Playbook of Mao – How political insecurity drives external aggression and internal revolution

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New Decree

Xi Jinping recently announced a ‘clean plate’ campaign. Such announcements by China’s supreme leader exhibit the severity of the issue. Dictum like ‘war on food waste’ reminds many Chinese people of a period of rationing and the cultural revolution of Mao Zedong1. In China, the term ‘food security’ has different connotations and reminds the earlier generations about the horror that Chinese society went through in Mao’s era. Xi Jinping has been the most powerful leader of China after Mao2. Xi Jinping’s actions and personality cult also strongly resonate with Mao. Many parallels have been drawn, and comparisons have been made about two leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)3. As a result, Mao’s actions have lessons for understanding today’s political and social situation in China and its impact outside.

Mao and Great Leap Forward – From Food Crisis to Global Pandemic

In 1958, the People’s Republic of China, under Mao’s leadership, introduced a second five-year plan. That plan is widely known as ‘the great leap forward. However, the program achieved precisely the opposite of that. The agrarian society of China tried to transform itself into a soviet style state-driven industrial economy. The great leap forward began in 1958. It ended in 1961 instead of 1963 due to the disaster it created.

Mao wanted to achieve industrial modernization levels of the United Kingdom within 15 years with China’s large population4. Agrarian society suddenly became an industrial labour force to produce steel. Human resource from agriculture, hospitals and even schools was diverted to produce iron. People started makeshift furnaces at home to make steel (pig iron) as promoted by the party. However, low quality steel produced at home had very little economic value. The campaign resulted in the production of large-scale low-quality steel in the first year. However, food production declined. There was not enough workforce to collect the harvest in many regions as a large labour force was diverted from agriculture to steel production.

Under great leap forward, Mao introduced another campaign called the four pest campaign. The campaign aimed to eradicate mosquitoes, rodents, flies, and sparrows. On May 05, 1958, CPC’s mouthpiece People’s Daily wrote that “No warrior shall be withdrawn until the battle is won, all must join battle ardently and courageously; we must persevere with the doggedness of revolutionaries.” Mao added revolutionary fervour and mobilized people along with children to wage war and eliminate the enemy of the people – the four pests. Contests were held, and people were rewarded for collecting the largest number of rats or dead flies and mosquitoes or dead sparrows. Soon sparrows were extinct species in China. Locust storms and bugs destroyed crops as predator sparrows went extinct. The campaign resulted in severe ecological imbalance. These events led to China’s great famine. Around 4.5 crore people died from starvation and disease. Thousands of cases of cannibalism were reported in this period of the great leap forward5. The economic distress and food shortage continued in Mao’s era of the great leap forward and cultural revolution.

The mindset of the leadership at the time of crisisMao and Great Leap Forward – From Food Crisis to Global PandemicThe mindset of the leadership at the time of crisis

As the crisis grew, food grains were diverted from rural areas to cities to feed the urban class and to show normalcy to the outer world.

The disastrous consequences of the great leap forward were becoming evident by 1959. However, Mao did not halt the campaign so as not to dampen the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. Ecologists and party members who tried to raise alarm were targeted as right-wing traitors and enemies of the people’s revolution. People within the party, who criticized the great leap forward, were dismissed from official positions. China’s defence minister Peng Dehauai was purged from his post after he criticized Mao’s policies at the Lushan Conference. After 60 years, the situation did not change much for doctors who tried to raise alarm for Coronavirus6.

The state continued to project a rosy picture. Local-level officers achieved harvest targets in account books to keep top party leadership happy. Knowing China’s internal situation, Japan offered a discrete shipment of food grain. However, Mao declined any foreign help to show that everything is normal.

Death and devastation did not move the leadership of the party. In a secret meeting in Shanghai in 1959, Mao asked for the procurement of one-third of all grain to feed the cities and export. Mao said in the meeting “If you don’t go above a third, people won’t rebel. When there is not enough to eat, people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill.”

