Introduction
Pakistan as of 2023 has a population of 241 million people, of which ~15 million reside in Balochistan (Gallup Pakistan, n.d.; World Bank, 2023). The region shares an extensive boundary with both Iran and Afghanistan, along with a roughly 1000-kilometre coastline (Makran coast) along the Arabian sea. The Makran coast was frequented by Indian, Greek, Roman, and Arab sailors and merchants since the times of Lothal and the Sindhu-Saraswati (Indus) Civilisation. Balochistan itself hosts sites from the Civilisation (such as Kot Bala/balakot, Mehrgarh and Sutkagen-dor), boasting of some of the earliest remnants of agriculture and firemaking in the Indian subcontinent. Human migration patterns also suggest that early human hunter-gatherer bands from Ethiopia migrated into India and South-East Asia from the Makran coastline in the early Mesolithic and Neolithic periods (Sanyal, 2016/2017).
The significance of Balochistan
Balochistan contains roughly 40 percent of Pakistan’s natural resources- ranging from iron, copper, gold, chromium, rare earth metals and limestone to petroleum and natural gas. Balochistan also contains perennial water sources and huge potential for generating renewable energy. Sparse population allows for widespread commercial activities, includes hydroelectric and coal-fires power plants, mining projects, multisectoral manufacturing hubs, transport infrastructure, and of course, the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), costing a whopping 65 billion USD (Farooqui & Aftab, 2018). Most of the funds have been invested by China to open South-West China (specifically the Tibet and Xinjiang regions) to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan-Occupied Jammu Kashmir (PoJK) and Pakistan
The CPEC has brought billions in Chinese investment and bailouts to a cash-strapped Pakistan, protecting it from insolvency. Chinese defence technology was readily exported to Pakistan, China’s “iron brother”, in order to deepen bilateral cooperation. This has once again allowed Pakistan to flex its muscles against India, who has since long maintained a distinctive edge over Pakistan. In exchange, China has gained uninhibited access to Pakistani natural resources which fuels its industries back home. Additionally, it creates a secure passage of trade and transport to the Arabian Sea through the Gwadar port, mitigating in part its ‘Malaccan Dilemma’.
However, there is just one catch in this magnanimous and deep-seated initiative that is considered the most important link of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All this progress- for both economies, has ironically not reached the 15 million who inhabit the very province where most projects have been implemented- the Baloch. Therefore, as is the case for many resourcerich countries- in the absence of industries, education, job opportunities, corruption and government inadequacy often makes the abundance of natural resources a curse, instead of a blessing (Ali, 2017).
The Baloch struggle for liberation (1947-2003)
Following the forced accession of the Khanate of Kalat (in modern-day central Balochistan) into the dominion of Pakistan in 1947, the ruler’s brother- Prince Kareem Khan- fled to Afghanistan, wherein he gained support from the Shah to raise an insurgency against the Pakistani military. As Pakistan sought to unify all four provinces of West Pakistan under the ‘One Unit’ scheme, Baloch leaders were justly distraught at the consolidation of the Punjabi political majority in the country. This led to multiple waves of insurgencies, until the 21st century, against the Pakistan military and political leadership, even as oil and gas fields in Balochistan were tapped into to provide for the burgeoning Pakistani economy (Munk School, 2018). Balochistan has since seen its mineral resources being exported to other regions of Pakistan for further processing, in the absence of developed industries. Issues such as water scarcity, lack of employment and education, political tussles, etc. have converted this agriculture-dominant region into a province dependent on an indifferent and exploitative political elite from Punjab and Islamabad. Balochistan’s contribution to Pakistan’s GDP has since dropped from 4.9% in the 1970s to 3.7%.
Balochistan remains a region with the highest infant and maternal mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan (Kupecz, 2024). As per available data, 85 per cent of the population has no access to safe drinking water, around 75 per cent is deprived of access to electricity, 70 per cent do not have access to education and 63 per cent are living below the poverty line (Anand, 2023). Therefore, a lack of economic opportunity, absence of public facilities and essential services, meagre political representation and a very poor standard of life characterised balochistan until 2000.
