

FINS JOURNAL OF DIPLOMACY & STRATEGY



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The Journal...A Journey.

FINS Journal of Diplomacy & Strategy is a double blind, peer reviewed quarterly research Journal. This Journal purports to cover a vast arena/segments including but not limited to internal & external security, defence, international relations, military management, peace science, defence economics, intelligence, terrorism, cyber security, psychological warfare.

FINS invites articles from erudite scholars, practitioners, research based thinkers and writers for this journal.

Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS), A THINK-TANK, was conceptualized by some like-minded personalities like you in 2003 with prime objectives including –

- Develop comprehensive Defense approach for the Nation
- Promote national security as every citizen's concern and responsibility
- Analyze future security threats, National challenges & advocate preventive measures.
- Undertake strategic studies and research.

FINS one of the main objectives is to change age old 'Compartmentalized Approach' in dealing with the matters of national security to 'Integrated National Security (INS) approach' which will help in foreseeing multi -dimension complex challenges and will develop, initiate and stimulate in translating it into integrated approach in achieving national objectives pertaining to national security.

In its pursuit of 'Strong, Secure & Prosperous Nation', FINS has chalked out aggressive agenda for translating its vision – "Initiate-Interact-Influence", into a reality by focusing on new initiatives including –

- Developing 'National Interest First' culture in the country.
- Sensitizing our Youth on various strategic issues of National Security and encouraging them to contribute actively intellectually, academically, physically – to ultimately make strong, active, responsible citizens having holistic perspective on NATIONAL SECURITY.
- Reaching out to people in India and outside India effectively and efficiently and create responsible opinions on various cross border matters which can be dealt with alone from inside but in conjunction with people whom it matters from outside.



Thru' the Desk of the Editor

The first issue of your journal was released on October 2017 in Goa by none other than the Chief of Naval Staff Adm. Sunil Lanba. On that occasion there were very senior veterans from defence forces, diplomats and representatives of twenty two countries present. The first issue covered a very vast arena in the field of diplomacy and strategy and was very well received by the audience. The issue is available on our archives@ finsindia.org.

At this point, I take a stock of ancient Indian culture history and the two strands therein. One being the Vashista tradition and the other being the Vishwamitra tradition. One tradition which was devoted to knowledge and the other which worshipped power. The Vashishta tradition is immersed in the pursuit of knowledge and social welfare, while the Vishwamitra tradition is obsessed with acquisition, protection and expansion of power.

The Vishwamitra tradition turns history around by confining ancient history to memory and moving its focus to the creation of modern history. On the other hand the Vashista tradition with its dedication and devotion attempts to influence the present, through an analysis of the past. However, through its focus on power, the Vishwamitra tradition mocks at the Vashista tradition, while on the other hand immersed in its focus on knowledge, the Vashista tradition looks down upon the Vishwamitra tradition. From the ancient times, till today, both these traditions have not lost track of their roots. Even today, the scholars who worship knowledge look down upon those who are devoted to the acquisition of power, while those in power always mock those, who are intellectuals.

It would be no doubt easy for keen observers to realize that today the “practical” approach of the intellectuals and the callousness of those in power has increased to some extent. As a result, despite looking down upon power, intellectuals today value the need to maintain a relationship with power, that could serve them in good stead and those in power have started patronizing intellectual, to show that they value knowledge. As a result those who believe in intellectual purity and integrity still fall prey to the entrapments set up by those in power. Realizing this weakness, those in power use the intellectuals to support them through their improper actions.

Hence, policy makers and scholars need to be brought on the same platform. And therefore, there is a genuine need for a journal like yours, where the thinkers, practitioners and policy makers jointly contribute to the thought process in a positivist manner.

This second issue also contributing to this movement and contains usual columns like research articles, military history, book review and many more.

Stay connected!

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Blue Ocean Diplomacy: Way Forward For Blue Economy

“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters” was the prophecy made over a century ago which has become a reality today. In the battle for supremacy, Indian Ocean has been witnessing a good number of contenders staking claim over its waters in the recent past. As a strategically located nation and an ocean named after it, India is now gearing up to take an active stance in what is considered its backyard. Indian Ocean is the world’s third largest ocean and carries half of world’s container ships, one third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two thirds of the world’s oil shipments. Some of the world’s most important trade routes pass through its waters. But once declared a Zone of Peace, the security and economic implications of the power dynamics between the nations of the Indian Ocean Region have the capability to not just impact the littoral states but the whole of Asia-Pacific region.

‘Indian Ocean diplomacy’ or ‘Blue Ocean Diplomacy’ gained momentum with the visit of the current Indian Prime Minister to Sri Lanka and the ‘Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) of Seychelles, Mauritius in the years 2015. With the major sea lines of communications passing through the Indian Ocean and the presence of key choke points in it, veteran and emerging world powers have been showing keen interest in making their presence felt in the ‘Indian Ocean Region’ (IOR), especially in the last decade or so. The concept of ‘Maritime Silk Road’, through the ‘String of Pearls’ as proposed through the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) of China is a matter of serious concern, as the state has the notoriety of being expansionist and revisionist both. The presence of US Navy’s 7th Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pak war and its naval base of Diego Garcia in ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ (BIOT) also highlighted the significance of the IOR. Despite the facts, India needs to actively pursue Blue Ocean Diplomacy in order to remain the biggest stakeholder in the security and economic architecture of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Blue Ocean Diplomacy essentially comprises imbibing the core values of the Blue Ocean Strategy towards creating a Blue Economy. Initially put forth as a marketing management concept, but is lately viewed as a corporate strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy advocates the creation of uncontested market space by creating and capturing new demand, thus making the competition totally irrelevant. Whereas the Red Ocean Strategy competes in existing market space and tries to beat the competition by exploiting the existing demand. China has been quite clearly trying to follow the Red Ocean Strategy, whereas with the revival of the regional forum of ‘Indian Ocean Rim Association’ (IORA), India has a definite advantage of adopting the Blue Ocean Strategy wherein it’s a win-win situation for all the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region. Value innovation as a key underpinning of the Blue Ocean Strategy would mean pursuit of differentiation and low cost simultaneously.

It was Indian Ocean Rim Association's Jakarta Concord which laid the ground map for a Blue Economy for IOR littoral states. Blue Economy, as an idea was first put forth by Gunter Pauli. There are various working definitions of Blue Economy such as that in IORA's Mauritius Declaration on Blue Economy, as well as advocated by Indian think tanks such as 'National Maritime Foundation' and 'Research and Information System for Developing Countries' have been in use. According to Blue Economy Vision 2025 report by FICCI, "The Blue Economy encompasses a wide range of economic activities pertaining to sustainable development of resources and assets in the oceans, related rivers, water bodies and coastal regions – in a manner that ensures equity, inclusion, innovation and modern technology. Subtly distinguishable from the "ocean economy" in terms of nuance and emphasis, the Blue Economy is a newer and more contemporary term, popular with Small Island Developing States (SIDS) as well as international organisations, media, experts and governments in a growing number of countries." In fact, 'Goal 14' of United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals resonates with the basic tenets of blue economy which is, "conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development."

Several noteworthy initiatives have been taken by India in the recent past in the direction of Blue Ocean diplomacy. Indian Navy's 'Look West Maritime Diplomacy', 'Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation' between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives and 'Project Mausam' are to name a few. There are a few core areas which need to be carefully worked at so as to be able to move swiftly towards a Blue Economy which are as follows:

1. In 2015, Seychelles became one of the first countries in the world to establish a Blue Economy Department under the Ministry of Finance. It also has initiated the creation of a Blue Economy Research Institute. Way back in 2012, European Union had announced its Blue Growth Strategy for sustainable development of marine and maritime sectors. Around the same time, China released its 12th Five Year Development Plan for National Marine Economy realising the significance of ocean economy. In view of the same, it becomes pertinent for India to chalk and spell out its National Blue Economy Strategy at the earliest and subsequently an action plan, for SAGAR already has provided the vision.
2. In view of Jakarta Concord, out of the six priority areas, it would be advantageous for India to formulate a politico-legal framework with institutional mechanism for marine terrorism and piracy, which would also greatly benefit the island nations of the Indian Ocean region.
3. There is an urgent need for a cultural framework to leverage the coastal and marine tourism and be able to connect to IOR nations thus amalgamating Project Mausam. For instance, India needs to well- promote it's island Union Territories of Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep and link it with the tourism economy of South-East Asian countries which would further India's soft power.
4. Institutional mechanisms towards domain cooperation in disaster response, marine academic and research areas with members of Indian Ocean Rim Association need to be put in place for achieving the Blue Economy.
5. Greater emphasis on building Indian ports as transshipment hub through Sagarmala Project and restructuring Indian shipbuilding industry is the need of the hour.
6. Sectoral integration with policy emphasis of 'Make in India', 'Digital India', 'Skill India' could be

worked out towards leveraging the marine resources with creation of infrastructure, availability of skilled manpower with respect to India's Exclusive Economic Zone.

Since each Small Island Developing State in the Indian Ocean Region, has a different level of strength, capabilities, expectations and needs, India needs to work at strengthening the relationship through a mutually beneficial association with each littoral state through bilateral and multilateral arrangements for the pursuit of Blue Economy through adopting Blue Ocean Strategy. This, in essence, would strengthen India's position to be able to counter China's growing maritime ambitions. Further, it would help India in becoming a true representative of the interest of the Indian Ocean Littoral States and emerge as strong maritime power.

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
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Incredible Naval Strategy: Operation Python and Trident

Introduction:

Sea had been and are today one of the most prime movers of world economies. Seas have provided for transport, exploration and conquer of lands far beyond one's own territories. The oceanic influences throughout history have proved beyond doubt the influence of sea power. Even the mighty Persian Empire could not stand against the Athenian fleet to conquer the Grecian city-states. The Phoenician, Egyptian, Carthagian and Roman power largely depended upon control of the seas. For three centuries, the Vikings used the Black sea and Strait of Gibraltar to raided and pillaged and went where they willed, far into central Russia and Ukraine and Constantinople.

