Abstract

Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer, conducted by the Israeli and American armed forces respectively in 2025 and Operation Epic Fury which occurred in 2026 have placed the Iranian nuclear enrichment program at the forefront of security and non-proliferation discourse globally. This endeavour, which finds its origins in the civilian nuclear cooperation extended to Shah ruled Iran, an NPT signatory, was militarised in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, as also the Gulf War served as catalysts for the nuclear mythmakers in the Islamic Republic. This coincided with the transnational proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan, resulting in the transfer of critical technology to the Iranians. The discovery of undeclared enrichment facilities in 2002 was followed by extensive IAEA inspections and UNSC resolutions with the latter resulting in the imposition of a strict sanctions regime and a consequent decline in oil revenues and the freezing of assets. The JCPOA signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+EU, the subsequent withdrawal of the USA in 2018, reimposition of snapback sanctions, Iranian progress in the enrichment process and the alleged denial of access to IAEA inspectors culminated in the operations conducted in 2025 and 2026. In this light, the research aims to analyze the frailties inherent in multilateral frameworks like the JCPOA and the NPT, focusing on vulnerabilities due to their weak enforcement mechanisms which precipitated this crisis. Examining the relative decline in the relevance of these arrangements, resulting from an erosion of multilateralism in today’s era and the necessity to strengthen them is of paramount importance. The paper will be driven through a qualitative, analytical and interpretative method of secondary research relying upon verified sources like reports from international bodies, established think tanks, research papers, etc.

Introduction

The global nuclear order, which has evolved significantly over the years, has witnessed an intense state of flux over the last couple of decades. With the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's advent as a self-proclaimed ‘responsible nuclear weapon state’, fears around the proliferation of these weapons have only heightened (Davenport, 2022). This unease has exacerbated with the exposure of the covert Iranian nuclear enrichment programme in the year 2002 by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an overarching organisation of Iranian dissidents (Iran Watch, 2023). The clandestine nature of these dual use facilities, which were not declared to the IAEA, caused concerns surrounding proliferation activities amongst NPT signatories and exposed the vulnerabilities of multilateral frameworks in preventing such developments. As a result, there arose a need to address these issues through multilateral arrangements. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015, was a measure in this direction. That the USA withdrew from it depicts the weaknesses inherent in such agreements in an era of rising unilateralism and geopolitical flux. The military operations targeting these facilities were conducted in a bid to render them dysfunctional and are testimony to the fact that states are now resorting to unilateral kinetic action to respond to the void left by the absence of effective disarmament frameworks. The trust deficit, resulting from this, is most visible in the Iranian government's refusal to permit the IAEA to conduct inspections of their enrichment facilities (Liechtenstein, 2026). Such arbitrary measures have undermined the institutional legitimacy of these bodies. Furthermore, the West is not devoid of blame either. The non-reciprocal withdrawal of the USA from the JCPOA, coupled with the imposition of snapback sanctions, has worked to weaken trust in sanctified agreements. As a result, it's necessary to strengthen these agreements and ensure that enforcement mechanisms remain capable of holding violators accountable. While agreements like the NPT have largely held strong against proliferation risks, entities like the AQ Khan network have succeeded in subverting these structures. The omnipresence of non-state actors in such endeavours exacerbates concerns surrounding the possible spread of nuclear weapons amongst them, thereby increasing the threat of nuclear terrorism. The purpose of this research is not to delve into the nitty-gritties of this programme and engage in prognostications about the intentions of state actors and the possibilities of weaponization.

The objective remains to provide a chronicle of the history of the programme, an account of the extant frameworks and their interactions with it along with an overview of possible measures to be taken to bolster these arrangements.

Research objectives

The primary objective is critically examining the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme through both historic and contemporary lenses. The research also aims at addressing the gap in analysing the frailties in multilateral non-proliferation frameworks and the pitfalls in these arrangements which led to a rise in nuclear proliferation. It also aims to delineate certain measures to ensure the strengthening of these disarmament structures. The aim remains to highlight the interactions between state actors, multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament arrangements and the need to combat an ever-increasing threat of nuclear proliferation.

Literature review: The research delves into credible and verified secondary sources like research papers from established academic journals, government documents and the data derived from them, etc. Since the research problem is complex and polarising, reports compiled by well-established think tanks have been referred to as well. Articles from international media outlets have been examined to analyse contemporary developments from diverse perspectives. Historical records have been taken into account to delineate the evolution of this programme. Since a key area of focus of the paper is the impact of multilateralism in the non-proliferation domain, reports, resolutions and policy statements from extant bodies have been scrutinised. Therefore, the paper attempts to achieve the research objectives through a thorough secondary research leaning on authoritative academic and non-academic literature.

