Abstract
Road networks in Arunachal Pradesh have improved considerably in the last two decades. Look East and Act East policies which focus on connectivity have brought huge dividends to the state. Recurring confrontations between the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA at the LAC have added to the urgency of creating better infrastructure in the state, including in border areas. This article analyses the evolution of road connectivity in Arunachal Pradesh from independence to the present day and examines some of its possible long-term consequences in the context of India-China relations.
Keywords: Arunachal Pradesh, Connectivity, Line of Actual Control, Look East Policy.
Introduction
After 75 years of India's independence, its borders have remained unsettled and assertive neighbours, be it Pakistan or China, have challenged India’s boundaries recurrently. The escalating tensions on line of Control (LOC) and standoffs at Line of Actual Control (LAC) in recent times have been a major cause of security concern for India.
The latest major clash between the Indian Army and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was in the Yangtse area of the Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh on the disputed LAC on December 09, 2022. The Defence Minister of India Rajnath Singh told the Lok Sabha that “PLA troops tried to transgress the LAC in the Yangtse area of Tawang Sector and unilaterally change the status quo. The Chinese attempt was contested by our troops in a firm and resolute manner” (Singh, 2022).
It is interesting to note that on July 20,2020 Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh Pema Khandu had inaugurated a gompa i.e., a prayer hall for Tibetan Buddhist monks at Chumi Gyatse waterfalls which are in close proximity of the LAC in the Yangtse area and which are considered holy by the Tibetan Buddhists. A new road up to Tsechu village near the falls has been developed by India to promote tourism in the area and to facilitate travel up to the holy site (Hasnat, 2020). The fact that the December clash between the Indian Army and PLA occurred in the same sector of LAC points to the growing border infrastructure created by India as a short-term cause for more provocation by the Chinese.
After the Doklam standoff in June-August, 2017 and the Galwan clash in June 2020, this was the third major reported clash between the two forces on the LAC. In October 2021, there was another face-off, near Yangtse. Differing perceptions of LAC and improved infrastructure on the borders is bringing patrols from both sides into more frequent contact and the potential for more such confrontations in the future exists. Amongst many other strategic, tactical, and political aspects, this clash once again brought into the forefront the issue of border infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh. Against this backdrop, this article will analyse the recent developments in border road infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh and their impact on connectivity and security situation in the area.
Historical Perspective
Ever since the 1962 conflict between India and China, the issue of border infrastructure has been vexing the Indian policymakers. India-China border is 3488 km long with 1126 km along Arunachal Pradesh (Ministry of Home Affairs, Management of the Indo-China Border). The Indo-China LAC is divided into three sectors-the Western sector stretches from the east of the Siachen glacier through Aksai Chin to union territory of Ladakh; the Central sector stretches across Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand while the Eastern sector runs along the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh borders. LAC terrain is mountainous and extremely difficult to access, guard and patrol round the year, especially from the Indian side. Transport and communication networks in the forward areas along LAC in all three sectors have been weak or non-existent for decades.
Lack of a robust road network in Arunachal Pradesh has historical reasons. The area of present-day Arunachal Pradesh was never under the direct control of the great Indian historical empires like the Mauryan, Gupta or Mughal empire, which were centered on the Indo-Gangetic plain. Two great mediaeval empires of Assam, the Sutiyas and the Ahoms, did not bring the Himalayan foothills and the tribes living within them under their direct administrative control. Their focus was to protect the agricultural communities in the Brahmaputra plains from frequent attacks by the hill tribes. They did not pursue a policy of conquest of the hills (History of Northeast India (1228 to 1947), 2016).
The area was sparsely populated and inhabited exclusively by hill tribes who had a clear notion of their territory. The tribes lived in isolation and interacted with other tribes only for barter exchange. Bridle paths, mule tracks were the type of road tracks in use in the hills, especially in the upper regions. During the late mediaeval period, Ahom administration placated the tribes in the foothills of Arunachal and started the practice of giving posa (which means a right to collect subscriptions for common cause) to hill tribes in return for peace in the plains and largely left the tribes to their own way of life (Acharya, 1992). They did not generally resort to force to completely subjugate the tribes.
