial markets has significantly increased. Such linkage of different regions attracts attention of policy makers and investors to estimate what could be future of inter-regional equations. They explored economic tie-up with GCC considering today’s dynamic socio-political scenario. Such collaboration is significant as India is aiming at tag of US$ 5 Trillion economy in forthcoming years. The important factors that give cutting edge to India’s relationship with GCC are Oil, Remittances and Indian Diaspora in GCC. It is most vital that India needs to nurture its tie-up with GCC in forthcoming years (Kulkarni & Bandekar, 2019). GCC investments in India, China and Africa are occurring on an unprecedented scale. These Investments are more comfortable due to diasporic links and cultural ties (Abdelal et.al, 2008). It is not only India has substantial interest in GCC but China is also interested in GCC due to its oil richness.(Nader, 2011). According to Qian and Fulton (2017) China-GCC economic relations can be expected to intensify due to FTA. The FTA will also enhance cooperation opportunities for China and GCC under the “Belt and Road” Initiative, which will play an important role in expanding China’s regional presence. India –GCC bilateral export is positively determined by size of economies, trade openness and diaspora and is negatively determined by distance between India-GCC and import tariffs (Alam & Ahmed, 2018). According to Kulkarni and Bandekar (2019) perennial deficit of current account is more to do with merchandise, in particular oil imports, which are dependent on global crude prices. The demand supply, geopolitical situation affects the international crude prices. India is more vulnerable to price fluctuation as approximately 64 % of India’s oil need is imported from volatile Middle East region. The volatility of oil price affects GCC as well as India. Whenever oil price goes up, India’s import bill soars. If oil price goes down it effects economy and investment scenario of GCC, which results in less exports from India to GCC and shortfall in remittance to India from GCC region. Thus India is vulnerable to oil price volatility. In light of this, India needs safety net to manage impact of oil price volatility in better way. The INR priced oil imports and special lines of credit to GCC countries in terms of bilateral trade with India may help in better management of international trade and finance (Kulkarni & Bandekar, 2019). India shall have a clear policy with GCC so as to cooperate and collaborate with GCC in terms of Trade, Technology Transfer, Defence and Innovation. It is also important that India shall leverage its diaspora of 8 million NRI from GCC to cement ties further. The oil and remittances could be the key quantitative elements while semiskilled / unskilled workforce from India, counter terrorism, cyber security and anti-piracy could act as qualitative elements in bonding India’s ties further with GCC (Kulkarni & Bandekar, 2019).

India and the GCC Troika held their annual Political Dialogue on 3rd November 2020 in virtual mode. External Affairs Minister (EAM), Dr. S. Jaishankar, led the Indian delegation. GCC was represented at Troika-level by Dr. Nayef Falah M. Al-Hajraf, Secretary General of GCC, Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain and Dr. Anwar bin Mohammed Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, UAE. Senior representatives from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar also participated in the meeting. The leaders undertook detailed review of India-GCC ties and appreciated upward trajectory in ties witnessed in last few years. They expressed satisfaction that India and GCC countries have continued their close cooperation even during Covid-19 pandemic. EAM apprised GCC leaders of improving situation in India, both on health and economic side and hoped for early return to trade normalcy between India and GCC. India had ensured that supply chains from India to the Gulf were not disrupted despite lockdowns during the pandemic. EAM thanked GCC countries for taking care of Indian diaspora in their countries during Covid-19 pandemic. India had also taken special care to ensure the return of Indian health professionals to GCC countries and for supply of medicines and other essential items during the pandemic. EAM mentioned that large number of Indian workers and professionals are now eager to return to GCC countries to resume their work. EAM also apprised GCC leaders about progress made by India in vaccine development as well as in development and manufacturing of diagnostic and other equipment related to Covid-19. Both sides reaffirmed that they will continue to work together to tackle Covid-19 situation. The GCC welcomed India’s inclusion in the UNSC as a non-permanent member from January 2021. Both sides affirmed their commitment to reform multilateral institutions to reflect the realities of the 21st century and to work together to address contemporary challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, sustainable development and terrorism (MEA GOI, 2020).

Drivers for India GCC Relations

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been signalling greater importance of Middle East and Persian Gulf for India. Without any declaratory statement, Modi has delineated the parameters and components of the relations, namely, through intense political engagements to transform the transactional nature of the bilateral ties and add economic and strategic substance (Kumarswamy, 2018).