Methodology

The research conducted relies upon scholarly literature including academic journals, government documents, reports by international bodies, etc. The extant scholarship has been subjected to a qualitative analysis based upon secondary data sourced from verifiable outlets. The approach adopted is interpretive, critical and analytical. A thorough historical analysis has been blended with articles depicting contemporary developments. Notwithstanding the preponderance of a chronological arrangement of events, the research also involves an interpretative analysis and measures suggested on the basis of an examination of existing frameworks. While the approach remains primarily qualitative, the quantitative method is deployed sparingly when concerned with statistics from multilateral organisations, governments and reports from established think tanks.

Analysis

This section shall entail a detailed deliberation upon the origins and chronological development of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Historical background of the Iranian nuclear programme

Commentary surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme focuses primarily on the events of the 21st century, examining its historicity is of paramount importance in understanding the gradual evolution and covert weaponisation of the endeavour which began as a peaceful civilian nuclear initiative. While cooperation between the USA and Shah ruled Iran was diverse, spanning economic, military and technological sectors, the first widely cited instance of nuclear cooperation was the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms signed between the two nations in 1957, in keeping with the spirit of then President Eisenhower's flagship ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative (Kibaroglu, 2007). This was closely followed by the establishment of the Nuclear Research Centre at Tehran University in 1959 and began negotiations for acquiring a 5MW thermal research reactor for the Centre (Kibaroglu, 2007). The extension of critical technological aid and the sharing of scientific know-how through educational exchange programs provided Iran with scores of scientists, competent in nuclear technology, and possessing training from western universities. This initial phase culminated in the US supplying Tehran with a 5MW research reactor which came to be known as the Tehran Research Reactor (Davenport, 2023). With the NPT, of which Iran was a signatory, coming into force in 1970, the Shah regime began extensive research and launched numerous ambitious ventures in the field of civilian nuclear technology with the assistance of western trained Iranian technicians.

Dr. Akbar Etemad, who presided over the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), ensured that these projects, alongside widespread nuclear education schemes, were begun by 1974 (Iran Watch, 2023). This pivotal year also witnessed the Shah delineating his vision for an extensive indigenously developed nuclear programme as he charged the AEOI with the construction of 20 nuclear research reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, a reprocessing plant and a target of producing over 23000 MWe in nuclear power by the end of the century (Malus, 2018). In line with this blueprint, Iran solicited the services of Kraftwerk Union, a West German company to build two 1200 MW reactors at what is now known as the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Iran Watch, 2023). These attempts at constructing multifarious facilities, point towards a design to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle, right from ore mining and enrichment to fuel fabrication and finally reprocessing spent fuel. French state-owned nuclear behemoth Framatome was engaged for the construction of 2 additional 900MW nuclear reactors while plans were charted for the possible development of a nuclear facility at Isfahan (Iran Watch, 2023). These endeavours were driven by the Shah regime's assertion that Iran possessed the sovereign right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT. While Iran reiterated its commitment to mastering the entire fuel cycle up to and including reprocessing spent fuel, US interlocutors remained apprehensive of the Shah's intentions and continued to press for an agreement which would codify a disavowal of weaponisation of the American nuclear material transferred to Iran and thereby allay the Carter Administration's concerns over the expanding nuclear cooperation (Burr, 2009). American fears were not devoid of reason as the Shah himself equivocated both in public as well as in private when asked about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons in the future (Esfandiari, 2015). The much-coveted US - Iran Nuclear Agreement, finalised in 1977-78 was all set to be approved by Congress, thereby granting Iran ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status in terms of spent fuel reprocessing (Kibaroglu, 2007). The 1979 Islamic Revolution which overthrew the Shah regime, with Pahlavi and his family fleeing, as also the subsequent embassy hostage crisis only served to deteriorate US - Iran ties. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was frozen and a number of ongoing projects were halted. The decline in bilateral relations adversely affected the nascent Iranian nuclear programme.

