India, China are two of the world’s oldest civilizations and have coexisted in peace for millennia. Trade relations via the silk route acted as an economic link. However, since the 1950s, India- China relations have been characterized by border disputes resulting in three military conflicts-1962, 1967 and 1987. While the border disputes remain unresolved, both countries have signed the Sino- Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords in the 1990s and focused on Strategic partnerships from the beginning of the 21st century.
This paper attempts to chronicle the Sino- Indian relations into the following parts:-
Part I – Historical Background leading to 1962 border war;
Part II—Stand-off Relationship of three decades-Post 1963;
Part III- Confrontation to Cooperation leading to strategic Partnership in 21st Century;
Part IV- Future- Problems and Prospects;
Part I- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is axiomatic that all international disputes which end in war have a historical background. Sino-Indian relationship over Tibet is no exception. On 7 Oct 1950, when the Chinese Army ( Peoples Liberation Army- PLA) entered Tibet despite its focus on the Korean war, India was completely surprised. Tibetans appealed for help. We not only refused but advised them to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Chinese occupation of Tibet, which the British had kept as a buffer zone for over 70 years, had altered the geopolitical balance and posed a strategic threat to the Indian Sub Continent. Sardar Patel, in his prophetic letter of 07 Nov 50, a month before his death, wanted a showdown and tough line with China. He had recommended short and long term defence preparedness against the Chinese threats. Prof N G Ranga and DrShyam Prasad Mookerjee had expressed similar misgivings. Nehru not only ignored these warnings but justified his idealistic morality in international relations-“What right India has to keep a part of its Army in Tibet? Whether Tibet is independent or part of China? How does it matter?” We even opposed discussions of Tibet’s appeal in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 23 Nov 50 assuring UNGA that Beijing would peacefully resolve Tibetan’s concerns. This historical blunder, similar to the one on Kashmir, would continue to haunt India’s Security Planners for generations to come!!! Sardar Patel’s assessment and predictions of China deserve a place in every analysis of Sino-Indian relations even today.
Chronology of Events leading to 1962 War
1. 09 Sept 1951. Lhasa was “peacefully” occupied.
2. 1951 -1954. China focused on development of infrastructure- strategic road- network, airfields and communication centers and linking up with Sinkiang.
3. On 24 Apr 1954 India and China signed the famous PanchSheel Agreement to promote trade, commerce and friendly relations between Beijing and Delhi .In the euphoria of PanchSheel agreement, Chou misled Nehru about interpretation of India- China borders along Himalayan range and assured him of amicable settlement at a mutually convenient time. Alas, Nehru believed Chou.
4. Nehru strongly felt that India’s security demanded friendship with China. In early 1950s China responded eagerly as it wanted a bridge (Nehru) to the non- communist world. India unilaterally withdrew its military garrisons from Yatung, Gyantse and Lhasa and handed over postal and communication centers along with equipment to Chinese as a goodwill gesture.
5. 1954—1959 : After containing the American might in Korean war, China shifted its focus on Tibet and Sinkiang along it western borders and Indo –China along southern borders, while India was pleading for China’s admission into UNGA in 1956-57, Chinese cartographic aggression revealed in 1957 that large tracts of Aksai-Chin and N.E.F.A (referred as Southern Tibet by China) as Chinese territory. During 1957-58 Chinese patrols continued probing intrusions into Aksai-Chin and N.E.F.A sectors testing India’s response. In contrast, in the blind faith of Panch-Sheel spirit, we allowed the Chinese Military delegation to visit our entire Defense Establishments and gauge our state of training, equipment and preparedness. On 14 Dec 1958, Nehru drew Chou’s attention to wrong delineation of the Sino- Indian borders in an official Chinese journal.
6. 1959—1962 : On 23 Jan 1959, China officially repudiated the “traditional” delimited boundary which had been well recognized by both countries for centuries. Going back on all their assurances and violating the Agreement of 1954, Chou snubbed Nehru contending that:
• Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delineated,
• Mc Mohan line had never been recognized by China.
• The boundaries drawn on Chinese maps were consistent with those on earlier maps.
Thus China officially claimed 38000 sqkms in Aksai Chin and 90000 sqkms in N.E.F.A. as their territory. 31 Mar 1959- Dalai Lama was given political asylum with a rider that he should not indulge in political activity on Indian Territory. By 1960, India and China had drifted apart towards a point of no return. During Apr 1960, Chou (his last visit before 1962 flare-up) appeared willing to recognize the MacMohan line as a border in the Eastern region, provided India accepts Chinese presence in Aksai Chin. Nehru appeared agreeable to this deal, but the Indian Parliament, public opinion and press were so vociferous against Nehru’s passivity towards China that it blocked this deal. Throughout 1960-61, Chinese intrusions across the borders in Eastern and Western Sectors continued to assert claims. The Indian response was passive protest notes and setting up a thin line of defence posts (as part of much-publicized Forward policy) inadequately manned and poorly equipped. Professional military advice of Lt Gens Thorat and Varma on “Defense lines in-depth” was ignored by Menon- Lt Gen Kaul duo. When Army Chief Gen Thimmayya cautioned the Government in Jan 1961 against the possibility of Chinese attacks across the Himalayas, he was ticked off by Nehru as “rubbish”. China had decided to teach India a lesson on border issue as “Might is Right”. Thangla ridge at the tri-junction of India- Tibet- Bhutan was selected for occupation, build up and trap Indian troops in Namka-Chu valley where they would subsequently deploy to evict intruding Chinese in 1962.