The first recorded sea battle occurred about 1210 BC: Suppilulima II, king of the Hittites, defeated a fleet from Cyprus and burned their ships at sea. On the walls of Ramesses II is a depiction of the "Battle of the Delta" where the Ancient Egyptians defeated the sea invasion of the Sea People near the shores of Nile Delta circa 1175 BC, they used a naval ambush and archers firing from sea and shores. This was a classic example unconventional use of naval power.



Scene from an Egyptian temple wall shows Ramesses' combined land and sea victory in the Battle of Delta.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_warfare#/media/File:Seev%C3%B6lker.jpg

Navies continued to play a major role Romans, Arabs, Chinese, and Indians used their sea capabilities to dominate the world and world trade. The famous Chola expeditions to reduce the Sri Vijaya Empire speak naval capabilities of Indian rulers. The rise of Europeans trading powers and age of discovery added immensely to the development of ships and fighting techniques.

Post industrial revolution saw emergence of ironclad battle ships of various types and, the aircraft carriers with sizes, range speed, and greater firepower. The developments in weapon technology saw the end to frontal naval battles and the navies had more of power projection and constabulary roles.

Origins of Operation Trident and Python:

Post 1947 the military assets were divided between India and Pakistan, Indian Navy remained a small force, that needed to be augmented with new hardware and support systems, which for reasons better left un-discussed at this, remained a relatively a small fore as compared to the needs and size and changing geo-political situations in this part of the world.

Since inception of India and Pakistan the relations between these two nations in remained strained. Pakistan has used every opportunity or created one and continues to do so to act against India. India did restrain itself by following “*no first strike policy*” to a fair extent, but was pushed into skirmishes and battles on multiple occasions. 1965, 1971, 1992 etc, not mentioning the continued proxy war based on the concept of “*Bleed the enemy with a thousand wounds*”.

One of the most important conflicts between India and Pakistan was the war of 1971, which eventually culminated in liberation of East Pakistan and restructuring of Asian map with Bangladesh emerging as a new nation.

It was during this conflict the Indian Navy executed two daring naval operations viz Operation Trident and Operation Python, on Karachi the port town of Pakistan which were supported by Indian Air Force. The strategic objective was to cripple the Pakistan war machine supply lines coming from its port of Karachi. These operations saw the use of naval assets an

in an unimaginable and unprecedented way in the history of naval warfare. It is therefore pertinent to understand these operations and the lessons on how a small put well planned strategy and tactics can cripple the enemy to an extent that it forced to **submerge** into surrender. The date **4th December 1971** during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict is deeply etched in the annals of Indian Military History, and particularly in its Naval History.

1965 Conflict: On 9th April 1965, Pakistan intruded in the Kutch sector and gained control of Sardar Chowki near Kanjarkot. In the same year Pakistan also initiated two operations to capture Jammu and Kashmir, Grand Slam and Gibraltar. Operation Grand Slam (Attack Akhnoor Bridge) which was life line of Indian Infantry but also an important logistical point for Indian forces. Operation Gibraltar aimed to infiltrate Kashmir Valley and start a rebellion to support Pakistan. To divert attention from the main objectives Pakistan Military Headquarters launched Operation Dwarka, on 7th September 1965. The primary objective of the operation was to destroy (Non-existent) ground radar station ([Huff-Duff](#) beacon to guide Indian bombers) in Dwarka on the Gujarat Coast. This attack involved 7 ships of Pakistan navy. The attack commenced at 23:55 hrs. The attack was a dud as most shells fell between the temple and the railway station, which lay 3 km from the Lighthouse.

Some buildings were hit, with only the Railway Guest House suffering some minor damages and a cement factory of Associated Cement Company was also hit.

Damage assessment search revealed that major part of the ordinance used in the attack belonged to the pre- 1947 era with mark of INDIAN ORDINANCE, remained unexploded as they landed in soft soil. Total Loss was of one steam engine, one guesthouse and a Cow.

Though the attack was a miserable endeavour by Pakistan, Indian Navy failure to react was a thorn that the navy could never forget.

Indo-Pak Conflict 1971: By 1971 the situation in the East Pakistan had gotten worst with large scale genocide and atrocities. The net effect was large scale migration of people towards India, exerting excessive drain on Indian Economy and treasury. Relation between India and Pakistan once again were strained as Pakistan using the pretext that India is helping the Bangla speaking people of East Pakistan, this led to war-like situation.

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Sam Manekshaw (Field Marshal **Sam** Hormusji Framji Jamshedji **Manekshaw**) and Admiral Nanda S. M Nanda (Sardarilal Mathradas) met to decide on policy. It was decided to be **offensive than defensive**. Preparations began as per the decision. Role of Indian Navy: Indian Navy was entrusted with two responsibilities;

- 1) **Blockading East Pakistan harbours:**
Thus blocking reinforcements and escape.
- 2) **Attack Karachi Harbour in West Pakistan:** Three primary reasons for the decision a) Karachi was life line of Pakistan trade and economy. B) Oil and Ammunition Dumps 3) Headquarters of Pakistan Navy.

Preparations by Indian Navy: The Eastern Command based on the decision of **Offensive Strategy** the Navy began its preparations. Navy was divided into Eastern and Western Fleets.

INS Vikrant was dispatched in the Bay of Bengal for the Naval Blockade, which was done successfully by end of 1971. This completely isolated East-Pakistan's trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.

4th December 1971: Areal Attacks from aircraft

launched from Vikrant on Chittagon or Chitgaon and, Cox Bazar in East Pakistan. Meanwhile Pakistan had dispatched its submarine PNS Gazi to seek and Destroy INS Vikrant. But could not locate Vikrant and hence reached Vishakhapatnam, the Headquarters of Eastern Naval Command to lay mines. INS Rajput was sent to hunt PNS Gazi. Rajput detected Gazi and commenced attack with Depth Charges and 3rd December 1971 was sunk with all its 92 sailors.

Payback Time: The Navy was looking for Payback for the 1965 attacks on Dwarka. The offensive role was a welcome gesture. As an offensive it was decided to attack the lifeline of Pakistan, the port of Karachi and the two operations, Trident and Python were conceived. The strategy was to use the newly acquired Russian built OSA Class Missile Boats to launch missile attack on Karachi.

Preparations: A strike group was formed and named as Karachi Strike Group. The boat belonged to the K25 Killer Squadron of the Navy. The strike group comprised of three Vidyut Class missileboats;

[*INS Nipat, INS Nirghat and INS Veer,*](#)

Commanded by Commander Babru bhan Yadav embarked on INS Nipat. The 3 Boats were deployed at Okha in Gujarat.

The OSA class Missile Boats were small in size but had great speed which limited its range. It also had limitations with reference to its radar range and anti-aircraft capabilities. Every Missile boat carried 4 [*SS-N-2B Styx \(surface-to-surface missiles\)*](#) which had a range of 40 kms.

To overcome the difficulties of range and radar, 3 anti-submarine, Arnala Class Corvettes, INS Kadmat, and Katchal were to be deployed provide air and Submarine protection cover to the Squadron. The Corvettes had better radar and anti aircraft defence systems, thus helping to trace the enemy. Special fuel depots were created at Okha and Diu and INS Poshak was to be stationed half way to Karachi for refuelling the boats before and after the attack.

AFB near Karachi. With the preparations in place, the day had arrived.

Operation Trident Begins: The Distance between Okha and Karachi is about 500 Kms. To overcome the limitation of the range of missile boats it was decided that the corvettes will tow the missile boats. The squadron was to maintain complete radio silence till they reach close to Karachi. The Strike Group set sail. On 4th December, the strike group reached 250 nautical miles (460 km; 290 mi) (nmi) south off the coast of Karachi, and maintained its position during the day, outside the surveillance range of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

The Pakistan Air Force had two airbases, Masroor (Karachi) and Badin, from where they could have launched air attacks against the missile boats. The two bases were attacked on 4th December destroying the Badin radar station. The attack was planned for the night to take full advantage of lack of night bombing capabilities of PAF.

Indian task group moved in a arrow head formation with INS Nipat leading the way and INS Nirghat five miles to its port (left) and INS Veer on starboard (right) and reached 180 nmi (330 km; 210 mi) from its position towards the south of Karachi. Another advantage for the Indian squadron was the fluency of its crew in Russian. This would prove to be very useful while communicating.

By 20.00 hrs the squadron inched up to Karachi at a speed of 24 knots (approximately 44.5 kmph). Dusk had fallen. The squadron had a stroke of misfortune as well as good luck. The misfortune had to do with the fact that it was a full moon night, making it frighteningly easy for the squadron to be spotted as six white stripes on the pristine blue Arabian sea by a Pakistani aircraft (as a matter of fact a Pakistani patrol aircraft did indeed notice ‘unidentified ships traveling north-west’)



Source: <https://www.scoopwhoop.com/In-1971-The-Indian-Navy-Attempted-One-Of-The-Worlds-Most-Daring-War-Strategies-On-Karachi/#.de7383cba>

Now it was 21.45 hrs the distance to Karachi was now 80 km. The squadron had a stroke of good luck. Being wartime the Pakistan Navy had ordered that all non-navy ships to stay out of the Karachi harbour at a range of minimum 112 km between dusk and dawn. This was advantage as any beacon identified on the radars of the killer squadron could be safely predicted to be a Pakistani warship.

Final checks on equipment in all vessels were performed. The radars were constantly being monitored on all ships (INS Poshak stayed behind in Mangrol and INS Vidyut stayed outside Karachi harbour to act as a

mobile refueling depot and armed backup respectively).