Post Shah era developments

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Iran- Iraq war which began in 1980 coupled with the inveterate anti-Americanism of the Islamic Republic resulted in the nuclear programme grinding to a halt. The Ayatollah Khomeini led regime was itself skeptical about the Shah's expansive nuclear initiative. However, this policy ambiguity regarding the need for a deterrent was effectively laid to rest by the cataclysmic consequences of the Iran-Iraq war. The lethal use of chemical warfare by the Iraqi Baathist regime exposed the vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic in the matters of non-conventional warfare and highlighted the necessity for the regime to develop CBRN capabilities for its survival. Furthermore, the US arms embargo and the devastating sanctions regime imposed as an outcome of the classification of the nation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 caused even greater problems for Iranian conventional rearmament (Davenport, 2023). The change in attitude in the aftermath of the war is stark when one compares it to the invidious anti-modernisation streak visible during the early months of clerical rule. Dr. Etemad has recounted the animosity of the Vilayat e Faqih regime towards scientific development and the purges carried out in establishments like the AEOI (Kibaroglu, 2007). Reasons cited for this hostility towards the nuclear sector included the astronomical costs incurred, concerns surrounding dependence on foreign technology and the Ayatollah's theological resistance to the very concept of nuclear power (Azodi, 2021). The gradual amelioration of the regime's sacrosanct opposition to anything remotely modern was hastened by the compulsions of a running a wartime nation.

While the Bushehr project had been all but halted, the urgent need to recommence the nuclear programme was felt for both civilian and military purposes. This change of stance can be credibly established through the statements of the then Iranian leaders themselves. IAEA internal working documents point to the fact that then President and later Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had, in 1984, announced before a gathering of top regime officials that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had revisited the Islamic Republic's policy on the nuclear programme and had permitted its further development in light of security threats (Albright and Stricker, 2010). Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) and later President, in an address to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in 1988 tacitly espoused the development of non-conventional warfare capabilities in view of the catastrophic Iran Iraq war (ISIS, n.d.).

This fundamental shift in the policy outlook encouraged Iran to look for partners in its proposed endeavours. China signed two nuclear cooperation protocols in 1985 and 1990 with Iran while the Russians inked a pact for the completion of the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in 1995 (Iran Watch, 2023). Alongside formal agreements with state actors, the regime dabbled in the purchase of enrichment equipment covertly through the means of non-state actors of the infamous AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network. It is reported to have received a starter kit for a gas centrifuge plant, a set of technical drawings used for building P1 centrifuges, samples of the components utilised in them and instructions to enrich weapons grade uranium (Albright and Stricker, 2010). In 1991, Iran also procured nearly a metric ton of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from China, to master the fuel cycle, which the former was obligated to declare under the NPT but desisted from doing so, committing a violation of the treaty's clauses (ISIS, n.d.). The mid 1990s also witnessed the creation of a team of scientists under the aegis of Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, which was to spearhead the programme and the negotiations to be held with the Khan network (Piotrowski, 2025).

The sheer extent and depth of the cooperation between the Iranians and the Khan network is evident through the trove of documents highlighting the activities of the network. The much-discussed 1987 deal between Iran and the Khan network, pegged at about 3 million dollars, was the foundation for cooperation between the two entities. The most significant happening in this regard was the alleged transfer of 3 complete P2 centrifuges to Iran, as per the admission of Buhary Syed Tahir, a close confidante of AQ Khan and a key member of his clandestine network (IISS, 2007). Alongside the direct procurement of disassembled centrifuges, components and designs, the Iranians also gained significant insight into the global proliferation ecosystem. Thus, they were able to acquire certain critical materials like maraging steel from Khan's contacts spread across the globe (Abbas, 2018). The assistance extended to Iran by this network proved crucial in the future trajectory of its programme. This is starkly visible through the deployment of P1 and P2 centrifuges in the Natanz Enrichment Facility, the largest in the country (Rowberry, 2013). These inflows of critical technology, components, designs and technical knowhow enabled the Iranians to chart out an ambitious pathway towards the eventual attainment of nuclear weapons. In the last decade of the 20th century, top Iranian officials approved a plan dubbed the ‘Amad Plan’ which would ultimately lead to the development of five nuclear warheads by 2004 under the auspices of a team of scientists headed by Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Iran Watch, 2023).