The Yandabo treaty of 1826 gave the British control over Assam (Britannica, 1999). The Ahom policy of non-interference in the tribal affairs continued under the British colonial administrators. They gradually ventured into the foothills, initially for exploration of the area and later to establish their authority. The British did not make very serious attempts at administering the hill area, unlike the Brahmaputra Plains, as they did not consider it rewarding enough. The British left the upper hilly regions and frontier tracts untouched. Under British colonial rule, the area of present-day Arunachal Pradesh was first carved out of the province of Assam by way of two frontier tracts in 1919, namely Balipara and Sadiya frontier tracts. These North-East Frontier Tracts (NEFT) were later divided into smaller administrative subdivisions, but within Assam. After independence, the area was designated as North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1951 (Verrier, 1957). Thus, a modern administration gradually came into being in this remote area in the first half of the twentieth century. Even under the British administration, new roads or the development of existing roads did not happen. For instance, the Gazetteer for East Kameng and West Kameng states that “There was hardly any development of the existing communications or construction of new roads during the British rule”. The Gazetteer further records that “There was no motorable road in the three districts of East and West Kameng and Tawang before independence” (Choudhury, 1996). Development of roads under an imperial or colonial administration did not happen in the area for centuries.
After Independence
Development policies followed by the Government of India in NEFA in the first two decades after independence and the international situation prevailing in China and Tibet up to 1959 also contributed in a way to the slow development of the road network, especially in border areas.
After independence, there was a frequent debate about the development policies to be followed in tribal areas, including in NEFA. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, writing the foreword on February 16,1957 to the first edition of Verrier Elwin’s book ‘A Philosophy For NEFA’, summed up this debate as follows “… I felt we should avoid two extreme courses: one was to treat them (the tribes) as anthropological specimens for study and the other was to be allowed them to be engulfed by the masses of Indian humanity. I began to doubt how far the normal idea of progress was beneficial to these people and indeed whether this was progress at all in any real sense of the word. It was true that they could not be left cut off from the world as they were. Political and economic forces impinged upon them, and it was not possible or desirable to isolate them. Equally undesirable... was to allow these forces to function freely and upset their whole life and culture, which had so much good in them” (Verrier, 1957).
Prime Minister Nehru was emphatic that development in communications, medical facilities, education, and better agriculture is necessary. He set out the five core principles of development philosophy for NEFA; that People should develop along the lines of their own genius, that tribal rights in land and forest should be respected, that the work of administration and development should be done by a team of their own people after training, that these areas should not be over administered or overwhelmed with a multiplicity of schemes, and that the results of development efforts should be judged on the quality of human character that is evolved (Verrier, 1957).
The development policies that followed from this vision were designed to avoid over administering these areas and to circumvent the influx of outsiders into tribal territory. With the developmental works largely entrusted to local government departments, which had limited resources and with minimal involvement of other agencies of Government of India, construction of roads in border areas and overall, in NEFA continued to suffer.
International Situation
At the time of independence, the political situation in Tibet and China north of NEFT was in a flux. The Chinese Communist Party and the Koumintang government were engaged in a long tussle for control of China, which the Communists won in 1949 and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Britannica, n. d.). The Tibetan government was attempting to gain international recognition but failed to do so. In 1951, PRC brought Tibet under its control and claimed sovereignty over Tibet. The newly established PRC was industrially and economically weak and was perceived to be no threat to India’s national security. India and China signed the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, which espoused the principle for peaceful co-existence (MEA, Panchsheel). Possibility of an armed conflict between India and PRC was not contemplated by India then. Given the military technology in vogue in the 1950s, India considered the mighty Himalayas to be an impregnable barrier to a large-scale invasion. Thus, even from a security perspective, development of roads and other infrastructure in NEFA and especially in border areas was not considered essential at that time.