1962- Border War
Notwithstanding the gathering clouds of conflict over Himalayan borders, Defense Minister Menon turned deaf ears to the Army’s repeated requests for modernization and up-gradation of forces and making up existing shortages. Menon continued to flaunt Marshal Chen Yi’s assurance of 1960 that “China would not attack India on border issue”. Alas, Nehru supported Menon and ignored Army Generals professional advice. Based on massive build-up across Himalayan borders, Army Commanders Gens Sen and Varma warned the GOI “that if Chinese attack massively, Indian Army will be annihilated in Ladakh and N.E.F.A. The forces dispositions on the ground did not support Nehru- Menon’s assumptions and assessment of the tactical situation. By September 1962, the Chinese had massed well equipped and fully acclimatized four Divisions (75-80000 troops) opposite N.E.F.A. and two Divisions (35-40000 troops) opposite Ladakh as against 15000 and 7000 ill-equipped forces by India. On 04 Oct 62, Menon appointed Lt Gen BM Kaul as Corps Commander of a newly raised Corps in Tezpur (Assam). Lt Gen Kaul, after visiting the border areas from 05 – 10 Oct 62, reported to Nehru and Menon on 11 Oct 62 that Army was not in a position to evict the Chinese from Thagla and other intruded areas. Nehru agreed to postpone “Op Eviction” to the summer of 1963. Stunning the Armed forces and the Nation, Nehru on 16 Oct 62, on his way to Colombo, declared in Madras airport that “He had ordered the Army to throw out the Chinese from Thagla ridge”. The die was cast, the Chinese, who were preparing for a showdown since 1960-61, decided to teach India a lesson on border issues; international conflicts and relations.
On the morning of 20 Oct, 62 India woke up to massive assaults by Chinese across Eastern and Ladakh sectors against thinly deployed Indian forces. In the following 26 days of the war, China had inflicted crushing defeats on Indian forces in both the Sectors and humiliated India at all levels. There were local battles in some areas like Bumla (Tawang), Walong (Lohit) in NEFA and Rezang La and Chusul in Ladakh, where our troops fought heroically and inflicted heavy losses on Chinese. By 17 Nov 62, the Chinese had driven the Indian forces from Se La and Bomdila to the plains of Assam. On 18 Nov 62 Nehru’s anguish and helpless words in the Parliament-“my heart goes to the people of Assam” conveyed to a demoralized nation “the state of paralyzed leadership” at the helm of affairs, (Compare this to Churchill’s leadership in World war II-In Sept 1940, during the Battle of Britain, “we shall fight in the skies, fight on beaches and fight on high seas till the scourge of Nazism is destroyed in Germany”). Having achieved all their strategic, political and military objectives by 19 Nov 62, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire on 20 Nov 62 and withdrew all their forces on their side of the borders by end of Dec 62.
Postmortem of 1962 Debacle and Consequences
Politically, a shocked nation sacked Menon and castigated Nehru for his blunders of “Hindi- ChiniBhaiBhai”. He remained a paralyzed PM for the next 18 months. Militarily India’s gains were: Gen Henderson Brook’s report on causes of the military debacle
• Expansion and modernization of Armed Forces was undertaken in a professional manner;
• While we lost control of Aksai Chin forever, we regained control of NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) in full measure. Hence the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern sector got stabilized by 1980s;
• Indian Army was restructured, modernized and improved its combat capabilities in the next months. Consequently it could thwart Pakistan’s “Operation Grand Slam” in 1965;
• Effectively challenge Chinese provocation in Sikkim in 1967;
• Liberate Bangladesh in 1971 despite threats of retaliation from China and USA;
Who were the guilty men of 1962 (Political, Military and Diplomatic)? These questions have been asked again and again and political, military, diplomatic and media experts have answered partially. Even after six decades, GOI refuses to declassify “Gen Henderson Brooks Report” and expose those guilty men, who betrayed India.
Part II- STAND –OFF RELATIONS OF TWO DECADES; 1963 ONWARDS
After achieving their political and military objectives against India in 1962, China concentrated on strategic encirclement of India in South Asia, supporting Vietnam against the USA in Southeast Asia and four modernization programmes internally. Some of the major events which have implications for Sino- Indian relations are as follows.