While the Khan network was deeply invested in the Iranian programme, the role of the Pakistani state machinery, specifically its military forces, is scarcely examined in this context. Successive Chiefs of the Pakistani armed forces remained openly supportive of the Iranian program. General Mirza Aslam Beg had espoused the transfer of critical nuclear technology to Tehran, with his successor General Asif Nawaz having reportedly reached a deal that would involve bartering away nuclear technology in return for Iranian oil, to ease the grave forex crisis which had engulfed his nation (IISS, 2007). Although the conduit only consisted of drawings, components, etc., the contacts provided helped Iran develop its indigenous capabilities with support from Khan's suppliers globally. The enrichment capacities demonstrated by Tehran in its facility at Natanz are evidence enough to believe that if it were to withdraw from the NPT and work towards acquiring Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), it could obtain the requisite amount to manufacture a nuclear warhead (IISS, 2007).

Aftermath of the discovery of facilities

The turn of the century proved pivotal for the fate of the Iranian nuclear programme. A press conference held in the summer of 2002 by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a coalition of numerous Iranian opposition and dissident groups, unearthed the reality of the clandestine operations run by Tehran. The exposé of two undeclared facilities - a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production unit at Arak, sent shockwaves across the globe (Iran Watch, 2023). The dual use nature of these installations and their covert utilisation raised concerns over the weaponisation of these complexes for the fabrication of weapons grade uranium and plutonium. The Board of Governors at the IAEA adopted a resolution on the 12th of September, 2003 calling on Iran to suspend any and all enrichment and reprocessing activity, allow inspectors from the body to conduct operations and demanded that the Islamic Republic declare all fissile material in its possession, relevant to the programme (Davenport, 2023). Unfettered access was granted to these inspectors who, while noting the violations which had taken place already, recorded that substantial progress had been made in a bid to palliate them.

With the 31st October deadline for the signing of the Additional Protocol fast approaching, a triumvirate of European foreign ministers arrived in Iran to resolve the deadlock. This visit proved critical in the signing of the accord and created the ‘EU-3 and Iran’ framework, which served to temper the rising tensions between Tehran and Washington over the further period (ISIS, n.d.). This arrangement also stamped out an understanding between the two sides with Iran agreeing to extend the voluntary suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities. However, the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, Iran-US ties were strained even further. The Americans were apoplectic and demanded that the Iranian dossier, submitted to the IAEA, be transferred to the UNSC for the pursuit of punitive measures as retribution for what they considered as violations of Article 2 of the NPT (Kibaroglu, 2007). Iran refuted these allegations and repeated its claims of this incident being a result of bureaucratic oversight in reporting to the IAEA than the outcome of any regime machinations to acquire nuclear weapons. It further stated that owing to the Treaty allowing signatories the sovereign and inalienable right to pursue enrichment for peaceful purposes, Tehran could claim protection under Article 4 of the same (Kibaroglu, 2007). Notwithstanding Iranian protests to the contrary, the IAEA passed a resolution on 4 February 2006 referring the Islamic Republic to the UNSC prompting it to suspend its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol (Davenport, 2023).

A major reason cited by Iran in a bid to render the accusations of pursuing nuclear weapons null and void is the ‘fatwa’ issued against nuclear arms by the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, then Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. The characterisation of these weapons of mass destruction as ‘haram’ (forbidden) was quoted by former President Hassan Rouhani during his talks with the interlocutors from Europe in 2004 (Isfahani, 2024). While skeptics have voiced disagreement with the notion of accepting this assertion as gospel, Iran continues to argue that the Ayatollah's fatwa was binding on the nation. This is contradicted by critics who cite later statements by the late Khamenei as proof of him vacillating on this front. Many have also raised concerns about the possibility of the fatwa being disregarded in the interests of ‘regime expediency’ (Eisenstadt and Khalaji, 2021). Other voices, more sympathetic to the regime, have differing opinions on this matter. The fatwa, in such cases, is stated to be binding and obligatory, signifying a ‘unilateral’ and ‘unconditional’ renunciation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction (Sirjani, 2013). These views of the fatwa seem to characterise it as reinforcing existing non-proliferation commitments, strengthening them through what is understood as a law superseding any legislation passed by the Majlis, and tacitly espousing the peaceful use of nuclear technology as permitted under the NPT.