Economic Engagement and Interdependence

India and GCC states have strong economic ties which increased to US$ 84.96 billion in 2017-18, from US$ 7.8 billion in 2003-04. The Gulf region accounts for 12.98 per cent of India‘s total exports, while it has 13.76 per cent share of its total imports. Trade was mainly restricted to oil, spices and labour until 2000 (Pant, 1999). In past 20 years, its scope has expanded to fertilizers, petrochemicals, services, IT, gold and textiles. India and GCC states are signatories of Framework Agreement of Economic Cooperation (FAEC) which was signed in New Delhi on August 25, 2004. India-GCC industrial forum was established in February 2004, which enhanced trade and technology transfer activities (Pradhan, 2010). India granted Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to GCC states hoping to help secure a FTA (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2012).

According to Dubai Chambers of Commerce (DCC), Indian companies are eager to invest in Dubai. In 2008, 12,359 Indian companies were registered with DCC. This figure tripled in a decade. Currently, 38,238 Indian companies are registered, while DCC has opened its international office in India to facilitate business community (Dubai Chamber of Commerce, 2018). More than 800 leading Indian companies have opened their businesses in Jebel Ali Free Zone and many Indian business houses have strong presence in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Hundreds of Indian companies actively are engaged in business activities in UAE Free Economic Zones. India is one of largest trading partners of UAE (Augustine, 2016). Further opportunities are opening up as UAE is looking to diversify its economy, strengthen its financial and service sectors and establish Emirates as global tourism and sports hub. UAE is creating a knowledge-based economy to adjust to changing market needs (Quamar, 2018). From 2001 to 2016, FDI from UAE to India increased manifolds. UAE invested more than US$ 5 billion in India in 2017 which makes it third largest investment partner after China and US (John, 2018). Qatar is largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for 65 per cent of its global imports and 15 per cent of Qatar’s export of LNG. India is third largest export destination for Qatar and is tenth largest imports source. MoU for investment in India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) was signed with Qatar Investment Authority in 2016 (Times of India, 2016). Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund held by Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), other State-owned entities and private investors in Qatar are attractive investment propositions for India’s growing market (Hussain & Ghosh, 2015). Qatar has several large-scale investments in India, including more than US$ 1 billion stake in telecommunications company Bharti Airtel (BQ Magazine, 2015). India’s corporate sector has many operations in Qatar. These include Larsen &Toubro, Punj Lloyd, Shapoorji Pallonji, Voltas, TCS, Wipro, Mahindra Tech, HCL etc. SBI, ICICI and other Indian banks have limited operations under Qatar Financial Centre or private exchange houses (BQ Magazine, 2015). On 7th June 2016, Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SCDL) announced that Qatari company, Al Balagh Trading & Contracting and L&T had been appointed as main contractors to build 40,000 seat capacity Al Rayyan Stadium for football for World Cup matches scheduled for 2022 (Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2016). In November 2015, Indian Engineering, Procurement and Construction companies secured contracts worth US$ 5 billion for development projects in housing, hospitals, oil and gas, power transmissions in Kuwait (The Economic Times, 2015). On 26th January 2015, Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Ltd. signed US$ 150 million contract with Kuwait University for construction, operation and maintenance of buildings of colleges in Sabah Al-Salem University City (The Times, 2015). Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation awarded contract worth US$ 77 million to Larsen and Toubro in May 2015 to replace power substation at Al-Ahmadi refinery (DNA, 2015). The economic and commercial relations between India and Oman has been strengthened by presence of Indian private sector companies like Wipro, Larsen & Toubro, Shapoorji Pallonji, Jindal, Aditya Birla Group, Nagarjuna Construction Company, Simplex and KEC who are engaged in various projects in Oman. An Indian-Omani joint venture—Sebacic Oman will be constructing Sebacic Duqm Acid refinery which is worth US$ 1,200 million. Oman is among top five sources of fertilizers for India accounting for 5.26 per cent of India’s fertilizer imports. India imports 8 Metric Tons (MT) of urea, 25 per cent of which is supplied by Oman India Fertilizer Company (OMIFCO) (Ahmed and Soni, 2017). According to Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA), there were 426 Indian companies registered for business in Saudi Arabia by 2017, compared to 190 in 2007, which shows 150 per cent growth (Embassy of India, Riyadh, 2018). This extensive economic engagement and interdependence has been reciprocated with political warmth for India by Gulf countries. Trade and investment are vital factors in evolving Indo-GCC relationship.