Alternative Strategies
From a strictly military point of view, the policymakers are hard pressed to make a choice between two alternative strategies for communications and infrastructure near border areas. If the terrain is difficult and inaccessible, then the advancing enemy should not be facilitated by the communication network of the area. On the other hand, communications networks can be strengthened to induct more forces and equipment to stop the advancing enemy or to facilitate the advance of your own forces. The long-term societal benefits of development of communications far outweigh the temporary merit of stalling the enemy advance in the event of a war. Therefore, states seem to increasingly favour the latter alternative (Das, 2021). In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, the view of the policymakers seems to have changed between the two alternatives, with the focus now on rapid building up of the infrastructure near the borders.
Aftermath of Occupation of Tibet
The decisive change in the perception of border roads came in the aftermath of Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951, which created a direct military threat to India. Subsequently, the Tibet uprising of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s entry into India via the Tawang-Balipara-Tezpur route put India in a direct adversarial role to China. Chinese occupation of Tibet changed the security perception of Northern and Eastern borders. To assess the border situation and to augment the border defence infrastructure, the North and North-Eastern Border Defence Committee was formed in 1951 under the chairmanship of Major-General Himmatsinhji, the then Deputy Minister for Defence. The Committee had the mandate to study the problems created by the Chinese aggression in Tibet and to make recommendations about the measures to improve the administration, defence, communication, etc. of all the frontiers areas (Mullick, 1971). The Committee submitted its first report on NEFA, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Eastern Frontier (Burma) in April 1951 and a second report on Ladakh, UP, Nepal border in September,1951. The report of the committee is not available in the public domain. But according to B.N. Mullick, then Director of Intelligence Bureau, the Committee recommended construction of tracks and roads to connect all administrative posts and Assam Rifles posts to the Headquarters and to increase use of air transport for movement of personnel and supplies. Recommendations of the Committee, with some exceptions, were accepted by the Cabinet and the development of border areas was entrusted to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Road construction in the border areas was assigned to the Army Engineers and other roads were made the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport (Mullick, 1971).
Impact of Five-year Plans
As of 1950, the whole of NEFT, which became NEFA in 1954, lacked all-weather roads and the total length of roads was estimated to be barely 160 kilometers. Much of this network was damaged in the Assam earthquake of 1950. After independence, India adopted the model of planned development under which the state governments received substantial grants through MHA under the First and Second Five Year Plans for construction of roads. The plan outlay for construction of roads under the first and second Five-Year Plans was Rs. 1.35 Cr and Rs. 2.65 Cr respectively. The plan outlay for construction of roads in NEFA in the third five-year plan increased Rs. 7.21 cr. Important links like Darrang- Along road, Kimin-Ziro road and Tezpur-Bomdila road were constructed during this period. Under the first plan, roads were mostly constructed in the foothills, but under the second plan they were gradually extended to administrative centres in the hills (Rose and Fisher, 1967).
Initial Lessons
Construction of roads in Arunachal Pradesh proved to be a complicated and challenging task compared to road building in the plains of Assam. The Himalayan ranges are roughly in North-south alignment and divided into five major river valleys in the state, the Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit and Tirap. The naturally feasible alignment for roads is along the river valleys with very little feasibility of cross valley connectivity, except at an exorbitant cost. In a year, six months is the only working season as the rest of the period has rains. Besides, the terrain is mountainous with ravines and gorges, making it difficult for heavy equipment and labour and supplies to access the construction sites. Geologically, the Eastern Himalayas are a relatively young formation. Hence, there are frequent instances of landslides and collapse of slopes during construction. Further, due to lack of a local industrial base, skilled labour and equipment must be positioned from outside the area, thus adding to the cost of construction.