In spite of these assurances, the IAEA was committed to investigating alleged violations of the safeguards agreements and has since filed status reports on a regular basis to inform the international community about Iranian progress in upholding them (IAEA, n.d.). The role played by the IAEA, a leading multilateral institution which investigates violations of the NPT and non-compliance with safeguards protocols, needs to be examined. As depicted, the inspections began only after the exposé by the NCRI. Even in these cases, the IAEA required voluntary cooperation from the host country and permission to access facilities. This was denied on multiple occasions as will be seen ahead. This requirement for unilateral compliance, in the absence of concrete coercive measures, leads to the emergence of significant issues in inspections. While the UNSC did put in place a strict sanctions regime, it was in the aftermath of the revelations and served as a further reminder of the inability of the IAEA to enforce its jurisdiction. The abject lack of a unifying definition of ‘safeguard violation’ results in greater conjecture (Gerami & Goldschmidt, 2012). The want of independent enforcement mechanisms is evident through this instance.

It is incumbent upon one to analyse the measures undertaken by the UNSC to enforce compliance with IAEA standards. The first major step was the passing of the UNSC Resolution 1737 on the 23rd of December 2006 which established a Security Council Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee), tasked with the imposition of sanctions on the Islamic Republic for failing to halt enrichment activities as demanded by UNSC Resolution 1696, banned the supply nuclear technology and sensitive material and initiated a freeze of assets of the individuals closely involved in the programme (United Nations Security Council, n.d.). Four rounds of UNSC sanctions were imposed between 2006 and 2010 with UNSC Resolution 1747 introducing a two-way arms embargo and UNSC Resolution 1803 requiring a blanket abdication of enrichment activities alongside desisting from research and development pertaining to centrifuges and uranium enrichment (Albright & Stricker, 2010)

United Nations Security Council, n.d.). These proceedings proved cataclysmic for the Iranian economy. The sixth round of sanctions, covered under Security Council Resolution 1929, was particularly debilitating for the Iranian government as it prohibited the state from undertaking any activities related to ballistic missiles, tightened the arms embargo, worked against alleged Iranian smuggling and formed a Panel of Experts which would make recommendations to strengthen extant measures (Davenport, 2026).

The EU too, while endorsing UNSC sanctions, imposed its own on the 31st of December 2012 through a EU Council Resolution, which were later rescinded on the 20th of January 2014 in light of the Iran nuclear deal (European Council, 2026). The extension of the US secondary sanctions regime to the banks, financial and energy sectors reflect a move grounded in a response to alleged repeated violations of international law by the Iranian programme. The abandonment of Iranian projects, the exit of multinational banks and the damage to the state's oil revenues adversely affected the Iranian economy. The alienation of Iranian banks from the SWIFT and its economic isolation, coupled with measures designed to coerce entities into deserting Iran linked initiatives relegated the Iranian economy to the doldrums. Iranian oil exports nearly halved from 2.5 million barrels a day in 2011 to just about 1.3 million barrels a day in 2013 and this drove down the nearly 100 billion dollars in oil revenues in 2011 to a meagre 35 billion dollars in 2013 (Gheibi, 2022). The economic turmoil, exacerbated by the nearly 50 billion dollars’ worth of lost investments in the oil sector, resulted in a precipitous decline in the Rial's value as it plummeted to 37000 against the dollar by 2013, a steep rise in inflation, a decline in living standards and a meteoric escalation in prices of essential commodities (Gheibi, 2022). Thus, one witnesses the catastrophic impacts that secondary sanctions have had on the Iranian state and how they might have influenced decision making at a policy level.

The JCPOA saga:

The cumulative pressure created by the UNSC Resolution 1929, Congressional action on secondary sanctions and the EU Council sanctions, succeeded in coercing Iran to arrive at the negotiating table. Immediately after a meeting in December 2010, the P5+1 met again with Iranian officials in early January 2011 though this did not yield any results owing to the maximalist positions of both sides (Davenport, 2023). Further rounds of talks continued in Istanbul, Baghdad, Moscow and Kazakhstan over the following couple of years with both sides bringing forth their own proposals (Davenport, 2023). The election of Hassan Rouhani to the Presidency hastened the process of negotiations with a historic call taking place between him and then President Obama and the P5+1 and Iran reaching an initial understanding in late 2013 delineating a break on the programme in return for sanctions relief (Ballotpedia, n.d.). A nuclear agreement was finally reached on the 14th of July, 2015 with it being adopted on the 18th of October (Ballotpedia, n.d.).