Multiple developments in the early 21st century led to the rise of the current insurgent and rebel movement in Balochistan, involving local and global issues. Firstly, decades of migration of Pashtuns into Balochistan- from Pakistan and Afghanistan (during the Soviet war in Afghanistan)- has raised communal tensions. Punjabis and Pashtuns, approximately 45 percent of the population, control the military and political establishments, as well as the economic and administrative structures. This has disenfranchised Balochistan's 15 million people from representation in the provincial government of Quetta as well.
Secondly, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) announced in 2001 intends to transform the Baloch coastal city of Gwadar on the Makran coast into an economic hub and deep-sea port. As discussed before, baloch mineral resources form the backbone of China’s economic interests in its ‘iron brother’ Pakistan. However, the truth is far from ideal and the ground situation far from peaceful. The CPEC traverses across the length of Balochistan- however, it does not gain opportunities of employment. Most of the highly skilled labour and engineers come from China. China has also gained monopoly over fishery rights in the region, depriving the local Baloch population of traditional employment. Therefore, the CPEC is a Chinese ambition to extract minerals from Balochistan at the cost of the Baloch people by conniving with the central government. Dr. Naseem Baloch characterised it as a ‘path to exploitation’, claiming that it was only “worsening inequalities and dispossessing the Baloch people of their land and resources” (Gyalpo, 2022)
Baloch resistance and unrest (since 2003)
Since the inception of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Baloch insurgency has grown to be a formidable force since 2003. The Baloch cause has been taken up by several tribal leaders and organizations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Council for Independent Balochistan (CIB), etc. alongside the Pakistani Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Commission. The 2006 killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in a ‘firefight’ with security forces was the final straw- it was only the beginning of a new ‘kill-and-dump’ policy adopted by security forces and the Baloch Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD). Several Baloch leaders, protestors and dissidents were kidnapped in broad daylight and found murdered sometime later, amidst police denials to register cases. Conveniently dubbed as ‘rebels’ who attacked military establishments ‘first’, the Pakistani government is said to have eliminated over 14,000 persons only till 2016 (Hussain, 2024).
Baloch fighters conveniently target Chinese labourers and workers on the CPEC project (percieved as exploitative colonizers) with impunity, in order to deter China’s most ambitious and strategically critical connectivity project. There have been 36 conclusive attacks against Chinese nationals between 2002 and 2024, with 11 unclaimed attacks and 16 attributed to Baloch forces resulting in 37 people killed and 52 injured (Salman & Usmani, 2025). Therefore, they look to this as an opportunity for the Chinese to put pressure on Pakistan, urging a cessation of violence and better conditions for the Baloch. On the other hand, leaders such as Dr. Mahrang Baloch with the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) carried out mass demonstrations in Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad decrying enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings (Siddiqui, 2024)
Therefore, with strong popular and clerical backing to the Bloch movement, along with support from academia and human rights watchdogs, Pakistan’s actions to cement military and CChinese economic hegemomny in the region seems to be an uphill task. This has become tougher with the introduction of several fragmentary armed outfits- such as the baloch liberation Army, the tehreek-i- Tasliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, the balochisan Liberation Front (BLF) and several ideological splinter groups, it is strenuous for the Pakistani army and police to determine and weed out troublemakers
In addition to this potpourri of distrust and armed resistance, the use of suicide bombers, including women and highly educated people such as Banuk Mahukan Baloch and Shari Baloch, has helped create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity that no amount of military deployment can outlast (Hummel, 2025; Mukul, 2025).