Operation Trident Commenced: At 22. 00 hrs, the radar in INS Nipat started beeping, showing two enemy targets. The first was 45 miles north-west, and the second 42 miles north-east. Operation Trident had reached its most crucial leg. First target on the radar, now around 27 km away, had started moving towards the missile boat. It was the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar, weighing 3,290 tonnes when fully loaded. INS Nirghat and INS Kiltan were instructed to deal with the oncoming threat. INS Nirghat locked on to the target and launching its first Styx missile. The missile took off towards PNS Khaibar, which mistook the missile for an aircraft and started firing its Bofors anti-aircraft guns. The missile struck Khaibar on the starboard side below water level. The ship instantly lost propulsion, plunged into darkness and huge flames shot up due to an explosion in the boiler room. Khaibar started slumping towards the side of the explosion and sent an SOS to naval headquarters: *'Enemy aircraft attacked in position 020 FF 20. No 1 Boiler hit. Ship stopped.'* Now it was INS Nipat, which launched its first missile again to strike the Khaibar on its starboard side and gave the deathblow. The ship exploded, sending shockwaves across Karachi city. The sky was lit up in flames as ammunition on the ship exploded.

The SOS from Khaibar was responded by PNS Muhafiz, a mine sweeper. This ship was immediately fired upon by INS Veer with a deadly blow, the minesweeper exploded and sank. INS Nipat now engaged two contacts, MV (Merchant Vessel) Venus Challenger and Destroyer PNS Shah Jahan. MV Venus Challenger was completely dark, as it was a supply ship present inside the harbour. The ship was carrying US-supplied ammunition from Saigon for the Pakistani army and air force. PNS Shah Jahan was a warship almost the same size as PNS Khaibar, weighing 2,520 tonnes fully

loaded. The second missile from INS Nipat struck MV Venus Challenger, blew up the ammunition and the ship sank in less than eight minutes.

INS Nipat launched its third missile which struck PNS Shah Jahan, crippling it beyond repairs to be folled by a strike from the missile from after INS Nirghat. The ship was rendered useless for the rest of the battle. The two missiles fired by INS Veer found their targets, PNS Tipu Sultan and PNS Tughril, sinking both of them.

INS Nipat continued towards Karachi harbour and from a distance of 15 kms launched its two remaining missiles to strike the oil depot and refinery in the harbour. The fire had raged for next three days. The repeated request for air support from PAF did not receive response as the Masroor Base (Karachi) itself was under attack by IAF.

This attack made the Port of Karachi almost defunct and a blow to the Pakistan war-machine and economy. The damages, estimated, were to tune of \$3 billion, destruction of most of oil reserves, air bases hit.

The strike force by now was on its way back to rendezvous with INS Poshak for refueling for their onward journey home.

Operation Python: Immediately after the 'Operation Trident' Indian naval activity increased as a decoy for yet another eminent attack. Pakistan had increased its aerial surveillance. Pakistani warships attempted to outsmart the Indian Navy by mingling with merchant shipping. To counter these moves, Operation Python was launched on the night on 8/9 December 1971. A strike group consisting of one missile boat, INS Vinash, and two frigates INS Talwar and INS Trishul attacked the group of ships off the coast of Karachi.

About 22 kms from Karachi the group detected a batch of ships. INS *Vinash* immediately went into action and fired four of its missiles, the first of which struck the fuel tanks at the Kemari Oil Farm causing a heavy explosion. Another missile hit and sank the Panamanian fuel tanker SS *Gulf Star*. The third and fourth missiles hit the Pakistani Navy fleet tanker PNS *Dacca* and the British merchant vessel SS *Harmattan*. *Dacca* was damaged beyond repair, while *Harmattan* sank.

The two operations Trident and Python, and the Indian Air Force attacks on Karachi's fuel and ammunition depots, destroyed more than 50% of the total fuel requirement of the Karachi zone.

The after effect of these attacks, Pakistani High Command ordered ships to reduce their ammunition dumps so as to reduce the explosion damage, if hit. The ships were also ordered not to manoeuvre out at sea, especially during the night, unless ordered to do so. These two measures severely demoralized Pakistani naval crews. The attacks made the neutral merchant vessels seek safe passage from Indian authorities before heading to Karachi. Gradually, neutral ships ceased sailing for Karachi. In effect, a de facto naval blockade was created by the Indian Navy.

Conclusion: A decisive and imaginative military leadership and taking a call on offensive than defensive had paid off. Coordinated efforts by the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force made a rather decisive attack which crippled the Pakistan war-machine. With a well laid strategy with unconventional naval battle tactics, a small determined force with genius to overcome the limitations had etched a history in the annals of naval warfare never imagined and executed before.

Awards and Decorations: Operation Trident and Operation Python

Rank	Name of the Officer	Award
Fleet Operations Officer	G. M. Hiranandani	Nausena Medal
Commander	Babru Bhan Yadav	Maha Vir Chakra
Lt Cdr C.O. INS Nipat	Bahadur Nariman Kavina	Vir Chakra
Lt Cdr. C.O. INS Nirghat	Inderjit Sharma	Vir Chakra
Lt Cdr C.O. INS Veer	Om Prakash Mehta	Vir Chakra
Master Chief, INS Nirghat	M. N. Sangal	Vir Chakra
Lt Cdr. C.O. INS Vinash	Vijai Jerath	Vir Chakra



INS Nipat of Killer Squadron



INS Veer

Source: <http://english.mathrubhumi.com>



Styx Missiles being fired

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:183R>

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S. S. Pendse (PhD) Associate Professor, Tolani College of Commerce, Andheri, Mumbai.

(Published Posthumously)

Source: India Strategic

Making Of A Diplomat

Diplomacy is defined as the profession, activity or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country's representatives abroad. It would naturally apply to even the interactions of a country's representatives with foreign emissaries placed in the former's home country. From a common parlance perspective, it is also defined as the art of dealing with people in a sensitive and tactful way.

Taking both the perspectives into account, can we interpret it to apply in the situations where one is dealing with neither a foreign country nor its authorised representative but a host of elements who are either currently or / and potentially hostile to their home country's interest? I would answer it in the affirmative, if the location is Kashmir and the referred elements are those who have had their past in the militancy against the Indian state or / and have strong links to the separatist mindset and its network.

The said thought arose at the backdrop of an event organised by London School of Economics, last October, where there was a panel discussion, involving Amarjit Singh Dulat (who headed the Kashmir Group at the Intelligence Bureau (IB), later headed the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), till retirement and then worked in the PMO, as an Officer on Special Duty i.e. Kashmir, when Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister) and ex-ISI Chief Ehsan-ul-Haq. Here both the gentlemen reportedly agreed (in the words of the former) that "India made many mistakes in Kashmir and made a mess in the state". Dulat also stressed upon the need to resume talks between the two countries, at the backdrop of the official position

of the Govt. of India that it would not do so until Pakistan stopped engineering terrorist activities in India.

Although going by the Indian democratic traditions of free speech and their absence in Pakistan, the positions taken by Dulat and Ehsan-ul-Haq were understandable, it nevertheless raised a question about the propriety of an ex-RAW Chief's expression on an international forum, agreeing with the official position of an overtly unfriendly & hostile country, that happens to hold opposite views w.e.t. the same sensitive region of India. Interestingly, I had recently finished reading the book, "Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years" authored by Dulat (with Aditya Sinha, a journalist), published in 2015.

Throughout the book, Dulat has described a number of his interactions with current or ex-militants, political figures and other opinion makers among Kashmiris. He narrates the depth & width of his such interactions, intended genuinely towards bringing peace to Kashmir. Many of the people who interacted with him and whom he looked upto as harbingers of peace, had had their past in militancy and terrorism, be it Hashim Qureshi or Fidous Syed or Abdul Majid Dar or Irshad Malik. They seemed to have spent enough time (read years) in trying their hand at violence against the Indian state, in connivance with & under the instructions from Pakistan's ISI. After feeling frustrated with the unending jihad leading them nowhere and also suffering under the highhanded treatment from their Pakistani handlers, they seemed to open a channel with Dulat like Indian officials, for safe return & resettling in Kashmir. That clearly emerges as a pattern, after one goes through Dulat's narrations.

Secondly, the Indian state that Dulat represented, seemed to be interested in talking

to anyone and everyone, who may stand up and announce on a given day that he was interested in a dialogue with them, for peace in Kashmir. That only betrayed its weakness for peace (mainly through mutual or one-sided announcements of ceasefire) as a superficial measure of achievement and that too at any cost. Secondly, a number of Kashmiris were involved in this game. They dreamt of Azadi, for which they thought armed rebellion was the rightful tool. Then they crossed the border to get trained by the ISI, then returned to Kashmir to put the said training to effect. Some of them got killed or jailed by the Indian security agencies, in the bargain. The rest then again crossed the border to hide & survive.

After such holidaying in Pakistan for some time they got bored, wanted to marry and settle down back home, but were scared of ISI. So they opened a channel and said that they believed in dialogue to be the only way to solve Kashmir's problem and not violence. So Dulat like souls conveyed such "achievements" to the Govt. and pleaded their cases for safe re-entry and protection, with a hope that they would be useful in

explaining to their community the futility of jihad. However, they did nothing of that sort and engaged in politicking, as their aim was to join the mainstream local politics of Kashmir, where there was personality-oriented factionalism and no room for any kind of introspection but a zest to continue agitating about how India had treated them badly and how badly Kashmir needed Azadi. Even the line demarcating the mainstream politics got blurred many times over, when the Hurriyat (meaning freedom) Conference started playing a decisive role in influencing poll results and especially when Dulat like officials dished out promises to extremists, about mainstreaming them.

I look at the whole thing as a case study, a bit unconventional though. First of all Amarjit Singh Dulat, as described above, was never a career diplomat, in the strictest sense of the term. However given the role & the responsibility he was handling i.e. of gathering, analysing & reporting about the intelligence that would eventually safeguard India's security interests, he would naturally be expected to play a role that would befit the second definition of diplomacy i.e. of dealing with people in a sensitive & tactful way, especially in the hyper sensitive location called Kashmir. Secondly, the activity that one has to undertake essentially in such situations is

to open as many channels of dialogue as possible, the underlying prerequisite being handling the said process skillfully.