The UNSC Resolution 2231, passed on July 20, 2015 endorsed the deal and lifted all sanctions with the rider that they would be re-imposed through the snapback mechanism which would remain in place for a decade after the deal was signed (Williams, 2015). The deal operated through a number of sunset provisions which aimed to delay the programme, pushing it back by several years. The accord placed restrictions on centrifuges for a decade and on acquiring high amounts of LEU for a decade and a half apart from the commitments extracted from Iran to abjure HEU possession and pursue only peaceful research at Natanz, Fordow and Arak (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). A clause of paramount importance was the one dictating that enrichment levels must remain below 3.67 percent for 15 years after the commencement of the treaty and that any uranium hexafluoride even at this level, in excess of 300 kgs must be down blended (Williams, 2015). Blanket restrictions were put in to prevent the installation of any new centrifuges for a decade and limits were imposed on building new enrichment facilities for a period of 15 years (Kerr and Katzman, 2018). Measures were also undertaken to ensure compliance through verification mechanisms and permissions granted to the IAEA to pursue inspections even at sites not declared to it by the Islamic Republic (Kerr and Katzman, 2018). In line with initial Iranian compliance, sanctions were eased and assets unfrozen. Sanctions relief was also provided by the EU with respect to its unilateral actions. The agreement also ensured the temporary suspension of UNSC sanctions brought about under Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 2224 and 2231 in a phased manner, linked to the implementation of the JCPOA and satisfactory Iranian compliance (Williams, 2015).

The staggered retraction of sanctions was set to be incumbent upon the JCPOA joint commission and the IAEA being satisfied with the phased compliance of the deal by Iran. The 10-year mark was coined ‘Termination Day’ to commemorate the removal of all UNSC and EU sanctions with the upper limit on the uranium enrichment percentage (3.67%) expiring at the end of 15 years (Williams, 2015).

However, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018, claiming that it emboldened the regime to pursue proxy warfare, develop ballistic missile capabilities and eventually develop nuclear weapons after the timelines placed by the JCPOA elapsed. Sanctions on oil, finance, banking and other critical sectors were imposed once again by the United States. The Trump administration stated that the sunset clauses gave Iran leeway to enrich itself for a decade or so, embolden it as it gave an impetus to its proxy warfare and eventually produce nuclear weapons upon the lapse of the deal. The withdrawal, long demanded by Iran hawks in the US and Israel, was announced and carried out by the Trump administration which brought about a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ through sanctions and other coercive measures. The objective was to force Iran into giving up its nuclear programme by inflicting unprecedented economic pain onto the state. This was carried out in view of the concerns expressed by US allies in the Gulf and Israel. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, for instance, declared that if Iran were to attain nuclear weapons, the Kingdom would follow suit (BBC News, 2018). The Crown Prince’s statement ignited worries about the possibility of a nuclear arms race in an already fractious West Asia. Israel also remained uncompromising in its opposition to the accord. Then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised the signing of the JCPOA as a ‘stunning historic mistake’ owing to apprehensions regarding the sunset clauses and a dearth of concrete measures to tackle Iranian ballistic missile capabilities and support to regional proxies (CBS News, 2015). The reasons cited by Israel were the same as those propounded by states like the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain while voicing support for the Trump administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA (Kalin & Dadouch, 2018). While these sanctions imposed in 2018 have certainly caused predicaments for the Islamic Republic, they have not been enough to intimidate the state into abdicating its nuclear activities. Many would argue also that these actions have proven counterproductive with the state further consolidating its grip on the populace. The JCPOA falling apart has had undeniable and irrevocable ramifications for global politics. The US has, through its actions, made no qualms about its perception of the threat posed by potential Iranian nuclear weaponisation. Meanwhile, Iran has, in the face of crippling sanctions, doubled down on its nuclear programme. The consequences of these actions have been detrimental for all sides involved. Some developments which followed the withdrawal have been highlighted further. They will throw light upon the impact of the US withdrawal, actions taken by the Islamic Republic in its aftermath, the repercussions faced by countries in the region, the crisis of credibility engulfing the E3 and the need for the strengthening of multilateralism in dealing with such crises. The lack of receptiveness to forge a political solution to this conundrum and the predilection to resorting to military means is depicted through this series of events as well.