Raising of BRO
As the road building progressed in the 1950s, it soon became evident that the task was too difficult for state Public Works Departments (PWD) which were short of technology and funds required for it. Similar hurdles were experienced in construction in other sectors of LAC. Moreover, ‘roads’ was a state subject under the Constitution. The roads were being constructed mainly in the foothills and to connect administrative centres. The situation changed completely in 1959. After the failed uprising in Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India, as a result, there was a pressing need to upgrade the border road infrastructure. But the additional task could not have been carried out in the given situation on the ground by the state PWD or by Army Engineers alone. To resolve these difficulties of jurisdiction, funding and direct control over implementation, the Government raised the Border Roads Development Board and its executive arm the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) in March,1960 and May,1960 respectively (MORTH, GIO, Annual Report 2003-2004). BRO was given a twofold mandate. In peacetime, to develop and maintain the operational road infrastructure of General Staff in border areas and in wartime, to develop and maintain roads to keep the line of control through (Border Roads Organisation, n.d.).
Evolution of BRO in Arunachal Pradesh
BRO initially started with project Tusker (later renamed as project Vartak) in Arunachal Pradesh. The first road entrusted to BRO for construction was Bhalukpong- Tenga and for maintenance, was Misamari-Tenga in 1960. The works entrusted to BRO have grown over the decades, and today, four projects are based in Arunachal Pradesh. Project Tusker was renamed as project Vartak in 1963 and it continues to oversee roads in the Tawang sector and the western part of Arunachal. Three additional projects were raised out of Vartak to look after different geographical areas of the state as the requirement of construction increased. Project Udayakwas launched in 1986 to look after Eastern Arunachal and areas south of Brahmaputra. Project Arunank was formed in December 2008 to look after Subansiri, Siang and Siyom valley roads (Ishar, n.d.). Further, in 2011, Project Brahmank was raised at Pasighat to look after roads in East Siang, West Siang, Upper Siang, and Lower Dibang districts (BRO Additional DG reviews ongoing works under Project Brahmank 2022). Implementation of project Vartak and efforts of state PWD and other agencies involved in creation and improvement of roads resulted in a gradual improvement in connectivity within the state in the next three decades.
Changed International Context in the 1990s
Three important developments during the 1990s drastically altered the policy continuity in Arunachal Pradesh. First, with the changing global and domestic context, Indian foreign policy was reoriented from Non-Alignment and South Asia centric approach to a more comprehensive global, multilateral outlook. Wider and deeper engagement with nations of Southeast Asia was given importance in the policy architecture. The outcome was that India launched the ‘Look East’ Policy (LEP) with an emphasis on three ‘C’s: Culture, Commerce and Connectivity. This brought connectivity, both within the NE region and with nations of Southeast Asia, into focus. (Kalita, 2019).
Second, the upgradation of border infrastructure gained prominence once again in the aftermath of Kargil conflict. The Kargil review committee recommended reform of the interface between the Army and the Ministry of Defence, revamp of the intelligence set up and recommended integrated border management policies (Subrahmanyam, 2009). Therefore, in 1999 Government of India had to revisit the issue of border road infrastructure and sanction 13 new border roads.
Third, road and rail infrastructure development in Tibet became a cause of concern from an Indian security perspective. Ever since its occupation of Tibet in 1950, China had made continuous efforts to improve connectivity of Tibet and other Chinese provinces. It had organised special conferences to promote infrastructure development in Tibet. A vast network of roads had come up in Tibet in the four decades following its occupation. As later events showed, it was only to be strengthened further by Qinghai-Tibet Railway (QTR) and its extension, practically close to the LAC. The ostensible purpose of this network was to better integrate Tibet into the Chinese economy and to promote development, but its security implications for India were obvious (Das, 2021).
The ICBR Program
In this changed context across the LAC and within the NE region, reassessment of connectivity infrastructure, both civil and strategic, had to be done. On the civil side, connectivity projects to link all the state capitals in NE region by national highways were announced on August 15, 2003 (Ministry of Highways, 2004). On the strategic side, a special ‘China Study Group’, first formed in 1975 under the chairmanship of Foreign Secretary to advise the Government on China policy (Dutta, 2020) reassessed the state of border infrastructure in 2005 and recommended construction of 73 India-China Border Roads (ICBRs) (Dubey, 2020).