Mao was always willing to sacrifice his people like cannon fodder to achieve his political goals. In 1954, Mao told Prime Minister Nehru in a meeting that China has many people and they can not be bombed out of existence by nuclear weapons. So the death of one or two crore people is nothing to be afraid of. Three years later, in his speech in Moscow, Mao said that he was willing to lose 30 crore people – half of China’s population. Mao’s argument was that losing fifty per cent population would not mean much as China can produce more people.7

For two decades, China reeled under acute food shortage and severe economic distress. It was only in 1979 that per capita grain production surpassed pre-1958 levels.8

In 1978 China wanted to improve the rural economy and food production. As a part of agrarian reforms, the Chinese government promoted the collection and breeding of wildlife such as bats, snakes, rats for consumption. This wildlife farming has grown into a $20 billion industry with 20,000 wild animal breeding farms.9

The SARs outbreak was traced back to wildlife farming practices. China shut down its wet markets during the SARs outbreak. Considering its economic value ban was lifted soon. Again, the origin of COVID-19 is traced back to the Wuhan Wet market. Wildlife farming in China has become a source of diseases. After Corona Crisis, these operations and shops were banned once again. How long that ban will continue considering the appetite for such items is a question.

Corona Virus to Food Crisis

The problem does not end with Coronavirus, a ban on wet markets and wildlife farms. Xi Jinping recently urged people to stop wasting food and maintain a sense of crisis over food security.10 The orders from the top Chinese leadership imply that China could be facing an urgent food crisis. Xi Jinping recently inspected farms for the harvest and asked local officers to make food security a priority. In February, the Ministry of Commerce spokesperson admitted that China’s agriculture sector would face severe challenges due to the coronavirus crisis.

A leaked official notification from Linxia subdivision issued on March 28 has asked officials to increase awareness about food shortage and ensure each family maintains food storage for 3-6 months.

Recent incidents of fire at various grain reserves suggest the possibility of internal sabotage to avoid inspection due to the quality and volume of stocked grains.11

In a recent meeting, Chinese Vice Premier Hu Chunhua told provincial governors that local governments must assume the primary responsibility for ensuring food security in their regions.12

Quality and volume of existing stockpile of foodgrain available with Sinograin Corporation came under scrutiny after a video of dust filled mouldy grain stored at its facility went viral on Chinese social media.13 Sinograin is the largest state enterprise for grain storage. Later, Sinograin banned camera devices at its storage facilities.14 Following Mao’s playbook, state-run media is trying to portray the image of a bumper harvest after such leaks.

Corona Virus to Food Crisis

Six main grain production regions – Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Jiangsu, have been hit hard with a flood. Flood water has submerged large areas of agricultural yields. Prolong flooding has affected all three annual rice harvests.

According to the Lancet report, recent floods have affected 27 provinces across central and southern China in July 2020. The average precipitation in areas along the Yangtze River has reached the highest level since 1961. As of August 13, at least 219 people had been killed, 6.3 crores people have been affected by floods. Flooding has damaged 50 lack hectares of arable land.15

Despite massive damage, Xi Jinping did not visit flood-affected areas until recently.16 On August 18, Xi Jinping visited Anhui region for inspection. After the 1950 Huai River flood, Mao issued an order that ‘The Huai River Must Be Harnessed‘.17 The river flows through Anhui. Xi Jinping’s visit to the same region recently is politically symbolic and coincide with Mao.

Recently expelled communist party member Cai Xia has said that Xi Jinping’s unchecked power has made China the enemy of the world. Cai Xia was a teacher at the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party. She said that “Under Xi Jinping , the Chinese Communist Party is not a force for progress for China. In fact, it is an obstacle to China’s progress.”18

She further said “It is a vicious cycle. After a wrong decision is made, the result is not good. But those below are too afraid to tell Xi Jinping and wrong decisions continue to be made until the situation is out of control. In this vicious cycle, there is no way to stop the country from sliding towards disaster.” These words resonate with Mao’s time when local level officials cooked books to keep top leadership happy.19

Like Mao’s era, officials and people remain silent to avoid persecution under the name of corruption. China has punished 10 lakh people under Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive. Stick or carrot serves leadership well, but governance and people suffer. Mao-era style ‘self-criticism and towing the leadership line is once again back in practice. Tiktok founder criticised himself in a public letter for not serving core leadership.20

