The Indo-Pacific region is one of the most economically vibrant regions in the world. It contains 65 percent of the world’s oceans and 25 percent of its land. Additionally, it also makes up around 60 percent of the global GDP and has important trade routes. Notably, Japan, China, South Korea, India, and some Southeast Asian countries are key economic players in the region. The region witnesses around 80 percent of global trade by volume and 60 percent of maritime trade. There are two major trade agreements, the Comprehensive Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). From an economic perspective, the region is also strategically important. The presence of maritime chokepoints such as Bal al Mandeb and the Malacca Strait are key strategic locations (Nicolas 2021). While China has been increasing its power in the region, other countries have stakes. China’s economic coercion and belligerence are well-known facts and the question arises in dealing with its positions. While India seeks to expand its domain and venture into areas that have traditionally not been considered as a part of its a, Japan on the other hand has carefully scrutinized China’s rise and its subsequent challenges. Japan faces a security dilemma vis-à-vis China and seeks allies. As China expands its domain and tries to undermine other nations, countries like Japan aim to create a bloc fostering freedom of navigation and denial of strategic depth to China (Basu 2023). The term Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) was first used by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 when he mentioned the importance of maintaining lines of open communication and shared prosperity in the region (Joshi 2023).
On the other hand, countries such as the United States have important stakes in the region. It advocates for freedom of navigation and trade seemingly trying to undercut China’s increasing presence. The White House released its Indo-Pacific Strategy under the Biden Administration where it delineated that its focus will be on the Quad with added responsibilities for its partners. It will seek to modernize alliances, empower the ASEAN and cooperate on foreign assistance. Referring to China, the US has reiterated that it will defend its interests and deter military aggression against allies. It has also levied focus on India’s role in maintaining the free and open nature of the Indo-Pacific, calling it a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean (The White House 2021).
Likewise for India, the Indo-Pacific region provides a host of opportunities as well as challenges. It recognizes the maritime domain of the region and its willingness to step out of its immediate neighbourhood in fostering greater partnerships with the countries in the region is not only a challenge to China but also an act of political strong-will (Baruah 2020). For Japan, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific hinges on cooperation and stronger trade relations among all the parties. Obvious to the Chinese threat in the region, Japan has maintained its willingness to maintain the openness of the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020). In pursuit of the FOIP, there are certain commonalities between India and Japan. Primarily, cooperation with countries sharing similar objectives in the region includes promoting peace and a fair share of resources, freedom of navigation, and disallowing conflicts. Advancing mutual interests through enhanced connectivity, development of infrastructure, and maintenance of stability in the region (Szechenyi & Hosoya 2019). Hence, being natural partners, both India and Japan have embarked on fostering a greater sense of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
India and FOIP
As mentioned earlier, India recognizes the host of opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. It considers the position of China, its strengths and weaknesses, and the multitude of actors. For India, an increasing role in the region is not only a way to undercut China but also to effectively bolster its role. As a leading power, India cannot afford to ignore the region and needs to play an active role. For starters, its importance has been acknowledged by Australia, the US, and Japan. In a Joint Statement with Australia in 2020 both countries recognized, “many of the future challenges are likely to occur in, and emanate from, the maritime domain” (Ministry of External Affairs 2020). India seeks to synergize its Act East Policy and hence seeks Japan as a reliable partner. In the pursuit of creating new avenues for cooperation keeping the security perspective in mind, the Indo-Pacific theatre offers India unique opportunities. Primarily, India’s objectives coincide with that of Japan and other nations. In doing so, it seeks to formulate working partnerships with various stakeholders to increase its diplomatic footprint in the region (Prime Minister’s Office 2018). India is also aware that it requires an assertive approach to defend its maritime territory, which for long has been coveted by China. It understands the role the small island and littoral states have played in the region and is wary of China’s approaches to such nations. China for years has asserted its position in the Indian Ocean region in a bid to counter India. Understanding China’s preoccupation with its strategic gaps, the Indo-Pacific region is a perfect place to counter it. Thus, in a bid to increase its strategic advantage in the region and undercut China, it sees the Indo-Pacific region with the outmost seriousness.
