Introduction

The 9/11 attacks have written a completely new narrative of the emerging forms of conflict. The nature of this asymmetric warfare with faceless non-state actors is completely unpredictable and unanticipated with respect to battlespace, timing, nature of conflict, targets, motivation. This uncertain emerging security environment prompts the counterterrorism agencies all over the world to think more creatively, and the mantra is ―Think like a terrorist‖!

Historically, Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBWs) have been utilized by all civilizations since time immemorial. However, CBW terrorism was limited to few people with easy access to these toxic materials and possessed knowledge to utilize those. This scenario changed in 19th century with exponential growth of modern scientific understanding of Chemistry and Microbiology. Poisonous chemicals and pathogenic microbes became attractive and potent Weapons of Mass Destruction (Zanders).

Harmful chemicals and pathogenic microbes as CBWs were extensively developed and utilized during, and after WW I and II and cold war for sabotage, warfare and assassinations such as that of Reinhard Heydrich (Germany), Georgi Markov (UK), and Bio-weapons (BWs) program of Area 731 (Japan).

Bioterrorism

Intentional release of pathogenic microbes (viruses, bacteria or fungi) or toxins causing destruction, disease or death of targeted population, livestock or agricultural crops is Bioterrorism.

Historical use of biological warfare agents spread intentionally includes bubonic plague, tularaemia, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever and leprosy. The use of infected cadavers in the Black Sea coast to spread bubonic plague which resulted in the death of > 25 million people remains to be the most controversial, yet a landmark in the history of BWs. During subsequent centuries and colonial history, Small Pox remained the most suspected and effective BW agent used by British against Native Americans. With advent of Microbiology, modern era facilitated identification, isolation and large scale production of pathogenic organisms. During WW I Germany and France, on a small scale, developed secret BW programs. The threatening nature and horrors of chemical and BW programs of many nations led to ratification of Geneva Protocol in 1925, which prohibited use of biological weapons, but not their research and production (Barras and Greub).

During the interval between the two world wars scientists of Unit 731, the notorious Japanese governments BW program, subjected prisoners with inoculation of pathogenic organisms including cholera, small pox, bubonic plague, botulism, tularaemia; subjected to various experimentation like vivisection, germ warfare attacks, and left untreated. The Japanese army under the guidance of Unit 731 conducted large scale development of bombs, trials of BWs, infection of reservoirs, air-borne spraying of vector-borne diseases such as plague infected fleas on Chinese territories (Zaitchuk). The American army granted immunity to Unit 731 scientists after the end of WWII in exchange of the knowhow of BW program of Unit 731. Indeed, the fingerprints of US BW program can be traced back to Unit 731 including the types of biological agents studied and the simulations used. The cold war era also witnessed flare up of (mostly unsubstantiated) claims of BW attacks from both the sides in Korean and Vietnam wars, and Afghanistan invasion. Though Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Convention (BTWC) 1972 was signed by >100 nations under the pressure from WHO, it could not prevent nations from pursuing aggressive BW programs.

Bioterrorism during contemporary period includes two most striking and confirmed examples of BW use of Salmonella typhimurium by Rajneesh cult in 1984 wherein 45 people had to be hospitalized. The other was by Aum Shinriyko, a non-state apocalyptic terrorist organization in Japan, in 1994 – 95 of using BWs (Clostridium botulism, Bacillus anthracis spores) (seven deaths and 600 injured) and chemical sarin gas (Thirteen people died and > 5,500 were injured) (Carus). Several incidences of infected letters with plague and anthrax spores and ricin were reported in the US between 1996 and 2001 and later in UK in 2004.

Prevalence of such bioterror attacks or threats is comparatively less in India. The suspected spread of epidemics of pneumonic plague in Surat in 1994, haemorrhagic dengue fever in Delhi in 1996, Anthrax cases in Midnapur in 1999 and encephalitis in 2001 in Siliguri are difficult to point figures due to lack of evidence (Krishan et al.) However, more recent Ricin threats in 2017 at Bangalore campus of an IT giant, Wipro sounded a loud alarm bell for Indian security agencies.