Furthermore, the pragmatic economic policies of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang have been openly criticised for making room for Xi’s China dream. On August 24, the Chinese Premier, who is in charge of the economy, was excluded from a crucial meeting to discuss the future of the Chinese economy.21

Understanding playbook of Mao for power

Korean War

Mao seized power from KMT in 1949. China’s economic situation was not conducive for political stability.22 The Korean war broke out in 1950 between North Korea and South Korea and lasted until 1953. Mao diverted people’s attention behind another nationalistic and revolutionary cause in the Korean peninsula. People marched on the street against capitalist America. Over the next six months, more than seven lakh people were branded counter-revolutionaries and suspected of KMT sympathisers. All these people were executed or forced to commit suicide. China’s involvement in the Korean war ensured people’s support and provided Mao with time to consolidate grip on power.

How Mao turned the table on famine with 1962 war?

After a disastrous great leap forward, support for Mao within the Chinese Communist Party was at its lowest. At the Chinese Communist Party’s 7000 cadre conference (January 1962), Liu Shaoqi (Chairman of the People’s Republic of China) described the famine as a human-made disaster. As criticism grew, Mao was forced to accept responsibility against his wish and self-criticized himself. Due to disagreement among party members on various policies, the conference went on for a month. Mao regained control of power after the 1962 war and purged his opponents. After a disastrous great leap forward, the 1962 war turned the table for Mao. Mao’s strategy of limited hit and run conflict with India at the time of the Cuban missile crisis provided him with much-needed leverage to regain a position of power in the party.

After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev began the de-Stalinization of the USSR. Krushchev set out to reverse many of Stalin’s policies and dismantle the personality cult that had formed around him. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping accused Mao of behaving like old Stalin. He realized that there was not enough time to replicate something like the ‘Great Wall’ and become ‘Qin Shi Huangdi23, the sovereign emperor of modern-day China.

Knowing his legacy will not last long, Mao launched his last attack – the cultural revolution. Youth organized into radical Red Guards. Driven by Mao Zedong thought, Red Guards destroyed Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas – ‘the four olds to save Mao’s legacy’.24

‘Great Helmsman’ Xi is the Chairman for life like Mao

In 2018, Xi’s thoughts were incorporated in the preamble of China’s Constitution. These 14 thoughts or policy points include total control of the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership over people and the reunification of China. Xi Jinping also removed the term limit for the Presidential post. Xi has recently proposed planning till 2035, making his intentions clear to stay in power till the age of 82. Mao died at the age of 82. Like Mao, Xi Jinping may also go for Chairman’s position in the party.

New Era of Chairman Xi Jinping that reflects New Era of Chairman Mao

Xi Jinping’s belt and road initiative is a modern-day rival of the great wall built by the first emperor of China. Like Qin Shi Huangdi, Xi Jinping intends to unify China with Hong Kong and Taiwan as mentioned in his thoughts. With the implantation of the National Security law, Xi Jinping has gained indirect political control over Hong Kong – a step towards reunification. Taiwan will be next. The dream of becoming Qin Shi Huangdi has alluded to many including Mao and Xi Jinping is no exception.

Way ahead

Xi Jinping’s current aggression tactics are useful to test the resolve of other countries to fight back. There is a greater possibility that China’s aggression will culminate in a limited conflict to make a point that China is a superpower. The conflict point/s can be

  1. 1. Taiwan Strait
  2. 2. India
  3. 3. Vietnam
  4. 4. Japan’s maritime zones

The upcoming meeting of the fifth plenary of the 19th Central Committee in October will be crucial considering the intraparty situation. Xi Jinping might go for an offensive at the time of the US Presidential elections to achieve victory at home. Xi will use pages from Chairman Mao’s playbook to wield power. A little success in power projection can help him drive home the point and secure his position as the Chairman till 2035 or more.

With the imposition of Hong Kong’s new national security law, Xi Jinping has already made his intentions and plan clear. Like Mao, Xi Jinping will use Chinese nationalism directed outward and communist revolution targeted inward. The world is staring at conflicts in Indo-Pacific and perhaps another cultural revolution in China.