Energy Security

In 2014-15, India imported 109.88 million tonnes of oil from the world, out of which 58 per cent came from Gulf region. Due to India’s rapid economic growth, it is among world’s top four oil consuming countries (Economic Times. 2016). Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE are supplying 26,882 tonnes, 14,611 tonnes, and 10,433 tonnes oil to India, respectively. Qatar and Oman are its largest natural gas suppliers. Qatar is supplying 8.25 billion cubic meters natural gas, while Oman and UAE are exporting 0.35 billion cubic meters and 0.17 billion cubic meters, respectively (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010). Qatar is largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for 65 per cent of its global imports and 15 per cent of Qatar’s export of LNG. India is establishing Strategic Petroleum Reserve with help of UAE (Times of India, 2017). Energy security has provided stimulus for India’s security cooperation with GCC States.

China Factor and GCC

One of India‘s major foreign policies today is to counter rising China. India considers growing Chinese influence in Gulf region a challenge to its economic and strategic interests. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce, trade between China and GCC countries exceeded US $ 171 billion in 2017 (Ministry of Commerce, People‘s Republic of China, 2017). China is also aggressively pursuing Gulf region for signing FTAs for which nine rounds of talks have been completed (Ministry of Commerce, People‘s Republic of China, 2016). If China secures FTA from GCC, it is likely that Indian economic interests will be negatively affected since each is competing for cheaper oil agreements and export of non-oil goods such as textile, iron, steel, rice, wheat, kitchen items, household articles and electronics, in which India is currently lagging behind China. GCC-China Business Forum and GCC-China Strategic Dialogue are strategic forums for institutionalisation of bilateral trade and investment (Pradhan, 2011).China has also been promoting cooperation with GCC countries under Belt and Road Initiative (Qian, 2017). India also considers China a challenge to their energy and maritime security. This is apparent from Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004 and India‘s Maritime Strategy of 2015, which point to China as major security threat to its maritime security. India wants to secure four major entry points — Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Strait of Bab-el-Mandab and Cape of Good Hope (Indian Navy, 2015). Therefore, Indian Navy has been extensively engaged with naval forces of GCC countries through regular exercises to ensure its active presence in the region. China has emerged as another factor behind India‘s evolving relationship with GCC.

Growing Multipolarity in the Gulf

One important change affecting India-GCC relations is the growing multipolarity among the external powers engaged in the Middle East. The United States is downsizing its regional role and Russia is returning in force, all while China’s importance continues to increase. These changes bring unpredictability and will spur increased Indian engagement with GCC to directly protect India’s interests and gain influence with GCC governments (Pethiyagoda, 2017a).

Security Cooperation

If one looks at emerging relations between India and some GCC countries, their engagements are no longer restricted to traditional oil-energy related cooperation or remittance related financial activities, but are gradually entering security domain as well. The rising importance of security and defence cooperation is evidenced by Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) that have been signed by India with its GCC partners recently. India has bilateral defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman and Qatar for military training, intelligence sharing, combating terrorism and money laundering. This is a paradigm shift in their relations which have been dominated by oil and energy trade while security ties remained dormant. Such engagements with GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar are on the rise. Among all GCC states, Oman holds special attention as it signed a military protocol in 1972; Air Force-to-Air Force staff talks in 2009 (Kemp, 2010) and signed MoU on military cooperation which provides Indian Navy access to Duqm Port in 2018 (Roy, 2018). The two have signed several defence agreements such as MoU on Crime and Combating Terrorism 1996; Defence Cooperation MoU 2005 and formed Military Cooperation Committee in 2006. According to Grare (2016), such agreements are part of India‘s strategy to keep an eye on and act as balancer to China. India and UAE signed Strategic Dialogue in 2003 which allows import and export of arms (Kemp, 2010). Both regularly hold meetings under India-UAE Defence Cooperation Committee which was established in 2003. UAE has extradited number of terrorists to India (Kemp, 2010). The Gulf region in general and Saudi Arabia in particular consider US as their guardian against any possible threat from Iran (Pradhan, 2011). Saudi Arabia‘s decision to train its cadets at National Defence Academy of India is a strategic change (Hassan, 2018). The growing importance given by India as well as some GCC countries towards strengthening security cooperation is timely due to evolving geopolitical dynamics and security challenges in South Asia and Gulf region. Governments of India as well as some GCC countries are understanding importance of scaling up security cooperation not only due to security threats they are facing but also to establish thriving defence industrial cooperation for mutual gains.