Characteristics of potential bio-weapons

Just because CBWs are classified in the same category as nuclear and radiological weapons as possible WMDs, when a particular terrorist organization appears to have taken interest in CBWs, its acquisition, weaponization and eventual release of these weapons is presumed to be a reality. This comparison with nuclear weapons allows to make this presumption of CBWs as cheap, easily acquired and weaponizable weapon systems (Zanders). Whereas, in reality the technology knowledge base and skillsets required for CBW weapon systems is completely different, more complicated and requires endless experimentation without any assured results. Thus, acquisition of CBWs by non-state terrorist organization has a high probability but achieving CBW warfare capability for terrorist organizations is ambitious task. There is always a possibility of them acquiring CBW warfare capability from a rogue state though.

There is a need of disambiguation of terms such as bio-crimes vs. bio-terrorism and terrorism with CB agents/ materials vs. CB weapon warfare agents. Bio-crimes broadly relate to acquisition, possession, threat, attack for the intension of assassinations by state or non-state actors using biological agents, whereas bioterrorism relates to acquisition, possession, threat and attack large populations, military personnel, livestock or agricultural crops by state or non-state actors using biological agents as WMDs. Similarly, terrorism with CB agents/ materials relates to use of un-weaponized agents to cause harm, whereas CBW refers to the warfare systems researched, designed, developed and deployed by military organizations to achieve certain milestones in missions. The sarin attack in Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo, is an event to emphasize this distinction. This was a milestone event wherein a non-state terrorist organization used a warfare agent. This disambiguation is imperative to analyse the nature, motivation, origin and impact of anticipated bio-threat.

Biological Agents and Understanding the threat

The 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Convention (BTWC), prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of BWs of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Biological toxins though are classified as BW agents along with microbial pathogens, characteristically they differ as they cannot replicate like pathogens to cause epidemics or endemics. This arena of arms control which overlaps between BW and CW agents consists of mid spectrum agents such as toxins, bioregulators and certain peptides are not infective and are not live organisms, are related to both the categories, yet different from both (Carus).

Though Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and BTWC (1972) have made development, launch and maintenance of illicit CW and BW programs very challenging, BTWC has limitations for Biological arms control and disarmament, and have not prevented BW proliferation. No single policy convention can curtail the BW proliferation threat, but lessons learnt from the failures of many non-state/ state-funded BW programs should be helpful in creating an effective framework to impose higher barriers for future BW developments

(Bhushan; Ben Ouagrham-Gormley). CWC is more robust in CW proliferation as against BTWC with respect to declaration, inspection, verification, disarmament etc. and its robust treaty having two-pronged approach to the treaty with a general purpose criteria and ability to amend the schedules as exemplified by recent addition of Novichoks to Schedule 1 of CWC. Recently, major milestone for CWC treaty was achieved; as for the first time in the history CWC‘s Annexe on chemicals have been updated. ―This is an important development that demonstrates the adaptability of the Convention to changing threats while enhancing the OPCW‘s ability to remain vigilant, agile, and fit for purpose.‖ as recognized by The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), H.E. Mr Fernando Arias, recently (―Conference of the States Parties Adopts Decisions to Amend Chemical Weapons Convention Annex‖)

The potential impact of new technological developments in creating designer bio-weapons was first recognized in 2016, with a mention of gene editing by US Director of National intelligence in annual worldwide threat assessment report. These ―Next Gen‖ dual use BWs technologies include

. Synthetic biology (resurrecting disappeared pathogens/ synthetic pathogens (chimeras)) (Ahteensuu; Raina MacIntyre et al.)and Gene editing using CRISPR Cas9 for example for targeted bioweapons for specific ethnic populations (Future Bioweapons Could Kill People With Specific DNA)

. Gene drive technology (mosquitoes as bio-controls of Malaria)(James et al.)