Although the key word here is 'being skillful', the crucial part is to interpret it appropriately so as to suit the context, where the end objective can never be anything other than securing, protecting and promoting the interests of the state one is representing. While Dulat has been clearly expressive about the end objective of the then regime of the Indian state being securing peace, when we look closely at the vivid descriptions of the various interactions (most of which made for track II diplomacy, in his words) he had had with who's who of then Kashmir, it can safely be concluded that the whole exercise was nothing but appeasement.

Appeasement is defined as a policy of making concessions to an aggressor in order to avoid confrontation. In the past, the said term was most often applied to the foreign policy of the British Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, between 1935 and 1939, taking it to be the right kind of diplomacy. The following history has stood testimony to the conclusion that no amount of such appeasement could succeed in

avoiding the confrontation i.e. World War II, that finally put an end to the continental crisis unleashed by the Fuhrer.

While appeasement has all along been the consistent approach adopted by the regimes in India prior to 2014, towards endearing themselves to the politically cohesive & highly conscious minorities of India and Kashmir being politically controlled by the largest minority of India, it has only backfired when used as the sole tool of diplomacy in the region. Many instances narrated by Dulat in his book by way of providing insights into the Kashmiri psyche, only stand to corroborate the said theory.

Diplomatic communications are viewed as sacrosanct, even when transacted in track II or track III diplomatic effort, though there could be a difference of degree in treatment of them, in the descending order. From this perspective, certain expressions from Dulat's narrations can be found to be incongruous vis-à-vis the stated official position of the Govt. of India as well as with its unstated, underlying beliefs. Below is some select sampling:

- “When Afzal Guru was hanged in Feb.’13, for his “alleged” (that’s Dulat’s chosen word) involvement in the Dec.’11 attack on Parliament, he replaced Maqbool Butt, as the main martyr for the Kashmir movement. (p.284)”. Here, we all know that Guru was hanged after he was declared a convict by the appropriate court, by following the due process of law.
- US-based Kashmiri businessman Farooq Kathwari had formed ‘Kashmir Study Group’ (KSG) comprising of legislators & academics. His two sons had died as jihadis in Afghanistan. KSG presented a proposal in Dec.’98, that spoke of reconstituting Kashmir as a sovereign

- entity. Kathwari consulted Dulat (who sincerely shared his feelings & thoughts, the impression you get by reading their conversation in print) and re-coined the term as ‘self-rule’ of Kashmiris. (p.18,19,20)
- “And after suffering at the hands of the Mughals, Pathans, Afghans, Sikhs, Dogras and currently India, they (Kashmiris) fight with their brains”. (p.322). This is so awfully self-speaking, it doesn’t need any explanation.
- Dulat met Gen. Asad Durrani, former ISI Chief, at the Chaophraya Dialogue (Bangkok) in 2014. During the coffee break, their discussion dwelled on the proxy war initiated by Pakistan. Durrani retaliated saying that India too used proxies against Pakistan e.g. Mukti Bahini, at which Dulat kept quiet (p.293).

The most glaring and disturbing example here is that of the Dulat’s interaction with Pakistan’s Asad Durrani at Chaophraya Dialogue, where both of them did appear as members of the teams representing their respective countries, in a real time track II diplomacy effort. The episode of liberation of Bangladesh has historically been acknowledged by the world historians as an earnest requirement of the time. Secondly, India’s response (as no country was in the position morally & geographically to do that) by rising to the occasion and going all out to help the then East Pakistani people, suffering under the genocide unleashed by the West Pakistani army, simultaneously handling all the repercussions on its economy, caused by the influx of millions of refugees crossing borders, has well been acknowledged as a great effort towards a humanitarian cause. At this backdrop, an Indian diplomat keeping quiet, as if in acquiescence, in response to an atrocious claim made by an another diplomat representing a self-proclaimed enemy country in the same context, is

unthinkable to say the least.

Even Dulat's prescription for continuation of track II diplomacy with Pakistan (p.318) is based on the logic – Pakistan remains a factor in Kashmir, because of the anger & alienation against India and it provides Kashmiris with a convenient fallback position and Pakistan's fallback is its special relationship with China, which can't be underestimated – is unspeakable, as it betrays the fear psychosis that had possibly gripped the Indian state all these decades, post 1947.

A cautious researcher of the Kashmiri unrest can gather easily, that its essence & genesis, is rooted in nothing but the ideology of Islamic supremacy over a territory i.e. Kashmir, which was achieved through relentless mass conversions over centuries, followed by forcible evacuation of the unbending “kafirs” (read exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, in recent history). The whole restlessness is about the seeming infinity clouding ‘the waiting period’, before they enter the dream status of ‘Azadi’ (or annexation with today's PoK, which they may not be finding appropriate to talk about at the moment).

The incongruities identified above (which incidentally corroborate with the public expressions of the author at above-referred LSE event), are quite disturbing, looking at the non-alignment of an incumbent's thought process with the role that he was expected to play. It can certainly be a good case study, for inculcation

of certain basic values among future recruits of the Indian Foreign Service and such services, the retired senior officials of which would be expected to play a role in track II diplomacy, so as to reduce the scope for such awkward situations (read LSE event) in future.

I am reminded at this backdrop about what Dattatreya Hosbale, Jt. Gen. secretary of RSS, said at the time of releasing the revised edition of a Hindi book by Dr. Suryakant Bali viz. ‘Bharat Ko Samajhne ki Shartein’ (meaning the prerequisites to the understanding of India), in Feb.'17. He mentioned that the said book (as it explains the civilisational character of India so well) should be translated in English and distributed among all the Indian ambassadors worldwide, making it a compulsory reading for them all, so that they could represent India well. I only wish Dulat had read it before attending the LSE event of Oct.'17.

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Blog-post

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North Korea, a Conundrum: What are India's Choices?

Introduction

The author is a researcher based in Denmark with special interest in International Relations and diplomacy. India embarked on the diplomatic relation with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 1973. The relationship with both the countries had been a low-profile affair in international

relations. But, it seems everything suddenly changed, and the relationship came on the spot light during the visit of US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson to India in October 2017. During the joint press conference answering to the question of one of the journalists Indian External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj forthrightly stated that India has no intention to cut diplomatic ties with North Korea. What was more interesting in her statement is the reason behind nursing the stated intention; which is, that there should be some friendly countries of US in touch with North Korea to keep a channel of communication open. So, what is India intending to do? Is US also concurrent with India's policy towards North Korea, or is US also ready to allow India to play a role in minimizing the tension in the Korean peninsula? This article will try to analyse and answer what role India can play in the Korean peninsula and what should be India's strategic objective?

DPRK outreach to India

Earlier this year in June 2017, North Korean ambassador to India Kye Chun Yong gave an interview to a private TV channel where he talked about India's relation with DPRK. It is very rare to see a North Korean representative interacting with media, and this would not have been possible without the sanction from the highest level of the North Korean regime, quite possibly from Kim Jong Un himself. The ambassador talks about the good relation between India and DPRK and especially about 'Make in India' initiative from PM Modi. This can be construed that DPRK wants to have a close economic relation with India as the country is under extreme international economic sanctions.

Chinese Chequer

North Korea has huge economic dependence on China. On the other hand, China had been using DPRK as a tool to blackmail international community, making the international community believe that it has the leverage to bring DPRK at the negotiating table and dissuade DPRK from conducting nuclear and missile tests. So far, the world and especially US have been heavily relying on China to control N. Korea. But, we have seen that attempts of US through Chinese mediation have failed to stop N. Korea from pursuing its nuclear and missile programme. This is because, perhaps US have forgotten that N. Korean nuclear and missile programme had not been possible without the Chinese help [mostly economic and financial, and technological help to an extent]. On the other hand, China is using N. Korea to divert world's attention and especially US strategy to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region. So, the entire US strategy is misplaced at the first place. The focus should be to pull N. Korea out of the Chinese influence. Here, US is making the same mistake which it had already made in Iran (by thinking to undo the US-Iran Nuclear deal under Obama administration) and Afghanistan (by relying on Pakistan to bring stability in Afghanistan). Today, US is already deeply engaged in Afghanistan, and if it opens a new front in Korean peninsula then it would be counterproductive to the whole American Indo-Pacific strategy. If we see the geography of East and North-East Asia; then all countries Japan, South Korea (S. Korea) and Taiwan are technologically and economically one of the advanced nations of the world. For the sake of hypothesis, if North Korean and South Korea unite then it would be a severe challenge to China technologically, economically and even militarily. After all the two Koreas are the same people with shared history, culture and language. Further, this entire region would be under US influence. So, why would China be the part of solution in the Korean peninsula? In fact, China is the part of problem; just like Pakistan is the part of the problem in Afghanistan.

North Korean Nuclear Program

The world today especially US, west and its East Asian allies are worried about North Korean nuclear weapons and its missiles. But, they are not asking how come a country as poor as N. Korea got its hand over the nuclear weapons and missiles. Soon after the Korean war, DPRK started its pursuit of the nuclear

weapon. Initially, it did seek Chinese help ⁽⁴⁾, but, was refused by Mao Zedong. So, it embarked on an indigenous weapons program ⁽⁴⁾. Having denied by the Chinese, it went for help to the Soviet Union where it got its first nuclear breakthrough which resulted in setting up of first nuclear reactor by the Soviet help in 1964. In the years to follow the North Koreans started aggressive nuclear pursuit and managed to get help from some Belgian scientists about the design of a plutonium separation ⁽⁴⁾. Over the period of next decade and half they started experimenting and using it. This helped them to start producing weapon grade plutonium for nuclear warhead. In 2004, DPRK head Kim Jong -II invited a delegation of western nuclear scientists to visit its plutonium extraction facility which was testified later by an American scientist Dr. Siegfried Hecker (made total seven visits to N. Korea) who was one of the invitees at the said facility. And, couple of years later in 2006 North Korea conducted its first nuclear test ⁽⁴⁾.