Indian Diaspora in the Gulf - India’s unique soft power advantage

The presence of Indian diasporic communities’ abroad act as source of influence through spread of culture, faith, languages, skills which they transcend to host countries along with reinforcing positive image of India. India is developing close cooperation with hosting Gulf countries for security and well-being of its Diaspora and has signed various protocols and agreements with hosting GCC nations for protection and better treatment of its citizens. According to Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, India-UAE. is world’s second largest migration corridor, with 2.8 million Indians migrating to UAE between 1995 and 2015 (Deulgaonkar, 2017). India as world’s highest recipient of remittances (World Bank, 2017) receives 50 per cent of its total remittances from GCC countries; and among GCC, nearly 38 per cent comes from UAE (Bundhun, 2015). About 3.2 million strong and vibrant Indian community forms largest expatriate group in Saudi Arabia. There are over 630,000 Indian nationals working in Qatar, over 900,000 strong Indian community in Kuwait, over 688,000 strong Indian community in Oman and over 400,000 Indian nationals work in Bahrain. For India, Gulf States are important and viable source of energy reserves and remittances migrants send back to India and for Gulf region, India provides favourable environment for development of its economies with presence of skilled Indian diaspora. This significant pool of manpower has made India an important country for Gulf region. A kind of interdependency is generated between two regions whereby achieving strategic interests for each side is invariably tied to strengthening their relations through diplomacy.

In Middle East, one of India’s most distinct soft power assets is the diaspora and its role in shaping a positive image of the country. Indian workers are often known for being tolerant and willing to work hard under harsh conditions. The diaspora builds upon, cements and acts as present-day reminder to public in Middle Eastern countries of historical and cultural links between two regions (Pethiyagoda, 2017b). Indians continue to be preferred migrant community because of their high quality of technical expertise and discipline, their capacity to easily adjust to social lifestyle in Gulf and their reputation for being peaceful and accommodative individuals (Panda, 2009). Diaspora diplomacy has become an effective tool in supporting foreign policy goals in the Gulf.

Cultural Diplomacy

India‘s overall positive image has been strengthened due to India‘s cultural diplomacy. Here Indian film industry has played a significant role. In October 2007 Abu Dhabi organised an International Film Festival where Bollywood dominated the show. Indian government started ‘Project Mausam‘ to highlight India‘s historic maritime trade and civilisational links with Gulf countries (Ayres, 2018). Through this project, Indian Ministry of Culture is organising cultural events in GCC states on regular basis. It is because of such cultural initiatives and positive image that UAE allowed establishment of Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi (Sankar & Ashwani Kumar, 2018). Despite being non-Arab state India enjoys its observer status in the Arab League. India was invited by Foreign Minister of UAE Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan to attend meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as ‘guest of honor‘ (Times of India, 2019). This development illustrates ‘good will’ that India has been enjoying with GCC. These developments indicate that India enjoys positive image, which helps it further expand its economic and political interests in GCC region.

Strategic Realignments in Gulf

The Gulf region is a volatile place because of prevalent threats to internal and external security to nations found in the area (Ulrichsen, 2009). Gulf region has been going through massive strategic realignments in aftermath of Arab Spring in 2011. The fall of dictatorial regimes, war in Yemen, rise and fall of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), intra-Arab conflicts such as Qatar diplomatic crisis, Iran‘s nuclear deal and subsequent US exit, etc., have shaped strategic thinking of Arab ruling elite. The sharp fall in global oil prices has intensified debate among Arab elite regarding need to rethink socioeconomic structures in order to address challenges to social and political sustainability (Ulrichsen, 2009). These countries are diversifying their economies as well as expanding diplomatic relations with Asian countries in general and India in particular, in order to seek international support for their regimes, reduce their overwhelming reliance on US-led Western countries in terms of economic, political support and arms sales. India has voted thrice against Iran‘s nuclear programme in the UN, which is explicit support to Arab ruling elite against their perceived threat from Iran (Bhatnagar, 2018). India has adopted policy of neutrality in intra-Arab conflicts. GCC states realise India’s significance as an emerging political and economic power in Asia and beyond. India is aspirant for important positions in various international foras, like UNSC which is likely to be seen positively by GCC states. Modi’s effort is to “transform transactional nature of bilateral ties and add economic and strategic substance” (Kumarswamy, 2018). India’s expanding regional aspirations across the Indian Ocean are also a factor. India sees the Gulf and South Asia as strategically interactive and interrelated regions, and has increased its focus on the Gulf accordingly (Pethiyagoda, 2017a). Indian policymakers seem determined to raise India’s profile internationally, shed old mindsets and to help India position itself in a positive role rather than just a balancing force, adding that India engages the world with greater confidence and assurance. The growth of India’s power and standing and its active diplomacy can be seen in its renewed focus on GCC countries. Acknowledging that India’s ‘footprint’ in the region has been relatively autonomous of strategic calculation, Indian policymakers recognize the need to develop a holistic engagement strategy , one that seeks both to strengthen economic ties and institutionalise long term security cooperation.