India’s approach towards the region is guided by its vision which encompasses all the partners. It created the Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). It has taken various approaches to accomplish its role which is bilateral and multilateral in nature. It seeks to entrench cooperation through its assistance programs, deepen security and economic cooperation and assist them in building their maritime infrastructure. As reiterated by India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, “This remains a maritime century, and the tides of the Indo-Pacific region will certainly help shape its future. India along with its partner nations will make a collective effort to keep the oceans peaceful, open, and secure, and, at the same time, contribute to conserving its resources to keep them clean.” (Ministry of External Affairs 2022). With increased strategic engagement by India, it may not only be able to secure its lines of communication but deny China a decisive edge in any given scenario.
Japan and FOIP
For Japan, the Indo-Pacific region is of prime importance and it understands the dramatic power shift that may occur here, given the multitude of actors with varying interests. Japan considers the region to be dynamic and an engine of economic growth for the world. It agrees that the international community will benefit from establishing order in the region based on rule of law rather than coercion. For Japan, rule of law is of prime importance and it believes that no particular country should have the right to colonize the entire region, given the multitude of stakeholders. The importance of the rule of law can be ascertained by three key arguments. Primarily states should make and clarify their claims based on international law. They should refrain from using force or coercion in driving their claims and finally, states should seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. Prime Minister Kishida entailed that Japan’s concept of FOIP stresses ‘equal partnership’ and development of the ‘global commons’. Stressing the security aspect, Japan proposes safe use of the air in the context of the FOIP by which it wishes to see airways safe and secure for common use. Japan has laid stress on maritime security, promising to engage security components and empower agencies for the same. It has declared its intent to support individual nations in their pursuit of security in the region. Terming the Maritime Self-Defence Forces a ‘Force for Peace’ the Japanese government has taken steps to cooperate with other maritime nations.
Considering its position, there are five points on which its entire Indo-Pacific strategy revolves (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020):
1. Ensuring maritime security and safety- which emphasizes the security aspect of the region which is fraught with various dangers emanating from states as well as from non-state actors. It considers the challenges posed by China seriously and seeks to undermine its influence in the region.
2. Enhancing governance through capacity building- various states in the region must be self-sufficient in terms of their defence capabilities hence, Japan has entered into various partnerships with these states to bolster their defence as well as provide them with other material resources to become self-sufficient.
3. Securing connectivity across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific- the conjunction of both oceans makes this region important, hence Japan believes that lines of connectivity should be secure for prospects.
4. Rule-making to expand a free and fair economic order- Japan’s primary focus is to keep the region free for economic and other reasons without letting it turn into a field for contestation. It believes that playing by agreeable rules and under a fair economic order will foster common interests.
5. Promoting public diplomacy- Japan promotes this method of consultation to take into account various stakeholders in the region. It calls for respect for international and maritime law.
There are reasons why the Japanese government is stressing a lot about the concept of FOIP. With the changing world order that is turning out to be fractured and difficult to manage, the Japanese government feels that including stable democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific region will bear desired results. Apart from a fractured world, there is a myriad of issues ranging from geopolitical competition to global challenges such as climate change and crises. More than that, even though there are scopes for cooperation, various conflicts underline such features. Taking a cue from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Japan believes that the lack of an international order which is acceptable to all is a certain impediment to a rules-based order. The lack of consensus on various global issues makes it easy for confrontation rather than cooperation. In this regard, Japan believes that pursuing the idea of FOIP would enable greater cooperation in the region among the stakeholders. Japan has also underlined that in pursuit of FOIP, it does not seek to impose conditions or create any camps. It recognizes the various stakeholders in the region and their security dilemmas and hence, calls for cooperation. As a penultimate point, it seeks to undertake cooperation with various countries in the region of which one is India and it calls its partnership with India indispensable. It also speaks up for integration on various levels for the betterment of humanity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023).