Recent developments

As a consequence of the 2018 American withdrawal, Iran restarted its enrichment activities in full steam in 2019 with the Majlis revoking Iranian assent to the IAEA's Additional Protocol (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2025). In light of these developments, the Americans attempted to resurrect UNSC sanctions via the snapback mechanism. These efforts failed but the snapback measure was ultimately triggered by the E3 in 2025 (Kerr, 2026). Iran retaliated to the collapse of the JCPOA by declaring that it had begun work on the production of uranium hexafluoride at its uranium conversion facility and would also attempt to start production of centrifuge motors and construct an advanced centrifuge assembly plant at Natanz (Kerr and Katzman, 2018). The assassination of former Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani further strengthened the Iranian resolve to enhance nuclear enrichment, develop new centrifuges and resume heavy water production (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). The Islamic Republic has also reduced the extent, scale and intrusiveness of the IAEA inspections (Tirone, 2023). The IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency had reason to believe that Iran had increased its stockpile of 60% enriched Uranium 235 to 275 kg, becoming the only country to enrich it to such a high degree while disavowing the attainment of nuclear weapons (IAEA, 2025).

The agency had also found traces of Highly Enriched Uranium at undeclared sites and lamented the loss of complementary access after the failure of the JCPOA (IAEA, 2025). The Islamic Republic has provided access only as per the government's own safeguards agreement but does not seem open to continuing the Additional Protocol signed by it earlier (Kerr, 2026). The heightened enrichment levels coupled with the rejection of access to the IAEA to both previously declared and undeclared sites resulted in greater global concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme. While the Biden administration attempted to ease sanctions by amending the American position on snapback sanctions, the return of President Trump has ensured the continuance of the maximum pressure policy alongside military strikes targeting facilities at Isfahan, Fordow and Natanz. Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer in 2025 and Operation Epic Fury in 2026 aimed to dislodge the regime and give a setback to the nuclear programme. These attacks have deepened the schism between the two sides and despite ongoing negotiations, there has been very little progress on the signing of a nuclear deal of any consequence. The trust deficit is palpable and therefore the possibility of a revival of the JCPOA or the creation of any similar agreement is bleak. Nuclear negotiations undertaken by the Trump administration have gone nowhere with Iran currently possessing over 400 kgs of 60% enriched Uranium as per IAEA reports (Ghobadi, 2025). The military operations conducted in consecutive years have only worked to undermine trust in multilateral frameworks and have given an impetus to arguments which espoused the flouting of international law in favour of unilateral punitive actions.

Result and discussion:

Crisis of Multilateralism

This chronicling of the trajectory of the Iranian nuclear programme through the lens of its interaction with multilateral arrangements yields invaluable insights into the lacunae immanent in them. One pitfall which is starkly visible is the IAEA's abject lack of enforcement mechanisms. While it has rights to extensive and often intrusive inspections, it remains dependent upon the benevolence of the host nation. That nation retains the option of revoking access granted previously, denying access to newer sites and prohibiting visits to suspected undeclared sites. This has been the primary pitfall even in the implementation of the NPT which relies largely on the signatories’ voluntary cooperation. There remains a necessity for a fortification of the NPT with stricter controls, more oversight, greater prerogatives to the IAEA including systematised and regular inspections at dual use sites in nations utilising such facilities, etc. Apart from these measures, fostering trust in the agency's non partisanship is of paramount importance. States adversarial to the West must also be persuaded of the agency's lack of bias. Unhindered access, timely checks and bolstered enforcement mechanisms remain key to the survival of the non proliferation order. Although it is clear and logical for the IAEA to not possess any mandate to implement coercive measures to ensure compliance, it is vital that it coordinates its actions with bodies like the UNSC that do. The dysfunctionality that has gripped the UNSC also remains a cause for concern. With the chasm between global powers widening, multilateralism faces an existential crisis. Where once the UNSC spoke with one voice, it is now fragmented, and weak, riven with internecine conflicts. This is evident in the inability of the UNSC to effect measures to tackle the growing rifts between the USA and Iran. While its sanctions were far from ineffectual, the dearth of a common roadmap and vision to address the fallout of the American withdrawal from the JCPOA only worsened the situation. The infighting in the western camp between the USA and Europe proved insurmountable during President Trump's first term in office especially in relation to the Iran nuclear deal.

America's unilateral and hasty withdrawal, without any contingency plan to resort to, exposed the crisis engulfing multilateralism today. The JCPOA too has unfortunately been a victim of this phenomenon. Though the agreement itself was contentious, it was a functional structure which is yet to be replaced. The major issue, apart from misgivings over the sunset clauses and their ramifications for future weaponisation, was the vulnerability of the JCPOA being reduced to a domestic political hot potato and a fulcrum for polarisation. That the agreement could be rescinded and was not sacrosanct proved to be its undoing. The US withdrawal was closely followed by the Iranians defenestrating any pretence of holding up their end of the accord. Subsequently, the entire agreement collapsed. The alternative of opting out, being presented to the signatories, was a structural frailty which led to the 2018 crisis. Any further agreement must mandatorily address concerns of all parties involved, specifically the Iranian assertions of sovereignty over nuclear enrichment and Israeli and American fears over the former's possible weaponisation of its nuclear capabilities.