Instead of seeking conciliatory measures and greater democratic participation of Baloch interests, the Pakistani establishment has resorted to blaming India for fomenting dissent using agents of the Reseaarch and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence agency. This thought has percolated into academia as well, with countless reports such as Khetran and Shahzadi alleging strong “public perception” of RAW backing to Baloch rebels (Khetran, 2017; Shahzadi, 2023). The arrest of ex-Indian Navy officer Kulbhushan Jadhav from Iran under allegations of espionage has further stoked such counter-intuitive narratives. As Jadhav's death sentence following a show-trial in Pakistan remains under a stay by the International Court of Justice, the events suggest Pakistani insistence on negating legitimate Baloch grievances in favour of a supposed face-saving gesture of foreign interference
Baloch declaration of Independence: a new chapter
The crux of Baloch insurgent operations till date came when the audacious BLA hijacked the Quetta-Peshawar Jaffar Express in March, as part of the broader Operation Herof- with a staggering 71 precision attacks launched against 51 Pakistani military targets. The operation, carried out with chilling military efficiency, created a tough hurdle for Pakistani law enforcement and military to seize control. The huge loss of hostage and military lives received condemnation, while the Baloch rebels were glorified as liberationists by the BLA (TOI, 2025). The BLA has since promised a military operation in larger proportions to oust the Pakistani military and non-Baloch administrative officials, hinting at the dismantling of Pakistan as a ‘terror-exporting state’ (Firstpost, 2025a). The ‘Republic of Balochistan’ was also declared by spokesperson Mir Yar Baloch, who also called upon India to allow a Baloch embassy in New Delhi. Mir Yar also emphasised that the Baloch people ‘were not Pakistanis’, harkening back to the independent Kalat kingdom (Firstpost, 2025b). Efforts by the BLA to oust the Pakistani military have been accompanied with calls to the UN for peacekeeping forces, and a request for funds for printing new currency and passports. The Pakistani establishment’s iron grip over the region, therefore, seems to be slipping away. Losses of Pakistani soldiers, mineral convoys and attacks on non-Baloch officials have intensified in past months, underscoring the reinvigorated rebels and a despondent civil-military administration.
Balkanization of Pakistan: a well-rooted theory
India, long-accused of supporting the Baloch secessionist cause by Pakistan, has maintained neutrality on the issue. However, it would not be implausible to expect what the BLA calls the dismantling- the Balkanization of Pakistan. Decades of army control and despondent political leadership have alienated not only Balochistan, but also other regions of Pakistan- such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh. Increasing economic woes, FATF restrictions and increased attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have shattered the myth of a utopian Pakistan for the common people. Additionally, the Munir-Sharif power nexus has been breached by growing popular support for jailed former PM Imran Khan, leading to declining support to the ruling establishment. Amidst these crippling internal issues, the dogged determination of the government to foment cross-border terror against India, pander to Chinese economic imperialism and deepening cooperation with a hostile Bangladesh, has been seen with contempt. Therefore, sidelining domestic interests for foreign interference may be the unravelling of a nation rife with ethnic and linguistic faultlines. Amidst such drubbing, both domestically and from India, the elevation of Army Chief Munir to the position of Field Marshal mimics a long-standing tradition in Pakistan to mask military and political failures with trumped-up claims of superiority
India and a fragmented Pakistan- challenges and opportunities
“The idea of Pakistan’s balkanization isn’t just a thought experiment — it’s a possibility that’s creeping closer with every economic crisis and insurgent attack, like a storm brewing on the horizon”. (Gupta, 2025)
The balkanization of Pakistan is a possibility that the Indian military, diplomatic and political establishments must prepare for. While calls from analysts and commentators have often suggested passive or active Indian intervention in deepening rifts, such steps seem unlikely to occur, considering the obvious domestic and international backlash for interfering in the affairs of a foreign state. However, should Pakistan balkanize as a result of collapsing under its own weight, it does have certain long-term benefits for India
The isolation of the Gwadar port from Islamabad would effectively put an end to the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, also drawing away the significant mineral resources of Balochistan that power it. Gwadar port also serves as a link in the Chinese “String of Pearls’’ policy that ensures a strong Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region. China would also face a disruption of supply chains of coal, oil, gas, copper, gold, iron ore and other mineral resources that it seeks to import in larger quantities (TheNews, 2025). Therefore, Chinese utilisation of Pakistani and predominantly Baloch resources would take a substantial hit. This would also cripple China-sponsored industries in Pakistan, who constitute a large part of the Pakistani industrial sector due to the latter’s economic dependence on Chinese loans and bailouts.