. Cyberattacks on medical diagnostics and electronic medical records (EMR) (Hayes), insulin pumps, pacemakers (Dick Cheney)(Raina MacIntyre et al.)

. Role of non-lethal bio-weapons in asymmetric warfare (Michael L. Gross)

India, Asymmetric warfare and Bio-preparedness

Bio-preparedness planning of cold war era needs a paradigm shift in vision and approach considering the challenges arising due to new technological advances in dual use technologies and gain of function research (Ben Ouagrham-Gormley; Raina MacIntyre et al.). A national bioterrorism preparedness audit would help to reveal potential vulnerabilities in the public healthcare and agriculture infrastructure. Therefore, the resources invested and deployed for Bio- threat preparedness infrastructure and research will bring about paradigm change in the detection, prevention, treatment and management of emerging pandemics and epidemics, and not just from bioterrorism point of view.

Bioterrorism has a unique feature of causing fear psychosis in large populations. The horror of anticipated fatal, uncontrolled epidemics creates wide-spread panic, long lasting fear of invisible agents, anger towards the terrorist organizations or government or both, demoralization and social unrest. CBWs are attractive tools for non-state terrorist outfits to wage asymmetric warfare, considering covert support from state CBW programs. This puts tremendous pressure on the government agencies tackling the challenge. High density population, insufficient public healthcare systems, climatic conditions, lack of national comprehensive coordination network of national laboratories, research institutions, and overall ecosystem makes India vulnerable to potential bioterrorism attacks (Krishan et al.).

Public health perspective

Public health emergency management involves surveillance of infectious transmissible diseases, detection, identification of causative agents and modes of transmission, and strategies for prevention and control. These strategies are strikingly similar to those necessary for Bio- preparedness.

For surveillance of infectious diseases, Indian scientists have successfully established frameworks to estimate disease burden by building a three-tier surveillance system, spanning small catchment hospitals in rural areas to major cities (John et al.). These frameworks are designed for Typhoid caused by Salmonella strains. One of the scientists Dr. Kang while emphasizing the urgency of this work cites example of an antibiotic-resistant strain of Salmonella causing 5000-odd Typhoid cases in Pakistan in 2016 and warns of it getting spread in India (―With 3-Tier Surveillance, Top Indian Scientist Gets Ready to Battle Typhoid‖). This scenario is worrisome considering the bio-terrorism perspective and intentional use of such strains as potent agents.

By incorporating such existing frameworks, the jigsaw puzzle of comprehensive coordination network needs to be built for bio-preparedness mechanism with respect to,

. Preparedness and surveillance

. Prevention

. Detection, Containment and decontamination

. Diagnostic protocols for bio-agents

. Emergency response to threat/ event

Missing pieces of this puzzle such as building an ecosystem around bio-preparedness needs to be built which would include

. Cutting-edge research organizations with a specific mandate for bio-defence, pool of scientists, government agencies (like DRDO)-academia- industry collaborations for development of vaccines, detection kits, surveillance

. Extensive standard operating procedures (SOPs) for detection of bioterror agents using flowcharts for first responders like Primary Health Centres (PHCs), Emergency response teams

. National Laboratory network with multi-layered systems graded according to severity of the threat (BSL 1- 4) and efficient live-wire communication between the labs

. Comprehensive Coordinated Communication Network systems within all emergency response departments, emergency medical response (EMR) departments of large hospitals, Investigative agencies, Cybercrime agencies and international collaborators

. Psychological counselling support mechanisms to deal with fear psychosis of bioterror attacks

. Focus on ethics of scientific research and gain of function research in Indian research organizations and private industry

. Preparing for anticipated bioterrorism attack and modelling algorithms for consequences of bioterrorism response using simulation techniques

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has proposed a model for managing potential biological disasters. Similarly, there is need to develop a multi-sector comprehensive network of various government ministries such as Defence, Home Affairs, Health and Family welfare, Agriculture, HRD and other supporting ministries such as drinking and water supply, Railways, Rural and Urban development; judiciary, private industry and research and academic institutions (Krishan et al.).

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