Later, the N. Korean scientists started working on uranium based weapons. Here again, DPRK required a help from a credible source which came in the form of Pakistan. The help came from the infamous Khan network who had been running a nuclear proliferation ring. A. Q. Khan and [Pakistan regime] went into a barter agreement where DPRK would provide technological know-how of ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and Pakistan would provide enrichment technology for weapons-grade uranium ⁽⁴⁾. In 2010, Dr. Siegfried Hecker was again invited to North Korea, and this time he was taken to a uranium enrichment facility where he found 2000 centrifuges to produce weapons-grade uranium ⁽⁴⁾. It should be noted that Pakistan also got entire help for its nuclear program from China. So, it's evident that there is a China, Pakistan and North Korea nexus which is required to be broken. This is the real axis of evil with a geographical continuity (both Pakistan and N. Korea share border with China). Both Pakistan and North Korea are now problem for US, but both enjoy immense support from China. Now, Pakistan relies more on China to avoid its international isolation and so is North Korea.

Why DPRK wants Nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapon was used as a weapon to stop any military conflict or war during the cold war. It is a weapon to stop or prevent a conflict, it's not a weapon for use. But, this lies true for great powers. So, why North Korea requires a nuclear weapon? For small countries and particularly security states nuclear weapon is more a weapon for pride and symbolism. This even becomes a necessity for corrupt regimes and brutal dictatorships, e.g. Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea perfectly fits into this argument and aggressively pursues it primarily for three reasons: a) to protect its regime. b) for domestic consumption by creating an external threat so that people don't raise demands for social welfare and development programs. c) To use as a bargain chip in international diplomacy ⁽⁴⁾.

But, after the demise of the Soviet Union DPRK lost a close ally overnight from where it got a lot of economic and technical help. The Chinese also did not help DPRK much because Chinese were focussing more on their economic rise and hence worked together with South Korea (S. Korea) for their economic and technological growth. These events led N. Korea to enter dialogue with the US. The dialogues began in 1994 under which N. Korea will stop its plutonium program and in return US will provide two light water reactors which could be used for peaceful purpose of electricity generation ⁽⁸⁾. This agreement collapsed in 2002 under George W. Bush where the Bush administration accused N. Korea of cheating with the agreement and N. Korea accused US of delay in providing light water reactors (LWR) ⁽⁸⁾.

Later, after much deliberations and in consultation with China, N. Korea agreed six party talks which comprised N. Korea, S. Korea, China, Russia, Japan and USA. The talks began in August 2003 in Beijing

⁽⁸⁾. But, US sanctioned North Korean trading entities and Banco Delta Asia of Macau which resulted in N. Korea conduct multiple missile tests and first nuclear test in July 2006 ⁽⁸⁾. Further, UNSC passed resolution 1718, and asked N. Korea to abandon missile and WMD program and join six-party talks ⁽⁸⁾. Later, N. Korea agreed to shutdown Yongbyon reactor (plutonium based) when US and Japan committed to supply 50,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. But, N. Korea agreed to shutdown plutonium reactor because it had developed technology for uranium based weapons by producing fissile material from uranium centrifuge, thanks to the support and help from A.Q. Khan (Pakistan) network. It can be said that both N. Korea and US have made mistakes, but the onus lies more on US as it had been slow in securing energy requirements of N. Korea including not providing two LWRs.

US Sanctions

Since, the Trump administration came to power, it focussed on putting end to N. Korean nuclear weapons and missile program. For this, it relied too much on China and President Xi. But, after seeing no change in DPRK stance US started taking some steps on its own. US initiated sanctions on any company or entity dealing with DPRK. President Trump increased the power of US Treasury Office in September 2017 and authorised to take punitive sanctions on any company trading with North Korea ⁽²⁾. This can bring huge pressure on China as many Chinese companies and banks are trading with N. Korea, and China comprises 90% of total N. Korean trade ⁽²⁾. This will further hit many North Korean shell companies conducting trade through China. But, these sanctions might not deter N. Korea in pursuing WMDs because N. Korea has survived domestic famine and poor economic conditions and still pursued the weapons program. So, N. Korea is used to such adverse economic and financial conditions here in the form of economic sanctions. Further, the small Chinese banks which deal with N. Korea do not have much exposure to international financial system, and hence might survive the US sanctions ⁽²⁾.

India's role and its strategic interest

India has a very low-profile relationship with N. Korea. The last foreign office consultation between both countries took place in April 2016. The N. Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong visited India in 2015 ⁽¹⁾. India was the third largest trading partner of N. Korea after China and Russia in 2015. The bilateral trade between both countries is very modest where India imported goods worth \$ 88 million from N. Korea and exported goods worth \$ 111 million ⁽⁵⁾. The exports mainly comprise of medicine and food grains. Under World Food Program – 2016 India provided soybean worth \$ 1 million. In 2011, India provided food assistance worth \$ 1 million dollar under World Food Program (WFP).

If we look at the geography of N. Korea, the it has neighbours namely, S. Korea, China, Japan and Russia and US being extra regional power. Incidentally, these are the countries also involved in Six Party Talks. Of late, India has now started the “act east policy.” Further, India has good relationship with all nations which are N. Korea's neighbours (except China, but India has a sound economic relationship with China) including US. So, India is in a sweet spot in this situation. Not to forget, that India was among the few countries which was invited for briefing by Pyongyang after it conducted its sixth nuclear test on 3rd September 2017. This gives enough signal to India that it has a role to play in the crisis. I think India should take a lead in lowering the tension in the peninsula. Here, the Indian goal should be to take N. Korea out of the Chinese influence. For which a few measures must be taken by India in collaboration with the N. Korean neighbours including Russia and US. According to reports from Technical University of Germany some Ukraine based Russian companies have supplied missile engines to North Korea as these companies are desperate to sell

technologies due to their poor financial conditions. Here, India can use the Russian influence to deter these companies to sell technologies and hardware to N. Korea.

As I mentioned in my introduction, referring to the North Korean Ambassador's interview where he praised PM Modi for his "Make in India" initiative. India can boost its "Make in India" program by acting as a fulcrum between N. Korea, S. Korea and even Japan and Taiwan. The recent example is when the S. Korean automobile giant Kia Motors in April 2017 decided to open a new manufacturing unit in India worth \$ 1.1 billion investment, which was due to the rising anti- Korea sentiment in China and due to slowing Chinese growth ⁽⁵⁾. India can boost its electronic manufacturing base by collaborating with Taiwan, S. Korea and Japan in terms of high end technologies and the raw materials (e.g. Rare earth metals which are used in high end electronic device like mobiles, and laptops ⁽⁶⁾) for these industries can be imported from N. Korea. This will create economic interdependence with India being at the centre which will help reduce tension and will further open avenues for N. Korea to diversify its trade and be less dependent on China. As of now, China is the sole beneficiary of the huge deposits of minerals in N. Korea ⁽⁶⁾. Despite of the UN sanctions China imports huge amount of minerals from N. Korea. This collective step will help in bringing N. Korea out of Chinese influence.

In October 2017, India conducted tri service joint military exercise with Russia not far from the crisis zone giving signal to China about India's reach and that the region is not just a Chinese backyard. On the other hand, India can also play a role in lowering tension between US and Russia as Russia is a key player in North Korean crisis. So far US has made sufficient noise but least has happened to the N. Korean regime. So, the stakes are high for US and N. Korea has hardly anything to lose. So, under these

circumstances US should rely on countries like India who have open communication with North Korea. In the past.

Although India had been critical about N. Korean nuclear weapons and missile program, still India has a good track record of helping N Korea in providing humanitarian aid. In the past, India has trained N. Korean scientists at The Centre for Space Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) located in Dehradun ⁽⁵⁾. N. Korea is also working on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) ⁽³⁾ to acquire nuclear second-strike capability. On the hand Pakistan is also trying hard to acquire the nuclear second-strike capability as India has already achieved this. North Korea and Pakistan had bartered missile and nuclear technology in the past. Pakistan got missile technology (technology transfer) from N. Korea under a government to government deal after cash payment by Pakistan; where the Pakistani Ghauri missile is a copy of N. Korean No-Dung missile ⁽⁷⁾, which is revealed by Pervez Musharraf in his book "In the Line of Fire". So, this relation should be used by New Delhi to convince Pyonyang not to transfer the SLBM technology, ⁽³⁾ if India wants to have an edge over Pakistan in terms of nuclear second-strike capability from submarines. Here, the Indian goal should be to counter the China-Pakistan axis and to reach in Chinese backyard through N. Korea. India's relation with N. Korea should be based more on economic and cultural ties. India has already a modest human welfare ties but that needs to be scaled up to guarantee space in relationship with N. Korea.

Conclusion

So far, India has pursued a policy of non-interference, which is laudable. But, due to changing geopolitical scenario it needs to blend its policy with some pragmatism and real politik, and come out of the Nehruvian Non-alignment hang over and exhibit some hard power in its diplomacy along with the soft power (which has

earned it great respect). Not long ago, India took a very firm stance on Doklam issue with China (where Chinese had to back-off) without any belligerence which was closely monitored by the whole world especially countries neighbour to both India and China and of the Indian Ocean region. India's relation with N. Korea should be based more on economic and cultural ties. India has already a modest human welfare ties but that needs to be scaled up to guarantee space in relationship with N. Korea. Remember, US had been in intense negotiation with DPRK (even back channel diplomacy by sending interlocutors to N. Korea, e.g. Dr. Siegfried Hecker paid altogether seven visits to N. Korea ⁽⁴⁾) in the past, and it can have some agreement with DPRK like US-Iran nuclear deal by Obama administration. India has the potential to facilitate peace in Korean peninsula which US should reciprocate as a cooperation with India to realise its 21st century Indo-Pacific strategy. On the other hand, this is an opportunity for India to prove its bigger role as a rising power.

NOTE: N.B. - India considers North Korea nuke program a national security threat and adheres to UN sanctions. India is also concerned with proliferation regime and is participating in Vancouver Dialogue.

