Estimated reading time: 8 minutes
The title holds four keywords. This deliberation takes a peek into them and their parallels in the geostrategic context.
The first is Quad, also expressed as QUAD. The term has been heckling the geostrategic world for more than a decade now, like a hard shell turtle in a predator’s mouth during the seasonal arribada1 on the Odisha coast. It is not an acronym, but a derivative of an informal security initiative (quadrilateral security dialogue) between four nations with converging geostrategic security interests—Australia, Japan, India and the United States (AJIUS). It is not similar to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as the critics observe. NATO is a political and military international organisation comprising 28 countries in Europe and two in North America established subsequent to the Second World War with allocated or exclusive resources sufficient to flux2 the opposite polarity if needed to maintain security balance. Therefore, any comparison of Quad with NATO that may arise from the opposing critical sides is only impulsive at the moment. In comparison with NATO’s age and continuum stasis, Quad is an initiative, with a brief moment of history since 2007. The initiative was soon interrupted when Kevin Rudd, the Australian prime minister withdrew from the block under inherent confusion. The Quad of the day is a kind of riposte after Rudd’s tenure was over. It also shows that the life span of strategic dialogues could flutter on individual decisions of people in authority and hence need not be continuous.
Therefore it is the cause that matters, which an individual authority cannot blind-eye under any inducement. The revamping of Quad in 2017, when Australia changed its mind also meant the cause that drew the four together in 2007 was prolonging and almost acquired the polar stasis in the balancing game of geostrategy. The polar stasis means appreciation of critical geostrategic activities in advance for power balance. Quad may acquire the paradigm context for power balance based on terrain specificity, primarily maritime, in appreciated domains for the present. It needs to be defined, though. The next step is to premise on what the Quad ultimately wants to do and, then, defining the roles of participants.
Another geostrategic format that has originated as a trilateral security initiative is AUKUS. It is different from Quad, ab initio. As the letters suggest, it is considered a security pact of sorts between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Under the pact, announced on 15 September 2021, the US and the UK will help Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. In this context, it should be seen more as a trade pact3 that too limited to nuclear submarine deals.
But China denounced the pact as irresponsible4. Originally Australia had shown interest in French nuclear submarines. It is obvious that France was negated by Australia subsequently in nuclear sub shopping. It looked like a buyer’s choice under sellers’ power of persuasion; something odd compared to normal business marketing. It is a different matter that France too has substantial holdings in the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean enough to qualify for multi-ocean rim status. National governance is different from management and, therefore, the terms and principles of management may not be sufficient to explain national and global security governance. It is a different matter for study. France for the moment is neither in Quad nor (obviously) in AUKUS, though it is a key player in the chosen domain in all dimensions—land, air, surface and under. It is more so, when combined with New Zealand in the newly argued continent, Zealandia, where France holds the only other landmass—New Caledonia.
There were some media rumblings that why India and Japan were not included in AUKUS. The White House press secretary clarified that AUKUS did not indicate others will be kept out of domain security combines. Under AUKUS, Australia received a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for the first time. It is a military deal, not a military coalition or a security partnership dialogue.
For the common person, the submarine is a kind of mystery. The submarines evolved in military operations from the German U-Boats (undersea boats)5 to the present day nuclear-powered hunter-killer and ballistic missile submarines predominantly in the last century, though the idea was present much earlier. They still mystify the military scenario and look beyond the rules of war at sea under changing tactical doctrines. A nuclear submarine is powered using a nuclear reactor that need not be refuelled, normally during the life span of the vessel. It is not necessarily nuclear-armed. The advantage is the extent of stealth it can achieve submerged. It is important for the fight for the survival of humans when the world is under constant threat of Armageddon as perceived, though chances are remote in the advancing human system.