Baloch rebels, and by extension the Baloch “state”, have already displayed a willingness to engage with India upon separation from the Pakistani state. Should Sindh follow suit in all aspects, India may pursue active trade relations with the two states as part of bilateral and multilateral forums, working for economic rehabilitation and financial consolidation. India, as has been successfully demonstrated in the African continent, is a reliable partner for both developmental assistance and foreign direct investment- totalling $7 billion in 2024 (CII, 2024). Similar models of mutual development and economic progress may be pursued with these nascent nations, boosting India’s regional presence
The most important, and immediate effect, however, would be the decimation of Pakistani terror modules and support network in both mainland Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Jammu Kashmir. The return of Indian administrative control in PoJK would also decimate the China-Pakistan terror cooperation- not limited to weapons and narcotics transfers. India's reclamation of Gilgit Baltistan and other areas would also undermine Chinese efforts to bolster its own energy and mineral security through the CPEC, which passes through the mineral-rich region. Cutting the only link between Pakistani and Chinese borders also opens up India’s 108-kilometre Wakhan border with Afghanistan, boosting bilateral ties amidst greater engagement with the Taliban establishment.
However, it is not an entirely rosy picture. Multiple states along India’s western front come with the added threat of dealing with multiple entities without internal stability or mutual peace with each other. Islamabad and Panjab may become increasingly hostile towards India- deprived of both maritime access and natural resources, they may devolve into a land overrun by army-civilian conflict, and an increased spate of terror attacks against India as “revenge” for what Pakistan calls India’s “actions to divide Pakistan”. The same goes for KPK, wherein Pashtun-Pathan and Afghan-Pashtun tribal conflict would embolden the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP). Such regional instability is bound to spill over national borders, renewing the problem of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. This time, however, there shall be no one command and control centre that is currently attributed to General Headquarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi, the Inter- Services intelligence (ISI) and other affiliates of the Pakistani army, and by extension, the state.
Therefore, while terrorist recruitment networks and logistical and institutional support from Pakistan shall be divided into the territories of the newly-formed “states”, it shall present a diversified threat matrix for India, with multiple commanders, terrorist entities, and sources of funding that India would need to counter. Failure of governments and administrative setups would inevitably lead to the entry of vested foreign interests, seeking economic benefits and continued violence through puppet regimes. China currently remains the foremost concern as is today, recruiting both labour for economic activities and brainwashed youth for fomenting anti-state activities in India. Growing rapprochement and economic partnerships with the Afghan Taliban may also be utilised by the Chinese machinery as a supply route to keep India engaged in a war of attrition along the western border.
Problems at the border, or beyond it do not end at continued conflict. Prolonged civil war and inter-tribe conflict will push millions of people out in search of refuge. Pakistan’s current neighbours include Afghanistan and Iran, both of whom share animosity with the Pakistani establishment. Therefore, in the event of its collapse, refugees are most likely to move eastwards, into Indiatriggering a large-scale humanitarian and security maelstrom.