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Doklam Logjam And India's Strategic Riposte

On June 18th, 2017 Indian border troops interrupted China's road construction attempts at Doklam, at the tri junction between China, Bhutan and India. China claims that, it is normal road construction at mutually recognized Sikkim sector into Chinese territory and Bhutan has ceded claim on it. For China, this is clearly demarcated borderline which has been established by the 1890 convention between Great Britain and China related to Sikkim and Tibet and has been accepted by Indian Government in 1947.¹ India considers this dispute to be China's high handedness. Doklam, for India is Bhutanese territory. India – China special representatives' dialogue agreed to settle such disputes through consultations in 2012. China's military activity changed the status quo and unilaterally upset the equilibrium. India insisted that, both countries should take the army back simultaneously and open dialogue. China emphasized on Indian army to go back first and then opening of dialogue. Subsequently in June this year Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in Astana agreed on not allowing differences to grow into disputes. Indian diplomacy, while standing firm on its position on national security, represented the spirit of togetherness, and finally its restraint and resilience engulfed the clouds of war.

But, a Chinese contingent of troops still stands at the border; less than 1000 feet back from where the PLA had drawn up its battle lines in the summer. "There is a heavy presence of Chinese troops a few hundred meters away from the site of standoff and they are likely to remain at least until the winter" said Rajeev Rajan Chaturvedy, a researcher at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore.

But Doklam is not an isolated event. India – China have a long history of rivalry and Doklam is a part of a bigger design. Apart from border disputes and staple visas to Nuclear Supplier Groups membership & Maulana Masood Azar, there have been many disagreements. China – Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes through Gilgit – Baltistan and Pak Occupied Kashmir in an absolute No – No for India. Unipolar Asia does not serve India's purpose but, India understands the importance of being able to solve bilateral issues in peaceful manner China in that sense is hawkish. Nine dash line to trade protectionism, China has been bullying other nations, or wooing them with economic muscle. China today has no competitor in Indian Ocean Region. Geunhye of South Korea is in Blue House now, Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines, despite winning the Arbitration has mended his ways, Malaysia has swung towards China by signing historic defense agreement, and military leadership of pro – western power in Thailand has inked naval accords with China. Chinese hawkish designs are evident in South China Sea, in terms of disputes with South Korea, Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam. It is on this background that the Doklam logjam has to be analyzed.

China was repeatedly threatening military action as a possibility to end standoff between it and Indian troops. Wang Wenli, a Chinese diplomat had ever signaled that the time running out to peacefully resolve the crisis.² Whereas, Bhutan's ambassador to India Vetsop Namgyel states that Doklam is a disputed territory and Bhutan has an agreement with China that pending the final resolution of boundary issue, peace

and tranquility should be maintained in the area. The National Security Advisors meeting it BRICs had also not resulted into any definite solution. Global Times was constantly threatening India of military action and reminding India of 1962 wars.

India considered these statements as Psywar, as preached by Sun Tzu China appeared to have taken its symbolic representation as a scary fire- breathing dragon a tad too seriously, full of the belief that the moment it arches its body upright and spews verbal tinder, its neighbors, including India will cower in fear and do its bidding.³

Though Global Times threatened to annihilate all Indian troops in borer regions,⁴ and warned India against publicity challenging a country, supposedly superior in strength. India did not budge, barely five years after 1962, Indian forces inflicted a crushing defeat to the Chinese army during a skirmish at Nathula & Chola over 400 Chinese soldier died, compared to 80-100 indians.⁵ 1979 Sino – Vietnam war, was a complete debacle of Chinese army.⁶ in this war, over 23000 Chinese died and 43000 wounded compared to 10000 Vietnamese fatalities, Indian defense forces today seem equipped to guard her interests. It is essential that mutual co-operation is displayed. This is especially important as India has a terrain advantage in Doklam and Aug.14, 2017 two more Chinese incursions in Ladakh by Indian army.

Theoretical construct:

Chicken Game:

Remember our 1950s youths racing their cars towards one another and seeing who will be the first to swerve to avoid a collision? Now we suppose the players have no choice in the matter” each is genetically hardwired to be either a Wimp (always swerve) or a Macho (always go straight). The population consists of a mixture of the two types. Pairs are picked at random every week to play the game. Figure below shows the payoff table for any two such players – say, A and B.

To find the proportions of Wimps and Machos in such as ESS, let us calculate the fitness of each type in a general mixed population. Write x for the fraction of Machos and (1-x) for the proportion of Wimps. A Wimp meets another Wimp and get 0 for a fraction (1-x) of the time and meets a Macho and gets -1 for a fraction x of the time. Therefore the fitness of a Wimp is $0 \times (1-x) - 1 \times x = -x$. Similarly, the fitness of a Macho is $1 \times (1-x) - 2x = 1 - 3x$. The Macho type is fitter if

$$1-3x > -x$$

$$2x < 1$$

$$x < 1/2.$$

If the population is less than half Macho, then the Machos will be fitter and their population will increase. On the other hand, if the population is more than half Macho, then the Wimps will be fitter and the Macho proportion will fall. Either way, the population proportion of Machos will tend towards ½, and this 50-50 mix will be the stable polymorphic ESS.

		B	
		Wimp	Macho
A	Wimp	0,0	-1,1
	Macho	1, -1	-2,2

The Hawk –Dove Game

The game is played not by birds of these two species, but by two animals of the same species, and Hawk and Dove are merely the names for their strategies. The context is competition for a resource. The Hawk strategy is aggressive and fights to try to get the whole resource of value V . The Dove strategy is to offer to share but to avoid fight. When two Hawk types meet each other, they fight. Each animal is equally likely (probability $\frac{1}{2}$) to win and get V or to lose, be injured, and get $-C$. Thus the expected payoff for each is $(V - C)/2$. When two Dove types meet, the latter retreats and gets $V/2$. When a Hawk type meets a Dove type, the latter retreats and gets a 0, whereas the former gets V .

		B	
		Wimp	Macho
A	Wimp	$(V-C)/2, (V-C)/2$	$V, 0$
	Macho	$0, V$	$V/2, V/2$

The analysis of the game is similar to that for the prisoners' dilemma and chicken games, except that the numerical payoffs have been replaced by algebraic symbols. We will compare the equilibria of this game when the players rationally choose to play Hawk or Dove and then compare the outcomes when players are acting mechanically and success is being rewarded with faster reproduction.

Rational Strategic Choice and Equilibrium

1. If $V > C$, then the game is a prisoners' dilemma in which the Hawk strategy corresponds to "defect" and Dove corresponds to "cooperate." Hawk is the dominant strategy for each, but (Dove, Dove) is the jointly better outcome.
2. If $V < C$, then it's a game of chicken. Now $(V-C)/2 < 0$ and so Hawk is no longer a dominant strategy. Rather, there are two pure – strategy Nash equilibria : (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk). There is also a mixed – strategy equilibrium, where B's probability p of choosing Hawk is such as to keep A indifferent:

$$p(V-C)/2 + (1-p)V = p \cdot 0 + (1-p)V/2$$

$$p = V/C.$$

Analysis:

China – a hawkish player would be better off maintaining this position as long as others play a Dove. But if other nation, say, India plays Hawk, both would be better off moving aside. Thus how India continues to remain firm, more and more hawkish players would emerge, till the time Dove strategy becomes evolutionarily stable strategy. But, as today there are far more Doves than Hawks, India should not move aside even in future logjams.

Countering opponents strategic moves:⁷

1. Irrationality: It could work in both the cases
2. Cutting off communication: If India cuts off communication; active or passive to threats given by say, Global Times, it would work.

3. Leaving escape routes open: in this case the threatening side can move aside.
4. Undermining the opponents motive to uphold his reputation
5. Salami tactics: Do not comply with other wishes to a small degree at a time

Conclusion:

Analyzing Doklam issue through Game Theoretic approach this is typically a Hawk – Dove game and being Hawkish is an evolutionarily stable strategy for India at this time. Along with this India could play other given moves to counter opponents' strategy so as to ensure peace in the region.

Key Words:

Doklam, India, China, Game theory, Chicken game, Hawk Dove game

Abstract:

Over the summer, the world held its breath for 10 weeks while the two most populous and butted heads over a planned Chinese road through disputed border region between China & Bhutan. Just as quickly the stand-off began, however it ended with both sides pulling back early. September and yet around 1000 PLA soldiers still mean the disputed Himalaya border region. This paper analyses this issue using Game Theory and hints at India's possible strategic option.

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Military History



What Was the Vietnam War?

The Vietnam War was the prolonged struggle between nationalist forces attempting to unify the country of Vietnam under a communist government and the United States (with the aid of the South Vietnamese) attempting to prevent the spread of communism. Engaged in a war that many viewed as having no way to win, U.S. leaders lost the American public's support for the war. Since the end of the war, the Vietnam War has become a benchmark for what *not* to do in all future U.S. foreign conflicts.

Dates of the Vietnam War: 1959 -- April 30, 1975

Also Known As: American War in Vietnam, Vietnam Conflict, Second Indochina War, War Against the Americans to Save the Nation

Overview of the Vietnam War:

Ho Chi Minh Comes Home

There had been fighting in Vietnam for decades before the Vietnam War began. The Vietnamese had suffered under French colonial rule for nearly six decades when Japan invaded portions of Vietnam in 1940. It was in 1941, when Vietnam had two foreign powers occupying them, that communist Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh arrived back in Vietnam after spending thirty years traveling the world.

Once Ho was back in Vietnam, he established a headquarters in a cave in northern Vietnam and established the Viet Minh, whose goal was to rid Vietnam of the French and Japanese occupiers. Having gained support for their cause in northern Vietnam, the Viet Minh announced the establishment of an independent Vietnam with a new government called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. The French, however, were not willing to give up their colony so easily and fought back.