Gains from GCC India Strategic Relations – illustrative examples

• During Modi's August 2015 visit to the Emirates, India and the UAE agreed that the latter would invest up to US$75 billion “to support investment in India’s plans for rapid expansion of next-generation infrastructure, especially in railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial corridors and parks.” (MEA GOI 2015)

• ONGC Videsh Ltd and its partners Indian Oil Corporation and a unit of Bharat Petroleum Corporation have acquired a 10 per cent in stake in Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), a large offshore oilfield in Abu Dhabi for US$ 600 million, the first time any Indian company has set foot in oil-rich Emirates (The Times of India, 2018).

• Modi’s personal equation resulted in Qatari Emir wavering penalty of US$1 billion (S$1.37 billion) that India had to pay for importing less than agreed quantity of gas (Choudhary, 2015).

• King Salman’s personal intervention facilitated Indian evacuation of its citizens from Yemen in April 2015 (The Economic Times, 2015).

• India and Saudi Arabia are discussing possibility of India buying stakes in Aramco, the largest oil company in the globe (The Economic Times, 2018).

• In March 2018, Saudi Arabia granted over flight facility to Air India for its Delhi-Tel Aviv flight. This was the first time in over six decades that the Kingdom had given such a privilege for flights to and from Israel (The Times of India, 2018).

• India got access to Oman port Al Duqm for Military use, Chabbar Gwadar in sight (Roy, 2018).

• The UAE and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding to participate in the US$ 44 billion petrochemical plant in Ratnagiri in Maharashtra, and this would include the Saudi supply of up to two million barrels of crude oil per day (The Economic Times, 2018).

• The Gulf investments showed a considerable spike since 2014. Between 2000 and 2018, the Gulf Arab countries had invested US$6.75 billion (S$9.3 billion) in India as foreign direct investment and out of this US$3.6 billion or 53 per cent had come since 2014 (Kumarswamy, 2018).

• Despite being non-Arab state India enjoys its observer status in the Arab League. India was invited by Foreign Minister of UAE Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan to attend meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as ‘guest of honor‘ (Times of India, 2019).

Modi's visits to Gulf countries and engagement with their leaders have provided critical political content to bilateral relations. The current Indian buzz in Gulf is mostly result of political contacts since 2014 (Kumarswamy, 2018). These developments indicate that India enjoys positive image, which helps it further expand its economic and political interests in GCC region.

Conclusion

Under its ‘Look West‘ policy, India has coherently strategised its priorities towards the Middle East and adopted a rational approach to achieve its objectives. India has friendly relations with all GCC countries and has strategic interests due to energy security as well as presence of over eight million expatriates. India should continue to engage with all sides without antagonising any of the countries and without taking sides. Frequent state-level bilateral visits and extensive economic cooperation has synchronised India – GCC thinking in areas of energy security, trade and investment, and cross-border terrorism. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has substantially developed India‘s economic clout. India should capitalise on diversification plans of GCC countries. Balancing China, presence of strong expatriate community in GCC countries and promoting its soft image are key motivating drivers behind India‘s growing cooperation with GCC states. These developments indicate that India’s political presence will become inevitable for GCC countries in foreseeable future. Security cooperation is also likely to develop in future. India’s interests in GCC have deepened due to significant trade and investment relations along with expatriate presence. Hence, peace and stability in the region acquires greater significance for India.

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