With growing challenges and political insecurity; Xi Jinping will try to find inspiration in Mao’s actions. These actions will take China back on Mao’s path. A path that every Chinese leader after Mao has resisted.

References

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  2. 2. Gokhale, V. (2020, July 29). President Xi’s long game: World is dealing with a leader who believes he will shape a Chinese Century. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/ china-president-xi-jinping-coronavirus-pandemic-6528166/

  3. 3. Bandow, D. (2020, May 26). Xi Jinping Wants to Become the New Mao. The American Spectator. https://spectator.org/xi-jinping-wants-to-become-the-new-mao-china/

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  5. 5. Yang, J., Friedman, E., Guo, J., & Mosher, S. (2012). Tombstone: The great Chinese famine, 1958-1962. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

  6. 6. Liu, T. W. (2020, July 7). China Is Crushing Coronavirus Whistleblowers Again. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/07/china-virus-censorship-death/

  7. 7. Hung-Chao, L. Z. T. B. T., & with the editorial assistance of Anne Thurston. (1994). The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician Dr. Li Zhisui. Random House.

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  9. 9. Evans, S. (2020, March 17). Coronavirus has finally made us recognise the illegal wildlife trade is a public health issue. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-has-finally-made-us-recognise-the-illegal-wildlife-trade-is-a-public-health-issue-133673

  10. 10. Xi’s Speech Raises Question of China Food Shortage. (2020, August 14). NTD. https://www.ntd.com/xis-speech-raises-question-of-china-food-shortage_495518.html

  11. 11. Grain-Reserve Fires in China Fuel Speculation That Facilities Are Skirting State Inspections. (2018, October 9). Www.Theepochtimes.Com. https://www.theepochtimes.com/grain-reserve-fires-in-china-fuel-speculation-that-facilities-are-skirting-state-inspections_2637372.html

  12. 12. 胡春华强调 不折不扣落实好粮食安全省长责任制-新华网. (n.d.). 新华网_让新闻离你更近. https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-07/27/c_1126291902.htm

  13. 13. NTD News. (2020, July 14). Chinese social media alleges a granary of a major state-run grain stockpiler was full of moldy, poor-quality corn. [Video]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/news_ntd/status/1283074016593555456

  14. 14. Corn shortage in China? Photo ban on granaries fuels speculation. (2020, August 4). WION. https://www.wionews.com/world/corn-shortage-in-china-photo-ban-on-granaries-fuels-speculation-318041

  15. 15. Guo Y, Wu Y, Wen B, et al. Floods in China, COVID-19, and climate change. Lancet Planet Health 2020; published online Aug 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(20)30203-5.

  16. 16. Nakazawa, K. (2020, August 26). China portrays “Xi the Great,” tamer of floods. Nikkei Asian Review. https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-portrays-Xi-the-Great-tamer-of-floods

  17. 17. Watkins, T. (n.d.). Huai River System in China. San José State University Economics Department. https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/huairiver.htm

  18. 18. Kuo, L. (2020, August 18). China’s Xi Jinping facing widespread opposition in his own party, insider claims. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/china-xi-jinping-facing-widespread-opposition-in-his-own-party-claims-insider

  19. 19. 音频:中央党校蔡霞教授在红色后代秘密会议上的发言:必须换习、否则亡党!;中共已成政治僵尸(6/3). (2020, June 3). [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEBHVsHlPeI

  20. 20. Dhok, G. (2020, August 25). Why Countries Are Banning Chinese Apps? Forum for Integrated National Security. https://finsindia.org/why-countries-are-banning-chinese-apps/

  21. 21. Staff, R. (2020, August 25). 习近平九人“经济国师”首曝光 名单显示经济理念趋保守. Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/gf-08252020083055.html

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  23. 23. Qin Shi Huangdi was the first emperor and founder of the Qin Dynasty (221-210 BCE). Shi Huangdi literally means First Emperor.

  24. 24. Dikötter, F. (2017). The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962―1976 (Reprint ed.). Bloomsbury Press.
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