For years, Ho had tried to court the United States to support him against the French, including supplying the U.S. with military intelligence about the Japanese during World War II. Despite this aid, the United States was fully dedicated to their Cold War foreign policy of containment, which meant preventing the spread of Communism. This fear of the spread of Communism was heightened by the U.S. "domino theory," which stated that if one country in Southeast Asia fell to Communism then surrounding countries would also soon fall. To help prevent Vietnam from becoming a communist country, the U.S. decided to help France defeat Ho and his revolutionaries by sending the French military aid in 1950.

France Steps Out, U.S. Steps In

In 1954, after suffering a decisive defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French decided to pull out of Vietnam. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, a number of nations met to determine how the French could peacefully withdraw. The agreement that came out of the conference (called the Geneva Accords) stipulated a cease fire for the peaceful withdrawal of French forces and the temporary division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel (which split the country into communist North Vietnam and non-communist South Vietnam). In addition, a general democratic election was to be held in 1956 that would reunite the country under one government. The United States refused to agree to the election, fearing the communists might win.

With help from the United States, South Vietnam carried out the election only in South Vietnam rather than countrywide. After eliminating most of his rivals, Ngo Dinh Diem was elected. His leadership, however, proved so horrible that he was killed in 1963 during a coup supported by the United States. Since Diem had alienated many South Vietnamese during his tenure, communist sympathizers in South Vietnam established the National Liberation Front (NLF), also known as the Viet Cong, in 1960 to use guerrilla warfare against the South Vietnamese.

First U.S. Ground Troops Sent to Vietnam

As the fighting between the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese continued, the U.S. continued to send additional advisers to South Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese fired directly upon two U.S. ships in international waters on August 2 and 4, 1964 (known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident), Congress responded with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This resolution gave the President the authority to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson used that authority to order the first U.S. ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965.

Johnson's Plan for Success

President Johnson's goal for U.S. involvement in Vietnam was not for the U.S. to win the war, but for U.S. troops to bolster South Vietnam's defenses until South Vietnam could take over. By entering the Vietnam War without a goal to win, Johnson set the stage for future public and troop disappointment when the U.S. found themselves in a stalemate with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

From 1965 to 1969, the U.S. was involved in a limited war in Vietnam. Although there were aerial bombings of the North, President Johnson wanted the fighting to be limited to South Vietnam. By limiting

the fighting parameters, the U.S. forces would not conduct a serious ground assault into the North to attack the communists directly nor would there be any strong effort to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the Viet Cong's supply path that ran through Laos and Cambodia).

Life in the Jungle

U.S. troops fought a jungle war, mostly against the well-supplied Viet Cong. The Viet Cong would attack in ambushes, set up booby traps, and escape through a complex network of underground tunnels. For U.S. forces, even just finding their enemy proved difficult. Since Viet Cong hid in the dense brush, U.S. forces would drop Agent Orange or napalm bombs which cleared an area by causing the leaves to drop off or to burn away. In every village, U.S. troops had difficulty determining which, if any, villagers were the enemy since even women and children could build booby traps or help house and feed the Viet Cong. U.S. soldiers commonly became frustrated with the fighting conditions in Vietnam. Many suffered from low morale, became angry, and some used drugs.

On January 30, 1968, the North Vietnamese surprised both the U.S. forces and the South Vietnamese by orchestrating a coordinated assault with the Viet Cong to attack about a hundred South Vietnamese cities and towns. Although the U.S. forces and the South Vietnamese army were able to repel the assault known as the [Tet Offensive](#), this attack proved to Americans that the enemy was stronger and better organized than they had been led to believe. The Tet Offensive was a turning point in the war because President Johnson, faced now with an unhappy American public and bad news from his military leaders in Vietnam, decided to no longer escalate the war.

Nixon's Plan for "Peace With Honor"

In 1969, [Richard Nixon](#) became the new U.S. President and he had his own plan to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. President Nixon outlined a plan called Vietnamization, which was a process to remove U.S. troops from Vietnam while handing back the fighting to the South Vietnamese. The withdrawal of U.S. troops began in July 1969. To bring a faster end to hostilities, President Nixon also expanded the war into other countries, such as Laos and Cambodia -- a move that created thousands of protests, especially on college campuses, back in America. To work toward peace, new peace talks began in Paris on January 25, 1969.

When the U.S. had withdrawn most of its troops from Vietnam, the North Vietnamese staged another massive assault, called the Easter Offensive (also called the Spring Offensive), on March 30, 1972. North Vietnamese troops crossed over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the 17th parallel and invaded South Vietnam. The remaining U.S. forces and the South Vietnamese army fought back.

The Paris Peace Accords

On January 27, 1973, the peace talks in Paris finally succeeded in producing a cease-fire agreement. The last U.S. troops left Vietnam on March 29, 1973, knowing they were leaving a weak South Vietnam who would not be able to withstand another major communist North Vietnam attack.

Reunification of Vietnam

After the U.S. had withdrawn all its troops, the fighting continued in Vietnam. In early 1975, North Vietnam made another big push south which toppled the South Vietnamese government. South Vietnam officially surrendered to communist North Vietnam on April 30, 1975. On July 2, 1976, Vietnam was reunited as a communist country, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese government claimed they left only a force of about 70,000 including several army regular divisions in its northern area. However, the Chinese claimed to have encountered more than twice this number. During the war, Vietnamese forces also used American military equipment captured during the [Vietnam War](#).

Course of the war[\[edit\]](#)

The [Chinese entered Northern Vietnam](#) and advanced quickly about 15–20 kilometers into Vietnam, with fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of [Cao Bằng](#), [Lào Cai](#) and [Lang Son](#). The Vietnamese avoided mobilizing their regular divisions, and held back some 300,000 troops for the defence of Hanoi. The Vietnamese forces tried to avoid direct combat, and often used guerrilla tactics. The initial Chinese attack soon lost its momentum, and a new wave of attack was sent in. Eight Chinese divisions joined the battle, and captured some of the northernmost cities in Vietnam. After [capturing the northern heights above Lang Son](#), the Chinese surrounded and paused in front of the city in order to lure the Vietnamese into reinforcing it with units from Cambodia. This had been the main strategic ploy in the Chinese war plan as Deng did not want to risk an escalation involving the Soviets. The PVA high command, after a tip-off from Soviet satellite intelligence, was able to see through the trap^{[\[citation needed\]](#)}, however, and committed reserves only to Hanoi.

Once this became clear to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the war was practically over. An assault was still mounted, but the Vietnamese only committed one PVA regiment defending the city.^{[\[citation needed\]](#)} After three days of bloody house-to-house fighting, Lang Son fell on March 6. The PLA then took the southern heights above Lang Son^{[\[29\]](#)} and occupied Sapa. The PLA claimed to have crushed several of the Vietnamese regular units.^{[\[5\]](#)}

The Chinese now resumed their attacks aimed at the major provincial capitals and key communication centres in the border hinter land. Major battles developed at [Cao Bằng](#), [Lang Son](#), Hoang Lien Son, Lai Chau and Quang Ninh. The aim of these attacks was to draw in the regular Vietnamese Army formations and inflict heavy attrition on them through classical "meat-grinder" operations. There were fierce attacks and counterattacks. In Lang Son the Chinese launched 17 counterattacks to regain one objective.

By late last week of February, the Vietnamese had still not committed any of their regular divisions which were being held back for the defence of Hanoi. They had also not pulled out any of their 150,000 troops in Cambodia. In the provincial capital the Vietnamese adopted their favourite tactic: they withdrew from the towns into the adjoining hills. As the Chinese formations surged in they were engaged from all sides from the surrounding hills and quite severely mauled. At the same time, due to the crude tactics and strategy of the PLA command, PLA units also suffered extensive casualties themselves. The combination of high casualties, a badly organized command, harsh Vietnamese resistance and the risk of the Soviets entering the conflict stopped the Chinese from going any farther.^{[\[citation needed\]](#)}

On March 6, China declared that the gate to Hanoi was open and that their punitive mission had been achieved. On the way [back to the Chinese border](#), the PLA destroyed all local infrastructure and housing and looted all useful equipment and resources (including livestock), which were mainly donated by China

to support Vietnam's economy prior to the war, severely weakening the economy of Vietnam's northernmost provinces.^[5] The PLA crossed the border back into China on March 16. Both sides declared victory with China claiming to have crushed the Vietnamese resistance and Vietnam claiming that China had fought mostly against border militias.

Aftermath^[edit]

The aftermath of the war had different effects. China and Vietnam each lost thousands of troops, and China lost 3,446 million yuan in overhead, which delayed completion of their 1979–80 economic plan.^[30] To reduce Vietnam's military capability against China, the Chinese implemented a "[scorched-earth policy](#)" while returning to China, causing extensive damage to the Vietnamese countryside and infrastructure.^[31] Although Vietnam [continued to occupy Cambodia](#), China successfully mobilized international opposition to the occupation, rallying such leaders as Cambodia's deposed king [Norodom Sihanouk](#), Cambodian anticommunist leader [Son Sann](#), and high-ranking members of the Khmer Rouge to deny the pro-Vietnam regime in Cambodia diplomatic recognition beyond the [Soviet bloc](#). China improved relations with [ASEAN](#) by promising protection to [Thailand](#) and [Singapore](#) against "Vietnamese aggression". In contrast, Vietnam's decreasing prestige in the region led it to be more [dependent on the Soviet Union](#), to which it leased a naval base at [Cam Ranh Bay](#).^[32]

Chinese casualties^[edit]

The number of casualties during the war is disputed. Vietnamese source claimed the PLA had suffered 62,500 total casualties; while Chinese democracy activist Wei Jingsheng told western media in 1980 that the Chinese troops had suffered 9,000 deaths and about 10,000 wounded during the war. New Chinese sources indicated that China only suffered 6,954 lost.^[33]

Vietnamese casualties^[edit]

Like their counterparts in the Chinese government, the Vietnamese government has never announced any information on its actual military casualties. China estimated Vietnamese side had 42,000 soldiers killed and 70,000 militias also killed by the Chinese PLA.^[34] The Nhan Dan newspaper^[35] the Central Organ of the Communist Party of Vietnam claimed that Vietnam suffered more than 10,000 civilian deaths during the Chinese invasion^[35] and earlier on May 17, 1979, reported statistics on heavy losses of industry and agriculture properties.^[35]