It is also clear that while ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions have certainly dented the Iranian state's coffers, they are not enough to effect a change in its security posture. A comparison of UNSC sanctions and those placed unilaterally by the western powers would reveal that the latter's secondary sanctions and asset freezes have proven far more paramount in containing Iran and influencing the regime's decision making. It would, therefore, be useful to ponder upon the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions regimes and disarmament frameworks, both of which have proven to be ineffectual.

Strengthening multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament treaties in the multipolar era

Now that the shortcomings in these frameworks have been noted, it would be useful to establish certain ameliorating measures to resolve them. It is arguably more instructive to first look into the nitty-gritties which need fixing in terms of hammering out another nuclear accord with Iran. In this regard, the USA would be well served by delineating a clear list of priorities and discriminating between the nuclear issue and other outstanding sticking points with Iran. Therefore, the support extended by the Islamic Republic to proxies across the region as well as the development of ballistic missiles and a need to bring about a change in the character of the regime, ensuring that it remains sensitive to human rights concerns are vexed matters which ought to be dealt with separately. Attaching the resolution of the nuclear issue to these extraneous matters risks jeopardising the solution of the crux of the nuclear programme. Rolling back the nuclear programme is a pipe dream and focus must be placed upon halting it in its tracks and putting in safeguards to prevent the weaponisation of the nuclear programme, militarisation of its enrichment capabilities and developing nuclear warheads as well as weapons delivery systems (Levite, 2025). Any new accord must prioritise IAEA access to declared and undeclared sites, neutralise the Iranian veto over inspection rights, reinforce compliance with the Additional Protocol and Safeguards Agreement and ensure that Iran refrains from imposing unilateral restrictions upon IAEA operations. Advanced verification mechanisms must be put in place to reduce persistent concerns over the ‘breakout time’ (Hinderstein, 2025). That the technical knowledge regarding the nuclear programme would survive any nuclear deal is an undeniable fact. Extensive reportage of actions undertaken by State parties, creation of a Non-Proliferation Treaty Bureau and formalising the NPT’s infrastructure through the creation of an Office of Disarmament Affairs under the United Nations’ aegis are certain steps suggested by the United States through the means of a working paper (US Department of the State, 2024).

The NPT has proven largely effective when it comes to preventing nuclear proliferation. However, apprehensions that Iran might go the DPRK’s way, exit and then weaponise remain ever present. For this purpose, it remains essential that existing frameworks are strengthened, verification and authorisation mechanisms are reinforced, coercive measures are explicitly stated and multilateralism bolstered to tackle the threat of nuclear proliferation and weaponisation. Ensuring the continuance of safeguards agreements and adherence to the Additional Protocol by the Islamic Republic is crucial. Eventually, the solution which shall emerge must necessarily be multilateral to ensure its survival and acceptance. Unilateral coercive measures are perceived as illegitimate and hence they must instead be replaced by stricter measures through bodies like the UNSC which possess widespread acceptance. Avoiding past mistakes like sunset clauses for certain activities and provisions for unilateral exits is crucial. Bridging the gaping trust deficit between the US and Iran will be key as well. The crisis in multilateralism caused by geopolitical flux shall only worsen with time. In such a case, any new nuclear deal would be fraught with challenges, not only in its negotiations but also in its implementation. It is essential for nuclear policymakers in each of these countries to delineate priorities and negotiate accordingly. Whether the P5+1 will be able to hammer out another nuclear agreement remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Thus, the Iranian nuclear programme remains a matter of grave concern globally. This paper has made a foray into understanding it from the point of view of multilateral frameworks and their interactions with the said programme. Apart from delineating the historical trajectory of the issue, this article delves into the impacts of organisations like the IAEA and agreements like the NPT and JCPOA. While highlighting the possible lacunae, measures to strengthen them and resolve these shortcomings have been suggested. The role of nuclear proliferation networks has also been analysed. The failures in these arrangements point to the need to reinvent the approach towards disarmament and non-proliferation. How the world approaches these issues of paramount significance will decide the future of the global nuclear security architecture.

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