Cooperation between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific
As both countries have similar views regarding the Indo-Pacific region, cooperation stems naturally. Japan’s strategic concerns in the Indo-Pacific region are already explained and the threat it receives from China cannot be underplayed. In this context, India turns out to be a valuable partner. In 2007, Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe made a special mention of India concerning the Indo-Pacific region (Basu 2023). Primarily the points of convergence lie in promoting a rules-based order, maritime domain awareness, energy and maritime security, and greater projection into the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean Region. From the Indian point of view, the installation of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) is essential to foster greater community relations with allies. The concept behind this initiative is to improve the economic structure, logistics, and transportation and to provide better prospects for the region. India is aware of China’s outreach in the area through its economic assistance and programs, hence, it is a bid to counter it. The IPOI entails seven categories which range from maritime security, disaster management and reduction, resource sharing, cooperation in science and technology, and sharing vital information. Japan in turn has actively participated with India in the context of the IPOI, for instance, it set up the Supply Chain Resilience Imitative (SCRI) along with India (Kaushik & Toyoda 2023). Apart from the IPOI, India also set up another initiative known as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), which encompasses capacity building, regional security, sustainable development, and regional connectivity. Similar to the IPOI, Japan is an essential partner in this feature.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in a recent address laid out the vision of the FOIP, leveraging the notion that in highly fractured world order, security has become one of the most critical points of deliberations. In this context, he stressed on India-Japan cooperation in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. He drew from former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe’s ideas and discussed how India and Japan together could lead the region and maintain order (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023). Focussing on a rules-based order, both sides have made it sufficiently clear that such an order is welcome to all the stakeholders, does not restrict participation by any particular country, and disallows the overbearing nature of a hegemon. The presence of China in the region needs to be dealt with through military deterrence as well as with the aid of strong diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014). To counter disputes and conflicts a rules-based order would seem apt. It would require strict adherence to international maritime law and peaceful settlement of disputes (Choong 2019). The idea would be to enable a special strategic and global partnership between both countries.
To ensure freedom of navigation and deny any particular power special privileges the concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) merits discussion. Both India and Japan have repeatedly discussed MDA to ensure freedom in the region. The idea is to collect information, identify threats to peace and stability, and take proactive measures to neutralize them. Maintaining free and open sea lanes of communication, combatting non-state actors, and ensuring cessation of possible hostilities come under the purview of MDA. The commonality between both countries, despite Japan being more reliant on sea lanes than India is the presence of China. The creation of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness is another step to building surveillance in the area and sharing critical information. In addition to that it seeks to collaborate on mechanisms to enforce freedom.
Following the concept of MDA, the focus is levied on the positive aspects of ensuring energy and maritime security in the region. India and Japan are dependent on the Indo-Pacific region for trade and import of energy. The Malacca Strait is one of the most important chokepoints which allows trade. While cooperation on energy is critical, maritime security is an aspect that concerns all. Piracy is a problem in the region that requires concerted efforts from all parties. In this context, India and Japan adhere to the 3E+S model (Chellany 2010) by which energy security, economic efficiency, and the environment are secured. Such measures of cooperation not only lead to the smooth flow of energy but also hinders agents that compromise security in the region. To foster a greater sense of unity and maritime security, Indian and Japanese navies have collaborated on various occasions. The India-Japan Special Strategic Global Partnership has a security aspect that cannot be undermined. Both the navies have taken numerous joint exercises. India and Japan signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2020 to bolster cooperation. The ACSA focuses on mutual logistics support and joint exercises. The idea behind joint exercises is to develop cooperation (Suzuki and Kumar 2020). Features of such joint naval cooperation encompass search and rescue operations, anti-piracy operations, and logistic values. Although, the discussion mainly revolves around the Indo-Pacific region, both countries have extended their vision towards the Bay of Bengal region which is India’s strategic asset. Japan views the region as important as it sees the East Asian region, hence it promotes strategic autonomy in a bid to deny China the same.
Japan considers India a valuable partner in the region, whose democratic credentials are important for confidence building in the region. It views India’s Presidency of the G20 as vital for fostering a greater sense of unity and in collusion as Japan holds the G7 Presidency, even on a multilateral level cooperation is expected.
Conclusion
With changing global scenario that poses greater uncertainty, Japan seeks to engage partners in forming stable and sustainable partnerships. While India and Japan may disagree on the Ukraine crisis, there are a lot of levels of convergences between the two Asian nations. Primarily, both are concerned about the threats from China and are looking out for solutions to secure their lines of communication and vital supplies. Added to it, the maintenance of freedom of navigation and shared prosperity in the region are important aspects. As two important democracies, India and Japan have stable partnerships that may lead to greater prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.
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