Other skirmishes^[edit]

Border skirmishes [continued throughout the 1980s](#), including a significant [skirmish in April 1984](#). Armed conflict only ended in 1989 after the Vietnamese agreed to fully withdraw from Cambodia. This conflict also saw the first use of the [Type 81 assault rifle](#) by the Chinese and a naval battle over the [Spratly Islands](#) in 1988 known as the [Johnson South Reef Skirmish](#). In 1999 after many years of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation remained secret.^[36]

There was an adjustment of the land border, resulting in Vietnam giving China part of its land which were lost during the battle, including the [Ai Nam Quan Gate](#) which served as the traditional border marker and entry point between Vietnam and China, which caused widespread frustration within Vietnam. Vietnam's official news service reported the implementation of the new border around August 2001. Again in January 2009 the border demarcation with markers was officially completed, signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Dung on the Vietnamese side and his Chinese counterpart, Wu Dawei, on the Chinese side.^[37] Both the [Paracel](#) (Hoàng Sa: Vietnamese) (Xīshā: Chinese) and [Spratly](#) (Trường Sa: Vietnamese) (Nansha:

Chinese) islands remain a point of contention.^[38]

During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in strained relations between China and the pro-Soviet Afghan Communist regime. China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule. When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported the Vietnamese during the Sino-Vietnamese War and blamed China for supporting Afghan anti-communist militants. China responded to the [Soviet invasion of Afghanistan](#) by supporting the Afghan Mujahideen and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attack.^[39]

In response to the Soviet threat level, the Chinese [People's Liberation Army](#) trained and supported the Afghan [Mujahideen](#) during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. China moved its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself. Hundreds of millions worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese. Chinese military advisors and army troops were present with the Mujahideen during training.^[40]

The **Sino-Vietnamese War** ([Vietnamese](#): Chiến tranh biên giới Việt-Trung; [simplified Chinese](#): 中越战争; [traditional Chinese](#): 中越戰爭; [pinyin](#): zhōng-yuè zhànzhēng), also known as the **Third Indochina War**, was a brief border war fought between the [People's Republic of China](#) and the [Socialist Republic of Vietnam](#) in early 1979. China launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's [invasion and occupation of Cambodia](#) in 1978 (which ended the reign of the Chinese-backed [Khmer Rouge](#)).^[7] Chinese Vice-premier [Deng Xiaoping](#) saw this as a Soviet attempt "to extend its evil tentacles to Southeast Asia and...carry out expansion there.", reflecting the long-standing [Sino-Soviet split](#).^[8] As the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger notes: "Whatever the shortcomings of its execution, the Chinese campaign reflected a serious, long-term strategic analysis."^[9]

The Chinese entered northern Vietnam and captured some of the bordering cities. On March 6, 1979, China declared that the gate to [Hanoi](#) was open and that their punitive mission had been achieved. Chinese forces retreated back across the Vietnamese border, into China. Both China and Vietnam claimed victory in the last of the [Indochina Wars](#) of the 20th century; as Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia until 1989 it can be said that China failed to achieve the goal of dissuading Vietnam from involvement in Cambodia. However, Moscow surely realized that any attempt at expanding its foothold in Southeast Asia would have involved risk of military confrontation with China. Following the [dissolution of the Soviet Union](#), the Sino-Vietnamese border was finalized.




February 17,
1979 – March
16, 1979
(3
weeks and 6
days)

Location China–Vietnam
border

Result Both sides claim
victory

- Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam
- Continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia
- [Continued border clashes between China and Vietnam until 1990](#)

Territorial changes Little territorial changes for either side; effectively [uti possidetis](#)



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Book Review: Jammu and Kashmir Politics of Identity and Separatism

by Rekha Chowdhary, (2016)

Jammu and Kashmir is unstable at least for last twenty-eight years. The recent elimination of Burhan Wani revived the violence and increased discontent in the valley. The security forces and the policemen of the state of Kashmir have borne the brunt of public agitations. Kashmiri youths hurling stones at military convoys and armed personnel especially after Friday sermons is common. A Kashmiri Muslim police officer, DSP Ayub Pandith was recently killed on the suspicion of being a Kashmiri Hindu agent of the state; Kashmir Pundits continue to raise voice against islamization in the valley. The state of India too has changed its stance towards Kashmir. The old cordon and search operations are now back in use. Over 92 militants have been eliminated in the first six months of 2017 itself. Militancy is crumbling once again after one year of Burhan Wani's death. Kashmir and news emanating from Kashmir have already captured wide attention. Kashmir is also a topic of clashing nationalisms.

We Indians, often attach a great deal of importance to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Many of the esteemed thinkers, historians and scholars in India have espoused the idea that India's identity as a secular state depends on Kashmir being part of India. For Pakistan on the other hand Kashmir is an unresolved issue from the time of partition. Pakistan wants to settle it once and for all but not in the way that UN has prescribed. On the other hand there is considerably strong sentiment supporting separation of Kashmir which exists simultaneously with the democratic electoral process in Jammu and Kashmir. In such conditions a clear understanding of problem in Kashmir is of utmost importance.

The book, 'Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and Separatism' authored by Rekha Chowdhary, (2016) gives us a good insight into the history of Kashmir. It comprises of three main themes or parts; 'Conflict in Kashmir: background factors', 'Militancy and Politics of Separatism' and 'Locating conflicts in Kashmir within the larger context of Jammu and Kashmir.' Under these three themes she covers a great detail.

In the first part of her book she has mainly elaborated the process of identity formation among Kashmiris and various twists and turns this process took. The changing nature of Kashmiri identity and various movements and political parties which represented this identity from time to time are discussed with impeccable factual correctness. Flawlessness as far as the facts are concerned is a constant feature of this book as the facts are put forth just cold and simple with little ideological underpinnings.

The book gives academic justice to all in Kashmir and their respective ideologies. Substantial information is provided about Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues in the National Conference, Nehru and Congress and also of people who were on the other side of the spectrum, people like Syamaprasad Mukherjee. Their thoughts and acts have influenced the politics of not just Jammu and Kashmir but also of India as a union. In a more recent history separatists who later organized themselves under Hurriyat Conference and its numerous components acquired the center-stage. As far as democratic politics is concerned in the late 1990s,

dealing with a subject as delicate and complex as 'Militancy and Separatism' the author has made a great effort of covering the most aspects of Kashmiri militancy. She studies an event, theme or development from various angles. Just to give an example, the militancy in Kashmir has been described with great caution paying attention to the most important events and causes that led to emergence of it. She explains under what circumstances and from which groups did it derive its support, what complexities and what kind of internal rivalry various militant groups had. The book exposes criminalization under the garb of militancy and the violence and fear perpetrated by them because of which a common liberal Kashmiri has suffered. The book also talks about Islamic radicalization and a part of militancy in Kashmir going hand in hand through her details of widespread attacks on liberal Muslims and violence against Hindus.

In the interim period, when the mass support for the militancy had drastically gone down, there was a feminist angle to women withdrawing their support to at least foreign militancy which has been articulated in this book. The otherwise blur lines of distinction between different militant groups get even obscure in the minds of Indians who are not aware of ground realities and political aspirations. It is really to the credit of the author that the book gives us a nuanced view of ideological inclinations and objectives of militant and mujahedeen groups.

The third and last part of the book sheds light on the internal social and sub-regional aspects of the state. It summarily touches the topics such as the political divide between Jammu and Kashmir, demands for regional autonomy. It also takes cognizance of issues of divided families, refugees from PoK and West Pakistan. An entire piece of the third chapter is dedicated to the peace process and contemporary politics in Kashmir.

The only flip side of the book is that it rarely reflects the opinion of the author in case of many seemingly controversial issues. All that a reader can do is to deduce it on the basis of choices that the author has made with regard to the words and topics.

The logic of not assuring autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and treating it at par with other states in the union did have some substance to it when the Maharaja of Kashmir approached India for military support. But once the autonomy has been accorded it becomes India's responsibility to protect it so long as the people of Kashmir get a chance to choose their political destiny. Rather it was a promise that India made to Kashmiris, that it will conduct a plebiscite. For any mature democracy keeping a promise that it has made to its people is of primary importance. It's true that unless Pakistan withdraws from the occupied territory there cannot be plebiscite. But if such a day comes, India shall not shy away from facing it. To the Indian conscience one fact should matter, that is, 'a plebiscite is due'. We should really think twice about the assumption, that Kashmiris are participating in India's electoral processes which tantamounts to their legitimacy to the state.

The author provides a deep insight into the Center-State relations, India's efforts to bring uniformity in its federal structure. 'Asymmetric relationship' of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with union of India and the state's divided existence between India and Pakistan (and China) have been two tough realities that Indians are yet to make peace with. Democratic and electoral processes in Kashmir are ridden with malpractices. They run the risk of having scarce legitimacy. Kashmir, ever since it became a part of India has rarely seen free and fare elections. India being the largest democracy under the sun, has failed to install and strengthen the democratic institutions in the state. The problem in Kashmir has multiple facets. Unless and until the Indian state takes all of them into

On the other hand the rest of India and their representatives in Delhi have definitely failed to understand the concerns of a normal Kashmiris and refraining them from taking up the guns. Having said so, the wave of radical Islam is very much visible in Kashmir. It certainly poses a threat to India. Indian government will have to come up with a formal policy to deal with the Kashmir issue. Steps must be taken to contain violence of any kind. The government has to strengthen the democratic institutions. It must strengthen the state government by giving some autonomy if not all that they have demanded. It will have a pacifying effect and will lead to reduction of space of separatist politics.

India has tried its hand in implementing militaristic measures but if the government has to win hearts and minds of people then they will have to find out political solutions to the problems in Kashmir. Beginning with negotiations with various groups would be a good idea in that direction.



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