China- Pakistan Strategic Cooperation since 1963
Beginning with the border settlement of 03 Mar 1963, in which Pak ceded 5200 sqkms of Pak Occupied Kashmir (POK) territory to China, the latter has emerged as Pakistan’s most trusted military ally because of their mutually shared complementarities against India. By deepening their cooperation in military, technology, nuclear and economic fields, China and Pak have, in South Asia, emerged as “Strategic Allies”. By following Chanakya’s principles in international relations, “Your immediate adversary’s adversary is your ally”, China and Pak have jointly evolved strategy of “contain/destabilize India” since the mid-1970s. During 2010, China has inked various deals worth US$ 30 Billion to support and sustain Pak. However, having crushed Islamic militants in Sinkiang, China has cautioned Pak in Aug 2011, about its support to Islamic jihadi groups. 1964- China enters Nuclear Club: By testing its nuclear devices in Oct 1964 and subsequent nuclear weaponisation programmes, China has joined the exclusive club of Group of five Nuclear Powers. It is actively assisting Pakistan’s nuclear programmes. Sept-Oct 1967: Chinese opened fire on our troops in Nathu La on 11 Sep and Cho La on 01 Oct 67. Indian troops retaliated on both occasions and inflicted heavy casualties on them. This area has remained peaceful since then. 1967- Naxalbari Armed Uprising: Through their bases in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the Chinese supplied arms to Naxals and Maoists in West Bengal and encouraged armed uprising in Oct 1967. The State Government handled this uprising firmly and effectively. 1971- Indo-Pak War: China supported Pakistan and warned India. Swift liberation of Bangladesh, world opinion and having joined UNGA in Aug 1971, China preferred to remain a silent observer. 1980-81. Indian Army started the development of infrastructure and redeployment of forces along the borders in Arunachal Pradesh. In 1981 Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India for normalizing otherwise embittered relations after the 1962 war. It was decided to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) for resolving border issues through dialogue. During the 1985 JWG meeting, the Chinese proposed “mutual concessions” on the LAC without defining the meaning and disagreeing on the actual alignment of LAC on the ground. 1987- Sumdorong Chu Valley clash Twenty-five years after the Thangla venture, the Chinese crossed the LAC in Sumdorong Chu valley (adjoining Thagla ridge).In response, the Indian Army airlifted a brigade group and deployed “face to face” opposite the intruding Chinese. the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation lasted for weeks, with the Chinese threatening that “it would teach India another lesson”.
Part III- Confrontation to Cooperation
In Dec 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi visited China, the bilateral relations warmed up. Both sides agreed to:
• Fair and reasonable settlement of border issues while seeking mutually acceptable solutions;
• Set up Joint Ministerial Councils for promoting cooperation in economic, scientific and agricultural spheres;
• Continue dialogue on border issues through JWG.
• Deescalate situation in Sumdorong Chu valley and withdrawal of troops to pre 1987 positions;
Decades 1990s and 2000 have witnessed increased cooperation in economic, technology (IT sector), agriculture, diplomatic and military fields for the mutual benefits of both sides. Some major events/ developments are worth noting:
• During Sept 1993, when Narashimh Rao visited China, both sides inked” Sino- Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accord”, to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC;
• Ten meetings of JWG and five meetings of Experts group on border issues have taken place but there is little progress;
• Bilateral trade has increased manifold; Today China is India’s largest trading partner-USD 43 Billion annually;
• During the visit of AtalBihari Vajpayee, China agreed to recognize Sikkim as integral part of India. Consequently trade through Silk route (Nathu La) reopened;
• During 2009 a Chinese news paper article proposed balkanization of India into several small states is in the interest of South Asia; ( China does not have freedom press/media!)
Part IV- FUTURE – PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Problem Areas
• Border agreement on LAC???
• Chinese repeated claims on Arunachal Pradesh
• Development of Tibet into “a Spring Board” for future designs
• Nepal is in the circle of Influence of China?
• Sri Lanka- Chinese have increased military and economic cooperation,
• Kashmir- shifting stands; visa issue??
• Chinese hold over Myanmar; spring board to Bay of Bengal/ Indian Ocean?
Prospects
China and India-the two fastest-growing economies are expected to shape the new world order in the 21st century; China will overtake the USA as the number one economic power by 2030 and India is likely to emerge as number two by 2050! Border problems are unlikely to be resolved for few decades and China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh will remain; Both are required to following global challenges:-
• Global terrorism;
• Maritime piracy;
• Drugs and Narcotics trafficking;
• Global warming and climate change;
• Non-proliferation of nuclear weapon technology;
The general feeling is that Sino-Indian relations have entered a phase of pragmatic maturity and cooperation.