Unfortunately, the biggest problem is not a refugee crisis or a security threat from terror groups. If there is a larger threat than an unstable and potentially hostile state, it is multiple such states with a nuclear arsenal. International researchers estimate Pakistan to have 170 warheads fielded across land-based and aerial platforms, with potential strike ranges nearing 2,750 km (Kristensen et al., 2023). This has also been complemented by several ”tactical” nuclear weapons, whose field use in the eventuality of a war has been acknowledged by high-ranking Pakistani officials (IANS, 2015). In the vent of Pakistan’s balkanization, there is credible concern of such weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) falling in the hands of rogue, and potentially hostile actors. Currently, Pakistan denies a no-first-use policy against India, displaying readiness to launch a pre- emptive nuclear strike in the event of a war. However, both states have undertaken several measures to avoid the possibility of nuclear attacks or fallouts- such as the 1991 agreement disclosing nuclear installations with the other country (PIB, 2025). Therefore, the threat of an attack on India’s critical infrastructure through either a strategic or tactical warhead, is much more should Pakistan fragment into discordant and rogue, if not hostile, states.
Therefore, it is essential for India to be prepared for such developments, by integrating multiple avenues of government functioning
The most important remains the military and security aspect. Stepping up border surveillance and reinforcements to compensate for increased instances of refugees (including from sea routes) and border crossings is essential. Simultaneously, India must develop and bolster its air defense network by integrating Army and Air Force assets, providing cover against any aerial incursions. Special emphasis should also be laid on jammers and detected-energy weapons, which provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to costly missiles and gun systems. As experienced during current conflicts in Israel and Ukraine, a barrage of missiles, drones and rockets has overwhelmed integrated conventional air defence systems- while such attacks were thwarted during Operation Sindoor, non- conventional conflicts of the future will require greater integration with autonomous and low-cost systems to provide an impregnable defence
A robust diplomatic engagement is also essential to secure India’s frontiers in the face of external aggression and huge refugee influxes (if allowed). India would most likely oppose refugee inflows, due to obvious demographic and economic restrictions of being the largest democracy and most populous country. Withstanding international pressure and taking steps to ensure a state of normalcy and facilitating the refugees’ return to their respective territories should become the primary concern in such a scenario. India should also weigh its options in warily engaging with the newly formed states, seeking economic and civilisational partnerships based on shared histories, should also keep in mind the terror and subversion networks within the populations. Political posturing of friendliness and partnership must not be mistaken for amicable ties that lead to a sense of complacency and ill-preparedness.
On the international level, India must also seek the supervision and involvement of multilateral agencies to ensure normalcy in the territories. Primarily, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) should be roped in to take interim charge of Pakistan's civilian and nuclear facilities and nuclear warheads and see to their dismantling to prevent them from falling into rogue hands, which inevitably threatens not only India but all major world powers. It should also engage global lending institutions and foreign aid to help stabilise these nascent economies and prevent the emergence of ‘failed states’.
Conclusion
The Baloch issue is not a unilateral argument of tribal rights and an oppressive regime- it is a layered conflict of historical injustices and annexation, of the desire of self-expression and of angst against vested foreign interests. It is representative of the deep-rooted divides between citizens and the political-military establishment- which has remained steadfast on fomenting anti-India subversion and terrorism. Exploitation of natural resources without remuneration or representation has alienated the Baloch people to the point of uprising, and it is now manifesting in violence. Therefore, resolution to the Baloch issue lies in the government of Pakistan accepting its shortcomings in dealing with the requirements of the community, and to include them in developmental plans for the region- guided by both national projects and international economic interests.
This would mean a conciliatory stance on behalf of the Pakistani army, which has dominated civilian policymaking since the beginning of the Pakistani state. Therefore, such magnanimous reforms seem hypothetical for the time being. Until then, India must observe a ‘wait-and-watch’ strategy towards the internal squabbles and conflicts in the neighbourhood. However, this does not mean that India should become conciliatory or complacent towards Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces and civilian-military leadership do remain potent enough to inflict serious overt or covert damage on India, often at the behest of other strategic regional rivals such as China and Bangladesh. Any intent of ignoring or trivializing this very real threat would only harm India.
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About The Author
Yashodhan Deodhar is a Research Intern at FINS. He is a Graduate in Political Science from St. Xavier’s College (Empowered Autonomous), Mumbai and an incoming student of geopolitics and international relations at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education. He can be reached at [email protected]