The US navy pioneered in nuclear submarines (1939). It was followed by the Royal Navy (1946). The erstwhile Soviet Union commenced research on nuclear-powered submarines in 1950. Six countries deploy some form of strategic nuclear submarines though their capabilities vary: China, France, India, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. More countries are expected to follow. They include Argentina, Australia and Brazil.
The Submarine has proved its value during the world wars and subsequently the potential to deter and, if necessary, strike when the anteforces up the ante exceeding the limit. The value of a submarine as in the case of any military ware can only be judged in relation to the strategy and tactics for which it is planned to be programmed. Therefore, the doctrine behind the submarine matters considerably in its acquisition and deployment. It also means the technology of submarines is bound by the doctrine. Another development in the submarine compact is in antisubmarine tactics and technology. Along with it came the need for underwater domain awareness. No navy can be purposeful without defined intentions other than synthetic existence unless it develops the strategic offensive capacity for which the submarine is critical. Brown water is not the domain of naval forces if they have to be called modern.
Many policymakers and even senior military leaders have problems in appreciating the strategic importance of submarines and submarine warfare including antisubmarine warfare even today. This applied even to the United States in the initial days. Today the US is at the forefront of submarine technology and operational capabilities. Submarine awareness also calls for developing protracted antisubmarine campaigns in four dimensions: underwater, surface, air and space.
In the early days of its existence as a war weapon, submarines proved the preferred choice for the classical guerre de course. It not only changed the doctrine of the evolution of capital ships but also their role in the conventional broadside naval warfare. Submarine brought the stealth factor to the fore beyond the old fashioned smoke screens to hide at sea. Guerre de course is an interesting French term that literally means “race war.” It became a legal term that found a place in international maritime law in the 19th-century supporting trade disruption in naval warfare thereby denying resources to the enemy. It gave the right to privateers by a letter of marque to arm their ships to attack the merchant ships of the adversary in wartime. (Does this statement ring a bell about the case of the Italian Aframax oil tanker Enrica Lexie under the provisions of guerre de course for argument?)6 The Admiralty courts issued the letter of marque in those days. In all maritime wars up to the mid-19th century, the merchant shipping of belligerent powers suffered severe losses under the guerre de course, and it was brought to an end by international agreement at the Declaration of Paris in 1856. The USA refused to sign the declaration. It caused heavy casualties to US merchant ships during the American Civil War (1861–65). It would be better the US reexamines ratification of UNCLOS7 against this experience. Though it recognises the Convention as a codification of customary international law, it is yet to ratify it. The author may call it a kind of Kevin Rudd syndrome which could also be justified.
The guerre the course can be recast in international law and relations to cover future maritime operations in an entirely different format—in other-than-war situations for resource denial, as challenges to excessive maritime claims (EMC) within the ocean property regime (Paleri, 2002), global commons protection using naval forces without challenge and so on. It is not just trade warfare or something that can be countered by belts, roads and sea lanes. In tomorrow’s world, the presumed and perceived enemy could also be the most favoured trading partner itself. In such cases, the guerre de course can become ocean property maximisation for a country, the key factor of national security maximisation in the ocean terrain specific to the identified domain.
The situation is bad in the ocean. It is good news for any hardcore sailor.
EndNote
1. A Spanish term used to refer to the migratory season of female sea turtles from the Pacific and elsewhere for nesting preparatory to laying eggs. It is also the season when Indian coast Guard will be busy protecting them from predators of all kinds.
2. Here the assumption is that the global human system will balance on a bipolar axis with respect to power distribution and hence the flow of power is quoted in flux similar to a magnetic field between the poles. This needs to be studied further for geostrategic assessments.
3. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson later mentioned in the parliament that it was not an adversarial pact. PA Media (16 September 2021). “Prime Minister: Aukus is not intended to be adversarial towards China.” Yahoo! News.
4. “AUKUS: China denounces ‘irresponsible’ US-UK-Australia pact.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58582573. Accessed 28 September 2021.
5. “Unterseeboot” in German.
6. For students of law to examine; not commented further.
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