Out of these 73 ICBRs, execution of 61 roads having a total length of 3417 km with initial estimated costs of Rs. 4644 Cr was entrusted to BRO with their original targeted completion by 2012. In Arunachal Pradesh, 27 ICBRs with a total length of 1791 km were sanctioned (Lok Sabha, 2016). The Doklam incident in June-August 2017 lent more urgency to the creation of border roads. In the years following the Doklam incident, the Government steadily increased the budget for BRO from Rs. 5465 Cr in 2017-18 to Rs. 7575 Cr in 2019-20. After the Galwan clash in 2020, the budget further increased to Rs. 8860 Cr in 2020-21 and Rs. 9321 Cr for 2021-22. Correspondingly, BRO’s expenditure also rose from Rs.5457 Cr in 2017-18 to Rs. 7098 Cr in 2021-22 (Lok Sabha, 2022a). The increased momentum in road building is evident. Only 22 ICBRs were completed by March 2016 whereas 42 roads totaling to 1530.38 Km have been completed by March 2021. Connectivity had been achieved on 59 roads of length 3205.16 km and on the remaining two roads of length 118.41 km, the unconnected portion was only 29 km. Phase I of the ICBR program is now targeted for completion by March 2023 (Rajya Sabha, 2021).
In Arunachal Pradesh, construction of 27 ICBRs was entrusted to BRO. Scope of the ICBR program has been expanded from time to time. As on December 2022, BRO is constructing 257 border roads all over the country, out of which 64 roads totalling 3097 km are in Arunachal Pradesh. The construction is being done under a five-year Long-Term Roll over Works Plan (LTROWP) for the period 2018-19 to 2022-23 with priority fixed by the Army. The road construction in border areas received a further boost in October 2022 when additional 75 projects were launched by the Government. These include 27 roads out of which four roads totalling 34 km are in Arunachal Pradesh (Lok Sabha, 2022b).
The Frontier Highway
The Arunachal Frontier Highway is another strategically important and the biggest border infrastructure project in the state. According to various media reports, this 1748 km long highway from Nafra in western Arunachal to Vijaynagar on India-Myanmar border in south-eastern Arunachal has been approved by the Union Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways in November 2022 and construction of 192 km stretch has begun (Dash, 2022). The frontier highway will run parallel to the LAC and, when completed, will surely change the logistics and security scenario on the LAC.
Roads other than Border Areas—SARDP NE
Besides border road infrastructure, there has been a consistent effort to improve the road connectivity in the NE region by augmenting the existing national and state highways network. A major initiative for improvement in connectivity in the NE region was announced on 15 August 2003 by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to connect all state capitals in the north-east which were not then linked with the national Highway development Project (NHDP) network through four-lane roads. Following this initiative, in September 2005 Special Accelerated Road Development Program for Northeast (SARDP-NE) was launched to construct or upgrade roads across the NE region in Arunachal Pradesh, total roads of 3000 km length were planned, including 335 km national highways and balance 2665 km state highways and general staff roads. The scope of the program has been expanded from time to time.
The Trans Arunachal Highway from Tawang in the western Arunachal to Bogibeel Bridge near Dibrugarh in Assam with a length of 1644 Km connecting Bomdila, Neciphu, Seppa, Ziro, Along, Panjin, Rowing, Pasighat, Mahadebpur, Changlang and Khonsa is being constructed under the SARDP NE except the Tawang-Neciphu stretch under BRO (Rajya Sabha, 2014). When completed, this highway will provide connectivity from western Arunachal to Eastern Arunachal without having to cross the Brahmaputra, which would turn out to be a great boon to the locals. Newly incorporated National Highways Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL) is having an increasing footprint in Arunachal. It has sanctioned roads totaling 751 Km in length and has already completed 303 Km (MORTH, 2022a).
The Sela and NeciphuTunnels
Tawang to Neciphu stretch of Balipara- Charduar- Tawang road (BCT road) is under construction as part of project Vartak of BRO. This road is the lifeline of the Army in the Tawang sector as it connects headquarters of IV corps at Tezpur directly with Tawang and is critical for logistics on the LAC. To ensure all weather connectivity and safety of traffic, two tunnels on this stretch at the Sela pass and the Neciphu pass are being constructed. The present road, at the location of these passes, is hazardous due to foggy weather and the condition of the strata. At Sela pass, it is directly visible to the Chinese patrols on LAC (Sela tunnel in Arunachal will bolster security on the China border). Once the alignment is diverted through the two tunnels, all weather and safe connectivity up to Tawang will be ensured. The road is expected to be ready by March 2023 (PIB, 2022) and will be a critical addition to the border road network. The Present Scenario Overall, land connectivity is most vital for the development of any state and in the context of Arunachal Pradesh, it is also strategically important. The number of infrastructure projects at the border and within the state and the government’s spotlight on speedy completion proves undoubtedly that connectivity within Arunachal Pradesh and along the border areas has enhanced today than it was during the 1962 war. Official data released by MORTH shows that the total length of roads in Arunachal Pradesh increased from 14980 km in March 2012 to 55262 km by March 2019. The length of national highways increased from 2027 km to 2537 km in the same period. The length of state highways and PWD roads increased from 3856 km to 13500 km in the same period. Importantly, the network of rural roads increased from 3345 km to 25832 km in the same period (MORTH, 2022b). The border roads network in Arunachal is estimated to be 3097 Km, including 1725 km of ICBR Phase I roads. This improvement in connectivity will have a profound effect on the development of the state and on the security of LAC.
Conclusion
The last two decades have given a decisive turn to connectivity in Arunachal Pradesh by making it a top priority under, first the Look East policy and later the Act East policy. This has enormous economic and social implications for the state.
In recent years, as the domestic and international situation unfolded, the Indian government has escalated connectivity projects by bringing in new funding mechanisms and new organisations have been added to the existing ones to improve the overall performance in connectivity. Reforms in BRO have helped in removing bottlenecks in the execution of projects. Development of infrastructure in other parts of the NE region has added depth to the infrastructure in Arunachal. For e.g., Bogibeel and DholaSadiya bridges across Brahmaputra, though in Assam, have given strategic depth to the infrastructure in Arunachal.
On the policy side, a decisive shift has taken place with the ICBR program and the proposed Frontier Highway reaching near the LAC. Recently approved projects like the Arunachal frontier Highway and Trans-Arunachal highway may complete in the next five years, but the direction of the effort is clear. Societal development and security considerations are the key drivers of these developments.
Strategic experts are in agreement that China will continue its aggressive posture on the LAC and Yangtse like incidents will continue in the future. China undoubtedly has the advantage in border infrastructure as it started construction activities much earlier than India way back in the 50s. China also has the geographical arbitrage in Tibet with relatively less hostile terrain for construction on its side of the LAC. Therefore, India will have to increase the pace of development of roads and other border infrastructure in the future.
Development of roads deep inside the five principal river valleys will enable India to tap the hydroelectric power generation potential of these mighty rivers and it can have a long-term effect on the riparian arrangements between China, India and Bangladesh. Lower Subansiri Hydro-electric Power Project could be a harbinger of things to come in this respect.
Border infrastructure on both sides can be leveraged to enhance the potential for trade and commerce across the LAC between India and Tibet and also for cementing the ancient cultural ties between communities on both the sides of the LAC.
Borders are not merely lines on a map, but scholars today view borders as spatial entities which evolve continuously because of actions of state and non-state actors, natural forces, trade and commerce and cultural ties. This process of ‘bordering’ is ongoing and the concerned actors must manage it to achieve their national interests. Viewed thus, management of LAC is certainly a daunting task for India and China. Evolution of infrastructure on both sides of LAC is contributing to the process of bordering and needs closer attention.
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